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CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS
ERWIN CHEMERINSKYf
ABSTRACT
One crucial aspect of the Roberts Court's decision making has been
its systematically closing the courthouse doors to those suing corpora-
tions, to those suing the government, to criminal defendants, and to
plaintiffs in general. Taken together, these separate decisions have had a
great cumulative impact in denying access to the courts to those who
claim that their rights have been violated. The Roberts Court often has
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INTRODUCTION
Last year, the Supreme Court decided a case about the ability of a
state to give tax credits to support private parochial schools. The case,
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,' attracted almost
no media attention. The Arizona law allowed individuals to get a $500
tax credit if they gave money to a school tuition organization. The evi-
dence and the record of the case showed that virtually all of the funds
through these tax credits went to support Evangelical Christian and
Catholic schools. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the Arizona program violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. The federal court of appeals said that this was a
program that had the purpose and the effect of advancing religion. The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, divided along ideological grounds,
reversed. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court. He was joined
t Founding Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine
School of Law. This speech was delivered at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law on
March 8, 2012, as part of the Chu Family Distinguished Lecture in Constitutional Rights and Reme-
dies.
1. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
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by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justice
Kennedy said the taxpayers lacked standing to bring a challenge to the
Arizona law.
The Supreme Court had previously ruled that taxpayers had stand-
ing to challenge government expenditures violating the Establishment
Clause. But the Supreme Court said this is not a government expendi-
ture-this is a tax credit-so no one has standing to sue. In other words,
even if the program violates the Establishment Clause-even blatantly
violates the Establishment Clause-literally no one could come to court
to object. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a powerful dissent. She said the
distinction drawn by the majority makes no sense. Why, if we are going
to allow taxpayers to challenge government expenditures, not allow them
to challenge tax credits? She said $350 million that would otherwise
have been in the coffers of the Arizona State Treasury now has gone to
religious institutions. She said there is no stopping point. If a $500 tax
credit were permissible, then a $1,000 or $25,000 tax credit would be
permissible. In fact, the government now can support any kind of reli-
gion just by saying a person gets a tax credit. So if the government wants
to encourage people to buy religious icons, the government will simply
say it will give a tax credit just for that. As I said, the case did not make
headlines because no one paid much attention to it, except for maybe
federal court scholars and those who practice in this narrow field of law.
But imagine if the Supreme Court had held on that day that the gov-
ernment could give unlimited amounts of money to religious schools;
that would have made headlines. The difference is, so long as the Su-
preme Court ruling is in procedural terms about standing, no one pays
attention. I picked this case because it is recent and because it is power-
ful, but most of all, I selected it because it is typical. I believe that the
most important theme about the Roberts Court, which is now seven years
in existence, is how it is consistently closing the courthouse doors. And I
think this is pernicious because rights can be taken away directly, or they
can be removed by making sure that nobody can go to court to vindicate
them. And that is what I think the Roberts Court has been doing in area
after area. I want to focus on four areas, and for each I want to choose
cases almost exclusively from the last year. Now, I picked these cases
because they are recent and illustrative, but I could choose a number of
other cases during the Roberts era and cases from the Rehnquist Court,
too. Over and over, what is occurring is the courthouse doors are being
slammed on those who have viable claims and now have no way to vin-
dicate them.
I. CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS TO THOSE SUING CORPORATIONS
So the first of the four areas that I want to talk about is that the Su-
preme Court is closing the courthouse doors to those who want to sue
corporations. I believe that another of the key themes about the Roberts
318 [Vol. 90:2
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Court is how much it is a pro-business court. Without a doubt, the most
famous decision of the Roberts Court in its relatively young history is
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,2 which holds that cor-
porations can spend unlimited amounts of money in independent expend-
itures to get the candidates that they want elected, or those they oppose
defeated.3 This pro-business orientation is also very evident in the juris-
dictional decisions of the court.
Let me give you two examples from last term. Both, I think, are
quite important in terms of the practical effects. The first is AT&T Mobil-
ity v. Concepcion.4 AT&T was advertising that it was giving away free
cell phones. The Concepcions went and each got a free phone. They were
then surprised on their first monthly bill to see that they were charged
$30.22 in sales tax. They heard that there was a class action in federal
court, arguing that AT&T had committed fraud. The claim was that
AT&T had promised free cell phones, so it should have to absorb the
sales tax, not pass it on to the consumers. Well, the Concepcions, like all
of us, had to sign an agreement when getting their cell phones. The Con-
cepcions, probably like all of us, did not read the agreement they were
signing. Had they read that agreement they would have seen a clause that
said, in any dispute with AT&T, they agreed to go to arbitration; they
could not go to court. AT&T invoked a 1925 federal statute, the Federal
Arbitration Act, to say that the Concepcions could not sue; the claim
would have to go to arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act says that
contracts in interstate commerce with arbitration clauses shall be en-
forced unless they are revocable under state law.
The Supreme Court of California, in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court,5 had ruled that arbitration clauses in routine consumer contracts
are not enforceable under California law.6 The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia said that they were contracts of adhesion and not enforceable. The
Ninth Circuit, based on the Discover Bank case, said that the arbitration
clause in the Concepcions' contract with AT&T was revocable under
state law. Thus, the Concepcions did not have to go to arbitration; they
could go to court. The Supreme Court, again in a 5-4 decision, reversed,
with the same split among the Justices. Here, Justice Scalia wrote for the
Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito. Justice Scalia began by extolling the virtues of arbitration over
court adjudication in terms of efficiency. Justice Scalia then talked about
the ill effects of class actions on businesses. He spoke of, and I quote, the
"in terrorem" effect of class actions on corporations, forcing them to
2. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3. See id. at 899-900.
4. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
5. 113 P.3d I100 (Cal. 2005).
6. Id.atlIl0.
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settle even non-meritorious claims.7 The Supreme Court said that, there-
fore, California law was preempted. The Concepcions had to go to arbi-
tration.
Justice Breyer wrote for the dissenting Justices. Here, he said, the
alternative is not hundreds of thousands or millions of separate arbitra-
tions against AT&T. He said the reality is few or no claims against
AT&T. He said the reality is that people are not going to sue, or even go
to arbitration, for $30.22. He said we really need class actions for situa-
tions like this, where a large number of people each lose a small amount
of money. The case is important because arbitration clauses are increas-
ingly ubiquitous in consumer contracts, like in this litigation, in employ-
ment contracts, and even in medical contracts.
Not long ago, I went to see a new eye doctor for the first time, and
the receptionist gave me a whole stack of papers to fill out. In the middle
was a form where I had to agree that, in any claims against the eye doc-
tor, I would have to go to arbitration; I could not sue in court. I asked the
receptionist if the doctor would still see me if I did not fill out the form,
and she said she did not know. No one ever asked her that question be-
fore. The doctor did see me, but I have now heard of many physicians
who will not treat patients unless they sign arbitration agreements.
Around the same time, I bought a new Dell computer. As you know,
in order to use a computer for the first time, you have to click that you
have read the terms and agreed to them. I usually just click "agree" with-
out looking. However, in this instance, I decided to read-to see if there
was an arbitration clause. Sure enough, there was a paragraph that said, if
I had any dispute with Dell arising out of the computer, I would have to
go to arbitration; I could not go to court. Well, I wrote Dell a letter back
saying that I did not agree to that paragraph and by opening the envelope
of my letter, Dell agreed I could sue if I had any dispute. Dell did not
write back, but the computer still works.
This is actually one of several Supreme Court cases in the last few
years, all 5-4, all ideologically divided, all strictly enforcing arbitration
agreements to keep injured people out of court. Another example with
regard to closing the courthouse doors to suits against corporations, also
from last spring, is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.8 This was a class
action of as many as 1.5 million women employees of Wal-Mart, claim-
ing sex discrimination in pay and promotion. The federal district court
found that there was sufficient evidence to certify the class. The Supreme
Court, in the most important part of the ruling, held 5-4 that the class
could not go forward, with the same split among the Justices. Once more,
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
7. AT&TMobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
8. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provides that one of the requirements for a
class action is that there be commonality. Justice Scalia, writing for the
five-person majority, said that there was not sufficient commonality be-
cause hiring, pay, and promotion decisions were made by separate store
managers and assistant managers all over the country. Justice Scalia said
that Wal-Mart has an official policy that prohibits gender discrimination.
He said the anecdotal evidence is not sufficient to be able to show com-
monality for a class. Thus, the court held this could not be a class action.
Now, in all likelihood, few of these women will bring individual claims,
even if they suffered gender discrimination in hiring, pay, and promo-
tion.
It is difficult for an employee to sue a current employer without
risking his or her job. Also, the amount of money that is involved often
does not justify bringing the lawsuit. What the Court has done is simply
protect one of the largest corporations in the country at the expense of
the employees. If you think about it, this case is going to make it very
difficult for employment discrimination class actions to go forward in the
future. Those who represent plaintiffs who want to bring an employment
discrimination class action are going to have to look for the "Goldilocks"
of classes because if it is a small workplace where one or two people are
making hiring, pay, and promotion decisibns, there is not going to be
numerosity, another requirement for class actions. And then there is the
large workplace. Even, say, this university or my university, where hir-
ing, pay, and promotion decisions are made by departments and schools
across campus, there will not be the commonality for class actions. How
often will it be that you will have just the right class-not too small and
not too large-that there can be an employment discrimination class ac-
tion?
But the case, in its significance, goes beyond just employment dis-
crimination. Justice Scalia, for the first time in American history, said
that the standard for certifying a class is a rigorous one. Never before had
the Court said that the Rules of Evidence were to be applied at the class
certification stage. In these two cases, think of the defendants, AT&T
and Wal-Mart. We are dealing with two of the largest corporations in the
United States today and in all of American history, and yet the Court
seems unconcerned about providing a remedy to those injured by them.
I could talk about other examples, even from the last year. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court said that makers of generic drugs cannot be
sued for failure to warn consumers. These cases are all about closing the
courthouse doors to those who want to sue corporations.
2012] 321
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II. CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS
TO THOSE SUING THE GOVERNMENT
The second theme that I identify is closing the courthouse doors to
those who want to sue government and government officials. I think the
preeminent purpose of the United States Constitution is to protect people
from the government. So it follows that the preeminent purpose of the
federal court is to protect people from their government and government
officials. And yet, in area after area and in case after case, what the Su-
preme Court has done is slam the courthouse doors shut to those who
have suffered serious injuries at the hands of the government.
I am going to mention just a few examples of this. One place where
this occurred is making it much more difficult for people to sue govern-
ment entities. The Rehnquist Court, for example, greatly expanded sov-
ereign immunity, which made it much harder to sue state governments.
The Rehnquist Court said, for example, that states cannot be sued in state
court, just as they cannot be sued in federal court, even to enforce federal
statutes. The Rehnquist Court said that a whole host of federal civil
rights statues, like the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the
employment discrimination part of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
cannot be used to sue state governments, period.
Let me give you an example of this from last year, in terms of ex-
panding the immunity of local governments from suit. It is a case called
Connick v. Thompson.9 Thompson spent eighteen and a half years in
prison, almost all of them on death row, for a murder that he did not
commit. At the time of Thompson's trial, one of the assistant district
attorneys was given blood evidence that linked Thompson to an armed
robbery. It is clear, under the law-and none of the litigants in this case
disputed it-that the assistant district attorney was constitutionally re-
quired to give that blood evidence to the defense lawyer. Brady v. Mary-
landlo in 1963 requires it." The law of professional responsibility, under
the ethics rules in every state, requires it.12 The assistant district attorney
did not turn over the blood evidence; he hid it instead. Only many years
later, when the assistant district attorney was literally on his deathbed
dying of cancer, did he tell other assistant district attorneys what he had
done. But they did not tell anyone. Literally, just weeks before Thomp-
son's scheduled execution, through a series of coincidences, Thompson's
defense lawyers learned of this blood evidence. They had it tested. Not
only did it not match Thompson's DNA, it did not even match his blood
9. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. See id at 87.
12. See, e.g., COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2009); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2009); see also Lesley E. Williams,
The Civil Regulations of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3469 (1999) (discussing the
Brady doctrine in light of Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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type. A new trial was held and Thompson was acquitted. A great deal of
evidence came out that showed that Thompson was innocent of that for
which he had been convicted.
Thompson then sued the district attorney and the City of New Orle-
ans, claiming that they had a system and a policy of violating the consti-
tution's requirements, as articulated in Brady. The jury issued a large
judgment in favor of Thompson. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision re-
versed. Here, Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, but the split
amongst the Justices was the same. He was joined by Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito. Justice Thomas said that in
order to hold a local government liable, there has to be proof of a munic-
ipal policy. Justice Thomas said there is only one incident here. A munic-
ipal policy cannot be proven based on one incident. Justice Ginsburg
wrote a scathing dissent. She said, how can it be said here that there is
just one incident. She said five different assistant district attorneys over
an eighteen-year period knew of this blood evidence, and not one of
them spoke up. She said, moreover, in this case, this is not the only
Brady violation. It turns out that at the time of the trial, the police had an
eyewitness who described the assailant as having short hair. At the time
the murder occurred, Thompson had a large afro. The police and prose-
cutors never disclosed that to the defense. It too, of course, was a Brady
violation. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that there is a good deal of evi-
dence of systematic violations of Brady in New Orleans. It was not one
incident, but the Supreme Court protected the government and denied the
coverage of somebody who suffered an injury that no amount of money
can ever remedy.
Another way in which the court protects government and govern-
ment officers is by expanding immunity from suit. Any government offi-
cial who is sued for money damages can claim either absolute immunity
from suit, or at least what is called qualified immunity. Qualified immun-
ity means that the person can be sued for money damages only when it is
shown that he or she violates clearly established law that the reasonable
officer should know. In a series of decisions, the Roberts Court has ex-
panded both absolute and qualified immunity. This means that individu-
als who are injured-even if they are seriously injured-can gain no
recovery.
I again want to pick an example to make this concrete. I choose my
illustration from last term, and it is a case called Ashcroft v. al-Kidd.13
Abdullah al-Kidd was apprehended in Chicago O'Hare Airport on a ma-
terial witness warrant. He was then taken and held in a federal maxi-
mum-security prison. He was moved to two other federal maximum-
13. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
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security prisons. When he was transported, it was always in chains and
handcuffs. When he was released, he was placed under house arrest. His
wife left him. He lost his job. Well, it turns out that the U.S. government
never had the desire to use him as a material witness. The government
used the material witness warrant as a pretext because it wanted to ques-
tion him about somebody else they suspected of involvement with terror-
ist activity. Mr. al-Kidd was never suspected of any crime and was never
charged with any offense. As I said, there was never a desire to use him
as a material witness.
Mr. al-Kidd sued the Attorney General of the United States, John
Ashcroft, who had authorized this detention. Ashcroft raised absolute
and qualified immunity as a defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of al-Kidd and against John Ashcroft. Judge
Milan Smith wrote the opinion for the Ninth Circuit. I mention him by
name because he is not a liberal judge. He was appointed by President
George W. Bush. Judge Smith said that any government officer, let alone
the Attorney General of the United States, should know that it violates
the Fourth Amendment to hold a person unless there is probable cause.
There is a federal statute that allows a material witness to be obtained if
his or her testimony is essential and there is a risk of flight. Justice
Smith, writing for the Ninth Circuit, said, in this instance, there was no
desire to use him as a material witness. Besides, the requirements of the
material witness statute were not met. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court.
Justice Scalia said that the underlying motive of government officials
does not matter under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia said that,
here, there was a valid warrant issued by a federal magistrate judge. Jus-
tice Scalia said that the Attorney General should be protected by quali-
fied immunity because there is no case on point that says that the Attor-
ney General cannot use the material witness statute in this way.
The Supreme Court has said in many cases that there does not have
to be a case on point in order for there to be clearly established law that
the reasonable officer should know. But as Justice Ginsburg pointed out
in her concurring opinion, how can it be said in this case that there was
really a valid warrant? She pointed out that the government, in getting
the warrant, never disclosed to the magistrate judge that it did not really
want to use al-Kidd as a material witness. Flight is also a prerequisite for
a material witness warrant, and the government never told the magistrate
judge that al-Kidd was married to an American citizen and has children
who are American citizens. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, the gov-
ernment, in getting the material witness warrant, never pointed out that
al-Kidd was fully cooperating with the federal authorities and answering
all of their questions, so there was no need to detain him. Mr. al-Kidd
suffered an enormous injury, a clear violation of his Fourth Amendment
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rights. He lost his job and his marriage, and yet the Supreme Court said
that he could get absolutely no recovery.
The Supreme Court also has made it almost impossible now to sue
federal government officials who violate constitutional rights. As you
may know, there is not a federal statute that authorizes suits against fed-
eral officers for money damages when they violate constitutional rights.
In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,14 the Supreme Court said that federal officers who
violate rights can be sued under a cause of action directly inferred from
the Constitution.15 That case involved officers of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics who violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court
said that a damage remedy was possible. But Justice Harlan famously
remarked that for someone in Bivens' shoes, "it is damages or noth-
ing." Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, said that it is essential that
there be a remedy for constitutional violations. After all, isn't that what
Marbury v. Madison17 said?18 Where there is a right, there has to be a
remedy. But in case after case, the Supreme Court has denied a remedy
even when there is a violation of a right, holding that no Bivens suit is
available.
One of the most important is a case from this term. It is a case
called Minneci v. Pollard.19 The case involves a prisoner at a private
prison that operated under a contract with the federal government. The
question is, Can the prisoner sue the prison guards at this private prison
in a so-called Bivens cause of action? Surprisingly to me, the Supreme
Court ruled in an 8-1 decision that the prisoner could not sue the prison
guards. The Supreme Court said that the prisoner had a tort remedy
available under state law. If there is a tort remedy available, then you
cannot have a Bivens suit. There was a tort remedy available to Bivens in
that case-but the Supreme Court was clear-that vindication of a feder-
al right should not depend on the existence of state tort remedies. But
now it seems the Supreme Court is saying you cannot sue a federal of-
ficer for violating a federal constitutional right so long as there is a tort
remedy available.
I I had the opportunity to represent Joe Wilson and Valerie Plame
Wilson in their lawsuit against Dick Cheney, Karl Rove, Lewis Libby,
and Richard Armitage. If you remember, President Bush, in a State of the
Union address, said that Iraq was trying to purchase nuclear material. Joe
Wilson, a former Deputy Ambassador to Iraq, investigated and found out
14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. Id. at 397.
16. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. See id. at l47.
19. 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
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that this was untrue. He wrote an article in the New York Times saying
that he did not find in Iraq any indication its government was trying to
purchase nuclear material. 20 He also went on the Sunday-morning talk
shows and said this.21 At this point, Vice President Dick Cheney, his top
deputy Lewis Libby, Karl Rove, and Richard Armitage engaged in a
concerted effort to punish Joe Wilson. They did this by revealing that
Mr. Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA operative. Somebody can-
not successfully be a CIA operative if his or her identity is publicly re-
22vealed. And you might have seen this in the movie Fair Game, in
which Sean Penn plays Joe Wilson and Naomi Watts plays Valerie
Plame. So I filed a lawsuit in federal district court on behalf of Joe Wil-
son and Valerie Plame, claiming a violation of their constitutional rights
and seeking money damages. The district court dismissed, and the D.C.
Circuit affirmed in a 2-1 decision. They said there is a federal statute, the
Privacy Act, and because the Privacy Act exists, you cannot have a
Bivens remedy. However, the Privacy Act does not apply to the Office of
the President or Vice President. It cannot be used against Cheney, Libby,
and Rove. The Privacy Act provides no protection to Joe Wilson because
nothing about him was revealed. So what the D.C. Circuit held was that a
statute that does not apply is enough to preclude a constitutional remedy.
The D.C. Circuit went on and said that allowing this suit to go for-
ward might reveal national security information. Now, I likened it to the
child who kills his parents and begs for mercy for being an orphan be-
cause, after all, it was the defendants who revealed the national security
information. I said, moreover, in light of the Libby trial, anything sensi-
tive has probably already become public, and this is the motion to dis-
miss stage. Why not allow it to go forward, and if there is some national
security information, deal with it then? But the D.C. Circuit said, no
Bivens cause of action, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. I use
this as an example-and there are so many-of how difficult it is now to
ever sue a federal official for a constitutional violation. It illustrates how
the courthouse doors have been shut on those who want to sue the gov-
ernment or government officials.
III. CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
The third theme that I want to identify is closing the courthouse
door to criminal defendants. I think the most important way that this has
happened in federal court is the restrictions on those who want to bring a
writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus, which comes to us
from the English law, is referred to as the Great Writ. Article 1, Section 9
of the Constitution says that Congress cannot suspend habeas corpus,
20. Joseph C. Wilson IV, What IDidn't Findin Africa, N.Y. TiMES (July 6, 2003), at WK9.
21. See, e.g., This Week with George Stephanopoulos, (ABC television broadcast Apr. 9,
2006).
22. FAR GAME (Summit Entertainment 2010).
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except in instances of rebellion or invasion. In a series of decisions that
began with the Burger Court and intensified with the Rehnquist Court,
the Supreme Court made it much more difficult for state prisoners and,
for that matter, federal prisoners, to be able to come to federal court with
a writ of habeas corpus.
But these decisions pale in comparison to what happened in a 1996
federal statute, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which
imposed so many additional restrictions on those who want to bring ha-
beas corpus petitions. It imposed a statute of limitations, it imposed a
prohibition on success of the petitions, it strengthened the exhaustion
requirement, and so much else. So the reality is that people who have
been wrongly convicted, even innocent people, are much less likely to
have any recourse or access to federal courts.
Again, I am going to give you an example from just this last term,
of how the courthouse doors have been closed to criminal defendants.
Cullen v. Pinholster23 exemplifies my theme of the court closing the
courthouse door, but it received no media attention. And yet a former
student of mine who has been doing death penalty work for the last twen-
ty-five years says that this is the most important Supreme Court case to
come down in her career for her work.
The case involved a man in southern California who was tried for
three murders, and he was convicted. As soon as the jury came back with
its verdict, the assistant district attorneys said to the judge that they
wanted to schedule the penalty phase where the jury would be able to
decide whether to impose a death sentence. The defense lawyers object-
ed. Under California law, the prosecutors not only have to announce that
they might seek the death penalty, but they have to make certain disclo-
sures along the way. The assistant district attorneys had not complied
with California law. The defense lawyer said, we have not had any op-
portunity to prepare for a penalty phase. The judge overruled the objec-
tions of the defense counsel. The judge said, though, I understand you
have not had a chance to prepare for the penalty phase, so I will give you
whatever continuance you need in order to do so. The defense lawyer
said, never mind, we are ready to go forward with the penalty phase now.
And the judge scheduled the penalty phase for six days later. The defense
lawyers presented only one witness in terms of mitigating circumstances,
the defendant's mother. By all accounts, she was not an effective wit-
ness. The defendant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia upheld the convictions and the sentence.
The defendant then went to federal court with a writ of habeas cor-
pus, and he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. A number of decla-
rations were presented in support of the writ of habeas corpus. For ex-
23. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
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ample, there were declarations from the defense lawyers saying that they
had done no investigation whatsoever for the penalty phase. Affidavits
were presented from doctors, indicating that the defendant suffered from
serious mental illness. He was bipolar and had a seizure disorder. Affi-
davits were presented from the defendant's family members and from an
elementary school teacher, indicating that the defendant was seriously
abused as a child. The Supreme Court has said that those are mitigating
circumstances. The federal district court held an evidentiary hearing, all
of this testimony was heard, and the district court found ineffectiveness
of counsel. The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed in an 8-3 en banc rul-
ing. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for
the Court. Justice Thomas said that a federal court, in considering a ha-
beas corpus petition, is limited to the evidentiary record that was before
the state court and that it was inappropriate for the federal court to hear
any of this additional evidence. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her
dissent, What about the person who has been convicted in state court,
who finds evidence that shows that he or she is actually innocent? How
can that be heard? Or what if the defendant who asserts a Brady violation
in state court-and only after conviction and appeal to a public records
request-can prove that there was a Brady violation? Does this mean that
that evidence can never be heard?
Moreover, there is a statutory provision, part of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, that specifically authorizes evidentiary
hearings. It is 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The Supreme Court read this pro-
vision out of the statute, and then the Supreme Court went on and held
that this was not ineffective assistance of counsel. And, of course, if this
is not ineffectiveness of counsel, what would be? The effect is very much
to make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals who have habeas
petitions heard to prevail if they have new evidence. Now, I imagine the
majority's answer to this is, well, let the defendant go back to state court
and present the evidence there first. But what if it is a state, like some,
that does not have any post-conviction proceedings available? Or what if
it is a state like California, where the state's supreme court, even in death
penalty cases, does not hold a hearing but issues postcard denials? How
then is that new evidence to be heard? Think of just the innocent people
who have evidence of actual exoneration of innocence. How can they be
heard if the courthouse doors have been closed on them?
IV. CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS TO PLAINTIFFS IN GENERAL
The fourth and final theme that I want to point to is how the Su-
preme Court has more generally closed the courthouse doors to plaintiffs.
I think the single most important case-in the now almost seven years of
the Roberts Court-is Ashcroft v. Iqbal.24 Because I would expect that
24. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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most in this room have taken a civil procedure course, it is a case that I
assume you have studied. From the 1930s, when the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were adopted, it was always said that they ushered in a
system known as notice pleading. 25 Notice pleading said that a plaintiff
can go forward as long as he or she presents a short plain statement of
facts.
In fact, when I taught civil procedure, I used to say that Conley v.
Gibson,2 6 a 1956 Supreme Court case, embodied it. It said the complaint
should be dismissed only if there is no set of facts upon which relief can
be had. The philosophy of the FRCP is to make it relatively easy for
plaintiffs to get into federal court, to then have the chance to do discov-
ery to prove their case, and then use summary judgment as the screening
device.
In 2007, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 27 the Supreme Court said that
Conley's "no set of facts" standard has "earned its retirement" and "is
best forgotten." 2 8 The dissent referred to Conley as being "interred." 2 9
The Court did not use the word "overrule," but based on the metaphors it
chose, it might as well have. Twombly was a lawsuit under Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act for conspiracy and restraint of trade. And I
think it is quite reasonable to have read Twombly as just being about
pleading in antitrust cases, but two years later in Iqbal, the Supreme
Court made it clear that Twombly changes the pleading standards in all
federal cases.
Iqbal was of Muslim Pakistani descent and detained in New York
after September 11, 2001. Upon his release, he brought a lawsuit against
a large number of defendants, including the Attorney General and the
director of the FBI. Among other things, they moved to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, said that the complaint should have been dis-
missed. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Kennedy
said that the standard of pleading now in federal courts is plausibility.
The plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that the district court can con-
clude that it is plausible that the plaintiff can recover.
Now, the law I have always taught my students is that, in assessing
a motion to dismiss, the federal district court has to accept the allegations
of the complaint as true. Justice Kennedy said that is no longer so. Jus-
tice Kennedy said that the district court should not accept conclusory
factual allegations. To see how radical this changes the law, pick up any
25. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009).
26. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
27. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
28. Id. at 562-63.
29. Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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copy of the FRCP and look at the model complaints placed there by the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee. Every one of them would have to be
dismissed after Iqbal because they have nothing but conclusory allega-
tions of fact.
No one seems to know what plausibility means as a legal standard,
but it is clear it all depends on the judges. What is plausible to one judge
will not be to another. And many district judges are taking this invitation
to dismiss cases on the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, at the motion to dismiss
stage. Legal scholars have now done studies documenting a significant
increase in dismissals at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage-in just the few years
since Iqbal-and especially a significant increase in dismissals in civil
rights cases since Iqbal.30 And, of course, it makes sense that this would
happen because if plaintiffs cannot have access to discovery, they often
will not be able to gain the information to prove their case at the motion
to dismiss stage. This is an enormous victory for defendants and makes it
much harder for plaintiffs to recover.
CONCLUSION
Now, I have gone through examples, but this is a place where the
whole is much greater than the sum of the parts. If you look at all of
these cases-and all of the ones like them-you see why I say that what
the Supreme Court has been doing is closing the courthouse doors. We
take for granted in this country that an injured person will have the op-
portunity for his or her day in court. What I want to suggest to you this
afternoon is that increasingly that is just a myth.
30. "Especially after Iqbal, they appear to be granting 12(b)(6) motions at a significantly
higher rate than they did under Conley-which was already a sizeable 49% in the Database in the
two-year period before Twombly. In addition, Twombly and Iqbal are poised to have their greatest
impact on civil rights cases, simply because those cases are by far the most likely type of case to be
attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion." Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and lqbal
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 624 (2010). Ms. Hatamyar warns that her results
should be taken with caution because her statistical sample was small. Id. at 556 ("[T]he short time
span and smaller number of Iqbal cases counsel caution in interpreting the data."). However, Ms.
Hatamyar Moore (the same author) conducted a second later study with a much larger sample, in
which she found that motions to dismiss were 1.75 times more likely to be granted without leave to
amend under Iqbal than under Conley and that "constitutional civil rights cases in particular were
dismissed at a higher rate post-Iqbal than pre-Twombly." Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated
Quantitative Study of lqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 605 (2012); see
also Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 118 (2010) (finding increase in
dismissal rate of disability cases after Twombly).
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WHAT THE BRAIN SAW: THE CASE OF TRAYVON MARTIN
AND THE NEED FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION REFORM
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ABSTRACT
The shooting of Trayvon Martin caused many to question what ex-
actly led to the death of an unarmed seventeen-year-old African-
American teenager. This Essay discusses one piece of the puzzle: the
brain, in creating and preserving memories, can distort our perception of
events and people around us. This distortion of perception and memory
can later influence eyewitness testimony-often the most riveting and
misleading information for a jury. Bringing these two separate but con-
nected moments of inaccurate perception and inaccurate recollection
together, this Essay examines the role of memory and perception in the
death of Trayvon Martin and in eyewitness identification in criminal
cases, ultimately supporting broad reform in our criminal justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
I think the hoodie is as much responsible for Trayvon Martin's death
as George Zimmerman was.
-- Geraldo Rivera
Trayvon Martin lost his life when a neighborhood watch volunteer
pursued him, inaccurately concluding that Martin was a criminal who did
not belong in that gated community. Similar inaccurate assessments are
often made by witnesses at the scene of a crime. False determinations
about a suspect's appearance and behavior are due to implicit biases and
simply to how the human brain processes visual information while under
stress. One of the strongest reasons for a faulty determination is the mal-
leability of human visual perception, both in the moment of a crime and
in recalling the crime later.
The malleability of memory is apparent in research on eyewitness
misidentification in criminal cases, especially research on those convic-
tions that have been overturned. The unconscious process of remember-
ing is subject to a variety of influences, from the moment of the experi-
ence to the recollection months or years later.2 The creation of memory
has three successive phases: encoding, or acquiring visual information
while perceiving an event; storage, or retaining the information regarding
the event; and retrieval, attempting to recall and reconstruct the event. 3
Each phase and its relevance to misidentifications will be examined in
this Essay. This Essay also focuses on the impact of racial stereotypes,
implicit bias, and the ability to remember faces. In this way, the Essay
differs from a typical discussion of accuracy factors. The Essay will (1)
analyze encoding through George Zimmerman's correct and incorrect
eyewitness perceptions of Trayvon Martin, (2) review storage through
outside influences on eyewitness identifications, and (3) consider retriev-
al alongside the impact of police procedures on the recall of events. Im-
plicit bias is factored into and analyzed in each of these stages of
memory; bias is an influence that cannot be separated.
Memory retrieval in particular is evaluated in this Essay through
developments in innocence work and wrongful convictions. The exon-
I. FOX & Friends (FOX News television broadcast Mar. 23, 2012), available at
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1 525652570001/geraldo-rivera-trayvon-martins-hoodie-is-as-much-
responsible-for-his-death-as-george-zimmerman/.
2. See generally Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis ofFacial Identification
Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139 passim (1986) (studying variables influencing the accuracy of
memory and facial recognition). However, it should be noted that the "forgetting curve" indicates
that memory is lost and altered the most just after the event. Although a greater lapse in time be-
tween event and recollection of that event lessens the accuracy of the memory, the greatest decay of
the memory occurs in its immediate aftermath. See id. at 150.
3. Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-Ups, 21 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 489, 489 (2007).
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erations of wrongfully convicted individuals corroborate the science be-
hind false memory and faulty eyewitness identifications. They also pro-
vide a compelling insight into how George Zimmerman came to pursue
and ultimately encounter Trayvon Martin on the night of Martin's death.
The multiple factors that affected Zimmerman's perception of Mar-
tin and influence memory storage and retrieval generally are divided into
two groupings: system variables and estimator variables. These variables
include both physical and psychological factors that impact memory ac-
curacy during encoding, storage, and retrieval.4 System variables are
those "under the direct control of the criminal justice system."5 These
include police protocols on instructing a witness before lineup identifica-
tion, the composition of the lineup, and how the suspects are presented to
the witness. Estimator variables, by contrast, include physical influences,
such as lighting conditions, time of day, and weather at the time of the
event, or psychological influences, such as the race of the witness or the
suspect.6
This Essay analyzes both system and estimator variables to illumi-
nate the causes of false perception and memory. It examines the impact
of false perception on the occurrence of crime-Zimmerman's pursuit of
Martin-as well as on the justice system's response to crime-the use of
unreliable eyewitness testimony. The Essay queries whether our justice
system is able to accurately determine, understand, and respond to the
roles of perception, memory, and eyewitnesses to a crime. In this con-
text, Trayvon Martin's death can serve as a lesson to police and citizens
alike on the corruptibility of eyewitness accounts. His case provides a
lens through which one can re-examine the strengths and weaknesses of
our justice system and the very human individuals who comprise it.
I. MEMORY ENCODING: FACTS AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE ALTERCATION
BETWEEN TRAYVON MARTIN AND GEORGE ZIMMERMAN
The first phase of memory--encoding-is critical to the interaction
between George Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin. Encoding takes place
when the witness visually determines what is happening in the events
surrounding him.7 Encoding is the first step in creating and narrating a
memory.
4. Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REv. 1, 6 (2007). Other terms for these stages are "acquisi-
tion," "retention," and "retrieval." Jd.
5. Gary Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator
Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 1546, 1548 (1978).
6. See Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Todd K. Martens, The Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification: The Role of System and Estimator Variables, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 234-35
(1987).
7. Sarah Anne Mourer, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Procedures Under the Fourth
Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 49, 55 (2008).
8. See id.
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A. Estimator Variables
Visual observation, and thus encoding, can be influenced by many
of the estimator variables discussed above.9 Examples of these variables
include the eyewitness's stress level,o the duration of the event, lighting
conditions, conversations with co-witnesses, and exposure to other narra-
tives of what is happening." The accuracy of identification depends
largely on situational factors such as location and time of day,12 and
weather, poor lighting, and a short time frame can all influence visibil-
ity.13
Many of these estimator variables played a role in George Zim-
merman's false perception of Trayvon Martin. This is normal; memory
can easily fail or be distorted at the time of the event, as well as become
distorted or decay over time.14 Furthermore, individual characteristics of
the witness can affect one's perception. And, of course, whereas imme-
diate conditions can influence the unconscious encoding of the memory,
alternate motivations can affect what the witness reports to a police au-
thority.16
The dark and rainy evening,17 compounded by the stress and fear of
the event, may have hindered Zimmerman's ability to see Trayvon Mar-
tin clearly and led to Zimmerman's perception that Martin was armed.
These factors likely influenced Zimmerman's encoding of the events
9. Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & James P. Devendorf, Conviction After Misidentification: Are Jury
Instructions a Solution?, 35 CHAMPION 30, 31 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Judith L. Alpert et al., Comment on Ornstein, Ceci, and Loftus (1998): Adult
Recollections of Childhood Abuse, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1052, 1054-55 (1998) ("[A] large
body of evidence exists to suggest that, in contrast to normal memories, emotional (and, hence,
traumatic) memories are encoded differently. Emotional memories have been described as detailed
and accurate and not prone to error. . . . [A] review of research on traumatic memories indicates the
relative accuracy and persistence of traumatic memories as compared to more ordinary ones." (cita-
tions omitted)).
11. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 12-49
(4th ed. 2007).
12. See generally Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 Wis. L.
REV. 615 passim (explaining the problems with eyewitness identification and putting forward pro-
posals for reform).
13. See id at 615-16.
14. Richard A. Wise et al., A Survey of Law Officers and Its Significance for Cross-
Examining Witnesses About Eyewitness Accuracy, 35 CHAMPION 32, 32-33 (2011) ("Although
memory works reasonably well in everyday life, it does not operate like a video recorder that cap-
tures an event with near perfect fidelity. Some information may never be encoded (i.e., get into
memory), and details may be forgotten rapidly.").
15. See Savage & Devendorf, supra note 9, at 31-32.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967) ("The impediments to an
objective observation are increased when the victim is the witness. Lineups are prevalent in rape and
robbery prosecutions and present a particular hazard that a victim's understandable outrage may
excite vengeful or spiteful motives.").
17. See Transcript of George Zimmerman's Call to the Police, MOTHER JONES,
http://www.motherjones.com/documents/326700-full-transcript-zimmerman (last visited Dec. 30,
2012) [hereinafter Transcript of Zimmerman's Call] ("It's raining and he's just walking
around. . . ."). Trayvon Martin may have been wearing the hoodie over his head simply because of
the rain.
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around him, just as they can distort eyewitness identifications in gen-
eral.18
Zimmerman's psychological perceptions also were an important es-
timator variable. On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman called 911
to report a "real suspicious guy" who "looks like he's up to no good, or
he's on drugs or something."l 9 George Zimmerman had appointed him-
self captain of his volunteer neighborhood watch; the "real suspicious
guy" he saw that night was Trayvon Martin. 20 Martin, a seventeen-year-
old African-American male, was staying with his family in a gated com-
munity in Sanford, Florida.2 1 Zimmerman called 911 at 7:09 p.m., rough-
ly forty-five minutes after the sun had set on that rainy evening.22 In the
dark and the rain, Zimmerman could only identify Martin as an African-
American male in his late teens.23 He described Martin as wearing a dark
grey hoodie.24 That hoodie would ultimately become a symbolic image
of Zimmerman's blind identification of Martin as a criminal.2 5
B. The Hoodie and Implicit Racial Bias
More than a mere symbol, the hoodie blinded Zimmerman by both
enhancing his personal blind spot of conscious and subconscious bias,
and by acting as a physical block to Zimmerman's view of Martin. The
18. It should be noted that these same factors could have influenced Trayvon Martin's ability
to see Zimmerman and to know whether Zimmerman was armed. This is particularly possible given
Martin's countering concern about Zimmerman following him and continuing to follow Martin even
after Martin started running. Serge F. Kovaleski, Martin Spoke of 'Crazy and Creepy' Man Follow-
ing Him, Friend Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2012, at A9.
19. Transcript of Zimmerman's Call, supra note 17.
20. Frances Robles, Shooter of Trayvon Martin a Habitual Caller to Cops,
MIAMIHERALD.COM, Mar. 19, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 5758849.
21. Kovaleski, supra note 18.
22. On February 26, 2012, the sun set at 6:22 p.m. in Sanford, Florida. Sunrise Sunset Calen-
dar for Sanford, Florida, SUNRISESUNSET.COM, http://www.sunrisesunset.com/calendar.asp (enter
"Sanford, Florida" into search box; then follow "Other Month" hyperlink under the "Sanford Flori-
da" banner; then select "February" under month drop-down box and enter "2012" in year field; then
click "Make Calendar" button) (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
23. Transcript of Zimmerman's Call, supra note 17 ("It's raining and he's just walking
around. . . ."). Trayvon Martin may have been wearing the hoodie over his head simply because of
the rain. Kovaleski, supra note 18 ("The girl implored Mr. Martin, 17, who said he put his sweatshirt
hood up because of the rain, to run to the town house where he was staying with his father, his
father's girlfriend and her 14-year-old son.").
24. Transcript of Zimmerman's Call, supra note 17. In his own social commentary on race
and clothing, Geraldo Rivera also blamed the hoodie for Trayvon Martin's death, later stating more
fully, "A week ago I ranted against hoodies like the one worn by Trayvon. What I was trying to do
was caution parents that allowing their kids to wear hoodies or similar clothing in certain circum-
stances, particularly if they're minority young men, could be dangerous." Geraldo Apologises to
Trayvon's Parents for Controversial 'Hoodie' Comments as Thousands Join the Largest Rally Yet in
Teenager's Hometown, THE DAILY MAIL (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2123827/Geraldo-Rivera-apologises-Trayvon-Martins-parents-controversial-hoodie-comments.htmil.
25. See Elizabeth Flock, Geraldo Rivera Hoodie Comments Spark Prominent People to Wear
Hoodies, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, (Mar. 27, 2012 09:14 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/geraldo-rivera-hoodie-comments-spark-
prominent-people-to-wear-hoodies/2012/03/27/glQAOih4dS blog.html; see also Katherine Boyle,
The Hoodie Label, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2012, at CO.
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combination distorted Zimmerman's perception and memory of the teen-
ager.
Geraldo Rivera blamed Trayvon's hoodie as an indicator of criminal
behavior, one that could or should be avoided.2 6 The reality is more
damning: studies have shown that African-American faces and bodies
can trigger thoughts of crime, and thinking of crime can trigger thoughts
of African-American people. 2 7 As an African-American male, Trayvon
Martin lived with a heightened likelihood of being associated with crime.
Unarmed African-American men face a greater threat of being shot
than unarmed white men. 28 Shooter bias studies explore the impact of
implicit race bias on a person's decision to shoot.2 9 More than twenty
studies reveal that both white and African-American subjects are more
likely to shoot an unarmed African-American man than an unarmed
white man. 30 This shooter bias goes beyond negative sentiments and
shows the unconscious impact of racial stereotypes.3 1
Martin's race and the hoodie likely influenced Zimmerman's identi-
fication of Martin as a criminal. It should be noted, however, that the
hoodie itself also limited what Zimmerman was able to see. Research
shows that hair and even the hairline are important indicators of identifi-
cation, and the covering of hair influences the accuracy of identifica-
tion.32 Martin's hoodie physically obscured his facial features and ap-
26. See supra at notes 24-25.
27. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004).
28. Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR.
L. REV. 1, 43, 46-47 (2010). Similarly, African-American police officers face a greater risk of being
shot than white police officers. See Table 27: Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed; Type of
Weapon, 1997-2006, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 2007),
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/table27.html.
29. Benforado, supra note 28, at 42-44. The studies generally use simulations similar to video
games; the simulations show individuals of different races in many backgrounds where they are
carrying either a gun or a harmless item like a cell phone or wallet. Participants are asked to shoot
anyone who is armed and not to shoot anyone who is unarmed. Id at 43. The results are that
"[p]articipants are faster and more accurate when shooting an armed black man than an armed white
man, and faster and more accurate when responding 'don't shoot' to an unarmed white man than an
unarmed black man." Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1007 (2007); see also id.
at 1016-22.
30. Benforado, supra note 28, at 43, 49; see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1514-28 (2005).
31. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1324-25 (2002).
32. In a series of six studies analyzing data from over 1,300 witnesses, the witnesses made
fewer correct identifications when they viewed subjects wearing hats (44%) rather than subjects who
had visible hair and a visible hairline (57%). See Brian L. Cutler, A Sample of Witness, Crime, and
Perpetrator Characteristics Affecting Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 327, 332-33 (2006) [hereinafter Cutler, Characteristics Affecting Accuracy]. It
should be noted that this experiment was of witnesses who viewed versions of a video-taped enact-
ment of a robbery, and some time later attempted to identify the perpetrators from lineups. In some
lineups the perpetrator was present, in others no perpetrator was present. In each study, variables
were systematically manipulated to determine their impact on the accuracy of witness identifica-
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pearance from Zimmerman. This, along with Zimmerman's possible
association of the clothing with race and stereotypes of crime, may have
undermined Zimmerman's ability to correctly identify Martin as an un-
armed teenager.
Zimmerman followed the teenager, incorrectly suspecting Martin
was dangerous and possibly armed.34 Zimmerman initially stated, "This
guy looks like he's up to no good, or he's on drugs or something."3 5 Lat-
er, Zimmerman told the 911 operator, "He's got something in his hands,"
and "something's wrong with him," noting Martin had his hand in his
waistband.36 When Martin began running, his "guilt" was confirmed.37
Zimmerman pursued the teenager, stating, "[T]hese assholes they always
get away."38
Within minutes, the two confronted each other and Zimmerman
shot and killed Trayvon Martin.
II. MEMORY STORAGE:
DIFFICULTIES WITH EYEwITNEss IDENTIFICATION
The second stage of memory-storage, or retaining the information
of an event-is equally as corruptible as encoding. Bearing witness to a
crime is stressful and impairs a witness's ability to accurately perceive
his surroundings. 4 0 Contrary to assumptions that if one sees or experienc-
es a violent crime he is more likely to remember the details intensely,
studies show instead how extreme stress has a negative correlation with
41identification and recall accuracy.
tions. Id. at 332; see also Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Improving the Reliability of Eyewit-
ness Identification: Lineup Construction and Presentation, 73 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 281, 283 (1988);
Cutler et al., supra note 6, at 240; Brian L. Cutler et al., Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification: Putting Context into Context, 72 J. APp. PSYCHOL. 629, 630 (1987).
33. See Robles, supra note 20.
34. See Transcript ofZimmerman's Call, supra note 17.
35. See id. Zimmerman's first words to the 911 operator were "Hey we've had some break-ins
in my neighborhood, and there's a real suspicious guy. . . . [T]his guy looks like he's up to no good,
or he's on drugs or something. It's raining and he's just walking around, looking about." Id.
36. See id.
37. Perhaps additionally important to the weather conditions, visual impairments, and associa-
tions with race is Zimmerman's identity as a policing authority figure. George Zimmerman was the
self-appointed captain of his volunteer neighborhood watch. He had called 911 forty-six times since
2004, and fifty suspicious-persons reports were called in to police from his neighborhood between
2011 and 2012. See Robles, supra note 20. At the beginning of his call to 911 on February 26, 2012,
Zimmerman pointed out the number of break-ins and thefts in his neighborhood recently. See Tran-
script ofZimmerman's Call, supra note 17. He had a vision of himself as a guard and acted the part;
he carried a nine millimeter gun while "patrolling." This self-perception may have also played a
strong role in Zimmerman's encounter with Trayvon Martin.
38. See Transcript of Zimmernan's Call, supra note 17.
39. See Robles, supra note 20.
40. See Charles A. Morgan, III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encoun-
tered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265, 265-66 (2004).
41. See id.
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As an example, one study tested 530 active-duty military personnel
who were enrolled in military survival-school training by placing them in
situations of either high-stress or low-stress interrogation. 4 2 The person-
nel went through food and sleep deprivation for forty-eight hours and
then were shown both live and photo lineups of their interrogators.43 The
high-stress subjects performed much worse in the photo lineups, and
over two-thirds of them made an incorrect identification. In the live
lineup, 56% of the high-stress subjects made an incorrect identification."
The rate of false identifications in this and other studies supports the
conclusion that stress dramatically impacts a person's sensory percep-
tion4 5 and negatively affects the accuracy of eyewitness identification. 4 6
Recent studies also confirm that giving a witness any positive feed-
back after the witness makes an identification alters how the memory is
created and stored.47 If a witness receives positive feedback, he will re-
peat the identification with greater certainty the next time and will be
more confident in these perceptions, whether they were accurate or not.48
In a well-known 1998 study, participants viewed a security camera video
and attempted to then identify the gunman from a photo lineup.49 The
actual gunman was not in the photo spread; yet, all of the participants
made false identifications."o After making the false identifications, par-
ticipants were told that they had correctly identified the suspect, incor-
rectly identified the suspect, or told nothing at all. " The type of feed-
back the witness received influenced his later reports on how certain he
was of his identification, how good of a view he had of the suspect in the
42. See id. at 267-68.
43. See id at 269.
44. Id. at 272.
45. See ALEXIS ARTWOHL & LOREN W. CHRISTENSON, DEADLY FORCE ENCOUNTERS: WHAT
COPS NEED TO KNOW TO MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY PREPARE FOR AND SURVIVE A GUNFIGHT 39
(1997); BRUCE K. SIDDLE, SHARPENING THE WARRIOR'S EDGE 76-77 (1995).
46. See Kenneth A. Deffenbacker et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress
on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 692, 694-95, 698-99 (2004) (examining the
effect of stress on identification in 27 tests involving 1,700 participants as witnesses). Participants
made correct identifications 59% of the time in low-stress conditions and 39% in high-stress condi-
tions. Id. at 700. Also, false identifications in lineups where the target was present were higher with
participants in high-stress conditions (34%) than with those in low-stress conditions (19%)). Id. at
696.
47. Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-
Analysis of the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 APP. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864-66
(2006); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eye-
witnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 360, 360
(1998).
48. Douglass & Steblay, supra note 47, at 863-64; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 47.
49. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 47, at 363.
50. Id
51. See id. The purpose of the feedback was not to accurately respond to the participant's
identification but rather to gauge the influence of said feedback on the participant's memory of the
identification. Id. Thus, a participant who made a false identification would be informed that his
identification was correct. Id. An example of confirming feedback for the participant was "good, you
identified the actual suspect." Id. The disconfirming feedback was "[a]ctually, the suspect is num-
ber _."). Id.
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video, and even how clear his memory was of the event.5 2 The partici-
pants who received positive confirmation were more certain of their
identification later, thought they had a good view, and were confident in
their memories." Such a study shows how susceptible witnesses are to
suggestive statements.
Just as in the studies discussed above, the 911 operator's simple
feedback to George Zimmerman--that the suspect was a possible dan-
ger-may have served to reinforce Zimmerman's personal perceptions,
interpretations, and biases. 54 The stress of the situation was high for
Zimmerman, as evidenced from their dialogue. In his mind, Zimmerman
was following not a citizen or a neighbor but a person who was a danger
or a threat.
Zimmerman: Somethings [sic] wrong with him. Yup, he's coming to
check me out, he's got something in his hands, I don't know what his
deal is.
Dispatcher: Just let me know if he does anything[,] ok[?]
Zimmerman: How long until you get an officer over here?
Dispatcher: Yeah we've got someone on the way, just let me know if
this guy does anything else.55
Trayvon Martin was simply walking home, yet the social cue from the
operator confirmed for George Zimmerman that his perceptions of Mar-
tin were correct. Eyewitnesses are likewise influenced when they receive
confirmation or affirmation of identification by law enforcement. 56 This
same problem confounds the reliability of the identification in the mo-
ment and again when it is recalled later because it is stored as a seeming-
ly accurate memory.
The social cues and sanctioned authoritative interactions like the
911 operator's with Zimmerman, short as they may be, confirmed for
Zimmerman that he was watching someone dangerous, someone worthy
of police attention. When the suspect began to run, the conversation
with the 911 operator escalated with Zimmerman asking when the police
52. Id. at 365-67. Indeed, it should be noted that the witnesses who received confirming
feedback had made false identifications, and yet maintained and increased their confidence in having
identified the perpetrator.
53. Id. at 366.
54. J. Don Read, Features of Eyewitness Testimony Evidence Implicated in Wrongful Convic-
tions, 31 MANITOBA LJ. 523, 531 (2006).
55. Transcript of Zimmerman's Call, supra note 17.
56. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 47, at 366.
57. Id at 366-67.
58. For a more detailed explanation of how a witness's memory can be affected by variables
after the event, see Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Applica-
tion of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 582-83 (2000).
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would arrive, and the dispatcher confirming that an officer was on the
59way.
Zimmerman thought that Martin looked like a criminal, someone
who could break into the neighborhood houses, in part because Martin
was a young African-American man walking in the rain wearing a hood-
ie.6 o When Martin began to run, Zimmerman concluded that Martin was
escaping from a crime-that Martin was indeed a criminal.61 Zimmer-
man assumed Martin did not live in the community; 6 2 that assumption
obscured for Zimmerman the possibility that Martin was running home
to get out of the rain or to get away from Zimmerman, the stranger who
was following him.63 Ultimately, Trayvon Martin was a seventeen-year-
old young man returning from the store with Skittles and iced tea while
talking on the phone."' What George Zimmerman thought he saw was
another matter.
III. MEMORY RETRIEVAL:
DNA EXONERATIONS AND EYEWITNESS MISIDENTIFICATION
Misidentification and the decay of memory can also occur when an
eyewitness recounts an event later. Retrieval, the final stage of memory,
involves recalling and reconstructing the event. As noted above, the orig-
inal perceptions of the eyewitness can be altered after the fact through
otherwise standard procedures. One such problematic procedure is show-
ing a witness a suspect lineup or a photo array of suspects with no in-
structions from the lineup administrator.65 Without any instruction, the
eyewitness often assumes the perpetrator of the crime must be present in
the lineup or the photos: one of the individuals is guilty.6 6 The eyewit-
ness then chooses the person who most resembles the perpetrator, a phe-
59. Transcript ofZimmerman's Call, supra note 17.
60. See id (telling 911 operator "[h]ey we've had some break-ins in my neighborhood and
there's a real suspicious guy .... It's raining and he's just walking around, looking about.... [H]e
was just staring ... looking at all the houses").
61. Id. (telling 911 operator "[h]ey we've had some break-ins in my neighborhood and there's
a real suspicious guy .... These assholes they always get away. ... Shit he's running").
62. See Kovaleski, supra note 18 ("The girl, who talked with Mr. Martin several times that
evening, told the investigator that she then heard Mr. Martin ask, 'Why are you following me for?'
She heard the other man ask, 'What are you doing around here?').
63. See id. ("[T]he unidentified 16-year-old said Mr. Martin described a man who was 'crazy
and creepy' and on the phone, watching him from a vehicle before he started to follow him on foot.
The girl implored Mr. Martin, 17, who said he put his sweatshirt hood up because of the rain, to run
to the town house where he was staying with his father, his father's girlfriend and her 14-year-old
son.... Earlier, Mr. Martin had temporarily sought cover from the rain by one of the buildings.").
64. Donald Jones, Skittles, Ice Tea and the 'Right to Stand Your Ground' in Trayvon Martin
Case, MIAMIHERALD.COM, Apr. 11, 2012,
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/04/11/2743270/skittles-ice-tea-and-the-right.html; see also
Alexander Abad-Santos, Watch: Trayvon Martin Buying Skittle and Iced Tea at 7-Eleven, ATLANTIC
WIRE (May 18, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2012/05/watch-trayvon-martin-
buying-skittles-and-iced-tea-7-eleven/52522/.
65. See generally Wells, supra note 12, at 625 (explaining the problems with eyewitness
identification and putting forward proposals for reform).
66. Id.
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nomenon known as the "relative judgment process."6 Any statements by
the police or further information on the actions of the suspect serve to
reinforce that identification.68 Procedures implemented to assist an eye-
witness in identifying a suspect can reinforce or exacerbate any flaws in
the original observation.6 9
Additional cognitive factors also influence witness perception of a
suspect, including any physical traits. "Cross-racial misidentification" is
a phenomenon where people have difficulty identifying members of a
different racial group.70 Caucasians in particular have difficulty identify-
ing non-Caucasians.7 1 In a meta-analysis with nearly 5,000 participants,
witnesses were 1.4 times more likely to correctly identify a face they had
seen before if the person was the same race as their own; witnesses were
1.56 times more likely to falsely identify a new face if the person was a
- 72race other than their own.
In the altercation between George Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin,
Zimmerman was Caucasian and Hispanic, whereas Martin was African-
American. More insidiously, as noted earlier, shooter bias studies have
shown through videogame simulations that individuals are more likely to
associate African-Americans as armed and Caucasians as unarmed.
One of the most popularly known studies on implicit bias and eyewitness
identification involves a photograph of two men fighting; one man held a
knife while the other was unarmed.74 When both men in the photograph
were Caucasian, subjects generally remembered correctly which man
was holding the knife.75 When the Caucasian man was armed and the
African-American man was unarmed, the majority of subjects, both Afri-
67. Id. at 618.
68. Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation
Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 115, 117
(2002).
69. See Groundbreaking Study Finds Double-Blind Sequential Lineups More Accurate in
Eyewitness Identifications, JOHN JAY C. OF CRIM. JUST. NEWSROOM (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/4898.php (observing that study participants demonstrated greater errors in
simultaneous lineups rather than in sequential lineups, the former of which influence eyewitnesses in
identification by providing them a basis for comparison amongst the members of the lineup).
70. John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy ofCross-Racial Identifications, 28
AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 211 (2001).
71. Id.
72. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Eyewitness Identification: Thirty Years of
Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 3, 3, 15 (2001); see also Cutler, Characteristics Affecting Accuracy, supra note 32, at
329-30.
73. See Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 210, 223-24 (2012).
74. Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture's Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational Versus
Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007).
75. Id.
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can-American and Caucasian, misremembered the African-American
man as holding the knife.76
Studies similarly find people are more likely to misidentify objects
as guns when in the hands of African-American men instead of Cauca-
sian men." People display racial bias in how fast they decide to shoot or
not to shoot in simulations, and how accurate those decisions are in
shooting an armed versus unarmed subject. 8
Bearing out the underlying findings of these studies, cross-racial
misidentifications have surfaced in a large number of wrongful convic-
tions. The single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in the United
States is eyewitness misidentification.79 In a 2000 study, Innocence Pro-
ject founders Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, along with columnist Jim
Dwyer, found that 82% of wrongful convictions included mistaken eye-
witness identifications.80 Of those mistaken identifications, 44% were
Caucasian individuals erroneously identifying an innocent African-
American defendant as the perpetrator.8 1
Cross-racial misidentifications that lead to wrongful convictions can
occur because people find it difficult to recognize physical traits with
which they are unfamiliar.82 Yet for George Zimmerman, subconscious
bias based on race likely influenced his misidentification of Trayvon
Martin as a criminal. 83 In his phone call, with limited information, Zim-
merman saw the young African-American man walking in the neighbor-
76. Id at 30. For a study on the influence of the suspect's race on his appearance of guilt, see
Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and
Judgments ofAmbiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 310-11 (2010) (finding participants
shown the photo of a dark-skinned suspect were significantly more likely to find ambiguous evi-
dence more probative of guilt, and more likely to believe the suspect was guilty). A number of
studies have also shown that Americans of all races make positive associations with white faces and
negative associations with black faces. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Devel-
opment of Implicit Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17
PSYCHOL. SC. 53 passim (2006).
77. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 189 (2001).
78. Correll et al., supra note 31.
79. Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Jan. 2,
2013); see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 48 (2011) (finding that 190 of the first 250 DNA-based exonerations in
the United States involved eyewitness misidentification).
80. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE
GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT 318 (2003).
81. See id at 318, 366; see also Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487,
1493 (2008) ("The phenomenon of unreliable cross-racial identifications is universally accepted as
fact by psychologists."); Meissner & Brigham, supra note 72 (finding an African-American innocent
suspect has a greater chance of being misidentified by a Caucasian eyewitness than by an African-
American eyewitness).
82. See Meissner & Brigham, supra note 72, at 22-23.
83. See Matthew DeLuca, Did Trayvon Shooter Abuse 911?, DAILYBEAST.COM (Mar. 22,
2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/23/did-trayvon-shooter-abuse-91 I.html.
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hood as "suspicious" and "up to no good." 84 Zimmerman was known in
the neighborhood8 1 to warn residents to be "on alert" for African-
American individuals.86 As studies have shown how reading newspaper
stories about African-American criminals increases a participant's shoot-
er bias in a simulation, 87 Zimmerman may have been primed to mistake
Martin's Skittles and iced tea for a weapon-and to ultimately shoot
Martin-by his conscious and unconscious bias.
Furthermore, Zimmerman's perception may have been corrupted by
his expectations, beliefs, and sheer desire to catch a criminal, all common
influences on witnesses to a crime. Whereas these are normal influ-
ences on a citizen, police are trained to respond differently. Although
officers, just like citizens, can hold implicit racial biases, their firearms
training generally prepares them to override these automatic associations
and not display the same shooter bias. 89 Even firearms training on im-
plicit racial bias for college students produced a similar decrease in
shooter bias.90 Private-citizen gun owners, such as Zimmerman, have no
comparable training.
The influence of personal bias on what one sees, coupled with the
difficulty of accurate identification in a stressful moment, has resulted in
the death and wrongful incarceration of hundreds of innocent individu-
als.91
IV. REFORM: How TO INCREASE
THE ACCURACY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
To correct for the risk associated with police and other external in-
fluences on witness narratives and memory, both the courts and the fed-
eral government have offered guidance. In 1999, the National Institute of
Justice in the Department of Justice released a guide for law enforcement
on gathering eyewitness evidence. 92 The guide was created based on psy-
chological research and intended to maintain the integrity of eyewitness
84. Transcript ofZimmerman 's Call, supra note 17.
85. Robles, supra note 20.
86. Indeed, a year earlier, in 2011, he called 911 about a suspicious looking African-American
boy, who was "7 to 9" years old. See DeLuca, supra note 83.
87. Joshua Correll et al., The Influence ofStereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1102, 1107 (2007) ("[Rleinforcing or undermining racial stereotypes that link Blacks to
danger and crime can dramatically affect the magnitude of racial bias in the decision to shoot.").
88. See generally Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Internal and External Sources of
Misinformation in Adult Witness Memory, in I HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY
FOR EVENTS 209-23 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007); see also Robert J. Smith & Bidish J.
Sarma, How and Why Race Continues to Influence the Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisi-
ana, 72 LA. L. REV. 361, 381-85 (2012).
89. Adam Benforado, supra note 28, at 48.
90. Correll et al., supra note 31, at 1320.
91. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 80, at 55, 58,95, 262-65,281-85,318, 324, 352-53, 365-
66.
92. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999).
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identifications.93 Some of the suggested police protocols in the guide are
to ask open-ended questions of witnesses, to remind the witness the actu-
al perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup, and to obtain a
confidence statement of how certain the witness is in his identification. 94
Similar suggestions for improving the accuracy of eyewitness iden-
tification arise from scientific studies. Law enforcement officers are en-
couraged to advise the witness that the perpetrator may or may not be
present in the lineup, the witness should not feel compelled to make an
identification, it is as important to exclude innocent persons as it is to
identify the perpetrator, and the investigation will continue whether or
not an identification is made.95 Studies also recommend that the lineup
be a double-blind procedure in which the police administrator does not
know the suspect." To minimize the problem of relative judg-
ment-picking the person who looks most like the perpetrator-the pic-
tures or suspects should be shown sequentially.97 By allowing a witness
to decide on a suspect one at a time rather than comparing them all, the
reliability of the identification is increased. 98 The witness compares each
photo with her memory, rather than the photos with each other.99 A se-
quential presentation also lessens the pressure on the witness, who
should not know when she is looking at the final suspect. 00
Around the same time as the shooting of Trayvon Martin, the U.S.
Supreme Court reconsidered eyewitness identification issues for the first
time in twenty years.o10 Although the decision in Perry v. New Hamp-
shire did not advance reforms for police protocols in eyewitness identifi-
cations, it did reflect the growing concern over the malleability of eye-
witness identification.' 0 2 The Court held that a pre-admission judicial
ruling on the reliability of an eyewitness identification was only required
where a suggestive pretrial identification had been arranged by law en-
forcement. 03 Due process required nothing more, and any harms of the
93. Id at 1-2.
94. Id. at 5-6, 13, 15, 22-23, 32. The drafting committee included government officials,
social science researchers, law enforcement officials, defense lawyers, and prosecutors. Id. at 6. The
suggestions have been adopted by a number ofjurisdictions, including New Jersey, North Carolina,
Wisconsin, Illinois, Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, and Texas. For more details on these proto-
cols, see David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convictions: Let's
Give Science a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263, 279-82 (2010).
95. Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 94, at 281.
96. Id at 272, 278-79.
97. Id at 272.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. The sequential lineup was specifically envisioned as a potential solution to the problem of
relative judgment but has also increased the reliability of eyewitness identifications in other ways.
Wells et al., supra note 58, at 586.
101. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012).
102. The Court held that "the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial in-
quiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured
under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement." Id. at 730.
103. Id
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identification could be negated by cross-examination, expert testimony
on the problems with eyewitness identification, and jury instructions.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the only former trial judge on the bench, dis-
sented, noting the substantial problems associated with misidentification,
whether or not the identification had been organized by the police. 30
Justice Sotomayor went so far as to cite the empirical studies challenging
the reliability of eyewitness identifications: in quoting State v. Hender-
son,o5 she stated, "The empirical evidence demonstrates that eyewitness
misidentification is 'the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in
this country."'
1 06
In Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court just the year before
had reformed its test for the admissibility of eyewitness identification
evidence. 10 7 The court relied on decades of scientific research, emphasiz-
ing the growth in knowledge since the standing admissibility test had
been established. 0 8 In raising the bar for admitting eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence, the court recognized that the previous approach needed to
be updated.109 The court incorporated empirical evidence to find that the
current admissibility standard was not in keeping with due process obli-
gations under the New Jersey Constitution." 0
The court in Henderson specifically addressed estimator variables,
such as visibility, age of the viewer, and lighting, and system variables,
such as lineup procedures and police interaction. The court focused pri-
marily on the system variables and changing police protocol because
they are factors "within the control of the criminal justice system." "
The focus of the opinion in Henderson will reform police protocols
for eyewitness identifications in New Jersey and create more stringent
standards of "suggestibility" by the police." 2 However, the opinion's
104. Id. at 730-31, 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
105. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
106. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Henderson, 27 A.3d at 885).
107. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920-22.
108. Id. at 928.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 919 n.10 (citing N.J. CONST. art I, § 1). The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted
certification in order to address the "current framework for evaluating the admissibility of [eyewit-
ness identification] evidence," and it remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether
the standing admissibility test was viable "in light of recent scientific and other evidence." State v.
Henderson, 39 A.3d 147, 147-48 (N.J. 2009). The court appointed the retired Honorable Geoffrey
Gaulkin to preside as special master of the case. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 884. The special master
reviewed the scientific literature, the testimony of seven experts, and over 200 published scientific
studies. Id His thorough work was influential on the New Jersey Supreme Court's ultimate opinion.
See id.
111. Id. at 895.
112. A New Jersey Supreme Court opinion, State v Chen, 27 A.3d 930 (N.J. 2011), a compan-
ion case to Henderson, also acknowledged the suggestiveness of interactions with private actors, not
only with police. Id. at 932 (holding that the first Henderson requirement may be met by showing
evidence of suggestiveness caused by private actors and stating, "Recent social science research
reveals that suggestive conduct by private actors ... can undermine the reliability of eyewitness
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focus on police suggestiveness ignores the unreliability caused by esti-
mator variables and their contribution not only to inaccurate identifica-
tions but also to wrongful convictions." 3
Finally, it should be noted that the jury ultimately decides whether
evidence is reliable.1 14 Studies show that jurors lend greater importance
to eyewitness testimony than to nearly any other piece of evidence."' 5
Jurors also generally show a poor understanding of scientific research on
whether and how eyewitness testimony is reliable.1 1 6
CONCLUSION
Trayvon Martin's case and innocence litigation show the depth and
breadth of eyewitness identification problems in our current criminal
justice system. Not only does a witness experience difficulty in accurate-
ly assessing his surroundings in a stressful moment, the witness's visual
perceptions may be later tainted by a number of factors, including unin-
tentional outside suggestion. This psychological information demands
that actors in the criminal justice system adopt best practices for police
interviewing eyewitnesses. This information also contributes to a possi-
ble framework for understanding the death of Trayvon Martin. Perhaps
his death, and the increased awareness of how damaging racial bias and
situational factors can be to visual perception, will lead to heightened
scrutiny of an individual's own biases as well as those of the criminal
justice system. With greater awareness, greater reform to eyewitness
identification policies and procedures can follow.
identifications .... We consider that evidence in light of the court's traditional gatekeeping role to
ensure that unreliable, misleading evidence is not presented to jurors").
113. Justice Sotomayor made the same observation in her dissent in Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S. Ct. 716 (2012), stating that the majority's opinion "recasts the driving force of our decisions
as an interest in police deterrence, rather than reliability." Id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 728 (majority opinion).
115. See LOFTUS, supra note 11, at 9-10 (describing a study in which the conviction rate by
mock jurors rose by fifty percentage points when an eyewitness identification was provided, despite
the fact that the eyewitness had vision so poor he could not possibly have seen the suspect's face);
see also Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1452-55 (2007) (citing numerous
sources to support the proposition that "[tihe presumption that jurors can competently assess the
reliability of eyewitness testimony ... is a new legal fiction"); Rutledge, supra note 70, at 210.
116. See Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of
Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 178, 191-92 (2006).
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FRIEND, FOE, FRENEMY: THE UNITED STATES AND
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ALLISON M. DuSSIAst
ABSTRACT
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,
in which the Court concluded that a claim that a neutral and generally
applicable criminal law burdens religious conduct need not be evaluated
under the "compelling interest" test set out by the Court in Sherbert v.
Verner (1963). The Court relied on two recently decided cases, Bowen v.
Roy (1986) and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion (1988). All three of these cases rejected Free Exercise Clause claims
brought by American Indians. Following the Smith decision, Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to restore the
compelling interest test to all claims that the government has substantial-
ly burdened religious exercise.
This Article analyzes and critiques the post-Smith responses to Indi-
an religious freedom claims made by two groups: federal government
officials making public lands management-related decisions and federal
courts addressing claims related to Indian religious freedom. The primary
focus is on claims involving sacred sites located on federal lands. These
claims are in many ways unique to Indian religions, which, in contrast
with mainstream religions, commonly share the belief that particular sites
are imbued with sacredness and are consequently the only location at
which certain ceremonies can be conducted. The presence of sacred sites
on lands that were taken from tribes in the past to satisfy non-Indian re-
source demands and are today held as public lands can lead to conflicts
between Indian religious exercise rights and non-Indian desires to use the
lands for commercial or recreational purposes.
First, the Article focuses on cases in which federal officials have
taken account of Indian religious exercise needs in developing land man-
agement plans and have subsequently faced Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to their actions. Second, it examines cases in which officials have
made decisions that burden Indian religious exercise on public lands,
f Professor, New England Law|Boston; A.B., Georgetown University; J.D., University of
Michigan. The author is grateful to the Dean and the Board of Trustees of New England Law|Boston
for the summer stipend that supported the research and writing of this Article. Thanks are also due to
Govind Sreenivasan and to the participants in the 2011 Summer Workshop on Law, Religion, and
Culture at the University of Colorado School of Law, from whose comments and presentations I
have benefitted in completing the Article. I am particularly grateful to Professors Kristen Carpenter
and Rick Collins for inviting me to present the Article at the workshop.
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prompting challenges under RFRA. When confronting Establishment
Clause challenges to management plans, the Government has empha-
sized the political and trust relationships between the United States and
tribes, and has argued that accommodations appropriately alleviate gov-
ernment-imposed burdens on religious exercise. In responding to Indian
claims that government decisions substantially, and unjustifiably, burden
the plaintiffs' religious exercise, however, the Government tells a differ-
ent story. Courts have tended to side with the Government in both kinds
of cases. Third, the Article discusses the lessons learned from this analy-
sis about the need for heightened protection of religious exercise at sa-
cred sites and offers suggestions on seeking a path toward ensuring that
Indian religious practitioners are able to enjoy the level of religious free-
dom long provided to other Americans.
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INTRODUCTION
We also have a religion ... .
If we are to exist as humans, we are allowed to have a religion....
[W]e are looking at a bleak future ... in which we do not have the
right to practice our religion.... The only difference between us and
the "other Americans" is that we have dark skin and dark hair.2
Religion is behavior and not mere belief.3
The year 2010 marked the twentieth anniversary of the landmark
Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause decision Employment Division v.
Smith.4 In Smith, five Justices concluded that a claim that a neutral and
generally applicable criminal law that burdens religious conduct need not
be evaluated under the "compelling interest" test set out by the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner' and used by lower courts to evaluate free exercise
claims for decades.6 The Court gave its blessing to the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to two members of the Native American Church who
had been dismissed from their jobs for sacramental use of peyote.7 The
Smith majority relied on two recently decided cases in which the Court
had also rejected American Indian free exercise claims, Bowen v. Roy8
and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.9 Given
that Indian religious claims were at the heart of what Congress'o and
Supreme Court Justices" identified in Smith as an important change of
I. Red Jacket, Seneca Chief Remarks on Indian Religion (1805), in INDIAN SPEECHES;
DELIVERED BY FARMER'S BROTHER AND RED JACKET, Two SENECA CHIEFS 4-8 (James D. Bemis
ed., 1809), reprinted in WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN AND THE WHITE MAN 213 (1964).
2. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 27 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings] (statement of William
Nouyi Yang on behalf of the Hmong-Lao Unity Ass'n) (commenting on autopsies performed in
violation of Hmong religious beliefs).
3. WISDOM FOR THE SOUL: FIVE MILLENNIA OF PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SPIRITUAL HEALING 95
(Larry Chang ed., 2006) (quoting Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan).
4. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
5. 374 U.S. 398,403 (1963).
6. See id at 883-84. The other four Justices (O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall)
believed that the compelling interest test should be applied to such claims, although they disagreed
as to the result of applying the test in Smith. Compare id at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Blackmun, Brennan, & Marshall, J.J., as to Parts I and II of the opinion), with
id. at 907, 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, J.J.).
7. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 890.
8. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
9. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
10. In enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), see discussion infra Part 11,
Congress referred to the Smith decision as having "virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion" and
praised "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings," which the statute was
intended to restore. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006), invali-
dated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as
applied to the states in City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
11. In her concurring opinion in Smith, Justice O'Connor said that the "holding dramatically
departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence." Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion described the Court as effectuat-
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direction in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, it seems that any effort
to examine this development and its impact would be incomplete without
a consideration of Indian religious freedom claims post-Smith. Some
organizers of law school conferences discussing Smith's impact appar-
ently saw otherwise and left Indian religious freedom cases completely
off the agenda. 2 When it comes to the "first liberty," the rights and con-
cerns of the "First Americans" apparently were not considered worthy of
attention.
Although conference agendas may alone seem of little import, a
more significant concern is whether the omission of Indian religious
freedom cases as an important topic of discussion in these settings is
indicative of a broader indifference, or even hostility, toward Indian reli-
gious rights. At the most basic level, this omission raises the question of
whether anyone-besides Indians-cares about Indian religious freedom.
To put it another way, have Indian religious freedom claims become so
marginalized, despite their central role in the development of contempo-
rary Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, that they are of concern only to
Indians (and Indian law scholars)? And if this is indeed the case, what
does these claims' omission from the dominant narrative of American
religious freedom law say about their likelihood of success, particularly
in a legal landscape in which adherents of non-mainstream religions need
to rely on the political process for religious accommodations-a setting
in which (as Justice Scalia blithely stated in Smith) such adherents are at
a disadvantage?13
To explore these questions, this Article analyzes the post-Smith re-
sponses to Indian religious freedom claims made by two groups-federal
government officials making public lands management-related decisions
and federal courts addressing claims related to Indian religious free-
dom-to gauge the extent to which these groups are supportive of, indif-
ing "a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution." Id.
at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. Articles related to the twentieth anniversary of Smith were published in the South Dakota
Law Review in 2010 and in the Cardozo Law Review and Texas Tech Law Review in 2011. See
Symposium, Criminal Law and the First Amendment: Should Free Exercise of Religion Ever Be a
Defense to an Otherwise Valid Criminal Law, or Did Smith Get It Right?, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV.
239 (2011); Symposium, The Twenty Year Anniversary of Employment Division v. Smith: Reas-
sessing the Free Exercise Clause and the Intersection Between Religion and the Law, 55 S.D. L.
REV. (2010); Symposium, Twenty Years After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twen-
tieth Century's Landmark Case on the Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2011). Only the South Dakota Law Review conference included a panel
addressing Indian religious exercise. See USD NALSA Chapter Hosts Native American Law Sympo-
sium, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.usd.edu/press/news/news.cfin?nid=1882.
13. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("Values that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process.... It
may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disad-
vantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred . . . .").
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ferent to, or even hostile toward, Indian religious freedom.14 This Arti-
cle's primary focus is on claims involving American Indian sacred sites
located on federal lands. These claims are in many ways unique to Indian
religions. Although other religions certainly hold particular places, such
as temples, churches, synagogues, or mosques, to be holy, they tend not
to view the land on which places of worship are located as being itself
imbued with sacredness. As a result, if a particular place of worship is no
longer available for use, religious practices can be relocated without los-
ing their significance and efficacy. A new site for worship can be conse-
crated as the old one is deconsecrated-a practice that is usually not pos-
sible with Indian religious practices related to specific sacred sites."
The presence of sacred sites on federal lands-lands that were taken
from tribes to satisfy non-Indian demands for access to Indian land and
resources--can lead to conflicts between the needs of worshippers seek-
ing to enjoy free exercise rights in still sacred areas and the desire of
other users to engage in activities allowed under land management plans
and policies. Whereas land managers' protection of religious uses at
some sites indicates support for religious freedom, the uniqueness of
Indians' needs with respect to sacred sites suggests that these needs are
vulnerable to being disregarded in the face of competing land use de-
mands.
Part I focuses on four cases in which federal officials have taken ac-
count of Indian religious freedom in decision making as to public lands
and have subsequently had to defend their actions when non-Indians
challenged them on Establishment Clause grounds. Part II examines cas-
es in which officials have made decisions that burden Indian religious
exercise on public lands and that are consequently challenged under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).16 Congress enacted
RFRA in response to Smith, to restore the compelling interest test to all
claims that the government has substantially burdened religious exer-
cise.'7 Federal courts have tended to side with the Government in both
the Establishment Clause and RFRA cases despite the conflicting stories
that the Government has presented in these two categories of cases about
its relationship with, and responsibilities to, Indian tribes. Part III dis-
cusses the lessons that can be drawn from the analysis in Parts I and II
about the impact of RFRA, and of pre- and post-RFRA jurisprudence, on
Indian religious freedom claims. The Article concludes by offering final
thoughts on the challenges that continue to face Indian religious practi-
14. A future article will examine the response of other religious groups to Indian religious
freedom claims.
15. See Jane Hubert, Sacred Beliefs and Beliefs of Sacredness, in SACRED SITES, SACRED
PLACES 9, 13-14 (David L. Carmichael et al. eds., 1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006), invalidatedby City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
17. See id. ("The purposes of this chapter are ... to restore the compelling interest test ... and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened . . . .").
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tioners, who are merely seeking the protection for their religious exercise
that most other Americans take for granted.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO SACRED SITES
PROTECTION: THE GOVERNMENT AS FRIEND
At the centre of the Native American religious system is the affirma-
tion that spiritual power is infused throughout the environment in
general, as well as at interconnected special places, and that knowl-
edgeable people are participants in that power.18
[I]n furtherance of Federal treaties, and in order to protect and pre-
serve Indian religious practices, . . . [i]n managing Federal lands,
each executive branch agency . . . shall . . . (1) accommodate access
to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites ... and (2) avoid ad-
versely affecting the[ir] physical integrity ... 19
In an essay written for a conference marking Employment Division
v. Smith's twentieth anniversary, Professor Steven D. Smith began by
noting his assumption that religious freedom, "the legally recognized and
protected right of people to believe, worship, and live in accordance with
their religious faith, subject only to the overriding needs of social order,"
is "a good thing." 20 This assumption is not, he noted, as "platitudinous,
or as secure" as it may seem because "religious freedom has, and always
has had, its opponents." 2 1 Looking at this statement from a historical
perspective, it is difficult to think of any group for whom it is truer than
the indigenous peoples of the United States. Opponents of American
Indian religious freedom long existed both in the government and in so-
ciety. Indians' traditional religions were targeted for destruction and for
replacement by Christianity under government policies that ultimately
identified specific practices and ceremonies as punishable "Indian Of-
fenses."22
Professor Smith also observed that by the time the Constitution was
adopted, "the view that imposed religious orthodoxy was unnecessary,
undesirable, and unjust"23 had come to prevail and the project of "im-
posed religious orthodoxy was already on its last legs."
24 For American
Indians, though, this was not the case. Rather than ending with the adop-
tion of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, government-supported ef-
18. Dorothea J. Theodoratus & Frank LaPena, Wintu Sacred Geography of Northern Califor-
nia, in SACRED SITES, SACRED PLACES 20, 22 (David L. Carmichael et al. eds., 1994).
19. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
20. Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May Be
a Greater Loss Now Than It Was Then, 32 CARDOZo L. REV. 2033, 2033 (2011).
21. Id.
22. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 773, 788-89 (1997).
23. Smith, supra note 20, at 2035.
24. Id. at 2037.
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forts to convert Indians to Christianity gathered steam over the course of
the nineteenth century, peaking during the years of President Ulysses S.
Grant's Peace Policy. 25 Under the Peace Policy, reservations were as-
signed to particular religious denominations and groups for the purpose
of "Christianizing" the Indians.2 6 Although European- and early Ameri-
can-imposed religious orthodoxy had favored particular Christian de-
nominations, Indian policy supported the missionary efforts of a variety
of Christian denominations. Only at the end of the nineteenth century did
the federal government, swayed by anti-Roman Catholic sentiment, end
federal funding for Christian denominations that were running Indian
schools-an endeavor in which the waning of Protestant interest had led
to Roman Catholic dominance.27 Thereafter, for the next several decades,
religious instruction (of a decidedly Protestant character) of Indian chil-
dren continued in federally operated Indian schools.2 8 For Indians, then,
blatant government opposition to religious freedom, and efforts to im-
pose religious orthodoxy, long survived the adoption of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.
Even today, Professor Smith reminds us, religious freedom has its
opponents. Therefore, "if we think religious freedom is a good thing, we
cannot be complacent"; we must identify "who or what the threats to
religious freedom are, and then make arguments and craft strategies to
protect religious freedom against such threats." 29 Accordingly, the first
task for supporters of Indian religious exercise rights related to sacred
sites is to determine whether the federal government continues to pose a
threat to Indian religious exercise by its treatment of Indian sacred sites
located on public lands.
A. Pointers Toward Protection from Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the President
A number of developments beginning in the 1970s indicated a
commitment by the federal government to repudiate the past policies of
explicit suppression of Indian religions. In 1978, Congress enacted the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) 30 after receiving ex-
tensive testimony by Indian religious practitioners as to the multiple
ways in which their constitutional rights continued to be disregarded.
25. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 778-79.
26. See id. at 781.
27. See id. at 784-85. Although direct government funding of sectarian schools for Indian
children ended, tribes were free to direct that their own trust funds be used to fund sectarian schools,
in keeping with their free exercise rights. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908).
28. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 786-87.
29. Smith, supra note 20, at 2034.
30. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (Aug. 11,
1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006)).
31. See American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the S. Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. III (1978) [hereinafter AIRFA Hearings].
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Witnesses such as Dale Old Horn spoke of the continuing quest for equal
treatment:
Indian people who have held onto these old ways are still hoping
for the formulation of Federal policy so that they can at once be rec-
ognized as any religious group ... in America as having the same
freedoms, the same rights, that [are] afforded to all peoples of this
country. 32
Speaking in the Senate hearings preceding AIRFA's enactment, Senator
James Abourezk noted the importance of religious rights and the barriers
to their enjoyment by Indians:
One of the most fundamental precepts in the founding of our coun-
try is the freedom of religion. As citizens, Indians have an inherent
right to the free exercise of their religion.... Unfortunately, in recent
years, there have been increasing incidents of infringement of the re-
ligious rights of American Indians. New barriers have been raised
against the pursuit of their traditional culture, of which the religion is
an integral part. 33
Senator Abourezk attributed the imposition of these barriers to the
"[1]ack of knowledge, unawareness, insensitivity and neglect [that] are
the keynotes of the Federal Government's interaction with traditional
Indians' religions and cultures." 34 This situation was exacerbated by
skepticism about the legitimacy of Indian religions:
[M]any non-Indian officials [believe] that because Indian religious
practices are different than their own[,] ... they somehow do not
have the same status as a "real" religion, yet, the effect on the indi-
vidual whose religious customs are violated or infringed is as intense
as if he had been Protestant, Catholic or Jewish.35
There was a need for recognition of the fact that "America does not need
to violate the religions of her native peoples," that "[t]here is room for
and great value in the cultural and religious diversity," and that Ameri-
cans "would all be poorer if these American Indian religions disappeared
from the face of the Earth."36 To prevent this loss from occurring, Con-
gress needed to make "a clear statement . . . that this country will contin-
ue to fully respect and protect religious freedom of all" and to require an
examination of "our laws, regulations, and enforcement procedures to
insure that such a statement becomes a reality." 37 To this end, all gov-
32. Id. at 18 (statement of Dale Old Horn, Crow Tribe); see also id at 19 (referring to "the
sense of equalness that we feel we should have as Indian people").
33. Id at I (statement of Sen. James Abourezk).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
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ernment agencies needed to be made "responsible for administering the
laws that provide for Indian religious freedom," and government person-
nel were "not to restrict anything under the Government's jurisdiction as
a religious site.",3 To put these principles into action, AIRFA provided as
follows:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express,
and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo,
Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to
sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to wor-
ship through ceremonials and traditional rites. 39
Relevant federal departments and agencies were to evaluate their policies
and procedures, in consultation with traditional religious leaders, to de-
termine what changes were necessary to protect and preserve Native
- 40American religious rights.
Despite optimistic statements in the AIRFA hearings as to the posi-
tive impact that the statute would have on Indian religious freedom and
on the development of appropriate agency policies, Indian religious prac-
titioners continued to face obstacles to the enjoyment of their free exer-
cise rights, as evidenced by a series of defeats for Indian free exercise
claims in federal district court and courts of appeals.4 1 In 1988, the Su-
preme Court finally weighed in. In Lyng, the Court held, in a 5-4 deci-
sion, that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice (USFS) from permitting timber harvesting and the building of a
logging road in a sacred area in a national forest, even assuming that the
road would "virtually destroy the . . . Indians' ability to practice their
religion."42 The USFS's plans affected an area that is held sacred by the
Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians.43 The Court, in an opinion whose
tone at times seemed to indicate outrage at the audacity of the plaintiffs
in challenging land managers' decision making, treated the free exercise
claim as a threat to government property rights" and dismissed AIRFA
as a source of enforceable rights.45
38. Id at 82; see also id. at 83 (explaining that bureaucrats "are going to come to realize that
the Congress is saying 'you cannot restrict anybody's religious freedom, and that includes Indian
religious freedom').
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
40. See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 (2006).
41. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 823-28 (discussing cases leading up to Lyng).
42. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (alteration in
original) (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir.
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
44. See id. at 453-54.
45. See id. at 454-55.
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At the same time, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated
that the Court's opinion should not be "read to encourage governmental
insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen" and that the govern-
ment's property rights "need not and should not discourage it from ac-
commodating [Indian] religious practices.A 6 Justice Brennan, in dissent,
pointed out that it was "difficult ... to imagine conduct more insensitive
to religious needs than the Government's determination to build a mar-
ginally useful road in the face of uncontradicted evidence that the road
will render the practice of respondents' religion impossible." 47 Given this
reality, Justice O'Connor's encouragement of accommodation seemed
like an empty gesture.
Subsequent developments, however, have demonstrated that federal
land management decisions are at times based on the heightened sensitiv-
ity toward, and respect for, Indian religious needs and concerns that the
Lyng majority opinion encouraged. Such decisions have been prompted
by a number of congressional and executive actions. Amendments to the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) enacted in 1992 made Indian
sacred sites eligible for treatment as "[p]roperties of traditional religious
and cultural importance" (commonly referred to as "traditional cultural
properties," or TCPs) and required agencies managing federal lands to
consult with tribes as to federal undertakings that may affect these prop-
erties. 48 In 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13,007, enti-
tled "Indian Sacred Sites" (the Sacred Sites Order), which requires feder-
al land managers to "(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of
Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid ad-
versely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites." 4 9 The Sa-
cred Sites Order's provisions are triggered by identification of a site as
being sacred by Indians themselves (in contrast to designations of a site
as a TCP, which requires federal government involvement). An earlier
executive memorandum, signed by President Clinton in 1994, highlight-
ed the obligation to work with tribal governments as sovereigns, requir-
ing all federal agencies and departments to "consult, to the greatest ex-
46. Id at 453-54.
47. Id. at 477 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Dussias, supra note 22, at 828-31, 849 (dis-
cussing Lyng). For a thorough analysis of the Lyng litigation and its significance, see Amy Bowers &
Kristen Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of Conquest. The Story of Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 489, 489 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds.,
2011); Howard J. Vogel, The Clash ofStories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural
Conflict over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 759
(2001) (offering an interesting analysis of the Lyng dispute as a cultural conflict between communi-
ties, in which a rights-based approach is more likely to perpetuate conflict than to lead to an appro-
priate resolution).
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a(d)(6)(A)-(B), 470f (2006). For a helpful analysis of the NHPA and its
role in sacred sites protection, see DEAN SUAGEE & JACK F. TROPE, NATIVE SACRED PLACES
PROTECTION LEGAL WORKSHOP: SACRED PLACES TRAINING MATERIALS 22 (2008),
http://www.sacrediand.org/media/Sacred_places training materials.pdf.
49. Exec. Order No. 13,Q07, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
1996 (2006). Such actions are to be taken "to the extent practicable, permitted by law, and not clear-
ly inconsistent with essential agency functions." Id.
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tent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, with tribal govern-
ments prior to taking actions that affect federally recognized tribal gov-
ernments."50 Federal officials were directed to undertake activities that
affect tribal rights "in a knowledgeable, sensitive manner respectful of
tribal sovereignty." 5' The 1996 memorandum was supplemented by Ex-
ecutive Orders 13,084 (in 1998) and 13,175 (in 2000), both entitled
"Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments." 52
More recently, President Obama's 2009 Tribal Consultation Memoran-
dum directed federal agencies to submit detailed plans as to their imple-
mentation of Executive Order 13,175.
Individual federal agencies, acting pursuant to AIRFA, the Sacred
Sites Order, and Executive Branch initiatives related to the tribal-federal
relationship, have developed detailed policies and procedures for con-
sulting with tribes when considering actions that could impact them, in-
cluding with regard to sacred sites. The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), for example, has developed "Guidelines for Conducting Tribal
Consultations."54 Other agencies based within the Department of the
Interior (DOI), such as the National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, have taken similar actions. The NPS, for ex-
ample, established an American Indian Liaison Office in 1995 5 and has
developed guidelines for protecting sacred sites and resources and for
consulting with tribes when NPS plans or activities may affect sacred
50. Memorandum on from William J. Clinton on Govemment-to-Government Relations with
Native American Tribal Governments to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 30 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 936 (Apr. 29, 1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1994-05-
02/pdf/WCPD- I 994-05-02-Pg936.pdf.
51. Id; see also Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Government-to-
Government Relationship with Tribal Governments to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-
book2/pdflPPP-2004-book2-doc-pg2l77.pdf.
52. See Exec. Order 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Exec. Order 13,175, 65
Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
53. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Tribal Consultation to Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts and Agencies (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/otj/pdflobama-executive-
memol 10509.pdf; see also Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Information &
Regulatory Affairs, on Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Gov'ts to Heads of Exec.
Dept's and Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies (July 30, 2010) (providing guidance on the
submission of progress reports required by the 2009 presidential memorandum on implementation of
Executive Order 13,175), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/201 0/m l0-33.pdf.
54. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., H-8120-1, GUIDELINES FOR
CONDUCTING TRIBAL CONSULTATION (2004); see also SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 81-87
(discussing BLM procedures relevant to sacred sites protection).
55. See American Indian Liaison Office, 23 CULTURAL RESOURCE MGMT. 43, 43 (2000).
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sites or restrict access or ceremonial use.56 The DOI updated its tribal
consultation policy in 201 1"
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an independ-
ent regulatory agency with authority over a number of subjects related to
energy, such as the licensing of non-federal hydropower facilities under
the Federal Power Act, issued a "Policy Statement on Consultation with
Indian Tribes in Commission Proceedings" in 2003 "to articulate its
commitment to promote a government-to-government relationship be-
tween itself and federally-recognized Indian tribes."5 The Policy State-
ment "recognizes the sovereignty of tribal nations and the Commission's
trust responsibility to Indian tribes" and established a tribal liaison posi-
tion for the hydroelectric licensing program. 59 FERC's hydroelectric li-
censing process requires that applicants and FERC staff members consult
with tribes as to potential impacts of licenses on tribes, tribal lands, and
tribal interests.co
The U.S. Forest Service is an agency of the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture (USDA), which has established an Office of Tribal Relations to
be the primary contact point within the USDA for tribal consultation.6'
The Office has been working with the USFS, which has issued a Nation-
al Resource Guide to American Indian and Alaska Native Relations, on
reviewing sacred sites policy and procedures to examine their effective-
ness in protecting sacred sites.62
Congressional support for tribal religious activities within national
forests was strengthened by the Cultural and Heritage Cooperation Au-
thority provisions of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
(the 2008 Farm Bill).63 These provisions were enacted to "strengthen
support for the policy of the United States of protecting and preserving
the traditional, cultural, and ceremonial rites and practices of Indian
56. See SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 87-88 (citing OFFICE OF AM. INDIAN TRUST,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INDIAN TRUST RESOURCES
512 (2012)).
57. See KEN SALAZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3317, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES (Dec. 1, 2011), available at
http://alaska.fws.gov/extemal/pdf/so_3317_tribalconsultationpolicy.pdf.
58. Policy Statement on Consultation with Indian Tribes in Commission Proceedings, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,452, 46,452 (July 23, 2003).
59. Id.
60. See SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 92 (citing 18 C.F.R. §§ 5.1(d), 5.2(b)(3),
5.5(b)(8)(v), 5.6(d), 5.7 (2012)); see also Christy McCann, Dammed If You Do, Damned If You
Don't: FERC's Tribal Consultation Requirement and the Hydropower Re-Licensing at Post Falls
Dam, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 415 (2006) (discussing the development and implementation of the
tribal consultation requirement).
61. Who We Are, OFFICE OF TRIBAL REL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=OTR (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
62. U.S. FOREST SERV., NATIONAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE RELATIONS (1997); see also Sacred Sites, U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/tribalrelations/sacredsites.shtml (last modified Dec. 20, 2012).
63. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 8101-8107,
122 Stat. 1651, 1659 (codified throughout the U.S.C.).
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tribes, in accordance with [AIRFA]."6 The provisions authorize the tem-
porary closure from public access of an area of national forest land in
order "to protect the privacy of tribal activities for traditional and cultural
purposes"; allow the provision, free of charge, of trees, portions of trees,
and forest products to tribes "for traditional and cultural purposes"; and
restrict disclosure of culturally sensitive information.6 5
Acting pursuant to AIRFA and post-AIRFA developments such as
those summarized above, federal land managers have developed man-
agement plans for a number of public lands that take into account the
need to protect Indian religious uses at sites located on the lands. These
plans have been developed in consultation with tribes (and other interest-
ed parties) and seek to balance carefully the needs and concerns of dif-
ferent users. In several instances, the management plans and other land
use decisions have been challenged as violations of the Establishment
Clause. The charge that the government is in any sense trying to "estab-
lish" any traditional Indian religion's beliefs and practices as a state reli-
gion seems ironic, to put it mildly, when viewed against the backdrop of
historical government efforts to suppress Indian religious practices and
impose Christianity.66 Four plans designed to take into account Indian
religious exercise needs in connection with sacred sites, and the litigation
brought to challenge them on Establishment Clause grounds, are exam-
ined below.
B. Four Case Studies: Developing Management Plans that Respect Reli-
gious Freedom
1. Devils Tower National Monument
Those who use the butte to pray become stronger. They gain sacred
knowledge from the spirits that helps us preserve our Lakota culture
and way of life. They become leaders. Without their knowledge and
leadership, we cannot continue to determine our own destiny.67
64. § 8101(7), 122 Stat. at 2048.
65. § 8104(b), 122 Stat. at 2049-50 (closure); § 8105, 122 Stat. at 2050 (forest products); see
§ 8106(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 2050 (disclosure restriction). The disclosure restriction limits disclosure of
information relating to "resources, cultural items, uses, or activities that . . . have a traditional and
cultural purpose[] and ... are provided ... under an express expectation of confidentiality in the
context of forest and rangeland research activities." § 8106, 122 Stat. at 2050. Another provision
restricts disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of information "concerning the identity,
use, or specific location ... of ... a site or resource used for traditional and cultural purposes by an
Indian tribe." § 8106(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 2050. The provisions also allow for reburial of human re-
mains and cultural items in national forests. § 8103, 122 Stat. at 2049.
66. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
67. Brief for Intervenors in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, Bear
Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000) (No. 99-1045), 2000 WL 34014041, at
* 1-2 [hereinafter Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge].
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In Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association v. Babbitt,68 a group of
plaintiffs challenged a Final Climbing Management Plan (FCMP) devel-
oped by the NPS for Wyoming's Devils Tower National Monument.
Devils Tower, a popular rock-climbing site, had been damaged and dis-
figured by recreational climbers, who affixed climbing equipment to the
monument's surface.70 The monument (which was deemed eligible for
inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places) is also a sacred site
for a number of Northern Plains tribes.' In addition to physically damag-
ing the monument, climbers also had taken photographs of Indian reli-
gious practitioners participating in ceremonies and removed sacred pray-
er bundles.72
Members of various tribes each refer to Devils Tower by different
names "Bear's Lodge" (Cheyenne and Lakota), "Bear's Tipi" (Arapaho),
"Bear's House" (Crow), and "Tree Rock" (Kiowa). 73 Each tribe associat-
ed with the tower "considers it to be an area of great importance in tribal
heritage, culture, and spirituality."74 Historically it was, and is now once
again, the site of the Lakota Sun Dance, which the federal government
banned from 1883 until the 1930s.75
The FCMP provided that rock climbers would be asked to, out of
respect, "voluntarily refrain from climbing on Devils Tower during the
culturally significant month of June."7  The FCMP also called for the
development of an interpretive education program to explain the reli-
gious and cultural significance of the monument and for the placement of
signs to encourage visitors to remain on the trail around the tower. The
FCMP did not sit well with climbers and commercial guides, several of
whom filed suit in the Wyoming federal district court, claiming that the
FCMP promoted Indian religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
68. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), aff'd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
69. See id. at 1449-51.
70. Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 67, at 3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 3 n.l, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175
F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-8021), 1998 U.S. 10th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 57, at *3 n.1 [hereinafter
U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge]. An 1858 map labeled Devils Tower with the Lakota words for Bear's
Lodge, "Mato Tepee." Id. Prior to discussing the merits of the Establishment Clause challenge in its
brief filed in response to the claim, the Government argued that the appellants lacked standing to
challenge the FCMP because they had not suffered any injury as a result of it. See id. at 16-20.
74. Id. at 5; see also Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 67, at 1-5 (discuss-
ing the significance of Devils Tower, the impact of disturbances from climbing, and FCMP provi-
sions to deal with those impacts).
75. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 6 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN OFFICE 106 (1894)).
76. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450 (quoting NAT'L PARK SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, FINAL CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: DEVIL'S
TOWER NATIONAL MONUMENT, CROOK COUNTY, WYOMING, at i (internal quotation mark omitted)).
77. Id at 1451.
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2. Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark
Many diverse Native American tribes and individuals continue to re-
gard the Medicine Mountain complex as one of the most important
sacred sites in the nation .. .. [T]raditional ceremonial practices have
been continuous, despite the suppression of American Indian reli-
- * 78gious expression ... .
In Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service,79 a timber com-
pany raised an Establishment Clause challenge to the USFS's plan for
the management of Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark.so Lo-
cated on Medicine Mountain in Bighorn National Forest in Wyoming,
the Medicine Wheel is a prehistoric circular structure of rocks with a
large cairn in the center and radiating spokes of rocks. The Wheel and
Medicine Mountain have important historical, cultural, and religious
significance for a number of tribes. Archaeologists have concluded that
people have lived in the area for at least 7,500 years. Tepee rings, trails,
and other archaeological features and artifacts found near the Wheel at-
test to the longstanding human habitation of the area.
Federal protection of the Medicine Wheel dates to 1957, when an
approximately 200-acre area in Bighorn National Forest was withdrawn
from mining and virtually all other forms of claims "for the protection
and preservation of the archaeological values of the Medicine Wheel and
adjacent historic area." 82 A 110-acre area, including the Medicine Wheel,
was designated as a National Historic Landmark in 1969. Thus the
original impetus for protecting the Medicine Wheel was concern over its
archaeological and historic (rather than religious) values. Concern over
these values, along with visitor safety concerns, also prompted the devel-
opment of the Historic Preservation Plan for the Medicine Wheel Na-
tional Historic Landmark and Medicine Mountain (the HPP). Increased
use of the landmark had resulted in the displacement, destruction, and
removal of prehistoric features and artifacts. The HPP was developed via
a lengthy process that included consultation with, among other interested
parties, the Wyoming state historic preservation officer and two intertrib-
al organizations (the Medicine Wheel Coalition for Sacred Sites and the
Medicine Wheel Alliance).84
78. NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OMB No. 1024-0018, NATIONAL
HISTORICAL LANDMARK NOMINATION MEDICINE WHEELIMEDICINE MOUNTAIN 19 (2010).
79. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Wyo. 2001), aff'd, 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004).
80. See id. at 1292.
81. Id at 1286.
82. Id (quoting 22 C.F.R § 4135 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. Id
84. See id at 1286-87. The Big Horn County commissioner and the Federal Aviation Com-




Signed in 1996, the same year in which the Sacred Sites Order was
issued,8 the HPP sought to "ensure that the Medicine Wheel and Medi-
cine Mountain are managed in a manner that protects the integrity of the
site as a sacred site and a nationally important traditional cultural proper-
ty"86 The HPP established a process to integrate "the preservation and
traditional uses of historic properties" with other uses, with priority given
to "the protection of the historic properties involved by continuing tradi-
tional cultural use[s]," 87 and provided for an operating plan that included
use of on-site interpreters, limitations on motorized access, and protec-
tion of traditional cultural uses.88 The USFS implemented the HPP by
issuing an amendment (Amendment 12) to the Bighorn National Forest
Plan. 9
Wyoming Sawmills (Sawmills), a commercial timber company that
had long been the primary purchaser of timber from the forest, 90 chal-
lenged the USFS's approval .of the HPP and issuance of Amendment
12.91 In a suit filed in Wyoming federal district court, Sawmills alleged
that the USFS had impermissibly promoted religion because Indian reli-
gious concerns were a motivating factor behind the decision to adopt the
HPP. Sawmills further alleged that the HPP impermissibly caused the
closure of roads that had previously been usable for commercial logging
operations and required the expenditure of tax dollars on educating visi-
tors about Indian religion. 92
3. Rainbow Bridge National Monument
Neighboring Indian tribes believe Rainbow Bridge is a sacred reli-
gious site. They travel to Rainbow Bridge to pray and make offerings
near and under its lofty span. Special prayers are said before passing
[under] the Bridge .... In respect of these long-standing beliefs, we
request your voluntary cooperation in not approaching or walking
under Rainbow Bridge. 93
85. Id. at 1287; Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (1996).
86. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Brief for Appellants Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. at 9, Wyo. Sawmills, 383 F.3d 1241 (2004) (No. 02-
8009), 2002 WL 33005127, at *9) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. In addition to the
NHPA and AIRFA, the Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) and a number of other
statutes govern the USFS's management of the area. See id at 1287-88. ARPA mandates the estab-
lishment of programs to increase awareness of the significance of, and the need to protect, archaeo-
logical resources on public and Indian lands. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(c) (2006). ARPA requires
agencies making relevant rules to take AIRFA into consideration. § 470ii(a).
88. Wyo. Sawmills, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
89. Wyo. Sawmills, 383 F.3d at 1244.
90. Id. at 1245.
91. Wyo. Sawmills, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. Sawmills also challenged a USFS decision to
withdraw a timber sale that the USFS had proposed for an area within the HPP's coverage area. Id.
92. Id at 1292.
93. Brief of Appellees at 11-12 n.3, Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 98 F. App'x 711
(10th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4099), 2003 WL 24031937, at *11-12 n.3 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Natural
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In Natural Arch & Bridge Society v. Alston,94 Earl DeWaal and four
other individuals, along with the Natural Arch and Bridge Society (an
organization of natural arch enthusiasts), challenged the NPS's manage-
ment plan for Rainbow Bridge National Monument. 95 The largest natural
bridge in the world, Rainbow Bridge has religious and historical signifi-
cance for the Hopi, Navajo, San Juan Paiute, and other tribes. First pro-
tected under federal law by a 1910 presidential proclamation, which set
aside the bridge and a 160-acre tract of land as a national monument,
Rainbow Bridge National Monument received a major increase in visi-
tors when the adjoining Lake Powell and Glen Canyon National Recrea-
tion Area were created as part of a federal dam project. The project was
completed following an unsuccessful Free Exercise Clause challenge in
Badoni v. Higginson.96
By the late 1980s, the monument had suffered serious damage, such
as soil erosion, vegetation damage, and damage to archaeological sites
and petroglyphs caused by visitors who touched and climbed on them
and defaced them with graffiti. For members of area tribes such as the
Navajo Nation, who regard Tsi-Na-Ne-Ah (arch rock or rock bridge) as a
sacred place that should be respected and kept in as much of a natural
setting as possible, this amounted to desecration. 97
Recognizing the need for action to protect the monument, the NPS
developed the 1993 General Management Plan for Rainbow Bridge Na-
tional Monument (the Rainbow Bridge GMP), after decades of study and
consideration of public comments. Designed to protect both the natural
and cultural resources of the monument, the Rainbow Bridge GMP con-
templated discouraging (but not prohibiting) visitor access to the base of
the bridge and the area directly underneath it. A sign explained the spir-
itual significance of the site for Indians and requested that visitors not
walk under the bridge out of respect for this perspective. An interpretive
prospectus sought to 'help visitors understand that different cultures
perceive resources differently, i.e., some neighboring American Indians
regard Rainbow Bridge as sacred,' and 'generate visitor interest in the
cultures and lifestyles, from prehistoric to present times, of the people of
the Rainbow Bridge region."' 98
The plaintiffs sued in federal district court in Utah, claiming that the
Rainbow Bridge GMP violated the Establishment Clause. They argued
Arch] (quoting Rainbow Bridge National Monument, NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/rabr/index.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002), af'd, 98 F. App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2004).
95. See id. at 1216-19.
96. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), af'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
97. See Natural Arch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1210, 1213.
98. Id. at 1214. See generally DAVID KENT SPROUL, A BRIDGE BETWEEN CULTURES: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF RAINBOW BRIDGE NATIONAL MONUMENT passim (2003) (describing
in detail the history of the management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument).
364 [Vol. 90:2
FRIEND, FOE, FRENEMY
that it coerced them into practicing the Indian religion associated with
the belief about not walking under Rainbow Bridge.99
4. Cave Rock
Lake Tahoe is the place of origin of the Washoe people and .. . the
waters of Lake Tahoe, which are sacred, breathe life into the land,
plants, fish, birds, animals and people around it... .De'ek wadapush,
or "standing gray rock," now known as Cave Rock . . . is a place that
demands the highest respect. 00
In Access Fund v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,lo' the Access
Fund, a climbing advocacy group supported by rock climbers and the
recreation industry, challenged the USFS's decision to ban rock climbing
at Cave Rock, a natural rock formation located partially within a national
forest on the eastern shore of Lake Tahoe.102 Cave Rock is a sacred site
for the Washoe people and "a symbol of their cultural and religious iden-
tity.',103 Whereas Washoe religious practitioners have been coming to
Cave Rock for over 1,000 years when they feel called to seek power or
knowledge there, non-Indians have been going there since the 1980s for
rock climbing. These visitors drilled permanent bolts into Cave Rock to
aid them in their climbing, expanded climbing routes, and added a ma-
sonry floor inside the cave, all without USFS permission.
After Cave Rock was determined to be eligible for inclusion in the
National Register of Historic Places as a TCP and archaeological site, the
USFS developed a plan to protect Cave Rock and "regulate uses there in
a manner that . . . preserves the historic and cultural characteristics that
make the property eligible for listing on the National Register."'o The
USFS decided to ban climbing at Cave Rock and to remove the rock
climbing hardware because of the adverse effects on Cave Rock's herit-
age resources. According to the environmental impact statement underly-
ing the decision, the climbing ban was imposed because of these effects,
not as a way of "requiring others to conform their conduct to Indian cul-
tural concerns."' 06 The USFS also decided, however, to allow hiking,
fishing, and sightseeing at Cave Rock despite Washoe objections to such
activities at a site that the USFS acknowledged was a "core element in
99. See Natural Arch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
100. A. BRIAN WALLACE, WASHOE TRIBE OF NEV. & CAL., PROTECTION OF DE'EK WADAPUSH
(CAVE ROCK): FEDERAL MANAGEMENT AND LITIGATION UPDATE, http://www.yachaywasi-
ngo.org/SC24USAwashoe.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
101. 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).
102. Id. at 1039.
103. Id
104. Id. at 1040.
105. Id. at 1040-41 (alteration in original) (quoting Cave Rock Management Direction, 64 Fed.
Reg. 3678 (proposed Jan. 25, 1999)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
106. Id. at 1041 (quoting Cave Rock Management Direction, 64 Fed. Reg. 3678 (proposed Jan.
25, 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Washoe culture."1 0 7 The Access Fund challenged the climbing ban in
Nevada federal district court, arguing that it violated the Establishment
Clause.
C. Defending Management Decisions Against Establishment Clause
Challenges
The Establishment Clause challenges to the federal land managers'
decisions described above required Government attorneys to come to the
defense of these decisions. Explored below are the arguments made in
the litigation challenging the decisions, which evidence understanding of
the importance of what is at stake for Indians at sacred sites and of the
responsibility of federal land managers to take account of the United
States' political and trust relationship with tribes.
1. Satisfying the Lemon Test
In defending land managers' decisions against claims that they vig-
lated the Establishment Clause, the Government's arguments were (nec-
essarily) shaped by the prevailing legal test, set out by the Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 08 Under the Lemon test, a governmental
action does not offend the Establishment Clause if it (1) has a secular
purpose, (2) does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.'09 Consequently, the Government's first line of defense
was to distance the challenged decisions from efforts to protect religious
exercise by emphasizing motivations that were unrelated to religion, fol-
lowed by arguments that the decisions did not result in legally impermis-
sible effects or excessively entangle the agency in question with religious
institutions, authorities, or activities.
a. Identifying Secular Purposes for Management Decisions
In Bear Lodge, while defending the Devils Tower National Monu-
ment FCMP, the Government cited managing the site in "an orderly fash-
ion," accommodating both recreational and religious users,"o as a per-
missible secular goal of the FCMP. Similarly, the Government explained
in the Wyoming Sawmills litigation that the USFS's Medicine Wheel
107. Id. (quoting Cave Rock Management Direction, 64 Fed. Reg. 3678 (proposed Jan. 25,
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
109. Id. at 612-13.Although some Supreme Court Justices have criticized or even rejected the
Lemon test, it continues to play a central role in Establishment Clause litigation. See Nathan P.
Heller, Context Is King: A Perception-Based Test for Evaluating Government Displays of the Ten
Commandments, 51 VILL. L. REV. 379, 388-89 (2006).
110. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 25. This would "give [the] group[s] ... the type
of access they need to achieve their purposes." 14. at 26. The Government also argued, prior to
discussing the merits of the Establishment Clause challenge in its brief, that the appellants lacked
standing to challenge the FCMP because they had not suffered any injury as a result of it. See id. at
16-20.
366 . [Vol. 90:2
FRIEND, FOE, FRENEMY
National Historic Landmark HPP serves the secular purpose of
"manag[ing] federal land in an orderly fashion that protects the area's
cultural and archaeological properties.""' In Natural Arch, the Govern-
ment explained that the Rainbow Bridge GMP serves the secular purpose
of preserving the monument's natural and historical value." 2 Much of
the text of the Government's brief on appeal in Natural Arch matches
word for word with the text of its Wyoming Sawmills brief, reflecting the
fact that the briefs were submitted only a few months apart. 113
Elaborating on the "secular purpose" prong in Access Fund, the
Government noted the Supreme Court's statement in McCreary County
v. American Civil Liberties Union 114 that the Lemon test's first prong
asks whether the government took the challenged action for "the predom-
inant purpose of advancing religion"'15 and described the secular interest
in protecting "historically and culturally significant sites."" The rock-
climbing ban was adopted for the secular purpose of preserving the char-
acter and integrity of, and preventing harm to, Cave Rock, which clearly
has cultural, historical, and archaeological significance." Just as with
churches of historical significance that are administered by the NPS, the
fact that Cave Rock's significance is based in part on its use for religious
purposes does not preclude it from federal protection." 8 Additionally, the
government's "compelling secular interest in managing its land in a
manner that avoids interference with private citizens' religious practices"
supports accommodating religious practices, such as Washoe religious
uses of Cave Rock.'19 In countering the Access Fund's contention that
the USFS cannot have a secular interest in protecting a Washoe sacred
site, the Government noted the Ninth Circuit's recent rejection of this
111. Brief of Federal Appellees at 37, Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241
(10th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-8009), 2002 WL 33005129, at *37 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Wyoming
Sawmills]. The Government first argued that Sawmills lacked standing to pursue the Establishment
Clause claim. Id. at 31-32.
112. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 33. The Government noted how the Rainbow
Bridge GMP sought to protect vegetation by funneling visitors onto trails and sought to increase
visitors' appreciation by educating them about the historical and cultural context. Id The Govern-
ment also argued that DeWaal and the other plaintiffs lacked standing. Id at 17.
113. The Wyoming Sawmills brief is dated October 25, 2002, whereas the Natural Arch brief is
dated January 17, 2003. One U.S. Department of Justice attorney (David C. Shilton) is named in
both briefs. See U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at Caption; U.S. Brief, Natural
Arch, supra note 93.
114. 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005).
115. Brief for Appellees at 25, Access Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 05-15585), 2005 WL 3517404, at *25 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Access Fund] (quoting
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id Under McCreary County, the first prong is satisfied "except in those unusual cases
where the claim [of a secular purpose] was an apparent sham, or the secular purpose secondary." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 865 (2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In McCreary County, the Supreme Court concluded that a Ten Commandments display in
the McCreary County, Kentucky courthouse violated the Establishment Clause. 545 U.S. at 881.
117. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 25-26.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id. at 28-29.
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argument. In Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,12 0 the court upheld an
Arizona policy against purchasing aggregate materials that were mined
from sacred Woodruff Butte, holding that "the desire to 'carry[] out state
construction projects in a manner that does not harm a site of religious,
historical, and cultural importance to several Native American groups
and the nation' is a legitimate secular purpose."l21
b. Emphasizing Management Decisions' Permissible Effects
Addressing the Lemon test's "secular effect" prong, the Government
argued in Bear Lodge that any incidental advancement of religion at
Devils Tower was not a "forbidden effect"-the FCMP is simply allow-
ing "American Indians to advance their religions" (rather than the gov-
ernment advancing religion). 122 Responding to the plaintiffs' argument
that the FCMP coerced park visitors into participating in a religious ex-
ercise, the Government noted that no one is prohibited from climbing in
June. Moreover, even if the FCMP coerced climbers to decide not to
climb, this would not be a compelled religious act, but rather simply a
decision to respect Indian religious practices.1 2 3 The Government argued
in the Wyoming Sawmills litigation that consistent with the HPP's per-
missible secular purposes, the HPP had the permissible primary effects
of reasonably managing the landmark "by balancing the competing de-
mands placed on it" and of accommodating Indians' religious needs.124 It
did not have an impermissible coercive effect because it was merely en-
couraging people to respect religious sensibilities rather than forcing
them to participate in a religious exercise.125
In Natural Arch, the Government noted that the Rainbow Bridge
GMP had the permissible primary effects of reasonably managing the
monument to balance competing demands and of accommodating reli-
gious needs.126 By simply encouraging respect for religious sensibilities,
it did not have an impermissible coercive effect.127 Moreover, the Gov-
120. 382 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004).
121. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 28 (alteration in original) (quoting Cholla
Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004)). Woodruff Butte is religiously signifi-
cant to the Hopi Tribe, the Zuni Pueblo, and the Navajo Nation. Id Cholla Ready Mix challenged
Arizona's denial of a permit to sell materials mined at the butte to state construction projects because
of its status as an important cultural, historic, and religious site. Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 972.
122. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 32.
123. Id. at 32-33. The Government distinguished cases like Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594
(1992) (challenging prayers at high school graduation ceremonies), and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 61 (1985) (challenging school prayer), in which the Supreme Court found that students "had no
choice but to engage in a religious practice." U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 33. Under the
FCMP, any coercion would be "compulsion to forego secular activities," which these cases do not
suggest violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 34 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 594; Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 61).
124. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 17.
125. Id. at 40; see also id. at 48 50 (considering coercion under the endorsement test and
distinguishing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310-13 (2000)).
126. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 40.
127. Id. at 40-41 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 587).
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ernment noted that courts have upheld a wide variety of government ac-
tions that have allowed religious worship on public property, even where
these actions have involved the exclusion of other uses.12 8 Analogizing to
cases upholding military chaplaincy programs, the Government noted
that in the case of both military bases and sites like Rainbow Bridge,
religious practitioners "would be unable to engage in their religious ac-
tivity unless the government affirmatively accommodated that activi-
,,129
c. Demonstrating Limited Government-Religion Interaction
Finally, the Government argued in each of these cases that its deci-
sions did not run afoul of the Lemon test's "excessive entanglement"
prong. In Bear Lodge, the Government argued that the FCMP does not
result in excessive entanglement between government and religion be-
cause of the very limited involvement of the government with religious
practices. The FCMP does not, for example, require NPS monitoring of
ceremonies' nature or content.' 30 In Wyoming Sawmills, the Government
noted that the excessive entanglement prong requires examination of "the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of
the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority"' 3' and explained that the HPP
assures that the area around the landmark "retains an atmosphere condu-
cive to worship by individual Native American religious practitioners"
rather than benefiting religious institutions. 3 2 Moreover, the aid provided
is "neutral and nonideological,"l 3 3 and the USFS has no role in determin-
ing the "nature, content or manner of worship" at the site.' 3 4 Finally, the
involvement of the Medicine Wheel Coalition and the Medicine Wheel
Alliance, which "represent Native American interests, [but are] not ex-
clusively religious organizations," in consultation pursuant to the HPP
does not constitute excessive entanglement. 135
The Government explained in Natural Arch that the Rainbow
Bridge GMP passes muster under the excessive entanglement prong be-
cause, rather than reaching out to aid religious institutions, the govern-
ment was involved in Indian religious practices only in a very limited,
unavoidable way: "Because the United States acquired lands containing
Indian religious sites, it necessarily must make decisions regarding how
128. Id. at 43.
129. Id. at 44.
130. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 37.
131. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 46 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 615 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at 47.
133. Id (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
134. Id
135. Id. at 45.
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to manage those areas in a way that complies with various laws that re-
quire the government to be sensitive to American Indian religious prac-
tices."
In Access Fund as well, the Government argued that the Cave Rock
climbing ban did not foster excessive entanglement because there was in
fact no entanglement. The USFS was not participating in ceremonies or
in the administration of Washoe religious institutions, nor monitoring
religious practice, but merely enforcing "neutral restrictions on harmful
activities, while permitting access ... for permissible uses by both
Washoe and non-Washoe people."' 3 7
2. Responding to the Endorsement Test
The Government also defended land managers' decisions under the
requirements of another test for evaluating government actions that are
alleged to violate the Establishment Clause, the endorsement test. De-
rived from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,'3 8 the
endorsement test analyzes whether a "reasonable observer," aware of the
history and context in which a government action occurs, would view the
action as an endorsement of religion.' 39 In defending the adoption of the
Devils Tower FCMP under the endorsement test in Bear Lodge, the
Government argued that a reasonable observer would perceive that the
FCMP's goals are constitutionally permissible ones, such as "manag[ing]
federal land in an orderly fashion [and] balanc[ing] the competing de-
mands placed on the use of the site," rather than endorsing Indian reli-
gion.14 0 Responding to the challenge to the Medicine Wheel HPP in Wy-
oming Sawmills, the Government asserted that a reasonable observer,
aware of the history and context underlying the HPP, would recognize
that its goals include managing federal land in an orderly fashion and
balancing competing demands on the use of the monument, not advanc-
ing or endorsing Native American religion.141 The observer would under-
stand that the government only sought "to allow Native Americans cer-
tain opportunities to practice their religions with minimal disturbances
from other visitors and other uses." 4 2
136. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 45.
137. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 39. The Government argued, in conclusion,
that the USFS's "decision to protect the cultural, physical, and historic integrity of Cave Rock by
restricting rock climbing easily satisfies all three prongs" of the Lemon test. Id. at 25.
138. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. Id at 687-94.
140. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 39; see also id. at 37-39.
141. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 49 (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,




3. Acknowledging the Nature of Indian Religions and the Impact of
History
The efforts to counter Establishment Clause challenges that are de-
scribed above rely on arguments similar to those made in cases challeng-
ing actions alleged to improperly advance other religions. They focus on
non-religious goals, and effects, such as management of a site for multi-
ple uses.
Other arguments made in the sacred sites cases, however, drew on
the unique needs and experiences of Indian religious practitioners, while
also treating protection of Indian religions as in keeping with the protec-
tion of mainstream religions-an approach that differed from historical
treatment of Indian religious beliefs and practices as superstitions rather
than "real" religions.143 In defending the Devils Tower FCMP, for exam-
ple, the Government noted that Indians inhabited the Devils Tower area
long before European settlers arrived'" and that each tribe associated
with the tower "considers it to be an area of great importance in tribal
heritage, culture, and spirituality." 14 5 By noting the tribes' longstanding
presence in the Devils Tower area and the revival in the area of the pre-
viously banned Lakota Sun Dance,146 the Government acknowledged the
importance of the site and the past suppression of Indian religious activi-
ties there.
In defending the Cave Rock climbing ban in Access Fund, the Gov-
ernment situated the actions at Cave Rock within the broader landscape
of government protection of other historic and cultural sites. Describing
Cave Rock as "a site of unquestioned value ... as the quintessential
symbol of Washoe Indian culture, religion, and history," the Government
equated banning rock climbing at Cave Rock with similar bans at places
like Mount Rushmore.147 A holding that the government was unable to
ban rock climbing at Cave Rock solely because its significance stemmed
in part from its religious importance would evidence a "hostility towards
religion" that "would bring us into war with our national tradition as em-
bodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of reli-
gion."l48 Moreover, "the presence of Native Americans on this land since
143. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 22, at 789 (discussing nineteenth-century federal officials'
reluctance to recognize ceremonial dances as religious in nature); see also supra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text.
144. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 3 n.1.
145. Id. at 5-6; see also Intervenor-Appellees Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 67, at 5-6 (dis-
cussing the significance of Devils Tower, the impact of disturbances from climbing, and FCMP
provisions to deal with them).
146. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 6-7 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra
note 75).
147. Id. at 23.
148. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 23 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
673 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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time immemorial" renders "properties of traditional cultural and religious
importance to an Indian tribe ... entitled to protection."l 49
4. Mea Culpas for Imposing Burdens on Religious Exercise
Another justification offered by the Government for the challenged
decisions was ameliorating burdens on religious exercise that the Gov-
ernment itself had imposed, a consideration that was woven into the
Government's arguments in several ways. Moreover, the site-specific
nature of Indian religions meant that government imposition of burdens
was potentially even more damaging than would have been the case with
other religions. Thus, in Bear Lodge, the Government identified "remov-
ing a government-created obstacle to the exercise of religion," namely
the authorization of unlimited, noisy, and visible climbing on Devils
Tower,150 as a secular goal of the FCMP. The Supreme Court has estab-
lished that governmental action to alleviate interference with ceremonial
use created by the government itself does not violate the Establishment
Clause.' 5 ' The removal of government-created obstacles to the exercise
of religion is a particularly important goal where Indian religions are
concerned. Because of the sacred nature of a ceremonial site, "Indians
cannot go elsewhere for equivalent religious practices," and their prayers
and ceremonies had been subjected to "great disruption" from recrea-
tional climbers.152 The goal of "remov[ing] government-created obstacles
to the religious use of the site" would also be recognized by a reasonable
observer as a goal of the FCMP.1 3
The Government explained in the Wyoming Sawmills litigation that
the Medicine Wheel HPP serves the secular purpose of "removing a gov-
ernment-created obstacle to the exercise of religion," 54 namely "noise,
disturbance of objects, and other impacts from visitation" that had previ-
ously occurred under the USFS's management of the site and "some-
times had deleterious effects on religious pursuits."'5 5 The Government
referred to the site-specific nature of Indian religions: "[B]ecause the site
149. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
150. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 28.
151. Id at 28-29 (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)). The Government's brief explained the effort to
alleviate the burden on religious exercise:
In order to alleviate the interference with the ceremonial use of Devils Tower caused by
the government's authorization of recreational climbing, NPS adopted a plan that strikes
an appropriate balance between the recreational and ceremonial uses of the monument.
Under that plan, all recreational uses including climbing may be conducted throughout
the year while an educational campaign seeks to inform the public about the ceremonial
uses of the site and to discourage recreational climbing for the month in which the bulk of
those ceremonies take place. That limited governmental action to alleviate the obstacle
that the government itself created does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 30.
152. Id at 29-30.
153. Id at 39.
154. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 40.
155. Id at 41.
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itself is considered sacred, Native Americans cannot go elsewhere for
equivalent religious practices."l 56 The HPP's adoption struck "a permis-
sible balance between ceremonial and nonceremonial uses of the [land-
mark]" and its attempt "to foster visitor respect for and [to] protect tradi-
tional cultural and religious pursuits" and was constitutionally permissi-
ble. 57
In Natural Arch, the Government also cited the removal of "a gov-
ernment-created obstacle to the exercise of religion"'58 as a secular pur-
pose of the Rainbow Bridge GMP. Before the Glen Canyon Dam was
built, Rainbow Bridge "was inaccessible to all but a few tourists, and
thus the conflicts with the needs of Native American religious practition-
ers were minimal." 59 By creating the dam, the government "made Rain-
bow Bridge accessible to thousands of tourists per year, many of whom
had no knowledge of Native American customs and sensibilities." 60 The
disruptions to worship caused by the increase in these visitors "qualify as
burdens on the free exercise of Native American religion," which the
NPS sought to ameliorate by informing visitors of beliefs as to the
bridge's religious significance and asking them to respect these beliefs.' 6 1
These efforts constitute "a measured attempt to alleviate the desecration
which many Native Americans feel when visitors pass under the Bridge,
and thus at least partially lift this burden." 62
Finally, in the Access Fund litigation, the Government acknowl-
edged that it had imposed a burden on Washoe religious exercise by
"taking ownership of Cave Rock and permitting a wide variety of recrea-
tional uses despite the Washoe Tribe's use of the site since time imme-
morial." 6 3 The Government noted the dispossession of the tribe's tradi-
tional territory and its experience with a land-claims process that had not
provided for land recovery' M-a shortcoming of the implementation of
the Indian Claims Commission Act.' 65 The Government went on to em-
156. Id at 40.
157. Id. at 41.
158. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 36.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
162. Id
163. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 29 n.5. This argument was made in response
to the claim by amicus curiae Mountain States Legal Foundation (in support of the Access Fund) that
the government lacks a legitimate interest in accommodating religious practice where the govern-
ment has not itself burdened religious exercise. In the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, the
Government's attorney explained that because the "government owns this property, the government
has exclusive direction and authority to decide who get[s] to use the property. And so it is the gov-
ernment['s] action in allowing or not allowing rock climbing to take place that is going to be posed .
in the burden here." Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Access Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499
F.3d 1036 (2007) (No. 05-15585) (statement of Sharon Swingle).
164. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 29 n.5.
165. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 269 (6th
ed. 2011) (noting the focus of the Indian Claims Commission on monetary awards, even though the
Indian Claims Commission Act did not explicitly limit recovery in successful land claims to mone-
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phasize that its interest in accommodating religious practice is not lim-
ited to situations in which the Government itself had imposed a burden
on religious exercise.16 6
5. Acknowledging Obligations Arising from the Political and Trust
Relationships
In addition to acknowledging the responsibilities imposed on the
United States because of the deleterious impact of past policies on Indian
religious exercise, the Government also cited obligations stemming from
the unique relationship between tribes and the United States. In Bear
Lodge, for example, in identifying the secular goals of the Devils Tower
FCMP, the Government noted that the FCMP "serves the secular goal of
effectuating the federal government's political relationship with Ameri-
can Indians." Accommodations of Indian religious practices that help
to effectuate this relationship "are particularly appropriate" and have
been held to "satisfy the Establishment Clause based only on a showing
that the accommodation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.""'6 In addition, "[f]ulfillment of the federal govern-
ment's trust responsibility toward American Indian tribes . . . constitutes
a secular purpose .. . with the secular effect of promoting tribal sover-
eignty.",6 Analyzing the FCMP under the Lemon test's secular effect
prong, the Government explained that the FCMP is "effectuating the
federal government's political relationship with American Indians." 70
This relationship also figured in the analysis under the endorsement test:
a reasonable observer would perceive "effectuat[ing] the political rela-
tionship between the federal government and American Indian tribes" as
one of the FCMP's constitutionally permissible goals.171
In the Wyoming Sawmills litigation, the Government explained that
the Medicine Wheel HPP served the secular purpose of "effectuating the
federal government's political relationship with American Indians," as
recognized by the Sacred Sites Order and AIRFA.172 Courts have recog-
nized that religious accommodations that effectuate this relationship are
"particularly appropriate and satisfy the Establishment Clause based only
on a showing that the accommodation bears a rational relationship to a
tary damages, and the fact that just compensation would have required the return of at least some of
the taken land).
166. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 29 n.5 (citing Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d
765, 766 n.15 (9th Cir. 1991)).
167. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 23.
168. Id. at 24 (citing Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34-35 (1st Cir. 1992);
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991)).
169. Id at 25.
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id. at 33.
172. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 38. The brief also cited the Program-
matic Agreement that preceded adoption of the HPP for its recognition of the government's trust
relationship with tribes. Id
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legitimate government interest." 73 The rational relationship standard for
evaluating accommodations for Indians "derives from what the Supreme
Court has characterized as the 'peculiar semisovereign and constitution-
ally recognized status of Indians,' which 'justifies special treatment on
their behalf when rationally related to the Government's unique obliga-
tion toward the Indians."'"
74
"[E]ffectuat[ing] the government's trust responsibility and political
relationships with Tribes" was identified as one of the secular purposes
served by the Rainbow Bridge GMP in the Natural Arch litigation. 75 In
the Access Fund litigation as well, the Government referred to its "con-
stitutional role as protector of Native Americans."l 76 Its secular interest
in accommodating religious and cultural uses "is particularly acute with
respect to Native Americans, with whom the government has a unique
legal and historical relationship."77 Referring to the constitutional un-
derpinnings of the political relationship between tribes and the United
States, the Government noted that "[o]ur Constitution gives the federal
government significant latitude to act for the benefit of federally recog-
nized Indian tribes," as recognized by the Supreme Court in Morton v.
Mancari.178 The USFS's effort to protect the ability of a federally recog-
nized tribe-in other words, a tribe with a political, government-to-
government relationship with the United States-to use Cave Rock for
traditional purposes "was consistent with federal law requiring federal
agencies to attempt to protect Indian sacred sites and to accommodate
access to and ceremonial use of the sites by Indian religious practition-
ers."'7 9 Courts of appeals' decisions consequently have recognized that
"the Establishment Clause permits the government to take special steps
to accommodate Indian tribes' cultural and religious traditions."' 80
173. Id. at 38-39 (citing Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34-35 (1st Cir.
1992); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1215-17 (5th Cir. 1991)).
174. Id. at 39 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979)).
175. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 34 ("Actions which accommodate tribal cul-
ture, including religious practices, effectuate the government's trust responsibility and political
relationships with Tribes.").
176. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 21. The Government cited, in addition to
Lemon and Lynch, a number of Supreme Court cases in support of its position, including Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005), and Corp. of Presiding Bishops of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987). Id. at 23-25, 32.
177. Id at 30 (emphasis added).
178. Id (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 & n.24 (1974)).
179. Id. (emphasis added). The Government's brief cited the Sacred Sites Order and AIRFA in
support of this statement. Id. at 30-31 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24,
1996); 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006)).
180. Id. at 31. The Government's brief referred to Rupert v. U.S. Fish & Wildhfe Serv., 957
F.2d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1992), which rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal law
prohibiting possession of eagle feathers, except for Indian tribes' religious use, and Peyote Way
Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991), which rejected an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to a ban on peyote use except by Native American religious organiza-
tions. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 31-32; see also id. at 20-21 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§
3752012]
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6. Responding to Lyng and Other Indian Free Exercise Clause
Precedents
In defending against the Establishment Clause challenges, the Gov-
ernment also addressed Free Exercise Clause cases involving Indian reli-
gious practitioners, such as Lyng and Badoni. Lyng was cited for its en-
couragement of religious exercise accommodation and distinguished as
to its holding on the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause claim. In Bear
Lodge, for example, the Government noted that the Supreme Court em-
phasized in Lyng that accommodation of Indian religious practices is
constitutionally permissible."' Similarly, the Government argued in Wy-
oming Sawmills that the "HPP represents precisely the kind of accom-
modation encouraged by the Court in Lyng."l 82 The Government's briefs
in Natural Arch and Access Fund also noted Lyng's support for accom-
modation of tribal religious traditions.'83 The Government noted further
in Natural Arch that given the similarity between the NPS policies at the
monument and NPS free exercise accommodation at many other sites,
accepting the theory that the policies violated the Establishment Clause
would cast "a large shadow ... on the many similar efforts by the Park
Service and other agencies to accommodate religious practices on public
lands."' 84
Addressing the argument that Lyng's rejection of the plaintiffs' Free
Exercise Clause claim rendered the challenged land management deci-
sion illegitimate, the Government argued in Wyoming Sawmills that this
aspect of Lyng is "readily distinguishable."' 85 Lyng addressed the issue of
what the Free Exercise Clause requires of the government, while making
clear that the government "has a range of discretion to accommodate
religious practices."'8 6
The Government also responded to arguments based on Badoni, in
which the Tenth Circuit rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to the
Government's management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument.' 8 7
The Government noted in Bear Lodge that there was no conflict between
the adoption of the Devils Tower FCMP, in which the NPS chose to al-
low Indians to use Devils Tower for ceremonial purposes, and the court's
470(b)(2), 470a(6)(A) (2006)) (noting that federal law recognizes the government's interests in
preserving sites of religious importance to Native Americans, which are part of the historical and
cultural foundations of the United States).
181. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 34.
182. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 52.
183. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 37-38; U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note
115, at *32.
184. U.S. Brief, Natural Arch, supra note 93, at 31.
185. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 50. Lyng, along with Badoni v. Hig-
ginson, 638 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1980), were "[tihe principal cases relied on by Sawmills." U.S.
Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note Ill , at 50.
186. Id. at 52.
187. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179.
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decision in Badoni, which held that the Free Exercise Clause does not
require that the government exclude recreational visitors from Rainbow
Bridge National Monument to facilitate Indian ceremonial use.' 88 More-
over, although dicta in Badoni suggested that accommodations that ex-
cluded the public from "its normal use of the area" would violate the
Establishment Clause, the FCMP did not implicate the dicta because it
did not exclude the public from climbing. Also, in an interesting com-
ment on the proper characterization of uses of Devils Tower, the Gov-
ernment noted that "it would make no sense to characterize climbing
rather than American Indian ceremonies as the 'normal use' of the site,
as the ceremonial use of Devils Tower long predate[s] recreational rock
climbing on the site."'"9 Finally, the Government expressed disagreement
with the Badoni dicta, explaining that "the government routinely ex-
cludes the general public from public lands in order to allow religious
practices to occur, and such actions have never been held to violate the
Establishment Clause." 90 Examples of such a practice include chapels in
military institutions and airports, religious funerals in Arlington National
Cemetery, and the issuance of a permit for a Papal Mass on the National
Mall.'91
In Wyoming Sawmills, the Government dismissed Badoni as being
(like Lyng) "readily distinguishable."' 9 2 The dicta in Badoni indicating
that exclusion of tourists would violate the Establishment. Clause hypoth-
esized conditions that differ greatly from the management of the Medi-
cine Wheel pursuant to the HPP, which does not exclude the public and
is aimed primarily at protecting the landmark's cultural and archaeologi-
cal resources.193
The Access Fund also relied on dicta in Bear Lodge, Natural Arch,
and Badoni as support for its argument that the Cave Rock climbing ban
had the primary effect of endorsing religion. The Government distin-
guished these cases as each involving a different factual scenario than
was present in the Access Fund litigation and thus not undercutting the
argument that the climbing ban satisfied the Lemon test's "primary ef-
fect"' prong.1
7. Summary of the Government's Arguments
In the cases discussed above, the Government provided detailed de-
fenses of federal land managers' decisions utilizing the kinds of argu-
188. U.S. Brief, Bear Lodge, supra note 73, at 35 (citing Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179).
189. Id. at 36 n.12.
190. Id at 36; see also id at 38 ("Badoni is incorrect in suggesting that the Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from designating public spaces for exclusively religious us-
es . . . .").
191. Id. at 36-37.
192. U.S. Brief, Wyoming Sawmills, supra note 111, at 50.
193. Id. at 51.
194. U.S. Brief, Access Fund, supra note 115, at 36-38.
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ments and relying on the precedents that would commonly be used to
defend religious accommodations in Establishment Clause challenges,
indicating a conviction that Indian religious exercise rights fit within the
mainstream of religious freedom protection. At the same time, the inclu-
sion of arguments that draw on Indian law principles and precedents in-
dicates recognition that addressing Indian religious needs requires in-
formed, deliberate solicitousness on the part of the government and that
this treatment is firmly grounded in longstanding legal principles. Past
suppression of religious practices, taking of aboriginal lands, and other
actions that have burdened religious exercise necessitate protective ac-
tions to ameliorate these burdens, which interfere with ceremonial use-
a normal use of public land. Indeed, even an exclusion of the public from
a site to allow ceremonies to occur is defensible.
The United States' political relationship with, and trust responsibil-
ity toward, tribes was acknowledged as a permissible-and in fact cru-
cial-factor in shaping plans to manage public lands on which sacred
sites are located. The dilemma faced by Indian religious practitioners
was recognized: the site-specific nature of their religions means that they
cannot simply go elsewhere to conduct ceremonies and other activities,
but they face disruptions from other visitors if they continue their prac-
tices at sites on public lands. Plans that are devised to respect and protect
these practices do not violate the Establishment Clause. In short, the
Government's efforts to defend the management plans developed at the
four sites at issue in these cases suggest a rejection of past hostile and
discriminatory policies toward Indian religions and a firm commitment
to fulfill the obligation to protect the religious needs of their contempo-
rary practitioners.
D. The Judicial Response: Establishment Clause Challenges Rejected
In the Bear Lodge litigation, the district court rejected the Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to the request that visitors refrain from climb-
ing on Devils Tower during June. The court agreed with the Government
that the voluntary climbing "ban" had a secular purpose (removing barri-
ers to worship resulting from public ownership of the tower), did not
have the impermissible effect of coercing participation in religion, and
did not constitute excessive entanglement between the government and
religion.195 The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit,
which drew on briefs submitted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,
which had intervened in the litigation, and by amici curiae to discuss the
significance of Devils Tower in its 1999 opinion. The court of appeals
reviewed past government policy toward Indians, including support for
missionaries and violent actions to suppress religious ceremonies, such
195. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1455-56 (D. Wyo. 1998).
The court did not address the challenges to the interpretive program or the placement of signs be-
cause it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue these claims. Id. at 1453.
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as the 1890 Ghost Dance Massacre at Wounded Knee. The court noted
the results of the change in this policy, embodied in developments such
as AIRFA, the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act (NAGPRA), the 1992 amendments to the National Historical
Preservation Act, and the Sacred Sites Order.' 96
After this extensive discussion of past suppression-and more re-
cent protection-of Indian religious exercise, however, the court of ap-
peals declined to address the merits of the Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to the Devils Tower FCMP. The plaintiffs (who had continued to
climb at the site despite the voluntary climbing limit) had not suffered
any injury and therefore lacked standing to pursue their claim, the court
explained.19 7 Although the climbers were, the court noted, "clearly in-
censed by the NPS'[s] request that they voluntarily limit their climbing,"
their indignation was no substitute for showing an actual injury.198 After
the court denied the plaintiffs' request for rehearing en banc,199 they
sought Supreme Court review of the panel's decision, but without suc-
cess.200 The NPS continues to manage Devils Tower National Monument
with a view toward accommodating Indian religious practices, among
other uses of the site, and to enrich visitors' experiences by educating
them about its significance to those who have long worshipped there. 20 1
In Wyoming Sawmills, the district court concluded in 2001 that
Sawmills lacked standing to pursue its Establishment Clause challenge to
the Medicine Wheel HPP2 02 and consequently did not address the merits
196. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817-18 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817-18 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing
the historical suppression of Indian religion as a basis for ameliorative measures); Brief by Amici
Curiae Med. Wheel Coal. on Sacred Sites of N. Am. et al. at 9-10, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n
v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-8021), 1998 U.S. 10th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 62, at
*9-10. In the 1890 Ghost Dance Massacre, Sioux men, women, and children who had gathered on
the Pine Ridge Reservation were killed in an attack by Seventh Cavalry troops participating in ef-
forts to suppress the Ghost Dance religion. The scattering of the bodies of women and children along
a distance of two miles from their Pine Ridge camp indicated that many had been killed while flee-
ing. See Dussias, supra note 22, at 794-99 (discussing the Ghost Dance and the massacre).
197. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821-22. The court noted that the individual recreational climbers
had been undeterred by the FCMP and that the plaintiff who was a commercial climbing guide had
not established any economic injury. Id. at 821.
198. Id. at 822.
199. Brief for Intervenors in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20 n.24, Bear
Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000) (No. 99-1045), 2000 WL 34014041, at
*20 n.24.
200. Bear Lodge, 529 U.S. at 1037.
201. George L. San Miguel, How Is Devils Tower a Sacred Site to American Indians, NAT'L
PARK SERV. (Aug. 1994), http://www.nps.gov/deto/historyculture/sacredsite.htm.
202. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1292-97 (D. Wyo. 2001).
The court concluded that although Sawmills had suffered an injury in fact resulting from the HPP
because the HPP caused it to lose the opportunity to bid on timber sales, Sawmills' injury would not
be redressed by striking down the HPP because doing so would not guarantee Sawmills the right to
log in the Horse Creek area. Id at 1296-97. The court rejected claims that Sawmills had also suf-
fered an injury on the grounds that it was "directly affected" by the U.S. Forest Service's manage-
ment of Medicine Mountain under the HPP as a sacred site. The court noted that Sawmills relied on
previous cases that had involved individual (rather than corporate) plaintiffs who were offended by
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of the claim, a decision that Sawmills appealed to the Tenth Circuit. In a
2004 opinion, the court of appeals acknowledged the overlap, recognized
in the HPP, of the cultural, historical, and religious aspects of the land-
mark for Indians: "The HPP recognizes explicitly that the cultural and
historic importance of the Medicine Wheel is, for many Native Ameri-
cans, an element of their religious tradition."203 The court noted that the
preservation of the Medicine Wheel is consistent with the USFS's re-
sponsibilities under the Sacred Sites Order and a number of statutes
aimed at protecting archaeological and historical sites and resources.204
Because the court affirmed the holding that Sawmills lacked standing to
pursue its Establishment Clause claim, however, it did not address the
claim's merits. 20 5 The Tenth Circuit denied Sawmills' petition for rehear-
ing en banc,206 a defeat that was followed by the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of Sawmills' petition for writ of certiorari in 2005.207
The landmark was renamed in 2011 as Medicine Wheel/Medicine
Mountain National Historic Landmark and expanded to cover an addi-
tional area of more than 4,000 acres.208 The expanded landmark includes
the summit of Medicine Mountain, the Medicine Wheel, an adjoining
ridge, and other adjacent lands with traditional spiritual and ceremonial
significance.209 Whereas the original landmark designation focused on
the area's archaeological value and encompassed only a 110-acre area
around the Medicine Wheel, the expanded designation recognizes the
Medicine Wheel and Medicine Mountain as having national significance
because of their traditional cultural value to many tribes.210 In short, the
federal government's commitment to the protection of the Medicine
coming in contact with religious symbolism that was being advanced by government action. Id at
1294-95. Finally, the court rejected Sawmills' argument that it suffered a constitutional injury from
the use of tax dollars to further Native American religion, relying on the taxpayer standing analysis
in Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation of Church State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982). Id at 1295-96.
203. Wyo. Sawmills, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
204. Id. (citing the Antiquities Act of 1906, the Historic Sites Act of 1935, the NHPA, the
Archaeological and Historic Resources Protection Act of 1974, AIRFA, and the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act of 1979).
205. Id at 1249.
206. The Tenth Circuit denied Sawmills' petition for rehearing en banc in December 2004.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 546 U.S. 811 (2005)
(No. 04-1175), 2005 WL 520493 at *1.
207. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 546 U.S. 811 (2005).
208. America's Great Outdoors: Secretary Salazar Designates 14 New National Historic
Landmarks, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR (June 30, 2011),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/AMERICAS-GREAT-OUTDOORS-Secretary-Salazar-
Designates-I 4-New-National-Historic-Landmarks.cfm.
209. Interior Secretary Salazar Announces Renaming of Medicine Wheel National Historic
Landmark, NATIVE NEWS NETWORK (July 6, 2011), http://www.nativenewsnetwork.com/interior-
secretary-salazar-announces-renaming-of-medicine-wheel-national-historic-landmark.html.
210. Robert J. Miller, Medicine Wheel/Medicine Mountain National Historic Landmark,
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Wheel continues in spite of attacks by those who would place commer-
cial and other interests above religious freedom.
In Natural Arch, the district court applied the Lemon test and con-
cluded in 2002 that the Rainbow Bridge GMP served the dual secular
purposes of promoting visitor understanding of different cultures and
"fostering the preservation of the historical, social, and cultural practices
of Native Americans." 211 It did not have an impermissible effect because
a reasonable observer would not view it as conveying a message of gov-
ernent endorsement of Indian religious beliefs and because requesting
visitors to consider not walking under the bridge does not amount to co-
ercion "into practicing the Native American religion associated with the
belief' about not passing under it.212 Finally, the Rainbow Bridge GMP
did not create excessive entanglement between government and religion.
Not only are the entities (tribes) that benefit from it not primarily reli-
gious in nature and the NPS involvement with religious practices very
limited, but the NPS-tribal consultation about the bridge's cultural, reli-
gious, and social importance was necessary for the NPS "to fulfill its
important trust responsibilities to American Indians." 2 13 The court noted
the requirement in the Sacred Sites Order that federal agencies "accom-
modate access to and ceremonial use" of sites by Indian religious practi-
tioners and "avoid adversely affecting the[ir] physical integrity." 2 14
Plaintiff DeWaal, who blamed the NPS's actions at Rainbow Bridge
on "treehuggers from the Sierra Club" and "Injuns," 215 appealed the dis-
missal of the claim to the Tenth Circuit. Relying on Bear Lodge, the
court of appeals decided that none of the plaintiffs had standing to chal-
lenge the Rainbow Bridge GMP. 2 16 The court noted the similarity to the
Bear Lodge facts: in neither case did the plaintiffs suffer any injury from
being asked to voluntarily refrain from going to a certain area out of re-
spect for Indians' views on its religious significance.217 In 2004, the Su-
preme Court denied DeWaal's petition for writ of certiorari.2 18 The NPS
211. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1224 (D. Utah 2002). The
court concluded that only plaintiff DeWaal had standing to challenge the Rainbow Bridge GMP on
Establishment Clause grounds. Id. at 1216-19.
212. Id. at 1224-25.
213. Id. at 1226; see also id. at 1224-26. The court rejected DeWaal's additional equal protec-
tion claim. Id. at 1220.
214. Id. at 1226 n.11. The court also cited NAGPRA and the 1992 NHPA Amendments as
additional examples of statutes "protecting tribal governments and cultures." Id.
215. Id at 1221 n.9 (quoting Ranger Paul Nelson's incident report concerning Mr. DeWaal)
(internal quotation marks omitted). DeWaal expressed his theory about the "conspiracy" between the
NPS, the Sierra Club, and Indians in an encounter with a park ranger during a visit to the monument.
Id.
216. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 98 F. App'x 711, 715-716 (10th Cir. 2004). The
Natural Arch opinion predated the Wyoming Sawmills opinion (dated March 23, 2004, and Septem-
ber 20, 2004, respectively).
217. Id. at 716.
218. DeWaal v. Alston, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005).
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continues to manage the monument in a way that fosters respect for the
religious significance of Rainbow Bridge.2 19
Finally, in the fourth case, the Access Fund litigation, the district
court held in 2005 that the USFS had not violated the Establishment
Clause by imposing a climbing ban at Cave Rock. 22 0 The Access Fund
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. For the first time, a court of
appeals reached the merits of, and rejected, an Establishment Clause
challenge to a federal land management decision that took into account
Indian religious rights. The 2007 Ninth Circuit opinion began with a de-
scription of the religious significance of the site, noting that "many
Washoe compare Cave Rock to a church." 2 2 1 The court held that the
Government "easily satisfie[d]" the first prong of the Lemon test because
the ban "served the permissible secular goal of protecting cultural, histor-
ical and archaeological features of Cave Rock." 22 2 Moreover, even if the
climbing ban had been imposed "in part to mitigate interference with the
Washoe's religious practices, this objective alone would not give rise to a
finding of an impermissible religious motivation" because Cave Rock's
status as a Washoe sacred site "does not diminish its importance as a
national cultural resource."2 23 Nor did the climbing ban have impermissi-
ble effects. As a practical matter, the climbing ban could not be per-
ceived as endorsing Washoe religious practices, given that the USFS had
rejected the tribe's preferred alternative of banning all activities incon-
sistent with Washoe belief.224 Finally, there was no excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion simply because the USFS would
need to have a surveillance program to enforce the climbing ban; super-
visory oversight of recreational activities at the site is no different from
monitoring to ensure that other rules are followed. 2 25 The court also re-
jected the Access Fund's reliance on dicta in Bear Lodge and Natural
219. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, Rainbow Bridge National Monument, Things to Do, NAT'L
PARK SERVICE (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.nps.gov/rabr/planyourvisit/things2do.htm ("We ask that
visitors respect the religious significance of Rainbow Bridge to neighboring tribes and consider
viewing Rainbow Bridge from the viewing area rather than walking up to or under the bridge.").
220. Access Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
district court relied on Lemon); see also Jeff DeLong, Judge Tells Climbers to Keep off Cave Rock,
RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL (Reno, Nev.), Jan. 31, 2005, at Cl (stating that a federal judge upheld the
climbing ban in a January 28, 2005 ruling).
221. Access Fund, 499 F.3d at 1039 (describing the site's historical and archaeological signifi-
cance).
222. Id at 1043-44.
223. Id at 1044 (citing Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 972, 975-76 (9th Cir.
2004)).
224. Id at 1045 (noting that the preferred alternative "would have denied non-Washoe access
to the TCP and banned hiking and other recreational uses at the rock").
225. Id at 1046. The court noted that recent Supreme Court opinions had discussed the second
and third prongs of the Lemon test together, although some recent Ninth Circuit cases still discussed
entanglement as a separate prong. The court focused its discussion on the first two prongs, "with an
eye to potential effects that might result in government becoming impermissibly embroiled in reli-
gious affairs." Id. at 1043.
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Arch, which it noted are out-of-circuit cases that are factually distin-
guishable.226
Judge Wallace concurred in the Access Fund result but believed that
the climbing ban should be analyzed in accordance with the 2005 plurali-
ty opinion in Van Orden v. Perry,227 in which the Supreme Court found
that a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State
Capitol did not violate the Establishment Clause.228 Like the religiously
and historically significant Ten Commandments monument, the Cave
Rock climbing ban has a dual significance: "[A]lthough it may promote
the Washoe religion, it also protects a culturally, historically, and ar-
chaeologically significant site." 229 Mere promotion of a message con-
sistent with a religious doctrine does not violate the Establishment
Clause because there is "no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion." 2 30
Following the Access Fund decision, a USFS order was signed to
enforce a permanent climbing closure, and the USFS took action to re-
move the climbing bolts that disfigured Cave Rock. The USFS continues
to implement its management plan for Cave Rock-to prevent climbing
in or on Cave Rock, manage the site for its "historic, cultural, archaeo-
logical and scientific values," and repair the damage done by climbers.231
Access Fund's significance is underscored by a 2011 Montana fed-
eral district court decision. In Fortune v. Thompson,2 32 the court rejected
a claim that the USFS's travel management plan (TMP) for a portion of
the sacred Badger-Two Medicine area (in Lewis and Clark National For-
est) violated the Establishment Clause.233 The TMP created motorized-
use restrictions for most of the area to mitigate interference with Black-
feet religious practices, among other reasons.234 Relying on Access Fund,
the court found that the TMP passed muster under the Lemon test.235
226. Id. at 1046.
227. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
228. Access Fund, 499 F.3d at 1047 (Wallace, J., concurring) (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at
690-91).
229. Id at 1048.
230. Id. (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 684) (internal quotation mark omitted).
231. U.S. FOREST SERV., CAVE ROCK MANAGEMENT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2009).
232. No. CV-09-98-GF-SEH, 2011 WL 206164 (D. Mont. Jan. 20, 2011).
233. Id. at *1, *3.
234. Id
235. Id. at *2 3. The court noted that the restriction was adopted for "a host of secular purpos-
es, including benefits to air quality, water quality, soil quality, wildlife habitat, and fish habitat" and
with consideration to "the Traditional Cultural District located within Badger-Two Medicine Area
and to resources governed by the [NHPA], 16 U.S.C. § 470f." Id. Also, the principal effect of the
TMP neither advanced nor inhibited religion and the TMP did not lead to excessive entanglement
with religion. Id. For a discussion of traditional Blackfeet religion and the religious significance of
the Badger-Two Medicine area, see Jay Hansford C. Vest, Traditional Blackfeet Religion and the
Sacred Badger-Two Medicine Wildlands, 6 J. L. & RELIGION. 455, 460-84 (1988).
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Although the outcomes in cases that have rejected Establishment
Clause challenges to the public lands management decisions discussed
above are undoubtedly positive from the perspective of religious freedom
proponents, it should not be assumed that the land management plans
that survived Establishment Clause challenges, either on the merits or on
standing grounds, were sufficient to fully protect religious exercise.
Washoe Tribal Chairman A. Brian Wallace has noted, for example, that
the USFS plan at Cave Rock "permits activities that will continue to ad-
versely affect the Tribe's traditional use." He warned that although some
decisions to protect sacred sites are being made and upheld, there are no
guarantees that sites will be protected. Consequently, "repatriation of a
site to the indigenous people is the only way to ensure proper protec-
tion." He expressed the Washoe Tribe's "hope that the recent protections
to the site demonstrate the strength and resiliency of indigenous cul-
ture."2 36 Chairman Wallace's concerns are borne out by tribal challenges
based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to public lands man-
agement decisions that threaten to interfere with religious exercise, and
by judicial reactions to them, as discussed below.
II. RFRA CHALLENGES TO INADEQUATE SACRED SITES PROTECTION:
THE GOVERNMENT AS FOE
[T]he American court system, composed largely of non-Indian feder-
al judges, has demonstrated over the years an inordinate difficulty in
applying regular principles of the First Amendment to native reli-
gions. . . . [J]udges resist applying the same rules of law that they
routinely apply in any other religion cases. . . . [T]here are cross-
cultural difficulties in understanding . . . why this peyote plant is sa-
cred or why this waterfall or this mountaintop has to be pre-
served.... The courts have had so much difficulty that the U.S. Su-
preme Court ... turned over the chore of protecting Native religious
liberty to the legislative branch. 237
Congress recognized that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with reli-
gious exercise," and legislated "the compelling interest test" as the
means for the courts to "strik[e] sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests." We have no
cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts un-
der RFRA is an easy one ... 238
Examination of the arguments made by the United States in cases in
which it defends its actions against accusations that they violate the Es-
236. WALLACE, supra note 96.
237. Walter Echo-Hawk, Lenny Foster & Alan Parker, Issues in the Implementation of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act: Panel Discussion, 19 WICAZO SA REv. 153, 156 (2004).
238. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)).
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tablishment Clause may create the impression that the government is a
zealous defender of Indian religious freedom and sacred sites. A different
picture emerges, however, from examining the Government's response to
RFRA claims brought by tribes and individual Indians with regard to
government conduct, and government approval of conduct by third par-
ties, that threatens worship and other religious activities at sacred sites.
Similarly, the above analysis of federal court opinions addressing these
accusations suggests that judges understand what is at stake for those
who worship at sacred sites when these sites are threatened by competing
uses and recognize the need, and the United States' legal responsibility,
to protect these sites. The judicial response to RFRA claims based on
threats to such sites, on the other hand, belies this impression.
A. RFRA: Putting the Government to the Test
RFRA provides that the government may not "substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion" unless it "demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person ... is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest [and] is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest."23 9 Although the Supreme Court held in
1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores,24 0 that RFRA is unconstitutional as
applied to the states, on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's en-
forcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,241 the
decision did not invalidate the statute as applied to the federal govern-
24ment.242 RFRA does not define "substantially burden," but the statute's
legislative findings made it clear that Congress disagreed with the limita-
tions that the Supreme Court had imposed on religious freedom claims in
Smith:
[L]aws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; govern-
ments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification; in Employment Division v. Smith, ... the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the govern-
ment justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion; and the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(l)(a)-(b) (2006).
240. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
241. Id. at 536. In dissent, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Court should reexamine its
holding in Smith and "return to a rule that requires government to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and to impose that burden only by
means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
242. In Gonzales, the Court addressed the merits of a RFRA challenge to federal government
action while noting that "[a]s originally enacted, RFRA applied to the States as well as the Federal
Government," but in City of Boerne v. Flores the Court "held the application to States to be beyond




between religious liberty and competing prior governmental inter-
ests.243
Consequently, Congress sought to restore the application of the compel-
ling interest test to actions that Smith said, following on the heels of Lyng
and Roy, did not need to meet the test. RFRA's purpose clause identified
this goal: "[T]o restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sher-
bert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 244
Although RFRA resulted from Congress's judgment that Smith was
wrongly decided,24 5 the cases discussed below indicate that Congress's
solicitude for Indian religious freedom is not shared by all federal land
managers and federal court judges.
B. Case Studies in Inadequate Protection: Undermining Religious Exer-
cise Rights
1. Desecrating the San Francisco Peaks
From the deepest memories of every Dine person to the core of
their being, from the countless songs of innumerable ceremonies, the
Dine knows this sacred mountain, Dook'o'Osliid, is holy. I ask that
you hear my plea and respond so that the spiritual life of my people
can continue unmolested. 246
247In Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, several tribes came to-
gether to bring a RFRA-based challenge to a USFS decision to allow
snowmaking with treated sewage effluent (referred to by the Government
by the more benign-sounding term "reclaimed waste water") as part of an
expansion project at the privately operated Snowbowl Resort (Snow-
bowl) located on Arizona's San Francisco Peaks. To maximize profits
from the operation of a ski resort in what is, after all, a desert area,
Snowbowl sought a more reliable source of snow, rather than having to
depend on the natural snowfall that could be spotty in dry years. The
sewage effluent that Snowbowl wished to use for this purpose came from
the sewers of Flagstaff and thus contained wastewater not only from
homes but also from morgues, mortuaries, and hospitals. Despite treat-
243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2)-(5) (2006).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006) (citations omitted).
245. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Congress also responded to Smith by enacting
legislation aimed at protecting Indian religious use of peyote. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2006).
246. Plaintiffs Navajo Nation et al. Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on "RFRA" Claim at 9, Navajo Nation v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (No. CV 05-1824 PCT PGR), 2005 WL
2835658, at *9 (quoting Navajo Nation President Shirley's statement to the U.N. Educational, Scien-
tific, and Cultural Organization) (internal quotation mark omitted) [hereinafter Navajo Summary
Judgment Response].
247. 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) af'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 479 F.3d




ment, the effluent still contained traces of fecal coliform bacteria. Snow-
bowl also sought to build a 14.8-mile-long pipeline in order to be able to
pump 1.5 million gallons of sewage effluent, in the form of artificial
snow, onto the mountain each day from November to February. 248 The
USFS's approval of the plan meant that Snowbowl could become the
world's first ski resort to depend entirely on sewage effluent for making
artificial snow.249
For the plaintiff tribes (the Navajo Nation, the Hualapai Tribe, the
Havasupai Tribe, the White Mountain Apache Nation, and the Yavapai-
Apache Nation), the San Francisco Peaks are sacred. Spraying the peaks
with snow made from sewage effluent would interfere, the tribes ex-
plained, with specific practices and substantially burden their exercise of
religion. 2 50 The San Francisco Peaks have been identified as a TCP by
the USFS and determined to be eligible for inclusion on the National
Register of Historic Places. In addition to the RFRA claim, the tribes
brought claims based on (1) failure to comply with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA), the NHPA, and the National Forest Man-
agement Act; (2) failure to consult properly with the tribes on a govern-
ment-to-government basis, as required by the Forest Service Manual,
NHPA regulations, and executive orders; and (3) violation of trust re-
sponsibilities.25 1
The plaintiff tribes explained in their motion for summary judgment
on their RFRA claim how the expansion project would substantially bur-
den their exercise of religion. For the people of the Yavapai-Apache Na-
tion, for example, the project would have a devastating impact on their
ability to practice their religion and conduct their daily lives. Councilman
Vincent Randall explained that "[t]he sacred Mountain is also a conduit
for our prayers to travel into the unseen spiritual world"252 and that the
proposed use of sewage effluent would "taint and scar the Mountain,
causing it to be ineffective, essentially killing the spiritual force within
248. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2007). The com-
mercial enterprise operating the resort is the Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership, which
operates under a forty-year special-use permit issued by the USFS.
249. Zackeree S. Kelin & Kimberly Younce Schooley, Dramatically Narrowing RFRA 's
Definition of "Substantial Burden" in the Ninth Circuit-The Vestiges of Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association in Navajo Nation et al. v. United States Forest Service et al., 55
S.D. L. REV. 426, 432 (2010); see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia A. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In
Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1118-24 (2009) (providing a thoughtful discussion of
Navajo Nation).
250. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1099- 1106 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (describing the spe-
cific practices of, and the plan's impact on, the various tribes).
251. See Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, 15, 18, Navajo Nation
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (No. CV 05-1824 PCT PGR), 2005 WL
2835663, at *3, *15, *18.
252. Navajo Summary Judgment Response, supra note 246, at 8 (quoting Vincent Randall,
Dilzhe'e Apache historian and Yavapai-Apache Nation councilman) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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it.253 Anthony Lee, President of the Dine Hatallii Association (a Navajo
medicine men's organization), explained that Navajo "ceremonial songs,
prayers, and offerings will be affected negatively ... and thus, our
homes, children, and land will be significantly burdened. Our mountain
soil bundles and ceremonies will be tainted and contaminated. ... A
USFS archaeologist provided a concise summary of how the tribes view
the peaks:
(a) as a home of spiritual beings; (b) a place where significant mytho-
logical events occurred; (c) a place where spirits of the dead went to
be changed into bringers of rain; (d) personification of gods and god-
desses; (e) an area where important societies originated; and (f) as a
source of life.255
As to the Government's allegedly compelling interest in operating the
Snowbowl as a public recreation facility, the plaintiffs noted that the
Government had been able to do this for the past 70 years without the
proposed expansion and "nothing in this litigation would change that."2 56
Finally, the tribes argued that even if there were a compelling interest at
stake, the USFS had "selected the alternative that had the most signifi-
cant burden on practitioners of Native American religions"-hardly the
least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling interest.257 The
Forest Supervisor had even admitted that the effects on "traditional val-
ues" of the proposal that had been selected were "the most significant
and irreconcilable impacts of any proposal presented." 2 58
2. Holding Back the Waters of Snoqualmie Falls
[T]he mists created by the thunderous waters flowing over
Snoqualmie Falls connect the heavens and the earth.259
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion,260 the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe challenged an order of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granting a forty-year renewal of
the license of Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (Puget) to operate a hydroelec-
tric power plant, consisting of a dam and two powerhouses, at the
253. Id. (quoting Vincent Randall, Dilzhe'e Apache historian and Yavapai-Apache Nation
councilman) (internal quotation mark omitted).
254. Id. at 9 (quoting Anthony Lee, president of the Dine Hatallii Association) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The Dine Hatallii Association was formerly called the Navajo Medicine Men's
Association. Id; see also Kelin & Schooley, supra note 249, at 435-37 (describing the plaintiffs'
testimony about their religious exercise at the San Francisco Peaks and the impact of the proposal).
255. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
256. Navajo Summary Judgment Response, supra note 246, at *10-11.
257. Id at 14 (emphasis added).
258. Id
259. Tribe's Combined Reply and Intervenor's Brief at 1, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC,
545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 05-72739, 05-74060), 2006 WL 3856749, at *1 [hereinafter
Reply Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe].
260. 545 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Snoqualmie Falls.2 6 1 The Snoqualmie Falls is located about thirty miles
east of Seattle, where the Snoqualmie River "flows down from the Cas-
cade Mountains."26 2
The litigation capped over a decade of efforts by the Snoqualmie
Tribe to protect the falls from the impact of the power plant's activities
under a new license, for which Puget had applied in 1991.263 The Federal
Power Act (FPA) requires FERC to balance a number of interests, in-
cluding tribal interests and recommendations, in making licensing deci-
sions.264 FERC has developed a policy statement on tribal consultation to
help it meet this requirement.265 The Snoqualmie Tribe, joined by envi-
ronmental and church groups, intervened in opposition to the application,
relying on the Free Exercise Clause, AIRFA, and RFRA.266 The Depart-
ment of the Interior and the American Civil Liberties Union also ex-
pressed concerns about the Snoqualmie Falls project and its effect on
Snoqualmie religious rights in comments filed with FERC.267
During the license renewal process, the Snoqualmie Tribe explained
that the power of the falls for religious observances "derives from the
quantity and quality of the Falls' mist and spray, which in turn is deter-
mined by the quantity of flow over the Falls."268 Although natural flows
support these practices, a proposal by Puget for a yearly allotment of
flows for the tribe's purposes did not. One religious practice, for exam-
ple, the vision quest, "is by nature an individual and spontaneous prac-
tice, not one which can be 'scheduled"' to coincide with Puget's pro-
posed flow allotments.269
In issuing the new license in 1994, however, FERC rejected the
Snoqualmie Tribe's arguments. Citing Lyng, the 1994 FERC license or-
der stated that "[i]ncidental effects of Government which may interfere
with the practice of religion, but do not coerce its practitioners into act-
ing contrary to their religious beliefs, do not, within the meaning of the
First Amendment, constitute a prohibition on the free exercise of reli-
261. Id. The plant consists of a dam and two powerhouses. Although FERC is an independent
regulatory agency, rather than an agency with the kind of management authority over public lands
held by the NPS and USFS, it is included in the discussion here because of the potential impact of its
licensing decisions on sacred sites. Id.
262. Id.
263. Order Issuing New License, Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 107 F.E.R.C. 1| 61,331, at p.
62,513 (2004) [hereinafter Puget License Order].
264. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2006).
265. Policy Statement on Consultation with Indian Tribes in Commission Proceedings, 18
C.F.R. § 2.1c (2003).
266. Puget License Order, supra note 263, at p. 62,514, 62 ,5 18 .
267. Id. at p. 62,518 n.35. The Snoqualmie Tribe's participation in the license renewal process
was complicated by the fact that much of the tribe's work to protect the falls coincided with efforts
to gain federal acknowledgment as a tribe, a goal that the Snoqualmie achieved in 1997. Final De-
termination to Acknowledge the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,864 (1997).
268. Puget License Order, supra note 263, at p. 62,518 n.33.
269. Id.
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gion."270 FERC was in compliance with AIRFA, the order claimed, as
long as it considers Indian leaders' views and "avoids unnecessary inter-
ference with Indian religious practices" in implementation of the pro-
ject.27 1 Finally, FERC rejected the application of RFRA, claiming it was
not applicable "to situations in which the Government took some action
which incidentally affected the quality of an individual's religious expe-
,,272rience.
FERC Commissioner Nora Mead Brownell dissented from the deci-
sion based on the license order's failure to strike the right balance be-
tween Puget's interests and recreational, cultural, and religious interests.
The license allowed minimum daytime water flows that were well below
those recommended by FERC's own staff in the Final Environmental
Impact Statement prepared for the project. She highlighted the differen-
tial treatment of tourism-related interests and Snoqualmie religious
needs: the order included staff-recommended increased flow require-
ments for the three-day Labor Day weekend for tourists' benefit while
rejecting, without explanation, the staff-recommended minimum-flow
increases for the benefit of the tribe.273
Following rehearing of the license order, at the Snoqualmie Tribe's
request, FERC agreed that the order's water certification flows did "not
sufficiently take account of the Tribe's concerns" and issued a new order
(the Rehearing Order).274 Rather than adopting the overall flows recom-
mended by FERC staff, however, the Rehearing Order only required
higher water flows over the falls in May and June, the months when the
greatest volume of mist (recognized as a "critical component of [the
Snoqualmie Tribe's] spiritual experience") naturally occurs. 2 75 The Re-
hearing Order met with the disapproval of Puget, which claimed that the
flow increases, based on the Snoqualmie Falls' religious significance to
the tribe, violated the Establishment Clause. 27 6 Both the tribe and Puget
sought Ninth Circuit review of the issuance of the Rehearing Order.2 7 7
270. Id. at p. 62,519 (footnote omitted) (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439. 440, 447-48 (1988); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D. S.D. 1982), af'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983)).
271. Id
272. Id.
273. Id. at p. 62,541-43.
274. Order on Rehearing and Dismissing Stay Request, Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 110
F.E.R.C. 161,200, at p. 61,746, 61,749 (2005).
275. Id at p. 61,746. FERC reasoned that "[gliven the size of the project ... the relatively
small effect on net annual benefit, and the importance of the mist at this site to the Snoqualmie
Tribe, raising the flows ... throughout the months of May and June appropriately balances compet-
ing interests." Id. One commissioner dissented, noting that he saw nothing to warrant the rebalancing
of the interests from the original order. Id. at p. 61,749.
276. Order Denying Rehearing, Puget Sound Energy, Inc., Ill F.E.R.C. 1 61,317, at p. 62,392
(2005). FERC rejected the Establishment Clause argument. Id. at p. 62,390.
277. The Snoqualmie Tribe argued that FERC used the wrong legal standard to review the
tribe's RFRA claim as to the Snoqualmie Falls project and that FERC's conclusion that the relicens-
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3. Threatening the Medicine Bluffs "Viewscape"
Not since the bloody days of the forced captivity of my ancestors
have we faced such an ominous threat.278
In Comanche Nation v. United States,27 9 the Comanche Nation and
Jimmy W. Arterberry Jr., the tribe's historic preservation officer, sought
an injunction against the construction of a warehouse for use by the U.S.
Army's Fort Sill, Oklahoma military installation. The proposed ware-
house would adversely impact the "viewscape" of Medicine Bluffs, a
landform within Fort Sill. As the Army knew, Medicine Bluffs is fre-
quently used by members of the Comanche, Kiowa, and Wichita Tribes
"for spiritual cleansings, vision quests, healing ceremonies, and as a
place of repose for deceased family member bodies or ashes." 28 0 Medi-
cine Bluffs was added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1974
for being a unique geological feature and an area of significance to Na-
281tive Amencans.
The plaintiffs brought a claim under RFRA, alleging that the pro-
posed warehouse would impose a substantial burden on the conduct of
religious ceremonies and rituals by Arterberry and other practitioners of
Comanche traditional beliefs.282 Arterberry explained that Medicine
Bluffs is "the heart of the current Comanche Nation" and that the pro-
posed warehouse site would inhibit his view of the three peaks of Medi-
cine Bluffs, prevent him from orienting himself to the peaks, and prevent
him from "having a religious experience central to my way of life."283
The resulting impact of the proposed warehouse was grave indeed: it
"would completely prohibit members of the Comanche Nation from ex-
ercising their religion at the base of Medicine Bluffs . . . as they have
done for generations."284
ing did not substantially burden the tribe's exercise of religion was not supported by substantial
evidence. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008).
278. Complaint at Ex. 3, 2, Comanche Nation v. United States, No. 5:08-cv-00849-D, 2008
WL 4426621 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Comanche Nation Complaint] (quoting Letter
from Wahathuweeka (William G. Voelker), Chairman, Comanche Nation NAGPRA & Historic
Preservation Program, to Major General Peter Vangjel (Feb. 15, 2008)).
279. 2008 WL 4426621, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
280. Comanche Nation Complaint, supra note 278, at *3-4.
281. See Oklahoma National Register of Historic Places, NAT'L PARK SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/state/ok/list.htm?program-9F8DA718-155D-4519-3ElCC7FEEE2868BA (last
visited Jan. 3, 2013); see also National Register of Historic Places Inventory-Nomination Form,
NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.ocgi.okstate.edu/shpo/nhrpdfs/74001659.pdf (last visited Oct. 30.,
2012).
282. Comanche Nation Complaint, supra note 278, at 4-5. The plaintiffs also brought a claim
under the NHPA, alleging that the Army had violated Section 106 of the NHPA by failing to consult
with them about the impact of the project on the Medicine Bluffs viewscape. Id.
283. Id. at Ex. 4, 1-2.
284. Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 5,
Comanche Nation v. United States, No. 5:08-cv-00849 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008), 2008 WL
4426621, at *5.
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C. Resisting Religious Freedom Claims Under RFRA
1. Father Knows Best: Denying the Existence of a Substantial Bur-
den
In defending its actions under RFRA's requirements, the Govern-
ment argued in the cases outlined above that, contrary to the plaintiffs'
claims, either no burden was imposed on Indian religious exercise by the
challenged action or that the burden was not substantial. It stands to rea-
son that religious practitioners know best what kinds of government ac-
tions adversely impact their religious beliefs and practices, and how sig-
nificant the impact is or will be. The Government's argument in these
cases therefore amounts to a claim that the government knows more
about Indian religions than Indians do. Given the requirements of RFRA,
though, it is not surprising for the Government to argue that a plaintiffs
exercise of religion has not been substantially burdened in trying to
counter a RFRA claim, regardless of which religion's practitioners are
involved in a particular case. In light of the history of government policy
toward Indian religions and contemporary government commitments to
the protection of Indian religion and sacred sites, however, the argument
smacks of arrogance and continuing paternalism when made to counter
Indian RFRA claims.
The Government argued for a narrow definition of the "substantial
burden" concept in these cases. It sought to limit the concept to the fac-
tual situations present in pre-Smith and pre-RFRA cases in which the
Supreme Court invalidated governmental actions on Free Exercise
Clause grounds despite the fact that the language of RFRA does not limit
its application to these specific situations. Thus, in Navajo Nation, in
defending against the RFRA-based objection to using sewage effluent for
snowmaking before the Ninth Circuit, the Government emphasized that
(1) the Supreme Court's pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause cases had inval-
idated governmental actions only when "individuals [were] forced to
choose between following the tenets of their religion and either receiving
a government benefit or [facing] criminal sanctions" 285 and (2) the Nava-
jo Nation plaintiffs were not faced with the choice between their reli-
gious beliefs and the receipt of a government benefit or the threat of
criminal sanctions.2 86 Therefore, the plaintiffs had failed to show that
285. Response Brief of the Fed. Appellees at 20-21, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S.
Ct. 2763 (2009) (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 1304732, at *20--21 [hereinafter U.S. Response Brief,
Navajo Nation] (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963)). The Government also argued that the USFS had complied with NEPA in Defendants' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 4, 20-21, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866
(D. Ariz. 2005) (Nos. CV 05-1824-PCT-PGR, CV 05-1914-PCT-EHC, CV 05-1949-PCT-NVW, CV
05-1966-PCT-JAT), 2005 WL 6169180, at *4, *20-21 [hereinafter U.S. Motion for Summary
Judgment, Navajo Nation].
286. U.S. Response Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 21.
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their free exercise of religion had been substantially burdened.287 Moreo-
ver, the Government claimed, the plaintiffs' ability to gather sacred ob-
jects and conduct ceremonies at the San Francisco Peaks was not being
impaired 28 8 despite the evidence to the contrary presented by the plain-
tiffs. 2 89 In the Government's view, actions that would desecrate a sacred
site in the eyes of those whose religious exercise rights were at stake
would not amount to a substantial burden on these rights.
Expanding on this point, the Government characterized Ninth Cir-
cuit precedents' substantial burden analysis under RFRA as requiring a
finding that the government's action is either preventing the practitioner
from engaging in religious activity (by making that activity impossible or
by penalizing that activity through criminal sanctions) or is putting sub-
stantial pressure on the practitioner to abandon his or her religiously mo-
tivated conduct 290 and argued that the evidence did not support such a
finding.291 In fact, the plaintiffs had offered evidence that the Govern-
ment's action of allowing the use of wastewater for snowmaking did
indeed prevent them from engaging in religious activity. Practitioners
would no longer be able to gather materials needed for medicine bundles
and other religious purposes if they had been contaminated by the use of
wastewater and therefore were no longer usable for these purposes.292
They would be prevented from engaging in gathering of these essential
materials due to the government-sanctioned contamination just as effec-
tively as if the practitioners were physically barred from visiting the
peaks. The Government cited additional Ninth Circuit precedents as es-
tablishing that a government action imposes a substantial burden if it
prevents an individual "from engaging in conduct or having a religious
experience which the faith mandates."2 93 Here again, it seems that con-
tamination of the sacred San Francisco Peaks by snow made from sew-
age effluent would have this impact on the plaintiffs by preventing them
from performing ceremonies or gathering materials at proper places, but
the Government denied that this was the case. Finally, the Government
rejected the Ninth Circuit's 2004 decision in San Jose Christian College
v. City of Morgan fill29 4 as affecting the substantial burden analysis or
287. Id. at 26.
288. U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 29.
289. The Ninth Circuit panel opinion included an extensive discussion of the specific impacts
on sites, ceremonies, and resources described by the plaintiff tribes. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034-43 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing Hopi, Navajo, Hualapai, and Havasupai
beliefs and practices, and the burdens that the proposed action would impose).
290. U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 25-26 (citing
Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 2002)).
291. Id. at 29 ("Plaintiffs have set forth no evidence that any of their members will be substan-
tially burdened by the government's actions . . . .").
292. E.g., Joint Opening Brief of Appellants Hualapai Tribe at 16, Hualapai Tribe v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-15371, 06-15455), 2006 WL 2429668, at *16.
293. U.S. Motion for Summary Judgment, Navajo Nation, supra note 285, at 27 (quoting
Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000)).
294. 360 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004).
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its outcome because the latter case applied the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) rather than RFRA.295
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, in addressing the tribe's RFRA claim
as to the Puget hydroelectric project license order before the Ninth Cir-
cuit, FERC argued that in issuing the new license it "did not burden, let
alone 'substantially burden,' the Tribe's religious practices under
RFRA." 296 This claim was made despite the admission that the flow over
Snoqualmie Falls under the license would be less than the tribe had iden-
297tified as being necessary for religious purposes. FERC argued that a
government action does not impose a "substantial" burden on the prac-
tice of religion "where the action does not pressure the adherent to take
action forbidden by, or prevent the adherent from engaging in conduct
mandated by, that religion."298 FERC also relied on San Jose Christian
College-rejected by the Government as being relevant in Navajo Na-
tion-for guidance on the level of infringement that must be present for a
burden imposed by an action to be "substantial": "[T]he . .. action ...
'must be 'oppressive' to a 'significantly great' extent. That is, a 'substan-
tial burden' on 'religious exercise' must impose a significantly great re-
striction or onus upon such exercise."' 2 99 Although San Jose Christian
College defined "substantial burden" for the purposes of RLUIPA, FERC
noted that RLUIPA substantially tracks RFRA's language and was en-
acted in response to the partial invalidation of RFRA.3 00 FERC argued
that the tribe had failed to demonstrate that such a burden existed be-
cause the license issuance would not require members of the Snoqualmie
Tribe to violate their beliefs nor prohibit their access to the falls.3 0 1
FERC emphasized that the Snoqualmie Tribe was still practicing its reli-
gion at the falls and still regarded the falls as sacred, as if a substantial
295. Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 21,
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F.Supp.2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (Nos. CV 05-1824-PCT-
PGR, CV 05-1914-PCT-EHC, CV 05-1949-PCT-NVW, CV 05-1966-PCT-JAT), 2005 WL
2835678, at *21 (citing San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034-35
(9th Cir. 2004)). The Government also argued that even if the Ninth Circuit's current "substantial
burden" definition is best described by San Jose Christian College and a subsequent case, Warsol-
dier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005), the plaintiffs "had still failed to establish that their
religious exercise was 'substantially burdened."' Response Brief of the Federal Appellees at 3 1,
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (No. 06-15371), 2006
U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 737, at *31 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation].
296. Brief of Respondent FERC at 11, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th
Cir. 2006) (No. 05-72739), 2006 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 851, at *14-[hereinafter FERC Brief,
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe].
297. Id. at 22 n.7.
298. Id. at 25 (citing Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1996)).
299. Id. (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
300. Id at 25 n.8.
301. Id at 27; see also id. at 31-33 ("[T]he religious adherent bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that it cannot accomplish the mandates of its religion because of the government's action.").
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burden would exist only if the tribe had been forced to completely aban-
don worship at the falls. 30 2
In Comanche Nation, the Government argued that no burden would
be imposed on the plaintiffs' ability to exercise their religion by the Ar-
my's construction of the planned warehouse at Fort Sill. Having claimed
that no burden would be imposed, the Government did not offer a defini-
tion of "substantial burden."3 03 The Government argued that "there are
numerous other places where the Bluffs can be viewed," 3  a statement
that ignored the evidence that particular viewscapes of the Bluffs are
significant in Comanche religious practices. The Government was simi-
larly dismissive of the idea that moving forward with the warehouse con-
struction would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs (a requirement
for a temporary restraining order), disputing their "claim that the TSC
[Training Support Center] warehouse site is the only location to view the
Bluffs, practice their sacred ceremonies or ascend up the slop[e] to the
top of the Bluffs." 305
In summary, in these RFRA cases, the Government denied, or min-
imized, the impact of land managers' actions on Indian religious exer-
cise. On the other hand, in defending government actions against Estab-
lishment Clause challenges in the cases discussed in Part I, the Govern-
ment not only admitted that its actions had negatively impacted Indian
religious exercise but also has used this impact as a legal justification-a
permissible secular purpose-for the challenged action.3 06 Somehow the
government has developed myopia, or perhaps willful blindness, as to
such impacts in the RFRA context.
2. It's Our Land: Privileging Other Interests over Religious Exer-
cise Rights
In the sacred sites cases discussed in Part I, the Government de-
fended its decisions to act in ways that fostered respect for, and were
designed to prevent interference with, Indian religious exercise on public
lands. Moreover, the Government spoke of the taking of the land con-
taining sacred sites from tribes, and the government's special relationship
302. Id. at 34.
303. Federal Defendants' Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order with Brief at 25-
26, Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621 (W.D. Okla. Sept.
23, 2008), 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 97564, at *39 [hereinafter U.S. Brief, Comanche
Nation]. The court explained the threshold requirements for a RFRA claim:
Plaintiffs must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the governmental
action complained of (1) substantially burdens, (2) a religious belief rather than a philos-
ophy or way of life (3) which belief is sincerely held by the Plaintiffs. Only after Plain-
tiffs establish these threshold requirements does the burden shift to the government.
Id at 26 (quoting Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 942 F. Supp. 511, 517 (W.D. Okla.
1996), af'd, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Id at 25 n.14.
305. Id. at 26.
306. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text.
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with tribes, as necessitating the solicitude for Indian religious exercise
rights that the challenged management plans reflected. In other words,
the fact this was "the government's land" did not relieve the government
of responsibilities toward Indian religious practitioners.
Once again, the Government told a different story as to the signifi-
cance of its property rights in the RFRA cases. While denying that Indian
religious exercise was substantially burdened within the meaning of
RFRA, the Government went on to argue in the RFRA sacred-sites cases
that even a substantial burden would be justifiable because of the other
interests tied to public lands that were at stake-interests that were
deemed more important than religious exercise. Thus, in Navajo Nation,
the Government argued that even if the snowmaking plan constituted a
substantial burden, the USFS had a compelling interest in providing op-
portunities for recreation on public lands. The Government rejected the
claim (made by amici curiae) that the Government's actual "compelling"
interest was ensuring profits for Snowbowl, whose economic viability
was dependent on adequate snow, which could not be ensured by reli-
ance on natural snowfall alone in the San Francisco Peaks' desert envi-
ronment.30 s The USFS had, the Government claimed, "worked hard to
protect the natural resources that the tribes value for their religious pur-
poses," but the USFS has to "make hard choices." 309 In this case, the
"hard" choice was to treat skiing and other forms of recreation as more
important uses of the peaks than religious exercise by allowing desecra-
tion of the peaks by snow made from sewage effluent.
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, FERC maintained that the license order
advanced "myriad compelling governmental interests," such as "the pro-
vision of needed generation [of power] in the Puget service area; ... the
preservation of recreational benefits; [and] the provision of flood control
benefits"310 -benefits that presumably redounded primarily to non-
Indians. According to FERC, the sacrifice of a certain faith's religious
practices for "the common good" 311 could be required in order "to main-
tain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great
variety of faiths."312 As had so often been the case in the past, Indians
could be compelled to pay the price of decisions designed to benefit the
(non-Indian) public good.
307. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 37; id. at 44 (identifying provision of public
safety by expanding the facilities to reduce alleged overcrowding, also, as a compelling interest).
308. Id. at 41.
309. Id at 40. Other changes approved in the expansion plan included increases in the skiable
acreage and the creation of a snowplay area. Id. at 6-7. The Government identified providing for
public safety, by expanding the facilities to reduce alleged overcrowding, as a compelling interest as
to these changes. Id. at 43.
310. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 35-36 (citations omitted).
311. Id. at 36 (quoting Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir. 1996)).




In Comanche Nation as well, the Government argued that even if
the court determined that Comanche practitioners were "nominally bur-
dened in their religious practices," the construction of the warehouse was
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.3 13 The warehouse
was needed, the Government claimed, to support "an increased mission"
at Fort Sill that will result in an influx of new soldiers. 3 14 The military's
claimed needs trumped mere religious needs.
Defending land managers' decisions in the RFRA cases, the Gov-
ernment thus argued that other interests should be privileged over Indian
religious exercise. Although accommodation of Indian religious exercise
and protection of sacred sites was acknowledged as legally justified-
and in some cases even legally compelled-in the Establishment Clause
cases examined in Part I, these concerns fell by the wayside, pushed out
of the way by (more) compelling interests, in the RFRA cases.
3. We Did the Best We Could: RFRA's "Least Restrictive Means"
Requirement
In addressing the "least restrictive means" component of the RFRA
test, the Government argued in Navajo Nation that the USFS had chosen
the least restrictive means to further its compelling interests because it
had tried to minimize adverse impacts on tribal culture and religion and
had "considered all feasible alternative water sources for snowmak-
ing."3 15 From the plaintiff tribes' perspective, though, the agency had not
tried hard enough to prevent desecration of the San Francisco Peaks-
clearly an adverse impact-and the water source that it approved for
snowmaking-sewage effluent-was not one that the tribes saw as "fea-
sible." Feasibility was judged on the basis of land managers', rather than
religious practitioners', sense of what was acceptable at a sacred site.
The Government dismissed the testimony of a USFS archaeologist that
another alternative, which eliminated the use of sewage effluent, would
have satisfied the expansion project's purpose and need, arguing that she
did not fully understand the implications of the competing policies being
considered.3 16
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, FERC similarly claimed that the new
license order advanced compelling interests using the least restrictive
means by preserving power generation while respecting tribal inter-
ests.317 FERC repeatedly insisted that the new license order was actually
beneficial to the Snoqualmie Tribe's religious exercise, as if FERC offi-
cials believed that the tribe was unable to comprehend the benefits that it
313. U.S. Brief, Comanche Nation, supra note 303, at 30.
314. Id. at 8.
315. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 45-46 (emphasis added).
316. Id. at 46, 54 n.9 (indicating that the alternative mentioned in the testimony, Alternative 3,
did not use reclaimed water).
317. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 38.
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received under the license order, but if reminded of them repeatedly the
tribe would eventually understand and stop complaining. Although
FERC's argument was based on the fact that the new order undid some
of the harm done by the previous license order by restoring water flows
beyond what was required under that license, this improvement as com-
pared to past-required flows did not mean that there could not be grounds
for concern based on the present flows. In other words, some lessening of
burdens does not mean that they no longer exist or are not still substan-
tial. FERC's argument seems akin to reasoning that a prison immate
whom a warden had beaten three times a week has no grounds to com-
plain about being beaten once the beatings are reduced to twice a week.
In Comanche Nation, the Government did not explicitly address the
least restrictive means element of RFRA. After claiming that it has
"more than met the showing required" that the warehouse construction is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, the Government
simply scoffed some more at the plaintiffs' claim that their religious ex-
ercise was burdened. Characterizing the plaintiffs' use of the site "at least
annually" (according to plaintiff Arterberry) as "infrequent use,"318 the
Government stressed the alleged harm (financial and other) to the Gov-
ernment from the continuation of the restraining order, compared to the
"little if any injury to the Plaintiffs." 3 19 The public interest, the Govern-
ment argued, supported lifting the temporary restraining order that had
been imposed on the warehouse project:
It is in the public's interest to have a well-trained and equipped mili-
tary engaged in the War on Terror [and] to ensure that its environ-
mental laws and historical preservation laws are not 'highjacked' and
agencies held hostage, based upon frivolous or specious claims.320
This appeal to anxiety over the "War on Terror" as justification for ac-
tions that burden religious exercise brings to mind the concern voiced in
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Smith with regard to what Justice
Blackmun termed the "war on drugs." 32 1 Although Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the majority's refusal to apply the compelling interest
test, she concluded that the test was satisfied because of the State's com-
pelling interest in confronting drug abuse, "one of the most serious prob-
lems confronting our society today."322 In both situations, so the story
318. U.S. Brief, Comanche Nation, supra note 303, at 25.
319. Id. at 26. In addition to financial costs, other claimed impacts were on the Army's ability
to train newly arriving soldiers. Id at 26-29.
320. Id. at 29.
321. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 909-10 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (applying
the compelling interest test in his opinion, Justice Blackmun explained that "[i]t is not the State's
broad interest in fighting the critical 'war on drugs' that must be weighed against respondents' claim,
but the State's narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious, ceremonial use of
peyote").
322. Id. at 903-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice O'Connor concurred in
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went, suppression of Indian religious freedom was not too high a price to
pay for allegedly greater security against perceived threats.
4. The Long Shadow of Lyng
The discussion above has focused on the Government's efforts to
respond to specific elements of the RFRA test. It is also instructive to
examine the role played in the Government's RFRA defense by some of
the more sacred sites-, and Indian-, specific considerations that figured in
the Government's arguments in response to the Establishment Clause
challenges addressed in Part I. In that context, the Government relied on
the Lyng majority opinion's encouragement of accommodation of reli-
gious exercise on public lands as support for the agency decisions at is-
sue. The Lyng holding itself was distinguished as not being on point be-
cause a voluntary government accommodation, rather than a Free Exer-
cise Clause claim, was at issue.
In the RFRA cases, Lyng played a different (and, from the perspec-
tive of the plaintiffs, decidedly less benign) role. In Navajo Nation, for
example, the Government relied on Lyng as support for its argument that
the plaintiffs had not established that their free exercise of religion was
substantially burdened.323 The Government described the facts of Lyng as
being "somewhat analogous to the present case, as both involve free ex-
ercise challenges by Indian tribes to a Forest Service project on public
lands."324 The plaintiff tribes were charged with asking the court to per-
mit an action that Lyng had rejected: the imposing of "a 'religious servi-
tude' on public lands preventing the government from managing those
lands in the public interest,325-Or at least in the interest of members of
the public who did not regard the area in question as sacred.
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, FERC argued that Lyng "remains good
law" and that RFRA was not intended to invalidate it.326 Likening the
tribe's claim to that of the plaintiffs in Lyng, and using the same indig-
nant tone that characterized parts of the Lyng opinion, FERC warned of
the threat that the claim posed: "[T]his case involves nothing less than
the judgment in Smith on the basis of her application of the compelling interest test. She concluded
that the State had a compelling interest in regulating peyote use and that accommodating the Native
American Church members' religiously motivated conduct would unduly interfere with the fulfill-
ment of that interest. Id. at 907; see also id at 906 ("I believe that granting a selective exemption in
this case would seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote by
its citizens."). Justice Blackmun pointed out in his opinion, however, the contrast between sacramen-
tal peyote use and "the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of unlawful drugs" that impli-
cated health and safety concerns. Id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
323. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 24, 28.
324. Id. at 24.
325. Id. at 40-41 (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452
(1988)).
326. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 28-31.
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the government's authority and responsibility to regulate the public use
of its jurisdictional waterways." 327
5. The Role of the Establishment Clause
In cases discussed in Part I, the Government explicitly argued that it
could take into account Indian religious beliefs and practices in making
land management decisions without violating the Establishment
Clause.328 In the RFRA cases, on the other hand, the Government argued
that one of the justifications for imposing a burden on religious beliefs
and practices was compliance with the Establishment Clause. Thus, in
Navajo Nation, the Government noted that in making land use decisions,
the USFS "must be guided not only by its statutory duties, but also by
constitutional constraints," such as compliance with the Establishment
Clause.329 The Government insisted that the USFS had "provided a num-
ber of accommodations" to the plaintiff tribes during the development of
the expansion project, such as eliminating night skiing and lighting, seek-
ing to provide access to religious practitioners during construction, and
permitting the gathering of materials for religious practices, consistent
with both the Constitution and the USFS's multiple-use mandate.3 30 Ar-
guments that additional accommodations could be provided without vio-
lating the Establishment Clause were discounted.3 In short, the attitude
displayed toward the tribes was that having received some accommoda-
tions, they should be satisfied and not greedily demand more.
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, however, the Establishment Clause ap-
peared in a different guise. In addition to responding to the tribe's argu-
ment that its religious exercise had not received the protection required
pursuant to RFRA, FERC needed to respond to Puget's objections to the
required increased water flows for the purported benefit of tribal reli-
gious exercise under the Rehearing Order. Although Puget had not re-
newed in the Ninth Circuit proceedings the specific Establishment
Clause objection that it had raised in the FERC proceedings, 33 2 it still
objected to the impact of tribal religious needs on setting flow require-
ments. Puget argued that there was no evidence to support FERC's find-
ing that the flow that FERC ordered "will supply spray and mist suffi-
cient to provide the Tribe with a satisfactory religious and spiritual expe-
rience."3 Defending its decision, FERC explained that it had concluded
327. Id. at 37.
328. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
329. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 41-42. In its brief to the Ninth Circuit, the
Government quoted the statement of the district court that "compliance with the Establishment
Clause is an additional compelling governmental interest." Id
330. Id. at 42.
331. Id (discounting additional accommodations mentioned by the amici curiae as either
similar to the accommodations already given or as not requested by the plaintiff tribes).
332. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
333. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 54.
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that even though the flow level that it approved "would not provide the
full natural flows the Tribe requested, it could still enhance the Falls'
cultural value."334 FERC thus played its Establishment Clause cards in
two ways: (1) in defending its conduct against the RFRA claim, it argued
that it had been solicitous toward the Snoqualmie Tribe and its religious
needs, but (2) in responding to Puget's objection to the flow require-
ments, FERC downplayed the level of protection that it had provided.
6. Ignoring or Deflecting the Political and Trust Relationships
In the Establishment Clause challenges discussed in Part I, the Gov-
ernment cited its political relationship with and trust responsibilities to-
wards tribes in addressing the secular purpose and secular effect prongs
of the Lemon test and the endorsement test. In Bear Lodge, for example,
the Government acknowledged a trust relationship-based need to protect
Indian religious exercise even on federal (as opposed to trust) land."'
In the RFRA challenges to land management decisions, however,
the Government seemed to have developed amnesia with regard to these
important aspects of the federal-tribal relationship. In Navajo Nation, for
example, the Government did not even address the issue of whether the
approval of the expansion project violated the Government's trust or
political relationship with the plaintiff tribes in its brief to the Ninth Cir-
cuit. In the district court proceedings, the Government had addressed the
trust responsibility but downplayed it, asserting that the only trust duty
that was applicable was the duty to comply "with generally applicable
regulations and statutes," which (it claimed) the USFS had done.336 The
fact that the lands affected by the USFS decision were not held in trust
for the tribes was also emphasized.33 7
The Government did not refer to the trust responsibility or the Unit-
ed States' political relationship in either Snoqualmie Indian Tribe or Co-
manche Nation. Thus, these principles did not enter into the Govern-
ment's interpretation of the balancing of interests required by RFRA.
D. The Mixed Judicial Response to Sacred Sites RFRA Claims
In contrast to the rejection of the Establishment Clause claims of all
of the plaintiffs in the challenges to the land management decisions dis-
cussed above (albeit in some cases on the basis of lack of standing rather
than on the merits), the judicial response to the tribes' RFRA claims was
mixed. There were differences of opinion within circuits not only as be-
tween lower courts and appellate courts and between a court of appeals
334. Id. at 55.
335. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
336. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 33, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2005) (No. 3:05-cv-01824-PGR), 2005 WL 6169180, at *33.
337. Id. at 34.
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panel and the full court, but also as between courts in different circuits.
As the discussion below demonstrates, the proper interpretation of the
term "substantial burden"-left undefined by Congress in RFRA-is a
key point of contention.
1. Measuring the Burden Imposed on Religious Exercise
In Navajo Nation, the district court rejected the plaintiff tribes'
RFRA and other claims, 3 an outcome that the plaintiffs appealed. A
three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's RFRA
decision in 2007.339 The panel noted that although the appellant tribes'
beliefs and practices are not uniform and therefore the precise burden
imposed on their religious exercise varied, the burdens fell into two cate-
gories: "the contamination of natural resources necessary for the perfor-
mance of certain religious ceremonies" and the undermining of their "re-
ligious faith, practices, and way of life by desecrating the Peaks' puri-
ty."340 Applying Ninth Circuit precedents, the panel concluded that the
burden on the exercise of religion imposed by the USFS was a substan-
tial burden, i.e., one that is more than just an inconvenience and that pre-
vents practitioners "from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a
religious experience," 341 and that the Government had failed to show that
"approving the proposed action serves a compelling governmental inter-
est by the least restrictive means." 342
The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, reversed the panel deci-
sion in favor of the plaintiffs. The court accepted the Government's re-
strictive definition of "substantial burden," holding that "a 'substantial
burden' is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose between
following the tenets of their religion and receiving a government benefit
(Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the
threat of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder)."3 43 Thus the court relied on
a narrow definition that is not part of the statutory text, but rather is
based on restricting the concept of a substantial burden to the kinds of
338. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 874-76, 878 (rejecting plaintiffs' NEPA claim); id. at
880 (rejecting plaintiffs' NHPA claim); id. at 881 (rejecting plaintiffs' National Forest Management
Act claim); id. at 882 (rejecting plaintiffs' breach of trust claim); id at 906-07 (rejecting plaintiffs'
RFRA claim). The district court found (1) that the tribes had failed to demonstrate that the project
caused a substantial burden (as the court narrowly defined the term); (2) that the Government had
three compelling interests at stake; and (3) that the Government had adopted the least restrictive
means to achieve these interests. Id.
339. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F. 3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006).
340. Id. at 1039, 1041; see also id at 1039 (describing the burdens more fully as "(1) the
inability to perform a particular religious ceremony, because the ceremony requires collecting natu-
ral resources from the Peaks that would be too contaminated ... for sacramental use; and (2) the
inability to maintain daily and annual religious practices comprising an entire way of life, because
the practices require belief in the mountain's purity or a spiritual connection to the mountain that
would be undermined by the contamination").
341. Id at 1043 (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (describing substantial burden analysis).
342. Id at 1046 (compelling interest test conclusion).
343. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008).
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scenarios that happened to be present in two cases, Sherbert and Yoder,
that were referenced in the purposes section of RFRA.3" Congress cited
these cases (neither of which used the term "substantial burden") in
RFRA to indicate the kind of test that was to be applied (in place of the
Smith approach) to government actions that substantially burden free
exercise of religion. The language of RFRA does not limit the kinds of
fact situations in which a substantial burden would be found to exist and
the test consequently applies. Applying its narrow definition, the Ninth
Circuit held that because the "presence of recycled wastewater [i.e.,
treated sewage effluent] on the Peaks does not coerce the Plaintiffs to act
contrary to their religious beliefs under the threat of sanctions" and does
not "condition a governmental benefit upon conduct that would violate
their religious beliefs," there was no substantial burden on religious ex-
ercise that would necessitate application of the compelling interest test.345
Three judges joined in a strongly worded dissent charging that the
majority, in holding that "spraying 1.5 million gallons per day of treated
sewage effluent on the most sacred mountain of southwestern Indian
tribes does not 'substantially burden' their 'exercise of religion,"' com-
mitted three fundamental errors: misstating the evidence below, misstat-
ing the law under RFRA, and misunderstanding "the very nature of reli-
gion." 34 6 The dissent faulted the majority for adopting a narrow defimi-
tion of "substantial burden" by wrongly "looking to Sherbert and Yoder
for an exhaustive definition of what constitutes a 'substantial burden.' 347
The majority showed misunderstanding of the nature of religious belief
and practice by emphasizing lack of physical harm. In reality,
"[r]eligious belief concerns the human spirit and religious faith, not
344. Id at 1068 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963)). In Sherbert, the Court upheld the free exercise claim of a Seventh Day Adventist who
had been denied unemployment compensation benefits after she was discharged from her job for
refusal to work on her religion's Sabbath. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399, 402. The Court held that the
disqualification for benefits imposed a burden on the free exercise of her religion because "[i]f the
purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions ... that law is constitu-
tionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect." Id. at 403-04
(alteration in original) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government had not shown that a compelling state interest, which
could not bezachieved without infringement on her rights, justified the infringement. Id. at 409. In
Yoder, the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented the State from compel-
ling Old Order Amish parents, whose religious beliefs precluded public high school attendance, to
send their children to public school up to age sixteen. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. The Court found that
secondary schooling "contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith" and that
the impact of the compulsory attendance law on the practice of the Amish religion was "not only
severe, but inescapable." Id. at 218. The Court stated that "only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id.
at 215.
345. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1067.
346. Id. at 1081 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). For the dissent's elaboration on these points, see id.
at 1085-96 (addressing claimed misstatements of the law under RFRA).
347. Id. at 1086 (discussing six reasons why Sherbert and Yoder should not be looked to for an
exhaustive definition of "substantial burden").
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physical harm and scientific fact."348 The dissent suggested a potential
source for the majority's misunderstanding:
Perhaps the strength of the Indians' argument in this case could be
seen more easily by the majority if another religion were at issue....
I do not think that the majority would accept that the burden on a
Christian's exercise of religion would be insubstantial if the govern-
ment permitted only treated sewage effluent for use as baptismal wa-
ter, based on an argument that no physical harm would result and any
adverse effect would merely be on the Christian's "subjective spiritu-
al experience." Nor do I think the majority would accept such an ar-
gument for an orthodox Jew, if the government permitted only non-
Kosher food. 349
The dissent observed that there was a "tragic irony" in the majority's
emphasizing that the area at issue is "public park land" that belongs to
everyone:
The United States government took this land from the Indians by
force. The majority now uses that forcible deprivation as a justifica-
tion for spraying treated sewage effluent on the holiest of the Indians'
holy mountains, and for refusing to recognize that this action consti-
tutes a substantial burden on the Indians' exercise of their religion.
RFRA was passed to protect the exercise of all religions, including
the religions of American Indians. If Indians' land-based exercise of
religion is not protected by RFRA in this case, I cannot imagine a
case in which it will be. I am truly sorry that the majority has effec-
tively read American Indians out of RFRA. 350
The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari in 2009, urging the
Supreme Court to step in to resolve the growing disagreement among the
federal circuits as to the proper approach to determining whether a sub-
stantial burden exists under RFRA,35 1 but to no avail.352
The Ninth Circuit's restrictive definition of a "substantial burden"
under RFRA in Navajo Nation has negatively impacted efforts to protect
other sacred sites, such as the efforts of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe at
Snoqualmie Falls. In its 2008 opinion in Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, a
three-judge Ninth Circuit panel described the falls as being "considered a
sacred site by the few hundred enrolled members who today comprise
348. Id. at 1098.
349. Id. at 1097.
350. Id. at 1113-14.
351. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-20, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct.
2763 (2009) (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 46999, at *12-20 (noting the three approaches taken to the
substantial burden concept). The petition identified the Fourth and D.C. Circuits as sharing the Ninth
Circuit's restrictive definition; the Eighth and Tenth Circuits as adopting a much broader conception;
and four other circuits (the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits) as taking an intermediate
approach. Id. at 12-19.
352. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
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the Snoqualmie Tribe," without indicating why the size of the tribe is
relevant to the analysis.3 53 The court noted a number of aspects of the
significance of the falls, such as its central role in the Snoqualmie Tribe's
creation story and its being considered the dwelling place of a powerful
water spirit (in the plunge pool below the falls).354 It was in light of these
and other considerations that the Snoqualmie Falls has been designated
as TCP eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.355
The tribe identified a number of ways in which the Snoqualmie
Falls project substantially burdened its exercise of religion: "[Ilts opera-
tion deprives the Tribe of access to the Falls for vision quests and other
religious experiences, eliminates the mist necessary for the Tribe's reli-
gious experiences, and alters the ancient sacred cycle of water flowing
over the Falls."3 56 Tribal members have had a sacred connection with the
falls "since time immemorial," and have believed for centuries "that the
mists created by the thunderous waters flowing over Snoqualmie Falls
connect the heavens and the earth." 357 The project "divert[s] nearly all
flows away from the Falls" and has "prevented tribal members from en-
gaging in many traditional religious activities,"358 imposing a burden on
religious exercise that is "monstrous and substantial under RFRA."359
The Snoqualmie Tribe urged the court to interpret the term "substantial
burden" in accordance with its plain meaning and to recognize that the
RFRA test applies "whenever a law or an action taken by the government
to implement a law burdens a person's exercise of religion."
360
The Ninth Circuit panel, however, simply looked to Navajo Nation,
noting that the decision adopted "a narrower definition of that term [i.e.,
substantial burden] than we had in prior decisions."361 The court thus
highlighted the Ninth Circuit's narrowing of the protection available to
religious practitioners under RFRA in Navajo Nation, in marked contrast
to Congress's intent to ensure that free exercise protection was not nar-
rowly circumscribed.36 2 Applying Navajo Nation's narrowed "substantial
353. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1211 (2008). The court heard argu-
ments in 2007, but recognizing the significance of the then forthcoming Navajo Nation en banc
decision, waited to make its decision until the Navajo Nation en banc opinion was published. Id at
1210.
354. Id. at 1211.
355. Id
356. Id. at 1213.
357. Reply Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 259, at 1.
358. Id.
359. Id at 14.
360. Id at 25 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 5 (1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
361. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008). The court noted
that as defined in Navajo Nation, "a substantial burden is imposed only when.individuals are forced
to choose between following tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert)
or [are] coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by threat of civil or criminal sanctions
(Yoder)." Id. at 1214 (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
362. Id at 1214.
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burden" definition, the court said it does not matter if the Puget hydroe-
lectric project interferes with tribal members' ability to practice their
religion. 36 3 Because the court did not see "any evidence demonstrating
that Snoqualmie Tribe members will lose a government benefit or face
criminal or civil sanctions for practicing their religion," it held that
FERC's relicensing decision did not impose a substantial burden on trib-
al members' ability to exercise their religion.3 6 The decision made it
clear that the Navajo Nation substantial burden interpretation provides
courts in the Ninth Circuit, and in other circuits that agree with the Ninth
Circuit approach, with a mechanism to head off tribes' RFRA claims
without having to evaluate the Government's compliance with the com-
pelling interest test.
The decision in Comanche Nation, on the other hand, demonstrates
that a different outcome is possible in sacred sites claims under RFRA
when a court does not rely on the Ninth Circuit's restrictive approach to
identifying a substantial burden. After the district court issued a tempo-
rary restraining order against the Fort Sill warehouse construction, the
United States sought dissolution of the order. 365 In considering the claim
that construction of the warehouse substantially interfered with the exer-
cise of the religious beliefs of the individual plaintiff and other members
of the Comanche Nation, the court noted that although RFRA defines
"exercise of religion" and courts have recognized the exercise of Native
American traditional religions as an "exercise of religion," RFRA does
not define "substantial burden." 366 As the Tenth Circuit has defined the
term, in order for a governmental action to be considered to substantially
burden a religious exercise, it must "'significantly inhibit or constrain
conduct or expression' or 'deny reasonable opportunities to engage in'
religious activities." 3 67 The court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit
definition applied in Navajo Nation, noting that the Tenth Circuit has not
adopted that definition.368
363. Id ("The Tribe's arguments that the dam interferes with the ability of tribal members to
practice religion are irrelevant to whether the hydroelectric project either forces them to choose
between their religion and receiving a government benefit or coerces them into a Catch-22 situation:
exercise of their religion under fear of civil or criminal sanction.").
364. Id. at 1214-15. The court also rejected the Snoqualmie Tribe's argument that FERC
violated the NHPA by not consulting with the tribe on a government-to-government basis on the
grounds that the key documents that were generated pursuant to the NHPA Section 106 process (a
cultural plan, an historical plan, and a programmatic agreement) were finalized before the tribe was
federally recognized. Id. at 1216.
365. Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
366. Id at *3.
367. Id (quoting Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996)). The court relied on a
definition from Thiry, which was decided prior to the 2000 amendment of RFRA, but noted that
Tenth Circuit cases subsequent to the amendment did "not appear to signal a restrictive application




Applying the Tenth Circuit "substantial burden" definition, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits of their RFRA claim.369 The approach to
Medicine Bluffs that would be impacted by the proposed warehouse is,
and historically has been, a Comanche sacred site and the situs of tradi-
tional Comanche religious practices. These practices constitute a sincere
exercise of religion; therefore, the construction of the warehouse would
impose a substantial burden on Comanche religious practices. Noting
that Comanche traditional religious practices "are inextricably inter-
twined with the natural environment," the court explained that as far as
practices in relation to the Bluffs are concerned, "an unobstructed view
of all four Bluffs is central to the spiritual experience of the Comanche
people." 37 0 The proposed warehouse site was in an area offering the last
open, unobstructed viewscape from the south of the Bluffs and the only
available vantage point for viewing all four Bluffs. Moreover, the ware-
house would occupy the area representing the central sightline to the
Bluffs, in which practitioners center themselves on the gap between two
of the Bluffs, known as Sweet Medicine. The obstruction that the ware-
house would create in this area, along with the increased, disruptive ve-
hicular traffic that was expected to accompany it, would constitute a sub-
stantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious practices.37'
2. Balancing the Interests at Stake
In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit panel, having found a substan-
tial burden on religious exercise, rejected the argument that the approval
of the proposed expansion advanced compelling governmental interests.
The USFS's interest in managing the forest for multiple uses, including
skiing, is the kind of broadly formulated interest that the Supreme Court
found to be inadequate in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficent Uni-
ao do Vegetal,372 the panel opinion noted.37 3 Moreover, even if the sur-
vival of the Snowbowl as a commercial ski area depends upon being able
to use sewage effluent for snowmaking, this did not necessarily mean
that there was a compelling governmental interest in avoiding this result.
After all, given the San Francisco Peaks' location in a desert, "it is (and




372. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431-32
(2006).
373. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Gonzales,
546 U.S. at 431). In Gonzales, the Court applied RFRA and held that the federal Goveniment had
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in barring sacramental use by members of a religious sect
of hoasca, a tea that is brewed from an Amazonian plant that contains a substance listed on Schedule
I of the Controlled Substances Act. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 438-39. The Government had conceded




was known to the previous Snowbowl owners when they expanded it and
to the current owners (who now wanted "to change these natural condi-
tions by adding treated sewage effluent") when they bought it. 374 Given
the many other recreational activities available on the peaks, authorizing
the proposed use of sewage effluent for snowmaking was not justified by
the claimed compelling governmental interest in providing for public
recreational use.375
When the Ninth Circuit considered the case en banc, however, the
court's conclusion that there was no substantial burden on religious exer-
cise obviated the need to apply the compelling interest test.376 The court
treated the plaintiffs as if their claims stemmed from having their feel-
ings hurt and from being too quick to take offense, dismissively stating
that "the burden of the recycled wastewater can only be expressed by the
Plaintiffs as damaged spiritual feelings."377 Similarly, in Snoqualmie
Indian Tribe, the Ninth Circuit, having concluded that the tribe's reli-
gious exercise was not substantially burdened, did not put FERC to the
test of showing that the project serves a compelling interest. FERC was
therefore not required to show that its relicensing decision was the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. 7
In Comanche Nation, in examining the evidence of the significance
of the government interest at stake, an Oklahoma federal district court
concluded that although there was conflicting evidence about the neces-
sity of the proposed warehouse, it would accept military officials' testi-
mony that it was essential to Fort Sill's training mission. 379 Although this
amounted to a substantial demonstration by the defendants that the con-
struction of the warehouse was in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest, there was no evidence that construction of the warehouse
in its proposed location was the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest. Indeed, the evidence showed that officials had identified a much
less restrictive alternative location but had not seriously considered it.
The defendants had not only failed to consider less restrictive alternatives
but had also failed to consider the plaintiffs' religious practices at all.
Because it seemed unlikely that the defendants could meet their burden
374. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1045.
375. Id. The court also rejected the asserted interest in protecting public safety as justifying the
proposed expansion: "[A]lithough the Forest Service undoubtedly has a general interest in ensuring
public safety on federal lands, there has been no showing that approving the proposed action ad-
vances that interest by the least restrictive means." Id.
376. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
377. Id. at 1070 n.12.
378. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2008).
379. Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 442662 1, at * 17 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
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of proof under RFRA, there was a substantial likelihood that the plain-
tiffs would succeed in their claim. 80
Having found that the Comanche plaintiffs had demonstrated a sub-
stantial likelihood of success on the merits, the court reviewed the re-
maining requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction: irrepara-
ble harm to the plaintiffs if the injunction were denied, threatened harm
to the plaintiffs outweighing harm to the defendants if the injunction
were issued, and issuance of the injunction not being adverse to the pub-
lic interest.381 The court concluded that construction of a permanent
structure that would impose a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' reli-
gious practices would constitute irreparable harm and that any monetary
damages that the defendants might incur if an injunction were issued
"pale[d] in comparison to the prospect of irreparable harm to sacred
lands and centuries-old religious traditions that would occur absent in-
junctive relief."3 82 Finally, protection of landmarks like the Bluffs and
the traditional practices tied to them, which was "consistent with expres-
sions of public policy such as the RFRA and the NHPA," was not contra-
ry to the public interest.38 3 The court consequently issued a preliminary
injunction against any further construction-related activities at the site.384
Faced with the court's finding that the Comanche Nation was likely
to succeed on the merits of its claims, Fort Sill officials decided to aban-
don the warehouse plan.3 85 The Comanche Nation's effort to protect the
Medicine Bluffs viewscape thus met with far greater success than did
similar efforts by tribes whose efforts were blocked by the Ninth Cir-
cuit's cramped approach to identifying substantial burdens on religious
exercise in RFRA claims.
380. Id. at *18. The court reached the same conclusion as to the tribe's claim that the defend-
ants had failed to comply with the NHPA. They virtually ignored the viewscape concerns, which
were even raised by the director of the Fort Sill Museum prior to the sending out of the Section 106
notice letter, and sent out a letter that buried the details of the project in technical attachments and
lacked the detailed disclosure and information required by the Section 106 regulations. Moreover,
the requirement that there be good faith consultation indicated that the tribes should have been told
that the warehouse project was just "the tip of the iceberg," given that there were plans for further
construction; proper disclosure would have apprised the tribes of the cumulative impact of the Ar-
my's planned construction in the area. The NHPA requires an agency to "stop, look, and listen"
before proceeding with a project, but the defendants had "merely paused, glanced, and turned a deaf
ear to warnings of adverse impact," thus falling short of "the reasonable and good faith efforts re-
quired by the law." Id. at *19 (quoting Coliseum Square Ass'n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 225 (5th
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
381. Id. at *2.
382. Id. at *19.
383. Id at *17.
384. Id
385. Nolan Clay, Comanche Nation Successfully Argued That Medicine Bluff Area Is Sacred;
Army Loses $650K, OKLAHoMAN, Oct. 28, 2009, at Al (noting the Army's decision to suspend
plans to build the warehouse and the request to the district court that the case consequently be dis-
missed).
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3. The Impact of Lyng
In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected Lyng as control-
ling the case for two reasons. First, the challenge in Lyng was brought
directly under the Free Exercise Clause, which has a less demanding
standard that must be satisfied to justify a burden than does RFRA. Sec-
ond, the facts of the two cases were materially different. Whereas the
Supreme Court in Lyng saw no basis for distinguishing the plaintiffs'
claim from one that would require exclusion of non-Indians, the tribes in
Navajo Nation did not seek to prevent use of the San Francisco Peaks by
others.38 6 The court concluded with a telling observation:
The Court in Lyng denied the Free Exercise claim in part because
it could not see a stopping place. We uphold the RFRA claim in this
case in part because otherwise we cannot see a starting place. If Ap-
pellants do not have a valid RFRA claim in this case, we are unable
to see how any Native American plaintiff can ever have a successful
RFRA claim based on beliefs and practices tied to land that they hold
sacred. 387
Sitting en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit saw Lyng as being on
point and supporting the court's decision. 388 The court raised Lyng-like
policy concerns about the impact of concluding that the plaintiffs' reli-
gious exercise had been substantially burdened: "[A]ny action the federal
government were to take ... would be subject to the personalized over-
sight of millions of citizens." 389 In 2006, in Gonzales, however, the Su-
preme Court rejected a similar slippery-slope argument, dismissing the
Government's argument that making one exemption would lead to end-
less demands for others as "the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats through-
out history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for
everybody, so no exceptions."390
4. The Role of the Establishment Clause
In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected an argument
made by Snowbowl that complying with the Establishment Clause was
391an additional compelling interest furthered by the USFS decision.
"Declining to allow a commercial ski resort in a national forest to put
386. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007).
387. Id at 1048. In addition to holding that the plaintiffs prevailed on their RFRA claim, the
court reversed the district court decision as to one NEPA claim (holding that the Environmental
Impact Statement prepared for the project did not satisfy NEPA with respect to the possible risks
from ingestion of the artificial snow) but upheld the decision as to four other NEPA claims. Id. at
1048-59. The court also upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on
the Hopi Tribe's claim of lack of proper consultation under the NHPA. Id. at 1059-60.
388. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071-73 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
389. Id. at 1063.
390. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-36
(2006).
391. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1044-46.
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treated sewage effluent on a sacred mountain," the court explained, "falls
far short of an Establishment Clause violation" and "is a permitted ac-
commodation to avoid 'callous indifference' [to religious interests]."392
In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, the Ninth Circuit considered, and re-
jected, Puget's objection to the increased water flow for May and June
required in FERC's revised order. Although Puget's objection was not
explicitly based on the Establishment Clause at this stage, it still impli-
cated religious exercise. The court concluded that because FERC found
that a greater amount of water flow during these months would produce a
greater amount of mist, which is important to the Snoqualmie Tribe's
religious practice, FERC could reasonably conclude that increasing those
months' minimum-flow requirement "would augment the Tribe's reli-
gious experience and result in a better balance of interests" under § 10 of
the FPA.393 The court noted further that FERC had "carefully weighed"
the impact on the religious experience of the tribe of the decision to re-
quire increased water flows against the decision's financial impact on
Puget.394 This aspect of the opinion indicates how other statutes may
provide a basis for respect for, and accommodation of, tribal religious
rights, in the face of hostility toward tribal rights under RFRA. The bal-
ancing of interests called for by the FPA prompted FERC to increase the
water-flow requirements for May and June (to the consternation of Pu-
get) for the purpose of increasing religiously significant mist during
those months. Although the FPA's balancing of interests approach does
not put religious needs front and center as does RFRA, and the FPA's
reach is limited to the energy industry, it can still serve as a means for
tribal religious concerns to be taken into account in this setting.
III. CONFRONTING THE (FR)ENEMY: ADDRESSING THE UNFINISHED
BUSINESS OF PROTECTING (AMERICAN INDIAN) RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
One thing to remember is the people that came to this country from
other countries came here to have religious freedom, and I can't see
these same people denying us the freedom that we enjoyed before
they came.395
What conclusions can be drawn from the above examination of liti-
gation involving Indian religious exercise at sacred sites on public lands
and the roles of the Establishment Clause and RFRA in this context?
Two conclusions leap to mind: first, the government is not a consistent
392. Id at 1046 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 673, 673 (1984)).
393. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2008).
394. Id. Because Puget's briefs did not raise the Establishment Clause objection to the Rehear-
ing Order that it had raised in the FERC proceedings, the court did not address it. See supra note 276
and accompanying text; see also Puget Sound Energy, Inc.'s Reply Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe,
545 F.3d 1207 (Nos. 05-72739, 05-74060), 2006 WL 5022050.
395. AIRFA Hearings, supra note 31, at 83 (statement of Frank Tenario, All Indian Pueblo
Council).
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friend of Indian religious freedom and, second, the Government always
wins (or at least almost always wins). To put it another way, the govern-
ment's schizophrenic conduct toward Indian religious exercise creates
suspicion that it is, in modern parlance, a "frenemy"-an enemy dis-
guised as a friend, who cannot be counted on to act in accordance with
its own promises of respect and protection. From this perspective, the
conduct of the federal Government vis-A-vis Indian religious exercise
claims, and federal courts' response thereto, appears to come down to a
simple rule: Indian free exercise rights matter when the government de-
cides they do; otherwise, they do not. Indian religious freedom is pro-
tected only as a result of a kind of noblesse oblige.
If viewed in this way, the government's attitude toward Indian reli-
gions appears to have come full circle. Under explicit policies of an ear-
lier era, traditional Indian beliefs and practices were deemed barbaric and
classified as "Indian Offenses."396 Christianity was favored and promoted
as a crucial element of the process of "civilizing" the Indians. 3 97 This
policy was formally repudiated, as reflected in AIRFA and other statutes
and in executive actions.398 In practice, however, engaging in traditional
ceremonies and other forms of religious exercise, even if not explicitly
forbidden, may be protected on lands subject to federal government deci-
sion-making power only when land managers decide that such protection
is not contrary to federal goals and therefore deign to provide it. Once
again, Indian religious freedom may be subordinated to other federal
policies. Moreover, the contours of these policies continue to be shaped
by the demands of non-Indians to be able to enjoy and profit from land
and other resources taken in the past from tribes, even if their enjoyment
infringes on Indian religious beliefs and practices. Multiple use mandates
for what is today public land and policies that favor commercial resource
exploitation have become mechanisms for denying protection for reli-
gious uses of land in favor of recreational and commercial uses.
Further reflection on the cases explored in Parts I and II is neces-
sary, however, to develop a better understanding of what they reveal
about "who or what the threats to [Indian] religious freedom are" 399 and,
in turn, to formulate strategies for achieving the level of protection prom-
ised by the First Amendment, AIRFA, RFRA, and the Sacred Sites Or-
der, as well as by the recently endorsed United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.4 0 0 The first step is to look back to the
cases that not only provide the backdrop for contemporary sacred sites
claims but also continue to influence land managers' and courts' ap-
proaches to these claims: Lyng and Smith. Secondly, RFRA and its role
396. Dussias, supra note 22, at 788-89.
397. Id. at 776-87.
398. See supra notes 30-40, 48-49, 55-57, 63-66 and accompanying text.
399. Smith, supra note 20, at 2034.
400. See infra notes 462-69 and accompanying text.
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as a potential antidote for Smith where sacred sites are concerned should
be examined. Part III.D offers preliminary thoughts on moving toward
greater protection of religious exercise on public lands-stressing the
need for tribal input-in keeping with the political and trust relationships
between tribes and the United States.
A. Lyng: Sword or Shield?
The cases examined in Parts I and II reveal the continuing im-
portance of a case that predates RFRA by fifteen years: Lyng. These cas-
es reveal the two alternative functions that Lyng plays in litigation over
Indian religious exercise on public lands-justification for accommoda-
tion or excuse for infringement (or for denying that infringement has
occurred). The first function of Lyng has been embraced by federal land
managers in making decisions that protect religious exercise and by
Government attorneys and courts (in litigation) as evidence of the
Court's endorsement and encouragement of such protection as constitu-
tionally permissible. This accommodation principle is embodied in fed-
eral legislation and Executive Branch orders and actions. In short, there
is ample support for the continuing vitality of this aspect of Lyng.
The continuing force of the second aspect of Lyng, which has been
used as an excuse for actions that are so injurious as to desecrate a sacred
site or to threaten to destroy a religion, even after the enactment of
RFRA, is puzzling. As Justice Scalia recognized in Smith when refusing
to apply strict scrutiny, Lyng, along with Roy, proved to be, in essence,
the run up to Smith.40 1 Just as the majority of the Court declined to apply
the compelling interest test to protect Indian religious exercise in Smith,
the majority failed to do so in Lyng. Noting this history in its brief in
Navajo Nation, the Government observed that the Court's approach in
Lyng was "consistent with the line of cases leading to the Court's deci-
sion in Smith and the subsequent passage of RFRA."402 In other words,
Lyng was one of a pair of cases that led to Smith, which Congress repu-
diated in RFRA.
Lyng did not receive the same national attention that Smith later re-
ceived when it was decided. Lyng involved a scenario (a threat to a sa-
cred site on public land) that did not resonate with adherents of main-
stream religions. Before Smith, Lyng, along with Roy, could have been
dismissed as "odd ball" cases impacting only Indians. Smith's determina-
tion that the compelling interest test would no longer be applied to any
burdens imposed on religion by neutral laws of general applicability, on
401. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 269, 279 (2012) (noting that "[tihe Smith Court interpreted both [Roy] and Lyng as not
having used the strict scrutiny test"). As Professor Skibine explains, there are difficulties in interpret-
ing Lyng and its impact in the RFRA context. Id. at 279-82.
402. U.S. Brief, Navajo Nation, supra note 295, at 27.
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the other hand, was recognized as a threat to all religions, not just to
those with vulnerable sacred sites located on public lands. As an evangel-
ical Christian minister stated candidly in testimony to the House of Rep-
resentatives prior to the enactment of RFRA, if all that the Court had
done in Smith was to deny Free Exercise Clause protection to Indian reli-
gious practices, "we wouldn't be here today." 40 3 Non-Indians paid so
much attention to the Court's decision to, "without benefit of briefing or
argument, discard[] decades of precedent and announce[] a sea change in
first amendment law[]" in Smith because it meant that their "ability to put
[their] faith into action [was] now totally subject to majoritarian rule." 40
In other words, Smith mattered in a way that Lyng had not because non-
Indian religious practitioners were now to be treated like their Indian
counterparts.
Given Lyng's ties to the decision in Smith to abandon the compel-
ling interest test except in rare instances, it should follow that RFRA
reinstated the compelling interest test to scenarios like the threat to a
sacred site in Lyng. After all, the language of RFRA states Congress's
intent to restore the test that Smith abandoned. Congress noted in RFRA
that the Smith decision "virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neu-
tral toward religion" and praised "the compelling interest test as set forth
in prior Federal court rulings," which the statute was intended to re-
store.405 The process of abandonment of the compelling interest test in
Indian religious freedom cases did not begin with Smith but rather with
Lyng and Roy. Nowhere in RFRA did Congress state that the compelling
interest test should not be reinstated in cases where Indian religious free-
dom was at stake.
In arguing to the Ninth Circuit in Snoqualmie Indian Tribe that
Lyng defeated the tribe's claim, however, FERC argued that "pre-Smith
case law, including Lyng, remains intact"406 after the enactment of
RFRA. FERC quoted a statement made by one legislator:
RFRA does not [a]ffect Lyng ... because the incidental impact on
a religious practice does not constitute a cognizable burden on any-
one's free exercise of religion. In Lyng, the court ruled that the way
in which Government manages its affairs and uses its own property
403. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the H.R. Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 38 (1990)
(statement of Rev. Robert P. Dugan, Jr., Dir., Office of Public Affairs, Nat'l Ass'n of Evangelicals).
Reverend Dugan testified in the hearings on the initial predecessor to the bill that was ultimately
enacted, in revised form, as RFRA in 1993.
404. Id. at 41-42. For a legislative history of the enactment of RFRA, see generally Robert F.
Drinan & Jennifer 1. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.
L. & RELIGION 531 passim (1994).
405. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)-(5), (b)(1) (2006),
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
406. FERC Brief, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, supra note 296, at 30.
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does not constitute a burden on religious exercise. Thus, the construc-
tion of mining or timber roads over Government land, land sacred to
[N]ative American religion, did not burden their free exercise rights.
Unless a burden is demonstrated, there can be no free exercise viola-
-407tion.
The statement that Lyng is unaffected by RFRA because incidental im-
pacts on religious practice do not constitute cognizable burdens is, how-
ever, at odds with RFRA's recognition that neutral, incidental impacts
can be just as burdensome as intentional interference with religious exer-
cise and thus should be subject to compelling interest scrutiny. Moreo-
ver, Lyng recognized that the impact on Indian religion from the pro-
posed road construction and timber harvesting might well be severe-in
RFRA parlance, might well constitute a substantial burden. The Court
held that regardless of such an impact, the Government did not have to
meet the compelling interest test.40 8 In other words, the Lyng Court did
not apply the compelling interest test because the adverse impact on reli-
gious practice stemmed from the incidental effects of a government land
use decision. The Government was not deliberately discriminating
against "religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred."409 RFRA,
on the other hand, established that a government action with a significant
adverse impact on religious practice is not shielded from application of
the compelling interest test because such an impact was unintended.
Moreover, RFRA contains no carveout for land use decisions. In-
deed, in the oral arguments in Navajo Nation, the Government's attorney
acknowledged that RFRA does apply to land use decisions with inci-
dental impacts on religious exercise.4 10 Certainly the National Historic
Preservation Act, as well as National Environmental Policy Act, also
make clear Congress's longstanding understanding that tribes are legally
entitled to a role in decision making as to public lands in which they hold
cultural and religious interests.4 11
Two additional points about Lyng's reasoning and legacy are in or-
der. In addition to relying on the concept that incidental burdens imposed
on religious exercise are not subject to compelling interest scrutiny to
support the outcome in the case, the majority also relied on an expanded
understanding of the Government's property rights and the privileging of
these rights over religious exercise rights. Professor Kristen Carpenter
407. Id. at 31 (first alteration in original) (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S14,461, S14,470 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson)) (internal quotation mark omitted). FERC also
cited 139 CONG. REC. S14,461, S14,470 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
408. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988).
409. Id. at 453.
410. Oral Argument at 34:55, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. 3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (Nos. 06-15371, 06-15436, 06-15455), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pkid=000000 1352.
411. See SUAGEE & TROPE, supra note 48, at 22-24 (NHPA requirements); id. at 62-64
(N EPA requirements).
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has written convincingly about the flaws in this approach.4 12 In addition,
in Establishment Clause challenges to management plans, the Govern-
ment itself has acknowledged the responsibility that the taking of sacred
Indian land imposes upon land managers.4 13 This acknowledgment
amounts to a rejection of the argument that government property rights
automatically trump tribal religious rights.
Finally, the Lyng majority also argued that AIRFA was legally im-
potent as an additional basis for denying the plaintiffs relief. The majori-
ty opinion downplayed the statute's significance by quoting a statement
by one of its sponsors, Representative Morris Udall, that it "has no teeth
in it."414 Examination of the context for this statement, however, reveals
that it was not offered as a broad pronouncement indicating that AIRFA
lacked legal significance. Rather, Representative Udall voiced these
words in response to a colleague's concerns that AJIRFA would apply to
private land.4 15 He sought to ease the minds of House members who, at a
time when "we have [American] Indians marching on the Capitol,"
feared that Congress was "rushing a little bit fast" and taking an action
that could "disrupt the normal progress of America" by enacting
AIRFA.416 Representative Theodore Risenhoover also responded by ex-
pressing surprise that "we would in any way question the right of a group
of people to exercise their freedom of belief' and explained that AIRFA
"assure[s] the Indian people the right to practice their religion on ...
Federal property."4
In short, there are a number of reasons to conclude that Lyng can no
longer serve as a precedent supporting the argument that the government
need not comply with the compelling interest test as to actions that bur-
den religious exercise. At the same time, there is no reason to believe
that the aspect of Lyng that calls for government accommodation of reli-
gious exercise has lost its force. Rather, it has been strengthened by post-
Lyng developments.
412. See Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a
Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062-67 (2005). Professor Carpenter
highlighted the social relations view of property rights, which conceives of property as "a set of
'social relations' among persons with respect to things," as an alternative to the ownership model of
property rights. Id at 1088. She explored how, in the sacred sites context, common law property
rights for Indians grow out of the relationships between (1) the federal government and Indian na-
tions, under federal Indian law principles; (2) the federal government and individual citizens, under
the public trust doctrine; and (3) the United States and indigenous peoples within its borders, under
international human rights law. Id. at 1100-38. For a discussion of courts' privileging of government
property rights, see Dussias, supra note 22, at 819-33.
413. See supra notes 136, 160-61 and accompanying text.
414. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1988) (quoting
124 CONG. REC. 21,444-21,445 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
415. 124 CONG. REC. 21,443, 21,445 (1978) (noting that AIRFA "has nothing whatever to do
with private property" and that it "addresses property that is all federally owned").
416. Id (statement of Rep. Robert Badhamn).
417. Id at 21,446 (statement of Rep. Theodore Risenhoover).
416 [Vol. 90:2
FRIEND, FOE, FRENEMY
B. Smith: Repudiated by Congress but Still Potent
In Smith, just as in Lyng, Indian religious freedom claims provided
the occasion for limiting Free Exercise Clause protection against gov-
ernment action that threatened religious beliefs and practices. The Court
sidestepped evaluating the claims in these cases, whether involving (as in
Smith) a denial of government benefits rooted in religious conduct (sac-
ramental ingestion of a controlled substance) or (as in Lyng) interference
with worship at a sacred site on public lands by a land management deci-
sion designed to facilitate commercial use. In Smith, neither side had
argued that the compelling interest test did not apply, yet the majority
opinion reflected five Justices' decision that the Court should hold that it
did not. Given the difficulty that Indian claimants have had in persuading
courts to address their claims under RFRA's test, Smith's abandonment
of the compelling interest test continues to adversely impact Indians.
1. Smith and Hybrid Rights
In Smith, in trying to explain why the Court applied the compelling
interest test in cases like Yoder but now refused to do so in Smith, the
majority described these cases as involving "hybrid situation[s] .418 Not
only were free exercise rights at stake but so were other important rights,
such as parents' rights to direct the upbringing of their children.419 Pro-
fessor Michael McConnell has noted, however, that Smith itself could
have been considered a hybrid rights case that combined free speech
rights and free exercise rights: "Smith and Black could have made a col-
orable claim under the Free Speech Clause that the prohibition of peyote
use interfered with their ability to communicate [a] message," namely
their "faith in the tenets of the Native American Church."4 2 0 Indian
claims couched in Free Exercise Clause language can also implicate
rights to freedom of association.
In the case of Indian religious practices, one can argue that other rights,
in addition to speech and association rights, are also at stake, such as the
right of tribes to have their sovereignty respected, as well as rights flow-
ing from the trust relationship between tribes and the United States. The
Smith Court referred to the supposed hybrid rights cases as involving the
coupling of the Free Exercise Clause with other constitutional protec-
tions.421 Because the federal-tribal relationship also has a constitutional
418. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
419. Id. at 881.
420. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1109, 1122 (1990). The author concludes that the reason why the Smith plaintiffs' free speech
claim would not prevail as a hybrid with their free exercise claim, "a legal realist would tell us, is
that the Smith Court's notion of 'hybrid' claims was not intended to be taken seriously." Id.
421. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 ("The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amend-
ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections . . . .").
4172012]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
basis, tribal religious rights claims can be understood as hybrid rights
claims. Indeed, the Government cited its obligations pursuant to tribal
rights as secular purposes underlying management plans at Rainbow
Bridge National Monument and other public lands. Consequently, under
the Smith hybrid rights doctrine, government actions that burden Indian
religious exercise arguably are subject to compelling interest scrutiny
even post-Smith, without need for consideration of RFRA, on the theory
that they burden hybrid rights.
The application of the pre-Smith compelling interest test to burdens
on Indian religious freedom does not, of course, ensure protection for
religious practitioners. A court may well conclude that government inter-
ests outweigh religious exercise rights, as courts concluded in pre-Smith
sacred sites cases like Badoni.422 If strict scrutiny is applied, though,
there is at least a possibility that courts will vindicate Indian free exercise
rights on the basis of the government's failure to satisfy the compelling
interest test. Moreover, the prospect of having to meet the test could en-
courage land managers to make decisions that are more solicitous of In-
dian religious freedom.
2. The Impact of Smith on Claim Filing and Minority Religions
A 2004 study of free exercise claims during the period between the
Smith decision and the enactment of RFRA concluded that far fewer free
exercise cases were brought, with the rate of cases brought by religious
groups dropping by over 50% immediately after the decision. Moreover,
the number of rulings in favor of the plaintiffs dropped significantly.4 23
When Smith was decided, closing the courts to most free exercise
claimants logically could have been expected to have a greater impact on
minority religions because of their greater need to rely on the judicial
process for free exercise protection. The 2004 study, for example, found
that between 1981 and 1997, minority religions combined accounted for
nearly 62% of free exercise cases, while making up only 18% of U.S.
religious membership.424 It stands to reason that minority religions will
have greater need to turn to the courts to challenge government actions
than will mainstream religions whose needs and values are likely to have
shaped the drafting of laws and various government decisions in the first
place. In other words, because "the majority of Americans adhere to
mainstream religious groups, . . . laws of general applicability are likely
422. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 647 (D. Utah 1977), af'd, 638 F.2d 172,
177 (10th Cir. 1980). The Tenth Circuit concluded in Badoni that the Government's interests out-
weighed plaintiffs' interests. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
423. Amy Adamczyk et al., Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of
Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 242 (2004). The authors determined that the percentage
of favorable decisions dropped from 39% before Smith to less than 29% between Smith and the
enactment of RFRA. Id at 248.
424. Id. at 245-46.
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to be consistent with mainstream religious beliefs."425 Such laws "are
developed on the bases of majority norms, values, and beliefs."42 6 To the
Smith majority, this was not a concern, and effectively closing the courts
to those most in need of access, and instead sending them to beg for leg-
islative protection, was deemed acceptable. Discouraging practitioners of
minority religions whose free exercise rights were burdened by laws of
allegedly neutral laws of general applicability from going to court also
meant that courts (and the rest of society) would not readily become
427aware of the impact of these laws on such practitioners.
3. Smith and the Tyranny of the Majority
Justice Jackson wrote in 1943 that
[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as le-
gal principles to be applied by courts. One's right to ... freedom of
worship ... and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.428
The Smith Court's endorsement of putting the free exercise rights of mi-
nority religious practitioners to a vote, by abandoning them to the politi-
cal process, conflicts with this understanding of the Bill of Rights.
Representative Glenn Anderson raised concern about this develop-
ment in Congress in 1991, observing that "against all original intent of
the Founding Fathers and the history of American law, Smith allows ma-
jorities to trample on individual religious freedoms without any recourse
to the courts for constitutional protection." 2 9 Representative Anderson
noted further that the Court's "illogical refusal to examine any State in-
fringements on religious practices is disastrous to those religious practic-
es which may not conform to general law and do not have the popular
support to find politically granted exceptions." 430 This refusal could
mean that "the drinking of sacramental wine may be forbidden to minors
because of State age-related liquor laws," although this seemed unlikely
"due to our society's majority Judeo-Christian composition." 31 Justice
Blackmun observed in his dissent in Smith that the use of peyote as a
sacrament by the Native American Church is "closely analogous to the
sacramental use of wine by the Roman Catholic Church."432 Although
425. Id at 253.
426. Id
427. Id at 251.
428. W. Va. State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
429. 137 CONG. REc. 23,376 (1991) (statement of Rep. Glenn Anderson) (italics added) [here-
inafter Rep. Anderson Remarks].
430. Id.
431. Id,
432. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 n.6 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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this analogy is helpful in understanding the impact of Smith, it is worth
noting that the comparison between forbidding communion wine to chil-
dren and forbidding peyote to Native American Church members is not a
perfect one and understates the significance of a peyote prohibition. For
Roman Catholics, for example, consumption of eucharistic bread (the
communion wafer, or host) alone suffices for receiving communion,
whereas for Native American Church members, peyote is the only sub-
stance that is sacramentally consumed.433 Prohibiting peyote means
denying access to a sacrament entirely.
Moreover, Smith's relegation of religious freedom protection to the
political process meant primarily relegation to the state political process.
In other words, rejecting a judicial role in balancing rights under the
compelling interest test means that the courts leave individuals at the
mercy of state governments, even though, as Representative Anderson
observed, history has "unequivocally demonstrated that it is States which
are the greatest trespassers of our constitutional rights, not the greatest
protectors."43 4 Rather than respecting individual rights, states have sacri-
ficed "the rights of individuals, often poor and powerless, in haste to
please the demands of either the powerful or the many."435 It was in part
this unwillingness to protect individual rights that necessitated adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.436
By leaving the protection of the free exercise rights of adherents of
minority religions to governments that can be expected to act based on
political expediency, the Court abandoned the Judicial Branch's crucial
protective role where constitutional rights are at stake. In the view of
James Madison, the courts were to serve as "an impenetrable bulwark" in
defense of constitutional rights.437 Smith amounted to a statement by five
Supreme Court Justices that they no longer cared to play this role where
merely religious liberty was at stake. Only if other fundamental rights
were at stake, perhaps in conjunction with free exercise rights, would the
Court be willing to put forth the effort to review government actions for
their compliance with the First Amendment.
433. According to Roman Catholic teachings, because Christ is sacramentally present in both
the consecrated bread and the wine, ingestion of either alone constitutes receipt of communion.
434. Rep. Anderson Remarks, supra note 429, at 23,376.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Madison stated, "[I]ndependent tribunals of justice . .. will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of




C. RFRA: Restoration of Whose Religious Freedom?
1. RFRA and Majority Religions
Following Smith, Congress enacted an amendment to AIRFA to
protect sacramental peyote use by members of federally recognized
tribes against federal and state prohibitions.438 This development sug-
gested that appeals to Congress for religious exercise protection are not
always doomed to fall on deaf ears. RFRA, enacted the year before the
AIRFA peyote amendment, might also be hailed as evidence of the abil-
ity of the political branches of government-at least at the federal lev-
el-to recognize the needs of practitioners of Native American religions
and other minority religions for protection against substantial burdens on
their religious exercise. It is interesting, then, to note the dominance of
representatives of mainstream religions in the push to enact RFRA (and
to shape its language to meet their concerns). Moreover, their involve-
ment did not necessarily arise from an ecumenical spirit but perhaps
more from concerns over the threat that Smith might pose to their own
beliefs and practices. Indian religious practitioners pointed out the inade-
quacy of RFRA in written submissions to Congress, whereas the con-
gressional hearings that ultimately led to enactment of RFRA focused,
for the most part, on testimony from representatives of mainstream reli-
gions. RFRA itself was thus largely shaped by majority, rather than mi-
nority, voices and concerns.
The 1992 Senate hearing, for example, included testimony from
representatives of four Christian denominations, one of whom also testi-
fied on behalf of the American Jewish Congress.43 Only one member of
a minority religion, a Laotian immigrant who spoke about Hmong tradi-
tional religious beliefs, took part in the hearing.440 No practitioner of a
traditional Indian religion testified in the hearing, although a statement
by a coalition of Indian tribes and organizations was submitted.44' The
statement noted Indian support for the RFRA bill because "it is vitally
important to restore to all Americans the basic First Amendment free-
doms which have been stripped from them by recent Supreme Court de-
cisions," but also stressed the need for separate legislation to protect In-
dian religious freedom. Additional legislation was needed if Indians "are
438. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2006). The amendment provid-
ed that "the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional cere-
monial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall
not be prohibited by the United States or any State." § 1996a(b)(1). The provision applies only to
individuals who fit within the statute's definition of "Indian," namely a member of a federally rec-
ognized tribe. § 1996(a)(c)(1), (2).
439. 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at iii (listing witnesses and their affiliations);
id at 29 (noting that witness Oliver Thomas was testifying on behalf of both the Baptist Joint Com-
mittee and the American Jewish Congress).
440. Id. at 5-6 (noting statement of William Nouyi Yang).
441. Id. at 243. The statement was submitted by "a broad coalition of Indian tribes and organi-
zations and religious, civil rights and environmental organizations." Id at 244.
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to receive the same degree of protection of their religious practices as
that accorded other religious traditions."4 2 Although separate legislation
was passed with regard to sacramental use of peyote, efforts to enact
sacred sites-related protection were met with failure.4 3
2. RFRA, Equality, and Neutrality
Much has been written about the differences between the religions
of the indigenous peoples of the United States and Christianity.4" At the
same time, there are similarities between Indian religions and main-
stream religions like Christianity. There are beliefs and practices of Indi-
an religions that in some way correspond in function or at least in im-
portance with, while differing in form from, Christian beliefs and prac-
tices. Indian Free Exercise Clause claimants made this point (albeit with
little success) in pre-Lyng and pre-Smith cases, in which they analogized
between their beliefs and practices and those of Christianity, to try to
dispel ignorance of Indian religions and make the point that the Govern-
ment was infringing upon their religious freedom.445
To the extent that Indian religious beliefs and practices have coun-
terparts, in terms of such characteristics as function and significance,
with those of the predominant American religion of Christianity, then the
failure to protect the former while protecting the latter raises the question
of whether this approach amounts to a kind of religious preferentialism
that past Supreme Court cases have rejected.446 We might well ask how
legal protection of Christian beliefs and practices through legislative,
executive, and judicial actions, while Indian religious beliefs and practic-
es of comparable function and significance to their practitioners are not
similarly protected, can be reconciled with the principle of neutrality, one
of the Establishment Clause's underlying values. How can this disparate
treatment be understood as anything other than the kind of denomina-
tional preference that Congress also rejected in its most recent religious
freedom-related enactment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA)? Enacted in 2000, RLUIPA, which requires all
governments to meet the compelling interest test in order to impose sub-
442. Id.
443. See, e.g., Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The Legal,
Historical, and Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion
Act, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 373, 384-88 (1993) (discussing efforts to enact legislation
to protect sacred sites, as well as sacramental use of peyote and other religious rights). A bill entitled
the "Native American Sacred Lands Act," for example, was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives in 2002 and again in 2003 but was not enacted. H.R. 5155, 107th Cong. (July 18, 2002); H.R.
2419, 108th Cong. (June 11, 2003). The Senate bill that was ultimately enacted as the Native Ameri-
can Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1993 originally included provisions to protect sacred sites. S.
1021, 103d Cong. tit. I (May 25, 1993). Only the peyote-related provisions were enacted.
444. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 22, at 811-15.
445. See, e.g., id. at 815-19.
446. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (stating that federal and state
governments cannot "prefer one religion over another"). In recent years, the neutrality principle has
played a particularly strong role where government funding is at issue.
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stantial burdens on religious exercise through land use regulation, pro-
hibits governments from imposing or implementing a land use regulation
that discriminates on the basis of religion or religious denomination.m
Focusing on sacred sites cases in particular, if RFRA is interpreted
and applied in litigation in a way that does not adequately protect Indian
sacred sites in most instances, this application of the statute raises the
question of why a category of claims is excluded, in effect, from protec-
tion under RFRA. Are sacred sites claims not within the purview of
RFRA because Indian rights do not matter? The judges who dissented
from the Navajo Nation en banc decision touched on this problem, ob-
serving that the majority's application of RFRA "effectively read Ameri-
can Indians out of RFRA.""8 The tribal coalition statement submitted to
Congress in the 1992 RFRA hearings also noted that courts have been
"perplexed" in applying the compelling interest test to sacred sites cases
and that there is a "need to ensure that the 'compelling state interest' test
is refined and made to more adequately 'fit' [Indian] religions."" 9 Put-
ting this question in terms of RFRA's substantial burden concept, Are
burdens attributable to incidental impacts on sacred sites on public lands
not "cognizable" because only Indians are so burdened? Clearly such an
exclusion is not apparent in the text of RFRA.
The comments above focus on the abandonment of neutrality that is
embodied in legal protection for Christian, but not Indian, beliefs and
practices. Neutrality needs to be considered in another way as well. Re-
spect for the neutrality principle justifies sacred sites protection extended
by federal land managers. If Christian beliefs and practices are already
protected, then efforts aimed at protecting Indian religious exercise are
neutral as between religions. In other words, actions that accommodate
Indian religious beliefs and practice are not "special treatment." Rather,
they are neutral as between religions if they attempt to provide the same
level of protection to Indian religions that is provided to Christian de-
447. RLUIPA provides as follows:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes
a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly
or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental in-
terest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). "'[R]eligious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." § 2000cc-5(7)(A). "Land use regula-
tion" is defined to include zoning and landmarking laws, and their application, that limit or restrict
land use or development. § 2000cc-5(5). The denominational non-discrimination provision states
that "[n]o govemment shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any
assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination." § 2000cc(b)(2). Addi-
tional sections provide protection for religious exercise by institutionalized persons. § 2000cc-l(a).
The Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause-based facial challenge to RLUIPA's institu-
tionalized persons provisions in 2005. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005).
448. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
449. 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 257.
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nominations. Consequently, measures designed to protect Indian reli-
gious practitioners' exercise of their religion do not run afoul of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Rather, they are consistent with the substantive neu-
trality that Congress embraced in RFRA. 4 50
Finally, the neutrality principle can be understood as playing yet
another role in this context: as support for religious practitioners arguing
that a government action has substantially burdened their religious exer-
cise and is indefensible under RFRA's compelling interest test. Defini-
tions like those employed by the Ninth Circuit to define "substantial bur-
den" rely on cases involving burdens on Christian religious practitioners.
In Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court focused on the coercive and
potentially punitive impacts of the government actions in question on
members of particular Christian denominations. If government actions,
however characterized and whatever their form, have as significant an
adverse impact on Indian religious practitioners as the challenged actions
did on Christians in Sherbert and Yoder, then the neutrality principle
requires recognition that such actions impose substantial burdens. In oth-
er words, if the compelling interest test is triggered by seriously adverse
impacts on Christian religious exercise, then negative impacts of similar
magnitude on Indian religious exercise should also trigger application of
the test. If they do not, then Christianity is receiving a form of preferen-
tial treatment that is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
D. Now What? Envisioning a Path Toward Equalizing Protection ofIn-
dian Religions
Part I demonstrated the impact that federal land managers who take
seriously their responsibilities to protect Indian religious exercise can
have in promoting Indian religious freedom, particularly given the Gov-
ernment's vigorous (and successful) defense of land managers' decisions
against Establishment Clause challenges. Part II demonstrated that if land
managers instead privilege other interests over Indian religious exercise
rights, then efforts to protect religious exercise at sacred sites through
RFRA may face an uphill battle, particularly in courts in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Taken together, Parts I and II teach the importance of effective trib-
al involvement in the development and implementation of management
plans related to public lands that contain sacred sites. Optimizing oppor-
tunities for meaningful tribal involvement thus appears crucial.
Although an analysis of the current opportunities for tribal involve-
ment in the development of management plans by federal government
departments and agencies, and of their effectiveness for tribes, is beyond
the scope of this Article, a few general observations can be made. First,
450. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1994) (rejecting formal neutrality and
reenactment of substantive neutrality).
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assessing these opportunities and their effectiveness must start with
tribes' perceptions of their experiences. Recent and ongoing efforts of
federal agencies to evaluate and update their sacred sites and tribal con-
sultation policies have solicited tribal feedback, which needs to be inte-
grated into policy development and implementation.
The need to have public lands management plans better respond to
the expressed needs of Indian religious practitioners was highlighted in
the 1992 tribal statement submitted during the process of enacting
RFRA. The statement commented that "if our legal system is to serve all
segments of society, it should ensure that unique needs of indigenous
peoples are addressed and incorporated." 45 1 Because of the "contorted
approaches" that have been taken in trying to apply "concepts developed
with the Judeo-Christian tradition in mind to vastly different tribal reli-
gious practices," there is a need for "more specific criteria [to] be spelled
out" so that federal officials (and federal judges, if it comes to that) "can
understand and fairly apply the 'compelling state interest test' in the con-
text of America's unwritten and little understood indigenous reli-
gions."452 Furthermore, the statement explained, "[g]iven the long history
of government suppression of tribal religion and the federal trust rela-
tionship, Indians are entitled to specific standards and assurances" that
prevent federal actions from "infring[ing] unnecessarily on their right of
worship.AS3 Developing firmer and more informative guidelines for fed-
eral land managers to turn to in assessing sacred sites impacts is, then,
another important task. The damage done to Indian religious freedom by
the Navajo Nation en banc opinion's application of a narrow "substantial
burden" definition, which evidenced misunderstanding of Indian reli-
gions, underscores the urgency of carrying out this task.
In developing guidelines for identifying substantial burdens on reli-
gious exercise at sacred sites, RLUIPA may provide some guidance. Alt-
hough RLUIPA's land use provisions apply by their terms to zoning and
landmark actions, the statute contains the substantial burden concept. In
determining whether denial of permission to build is a substantial bur-
den, courts determine whether the claimant has other sites that are rea-
sonably available and are approved for its desired use.454 Some scholars
have suggested that the RFRA substantial burden inquiry should include
an evaluation of whether alternative means of exercising the religion in
question exist.4 55 In some sacred sites cases, the lack of any comparable
451. 1992 RFRA Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 257 58.
452. Id.
453. Id (emphasis added).
454. See, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761-62
(7th Cir. 2003).
455. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 925, 947 (2000) ("[C]ourts will be required to decide whether there exist ample
alternative means of satisfying the claimant's religious obligations."); Skibine, supra note 401, at
295.
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site, because of the uniqueness of the site at issue, would weigh in favor
of a finding that actions that adversely impact a site or interfere with its
use impose a substantial burden. In other cases, although another location
exists that is suitable for a particular ceremony or other activity (or for
gathering religiously significant materials), such location might be una-
vailable for the needed use, perhaps because it is located on private land
or is otherwise off limits. In such cases, too, a substantial burden exists
under this understanding of the term.
As tribal experiences are analyzed and more effective consultation
and protection guidelines are developed, it is important to keep in view
the connection between tribal religions and tribal sovereignty. Indian
religious exercise rights involve not just the rights of individuals but also
the rights of political entities, Indian tribes. The United States and tribes
have a sui generis, centuries-old, government-to-government relation-
ship. Inherent in this relationship is a trust obligation, rooted in treaties
by which tribes ceded land to the United States. As Professor Mary
Wood has explained, these treaties were "made against a framework of
federal promises which guaranteed native separatism and federal protec-
tion of the tribes' ability to continue their way of life."456 Discussing the
failure to understand the nature of religious activities at sacred sites re-
flected in the Lyng and en banc Navajo Nation opinions, Professor Alex
Skibine commented as follows:
The importance of sacred sites to Indian tribes and Native practition-
ers is less about individual spiritual development and more about the
continuing existence of Indians as a tribal people. The preservation of
these sites as well as tribal people's ability to practice their religion
there is intrinsically related to the survival of tribes as both cultural
and self-governing entities. 457
As federal officials consider their past and future treatment of Indian
religious exercise claims, they need to keep in mind the responsibilities
that they owe not just to individuals but also to tribes more broadly. Ful-
fillment of these responsibilities to tribes, as well as to individuals, must
take account of current tribes and individuals and those of generations to
come. In short, tribes, and the duties owed to them under the political and
trust relationships between tribes and the United States, must be front
and center when protection of tribal religious exercise is evaluated.
456. Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 109, 112
(1995).
457. Skibine, supra note 401, at 273-74. Professor Skibine noted further that the statements in
these opinions seemed to "equate Indians' religious exercises at sacred sites with Western yoga-like
practices.... [T]his view portrays Native religious activities at sacred sites as only about spiritual
peace of mind." Id. at 273. Although spiritual peace of mind is part of the practice, it "do[es] not go
to the heart of why these sacred places are important to Indian people or why management practices
like cutting down trees and spilling recycled sewage water on sacred land are extremely disturbing to
many Indian tribes." Id.
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The significance of the federal-tribal relationship in the protection
of sacred sites was appropriately highlighted in a 2006 U.S. Department
of Justice legal opinion. Commenting on the federal government's re-
sponsibilities under the Sacred Sites Order, the Department's Office of
Legal Counsel relied on the "special trust relationship between the feder-
al government and federally recognized Indian tribes"458 to argue that the
legal principles that prohibit the government from "enacting regulations
that prefer one religion over others, that foster excessive entanglement
with religion, or that lift privately imposed burdens ... do not apply to
regulations that accommodate the religious practices of' such tribes.459
Moreover, even if ordinary Establishment Clause principles are applied
to accommodations related to sacred sites, such principles must be ap-
plied with the federal-tribal relationship highlighted in Mancari in mind;
doing otherwise "is plainly incompatible with the federal government's
duty toward the tribes.A60 This special relationship "envisions active
assistance from the federal government" where religious exercise is con-
cerned.461
Finally, the recent endorsement by the United States of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 462
suggests that the time is ripe to review the compliance of the United
States with the developed and developing international law on the protec-
tion of indigenous peoples' religious rights in general and of sacred sites
in particular. Although the United States was one of the four nations that
voted against the adoption of UNDRIP in the U.N. General Assembly in
2007,463 President Obama announced the United States' changed stance
in December 2010.464 Article 11 of UNDRIP asserts the right of indige-
458. Permissible Accommodation of Sacred Sites, 20 Op. O.L.C. 331, 1996 WL 33101199, at
*5 (Sept. 18, 1996).
459. Id. at *3.
460. Id. at *5. The opinion noted that "in Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court held that
preferences for federally recognized Indian tribes are subject to less exacting scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause than racial or ethnic preferences" because of the federal-tribal relationship.
Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
461. Id. at *5.
462. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter
UNDRIP].
463. Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples: A Historic
Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 539, 545 (2009). The other nations voting
against the adoption of UNDRIP (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) all changed their positions
on UNDRIP prior to the United States' change of position. Gail Courey Toensing, UN Declaration's
One-Year Anniversary: "Much to Celebrate, Much More to Be Done," INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
Dec. 12, 2011, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/12/12/un-declaration's-one-year-
anniversary-much-to-celebrate-much-more-to-be-done-66108.
464. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Remarks by the President at the Tribal Nations
Conference (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/12/05/remarks-president-tribal-nations-conference [hereinafter Obama UNDRIP Re-
marks]; see also President Barack Obama, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Initiatives to Promote the Government-to-
Government Relationship & Improve the Lives of Indigenous Peoples (Dec. 16, 2010),
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nous peoples "to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and cus-
toms," including "the right to maintain, protect and develop" manifesta-
tions of their cultures, such as historical sites and ceremonies.465 Article
12 sets out the right to "manifest, practise, develop and teach their spir-
itual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies" and to "maintain,
protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural
,,466sites. Article 25 asserts the right of indigenous peoples "to maintain
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their tradition-
ally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and
coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to
future generations in this regard." 4 67 More generally, UNDRIP provides
that indigenous peoples and individuals are to be free from discrimina-
tion in the exercise of their rights468 and that before governments adopt
and implement legislative or administrative measures that may affect
indigenous peoples, there must be consultation with their representative
institutions "to obtain their free, prior and informed consent." 4 69
Although non-binding on its face, UNDRIP stands as "an official
statement by most member countries of the United Nations that these are
the legal rights of indigenous peoples in international law" and thus has
"considerable political and moral force, creating the basis for it to be-
come binding international law."470 Some of UNDRIP's specific provi-
sions also reflect existing norms of customary international law.47 1
Moreover, UNDRIP as a whole is best understood as a document that
elaborates, "in the specific cultural, historical, social and economic cir-
cumstances of indigenous peoples," on already recognized "fundamental
human rights that are deemed of universal application."472
At the conclusion of a 2012 visit to the United States, U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples S. James Anaya noted that he had
"heard many stories about the significance of places that are sacred to
indigenous peoples, places like the San Francisco Peaks in Arizona and
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153223.pdf [hereinafter State Dep't UNDRIP An-
nouncement].
465. UNDRIP, supra note 462, art. 11, 1 1. States are to provide redress with respect to indige-
nous peoples' "cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior
and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs." Id. art. i1, 1 2. Cultural
heritage is also protected by article 31, which sets out the "right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions." Id art.
31, |1.
466. Id art. 12, 1 1. Article 12(1) also protects "the right to use and control of ceremonial
objects." Id.
467. Id. art. 25.
468. Id art. 2.
469. Id art. 19.
470. Coulter, supra note 463, at 546.
471. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
Indigenous People, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Funda-





the Black Hills in South Dakota, which hold profound religious and cul-
tural significance to tribes" and that "indigenous peoples reported . . .
that they have too little control over what happens in these places, and
that activities carried out around them at times affront their values and
beliefs.'A73 He concluded that continued efforts should be made "to re-
solve, clarify, and strengthen the protection of' sacred sites.474 The con-
cerns raised by the Special Rapporteur about U.S. sacred sites protection
are not without precedent in the U.N. system. In 2006, for example, the
U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed
concern about the impact of gold mining activities on Mount Tenabo in
Nevada, which is sacred to Western Shoshone tribes.475
Anaya highlighted U.S. support for UNDRIP as an important step
and commended the United States "for joining the rest of the countries of
the world in its support for this instrument." 4 76 Although he had heard
about federal initiatives that "can be seen as advances towards the im-
plementation of some provisions of the Declaration," it was "evident that
more robust measures are needed to address the serious issues affecting
Native American, Alaska Native and Hawaiian peoples in the United
States, issues that are rooted in a dark and complex history whose lega-
cies are not easy to overcome." 4 77 To conform to UNDRIP, "[c]ontinued
and concerted measures are needed to develop new initiatives and reform
existing ones, in consultation and in real partnership with indigenous
peoples." 7 8
Anaya's comments suggested the promise held out by the adoption
of UNDRIP, and by American support for it: "The Declaration provides
a new grounding for understanding the status and rights of indigenous
peoples, upon which the legal doctrines of conquest and discovery must
be discarded as a basis for decision-making by judicial and other authori-
ties."4 W In announcing the new support for UNDRIP, the State Depart-
ment asserted that "the United States is committed to serving as a model
in the international community in promoting and protecting the collective
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. U.N. Comm. for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Int'l Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, % 5-7, Decision from its 68th Sess., Feb. 20-Mar. 10,
2006, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/DEC/l (Apr. 11, 2006). For a discussion of the experiences of the
Western Shoshone in the international arena and, more broadly, of the United States' tribal consulta-
tion obligations following the endorsement of UNDRIP, see Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Indigenous
Consent: Rethinking U.S. Consultation Policies in Light of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1301 passim (2011). The decision of the BLM to allow an
expansion of gold mining activities at Mount Tenabo is the subject of ongoing litigation in the Ninth
Circuit. S. Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 2009).
476. James Anaya, Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indig-
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rights of indigenous peoples"480 and highlighted the USDA's initiative to
review USFS policies and "to examine the effectiveness of existing laws
and regulations in ensuring a consistent level of sacred site protection
that is more acceptable to the tribes."4 8 1 If the United States is sincerely
committed to serving as a role model for protection of indigenous peo-
ples' collective rights-a commitment that would distance the nation
from past policies of conquest and cultural genocide-improving protec-
tion of sacred sites surely must be part of the commitment.
CONCLUSION
I encourage all Americans to reach deep inside to try to determine
what it is that drives their lives most deeply. . . . [L]et us never be-
lieve that the freedom of religion imposes on any of us some respon-
sibility to run from our.convictions. Let us instead respect one anoth-
er's faiths [and] fight to the death to preserve the right of every
American to practice whatever convictions he or she has ... .482
We know that, ultimately, this is not just a matter of legislation, not
just a matter of policy. It's a matter of whether we're going to live up
to our basic values. It's a matter of upholding an ideal that has always
defined who we are as Americans. 483
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court rejected a Free
Exercise Clause claim by members. of the Native American Church in a
way that was widely perceived as threatening the religious freedom of all
Americans. This perception led to the enactment of RFRA to restore the
compelling interest test abandoned by Smith. This Article has analyzed
post-Smith and post-RFRA responses by federal land managers and fed-
eral courts to Indian religious exercise claims related to sacred sites on
public lands. Federal land managers have developed plans at some sites
that provide significant protection for Indian religious exercise and have
successfully defended them against Establishment Clause challenges. At
other sites, however, land managers' decisions have excessively bur-
dened religious exercise for the benefit of other interests, leading to
RFRA-based challenges by religious practitioners. The results of these
challenges to date have been mixed, with some of them showing the con-
tinuing significance of pre-RFRA cases like Smith and Lyng.
Recent efforts to evaluate and update policies and procedures for
addressing Indian religious exercise needs on public lands, coupled with
the 2010 U.S. endorsement of UNDRIP, suggest that the time is ripe for
improving agencies' responsiveness to Indian religious freedom claims.
480. State Dep't UNDRIP Announcement, supra note 464, at 2.
481. Id. at 14.
482. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2378 (Nov. 16, 1993).
483. Obama UNDRIP Remarks, supra note 464.
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If this hope becomes a reality, the promise of protection that Congress
made over thirty years ago in AIRFA-to "protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the[ir] traditional religions . . . including. . . access to sites "484
could at long last be fulfilled.
In closing, it is important to acknowledge how much is at stake in
the struggle to protect religious exercise at sacred sites. Speaking at the
time of another important anniversary-the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the enactment of AIRFA-Judge Carey Vicenti of the Jicarilla Apache
Nation commented that the greatest loss that tribes have suffered has
been the loss of lands. Although certain rights in the lands were extin-
guished, a crucial aspect of tribal ties to lands, however, was not lost:
[T]hat radiant sense of belonging that we had to these lands that we
lost.... remained in our hands... .The people from whom we came
still belong . . . to the sacred sites that exist all across the continent.485
Maintaining this sense of belonging is, Judge Vicenti explained, inextri-
cably bound up with resisting conquest:
[W]hat has happened over the past several hundred years has been a
constant effort at conquest. This conquest is not complete and won't
be complete until eventually that radiant sense of belonging is extin-
guished.... That is, in essence, what we are fighting for ... : we
have to retain . . . that beautiful and radiant sense of belonging to the
country from which we come. For this reason we can't stop ... our
efforts to try to protect our religious ceremonies, to protect the sacred
sites to which we belong.486
From this perspective, it seems impossible to overstate either the signifi-
cance of what is at stake where sacred sites on public lands are under
threat, or the weight of the corresponding responsibility of federal land
managers and courts, to protect Indian religious exercise rights at sacred
sites and thus not make conquest complete.
484. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
485. Carey N. Vicenti, Douglas Long & Chief Arvol Looking Horse, Religious Freedom and
Native Sovereignt-Protecting Native Religions Through Tribal, Federal, and State Law, 19








The U.S. government has committed grave human rights violations
by "disappearing" people during the past decade into the detention camps
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. And for nearly thirty years, beginning with a
1983 decision from a case arising in Uruguay, there has been a well-
developed body of international law establishing that parents, wives, and
children of the disappeared suffer torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment (CID).
This Article argues that the rights of family members were severely
violated when their loved ones were disappeared into Guantanamo. Fam-
ily members of men disappeared by the United States have legitimate
claims for torture or CID against the government under both international
and American law. However, rather than provide a forum to address the
plaintiffs' sufferings of egregious human rights violations, the United
States seeks to block all claims and evade accountability. In skirting
claims, the United States has proven to be a powerful and skilled adver-
sary both domestically and internationally.
My work with the Witness to Guantanamo project-in which we
have filmed full-length interviews of former detainees and others, includ-
ing military and government officials who have lived or worked in Guan-
tanamo and family members of former detainees-has inspired me to
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is a nation that "disappears" people. As a nation,
we have disappeared people into Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-
controlled "black sites" and foreign prisons;' into the pitch-black under-
ground "dark prison" in Kabul, Afghanistan; 2 into the massive prison
I. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BACKGROUND PAPER ON CIA's COMBINED USE
OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 2 (2004), available at http://reckoningwithtorture.org/wp-
content/uploads/Reading_2.pdf (noting the CIA's extraordinary rendition program).
2. Stephen Grey, Extended Interviews: Bisher al Rawi, PBS.ORG (Oct. 8, 2007),
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/rendition701/interviews/bisher.html; Interview with
Bisher al Rawi, former Guantanamo detainee, in London, Eng. (Aug. 2, 2011); David Rose, A Secret




facility in Bagram, Afghanistan;3 into the torture chambers of Abu
Ghraib in Iraq;4 and into the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.5
The innocent victims-the parents, wives, and children of the peo-
ple who were disappeared-suffered the worst thing imaginable: not
knowing what happened to their loved ones. The parents of the disap-
peared lost contact with their sons, the wives with their husbands and the
children with their fathers. And since 1983, the international community
has recognized that close family members have suffered torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment (CIID) when their loved ones were dis-
appeared by the state.6
This Article will focus on only one site where the United States has
disappeared people: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The first planeload of
twenty captives was flown from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Naval Base
on January 11, 2002. Ultimately, approximately 779 men were brought
to Guantanamo.8 It was not until the spring of 2006 that the U.S. gov-
ernment officially released the names of the men held in the Guantanamo
detention center.9 Until then, their family members either did not know,
or suspected but could not be certain, that their loved ones were disap-
peared into Guantanamo. And while their men were disappeared into
Guantanamo, the families suffered torture or CID.
Inevitably, these family members painfully suffer the disappearance
and loss of a loved one. A wife has to raise children by herself. She be-
comes both mother and father. She may also find that after her husband
is disappeared, few neighbors care to talk to her-effectively branding
her the wife of a "terrorist." 0 A child suffers from the loss of a father
during his early years and his transition from youth to adulthood. Anoth-
er child born after her father was disappeared will have never hugged her
father; she will not even know him. If and when the father returns home,
the children will sometimes refuse to respect or even acknowledge the
father as a parent, showing allegiance and loyalty only to the mother who
raised them. The parents of the disappeared no longer sleep peacefully as
3. See Hilary Andersson, Red Cross Confirms 'Second Jail' at Bagram, Afghanistan,
BBC.co.UK (May 11, 2010, 1:04 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8674179.stm.
4. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42.
5. PETER JAN HONIGSBERG, OUR NATION UNHINGED passim (2009).
6. U.N. Human Rights Comm. Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5,
Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
114, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/19/107/1981 (July 21, 1983) (expressing views of the Human Rights
Committee under article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, submitted by Maria del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros on behalf of her
daughter Elena Quinteros Almeida, and on her own behalf).
7. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 76.
8. The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo.
9. Pentagon Discloses Detainees' Names, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2006, at A17.
10. Eighty to ninety percent of the men taken to Guantanamo were sold by their Afghani and
Pakistani holders to the Americans for ransom. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 77-78. By the time
President Bush left office, five hundred of the men had been released.
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they can only imagine day and night what terror their child is enduring.
Even worse, these parents fear the worst tragedy that can ever befall a
parent-the possibility that their child will perish before they do.
Much has been written about the harsh treatment of the men in
Guantanamo-the CIID, as well as the torture that they suffered." But
little, if anything, has been written about the trauma inflicted upon the
parents, spouses, and children of the disappeared.
Family members of the men disappeared by the United States have
legitimate claims for torture or CID against the government under both
international and American law. Unfortunately, the United States has
proven to be a powerful and skilled adversary. It has successfully skirted
the jurisdiction of all but one of the international oversight bodies that
would otherwise have the authority to rule on challenges to the U.S. gov-
ernment's mistreatment of individuals. In addition, the United States is
able to impede access to federal courts on jurisdictional, immunity, stat-
ute of limitations, and other procedural grounds, thwarting the normative
goal of providing remedies for grave harms. In essence, although the
United States should be held accountable to the families of the disap-
peared, accountability waits in the wings.
No matter what one can say about the people we have held in Guan-
tanamo-whether they are terrorists or not-we are mistreating their
family members who are wholly innocent and painfully vulnerable. This
Article is written in search of both an international and a domestic forum
in which to hold the United States accountable for the sufferings of the
family members whose loved ones were disappeared into Guantanamo.
Part I of this Article defines "enforced disappearance" as recognized
under international law. Part II of this Article describes the landscape in
the detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into which the men
were disappeared. It also introduces the issue of notice to the families of
their loved ones' disappearance. Part III examines the venues and cases
that have recognized a cause of action for torture or CID by close family
members for the disappearance of loved ones under international law.
This part also looks at whether the United States can be held accountable
in an international forum for its role in disappearing men into Guantana-
mo.
Part IV explores the possible causes of action brought by parents,
wives, children, and other close family members against the United
States in American courts for the disappearance of the men into Guan-
tanamo. Included in this part is an analysis of the roadblocks in filing
claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA). This part will
11. See generally HONIGSBERG, supra note 5; JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE
STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS passim (2008).
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also suggest one possible way to bypass dismissal of the claims in federal
court. Part V concludes by suggesting possible alternate forums for fami-
lies to successfully pursue claims against the United States, including
filing a claim for declaratory relief under the ATS, filing a claim in the
courts of other nations under the theory of universal civil jurisdiction,
and filing a claim with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Inter-American Commission).
I. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE DEFINED
AND RECOGNIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Enforced disappearance is defined in the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance as
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons act-
ing with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, fol-
lowed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law. 12
The United States is not a party to this Convention. However, because
ninety-one nations are signatories, an argument can be made that the
Convention has become customary international law.13 If the Convention
were regarded as customary international law, the United States would
be found in breach of the Convention. 14 Even if the Convention and en-
forced disappearance have not become customary international law, in-
ternational oversight bodies have found nations to have disappeared peo-
12. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
G.A. Res. A/RES/61/177, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter En-
forced Disappearance Convention].
13. By becoming signatories, the ninety-one countries affirm that they will not participate in
enforced disappearances and support the belief that the act of enforced disappearance violates a
human rights norm. Although only thirty-six nations have ratified the convention, the absence of
ratifications does not necessarily indicate a rejection of the norm. Bureaucratic, administrative,
political, and legislative enactment concerns may impede the process of ratification. An argument
can also be made that as soon as a convention is initiated, it becomes customary international law-
the theory being that a significant number of countries have met for years to agree on the wording of
the convention and in doing so, these states have proclaimed their belief in the principle proclaimed
by the document.
14. Of course, the United States could argue that it is not a party to the convention and, con-
sequently, is not bound by the customary norm. However, the United States has never argued that
position and it would certainly be an embarrassing and absurd position for the United States to
advocate, given its public declaration for the promotion of human rights. In addition, it is the con-
ventional wisdom that once customary international law is formed, a nation cannot withdraw from
customary international law, unless it formally objects during the period that the customary norm is
forming. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE
L.J. 202, 233 (2010). Finally, an argument could be made that even if the United States is not bound
by this customary international law, it nevertheless factually disappeared people, an act the United
States would not want to be accused of having committed. See infra Part II.
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ple for nearly thirty years and have. subsequently held nations accounta-
ble based on their findings."
As for the United States violating the Convention as customary in-
ternational law, the two key elements of the Convention are easily met.
First, the United States abducted and deprived the liberty of men who
were transported to Guantanamo. A person can disappear under the Con-
vention even if he is not killed or tortured, as neither death nor torture is
required to satisfy the first element.
Second, the United States refused to acknowledge the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared persons for up to four years,16 holding
them outside the protection of the law. In fact, John Yoo, the author of
several torture memos written while he held the post of Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel,
wrote that "[n]o location was perfect," but Guantanamo "seemed to fit
the bill." 7 He added, "The federal courts probably wouldn't consider
Gitmo as falling within their habeas jurisdiction."i8
Because the victim's whereabouts are unknown or at least uncer-
tain, disappearance is a distinct human rights violation. An early report
issued in 1977 from the Inter-American Commission to the General As-
sembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) described disap-
pearance as "cruel and inhuman."' 9 A disappearance is not only "an arbi-
trary deprivation of freedom but also a serious danger to the personal
integrity and safety and to even the very life of the victim. It leaves the
victim totally defenseless, violating the rights to a fair trial, to protection
against arbitrary arrest and to due process., 20
The same report noted the serious impact of enforced disappearance
on a family: "[I]t is, moreover, a true form of torture for the victim's
family and friends, because of the uncertainty they experience as to the
fate of the victim and because they feel powerless to provide legal, moral
and material assistance."2 1
15. See HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 192-94; see also infra Part Ill.
16. The United States did not release an official list of names of prisoners until 2006. See
infra Part IV.D.2.
17. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
142 (2006).
18. Id
19. TULLlO SCOVAZZI & GABRIELLA CITRONI, THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCE AND THE 2007 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 342 (2007) (quoting Annual Report
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1977, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.
IV/ll.43, doc. 21 corr. 1, pt. 11 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id (quoting Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1977,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser. UV/II.43, doc. 21 corr. 1, pt. 11 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
21. Id. (quoting Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1977,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/V/ll.43, doc. 21 corr. 1, pt. 11 (1978)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
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In addition, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-
American Court) has indicated that in cases that involve the forced dis-
appearance of persons, the violation of the psychological and moral in-
tegrity of the victim's next of kin is a direct consequence of the disap-
pearance, causing the family members to suffer. Furthermore, the suffer-
ing is aggravated by the State's continued refusal to provide information
on the victim's whereabouts.2 2
Claims for torture or CID by family members have been brought by
family members before, and been recognized by, international oversight
bodies throughout the continents: the Human Rights Committee (HRC)23
the European Court of Human Rights (European Court)24 , the Inter-
American Court,25 the African Commission on Human and People's
Rights,26 and the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia-Herzegovina.27
The international provisions that have been violated include article
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),8
article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention),2 9 article 5 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, 30 and article 5 of the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights. 3' Analysis of the development of
international law violations for enforced disappearance appears is
Part III.
22. Blake v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 48, 1 50 (Jan. 22, 1999); Bimaca
Veldsquez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, 1|165 (Nov. 25, 2000); Goiburu v.
Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, 197 (Sept. 22, 2006).
23. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 6, 1. 1.
24. Qakici v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 583.
25. Blake v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 48, 150.
26. Amnesty International, Comit6 Loosli, Bachelard, Lawyers' Comm. for Human Rights,
Assoc. of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v. Sudan, Commc'n Nos. 48/90,
50/91, 89/93, 1 54, in African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Thirteenth Annual Activ-
ity Report, at 24 (1993); The Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan, Commc'n Nos. 222/98,
229/99, 1144, in African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Sixteenth Annual Activity
Report, at 39 (2003).
27. Palic v. Republika Srpska, Case No. CH/99/3196, Partial Decision on Admissibility, 115
(July 6, 2000). See generally Selimovic et al. v. Republika Srpska, Case Nos. CH/01/8365, et al.,
Decision of Admissibility and Merits, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, I| 183-
85 (Mar. 7, 2003).
28. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(A) (XXI), art. 7,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) ("No one shall be subject-
ed to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
29. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 3, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S No. 005.
30. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 ("Every person has the right to have his physical,
mental and moral integrity respected. ... No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman,
or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.").
31. African Union, African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5, June 27,
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5. ("Every individual shall have the right to the
respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms
of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.").
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The analysis in this Article might additionally support lawsuits
brought by close family members of people who were disappeared in
other prisons and detention centers throughout the world, as in the case
of the CIA's extraordinary rendition cases in foreign nations and black
sites or in Abu Ghraib. Also, close family members could conceivably
bring lawsuits on behalf of two American citizens, Jose Padilla and
Yaser Hamdi, and an American legal resident, Ali al-Marri, who were
disappeared into the naval brig in South Carolina, severely sensory de-
prived, and held for years in strict isolation and incommunicado.3 2 Final-
ly, the family of "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh may likely have
a claim for John Lindh's disappearance, who when first captured was
held incommunicado for fifty-four days in Afghanistan. 33 However, be-
cause the author is most familiar with the issues in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, and the jurisprudence on Guantanamo Bay is sufficiently more
advanced,34 this Article will focus on the claims of close family mem-
bers-particularly parents, spouses, and children-of men who were
disappeared into Guantanamo.
II. DISAPPEARING INTO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
A. A BriefDescription ofHow the Men Disappeared into Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba
On January 11, 2002, the first planeload of twenty men arrived at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, after a terrible eighteen-hour plane ride from
Afghanistan. The men, in orange jumpsuits, were shackled to the floor
of the plane. Their hands were short-shackled to a belly chain. They wore
earmuffs to cancel out all sounds and blackened goggles to block out
their vision. 3 6 Some also wore hoods. The men were offered peanut but-
ter sandwiches and apples. 37 However, because their hands were chained
32. See HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 41-70. As Jose Padilla's mother, Estela Lebron, told
the Witness to Guantanamo project that Jose Padilla is the not the same person he was before he was
captured and disappeared into the naval brig. Interview with Estela Lebron, Mother of Jose Padilla,
in S.F., Cal. (July 8, 2011).
33. Interview with Frank Lindh, Father of John Walker Lindh, in Berkeley, Cal. (Apr. 2,
2011).
34. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528 n.l (D.D.C. 2009) ("Since plaintiffs failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion...." (citations omitted)); Hamad v. Gates, No. CIO-591 MJP, 2011 WL 6130413, at *2-5
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011); see also Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Binyam
Mohamed, Abou Elkassim Britel, Mohamed Farag Ahmed Basmilah, and Bisher Al-Rawi by the
United States of America with a Request for an Investigation and Hearing on the Merits, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., at 4 (Nov. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Binyam Mohamed et al. Petition], available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ Ill 14-iachr-petition-final.pdf.
35. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 76.
36. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 24; Shafiq Rasul Video Interview, WITNESS TO
GUANTANAMO, http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/interviews/detainees/shafiq-rasul-british-citizen/
(last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
37. See sources cited supra note 36; Ruhal Ahmed Video Interview, WITNESS TO
GUANTANAMO, http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/interviews/detainees/ruhal-ahmed-british/ (last
visited Dec. 28, 2012).
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to their waists, the men could not easily, if at all, raise the food to their
mouths.3 8 The men were occasionally allowed to hobble to the toilet;
others wore diapers.39 Some of the men asked the guards to drug them
and put them into a sound sleep so they would not have to endure the
pain. Often, the military accommodated them.4 o
Overall, approximately 779 men were transported and held at the
detention center in Guantanamo Bay.41 Most, but not all, had been arrest-
ed in Afghanistan and Pakistan and were first detained in either Kanda-
har or Bagram Airfields in Afghanistan.42 A handful of the men were
43arrested in Bosnia and flown directly to Guantanamo. Two men were
picked up in Gambia and flown to the dark prison in Afghanistan before
being transported to Guantanamo." They were held in a pitch-black un-
derground cellar for several weeks and only permitted moments of dim
light when a guard briefly shined his flashlight to check on them.
Afghani and Pakistani military officers ransomed the men they
seized to the Americans for hundreds, likely thousands, of dollars in re-
sponse to millions of ransom flyers dropped over Afghanistan.4 6 People
who averaged 800 dollars a year were offered great wealth to turn in an
al-Qaeda or Taliban soldier. Afghanis and Pakistanis sought out Arabs
from other countries, seized them, and sold them to the United States.
Afghanis also sold tribal enemies.47 The families of the men who were
disappeared no longer heard from them.48
While being held in Afghanistan, many of the men suffered brutal
treatment amounting to torture. Some were hung by their wrists, 49 and
others suffered interminable isolation and incommunicado.so Most were
beaten regularly.5
38. Ruhal Ahmed Video Interview, supra note 37.
39. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 185.
40. Shafiq Rasul Video Interview, supra note 36.
41. The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 8.
42. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 86, 161.
43. Interview with Saber Lahmar, French National Guantanamo Detainee, in Bordeaux, Fr.
(Aug. 5, 2010); Interview with Haj Boudella, Bosnian Guantanamo Detainee, in Sarajevo, Bosn.
(Aug. 7, 2009); Interview with Mustafa Ait Idir, Bosnian Detainee at Guantanamo, in Sarajevo,
Bosn. (Aug. 7, 2009).
44. Grey, supra note 2; Interview with Jameel El-Bamma, British Guantanamo Detainee, in
London, Eng. (Aug. 2, 2011).
45. Id
46. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 78.
47. Id
48. See id. at 77-79.
49. Murat Kurnaz Video Interview, WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO (Sept. 19, 2009),
http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/interviews/detainees/murat-kurnaz-german-national/.
50. Grey, supra note 2.
51. Tom Lasseter, Day 2: U.S. Abuse of Detainees Was Routine at Afghanistan Bases,
MCCLATCHY.COM (June 16, 2008), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/06/16/38775/day-2-us-
abuse-of-detainees-was.html; Interview with Ayub Mohamed, Uyghur Guantanamo Detainee, in
Tirana, Alb. (Aug. 5, 2009).
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When the planes finally landed in Guantanamo Bay, the men were
transported onto a bus. At the site of the first camp, known as Camp X-
Ray, the men were unceremoniously tossed off the bus, given a medical
check-up and shower, and forcibly escorted to their cells in shackles.52
The first man who was pushed off the bus had his prosthetic leg tossed
off after him." Their cells, often described as dog kennels, were outdoor
cages eight feet by eight feet in size.54 The cells were completely ex-
posed to the tropical sun and the elements.5 ' Each cell had a toilet hole
and a bucket for water. Metal pipes for urinating were added later. 6 The
men remained at Camp X-Ray until more permanent housing was con-
structed.57
The men, who originated from forty-eight countries," often had
limited contact with each other. Many were held in isolation.5 9 One man
was held in isolation for approximately two years;60 another told the
Witness to Guantanamo project how he "broke" after being held for one
year in isolation.6 1 Other men were isolated not by being placed in a cell
apart from others but by their inability to communicate in the lingua
franca of the camps (i.e., Arabic or English). One man from Uzbeki-
stan-who was an uneducated farm boy and spoke neither Arabic nor
English-spent seven years in what amounted to full-time loneliness.6 2
Each morning, he would awake and observe the men in the neighboring
cells as they spoke and interacted with each other. Without the ability
to learn the languages to a level sufficient to communicate, he could only
watch.M
The detainees in those early years had no contact with the outside
65world, except sporadically with the Red Cross. However, the Red Cross
52. Brandon Neely Video Interview, WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO (Sept. 11, 2011),
http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/interviews/brandon-neely-prison-guard/.
53. Id.
54. Capt. Bob Buehn Video Interview, WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO (Oct. 22, 2011),
http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/uncategorized/bob-buehn-navy-captain-ret/.
55. HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 77.
56. Id
57. See id.
58. The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 8.
59. See, e.g., Feroz Ali Abbasi Video Interview, WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO (Oct. 10, 2012),
http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/interviews/detainces/feroz-ali-abbasi-british/; Moazzam Begg Video
Interview, WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO (Oct. 10, 2012),
http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/interviews/detainees/moazzam-begg-british/.
60. Moazzam Begg Video Interview, supra note 59.
61. Interview with Feroz Ali Abbasi, British Guantanamo Detainee, in London, Eng. (Aug. 7,
2010).
62. Interview with Anonymous, Former Guantanamo Detainee, in Riga, Lat. (Aug. 4, 2011).
63. Id.
64. Id.




was limited in what it could do or say, hamstrung by the United States'
requirements if it wanted to return. 6 6
The men in Guantanamo were held in isolation and secrecy until the
Supreme Court decision in Rasul v. Bush67 permitted lawyers to visit
their clients starting in mid-2004 68-two-and-a-half years after the first
men were brought to Guantanamo. Yet, even then, nearly two more years
passed before the government agreed to release the names of the de-
tained.69 Overall, more than four years passed from the time the first men
arrived at Guantanamo to when the government finally released their
names.
B. Notice to the Families
In analyzing whether the families may claim suffering .due to the
disappearance of their loved ones, the courts look at when the family
members first received notice of the disappearance. Part IV below ad-
dresses how federal courts consider the legal requirements of notice. This
subpart II.B introduces the issue of notice in the context of disappearance
into Guantanamo.
Mamdouh Habib, an Australian citizen, was brutally transported
from Pakistan to Egypt, under the United States' extraordinary rendition
program. He was tortured and drugged in Egypt for six months before
being transported to Afghanistan and then to Guantanamo.70 His wife
told the Witness to Guantanamo project that during that time, no Austral-
ian, Egyptian, or American official told her where her husband was held,
why he was being detained, whether any charges were brought against
him, or whether he was treated humanely. 71 The nations of Egypt, Aus-
66. Leaked 2004 Guantanamo Manual Shows Continued ICRC Restrictions, Severe Psycho-
logical Illness, and Risk of Suicide, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS. (Dec. 4, 2007),
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/leaked-2004-guantanamo-manual-shows-continued-
icrc-restrictions,-severe-pysc.
67. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
68. See id at 485. Not all detainees had lawyers. Jackie Northam, Q&A About Guantanamo
Bay and the Detainees, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (June 23, 2005, 12:00AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=4715916. Some detainees had lawyers be-
cause their families knew the men were in Guantanamo and could afford to hire lawyers for them.
HONIGSBERG, supra note 5, at 83-84. Other detainees had representation from the Center for Consti-
tutional Rights (CCR) in New York. Id. at 86. The CCR, in addition to having its own lawyers on
staff, was also the clearinghouse for volunteer lawyers representing the detainees. Id. Lawyers were
able to obtain names of some of the detainees through various sources, including from families who
had contacted attorneys and from detainees who had been released. Interview with Clive Stafford
Smith, Habeas Attorney, in Symondsbury, U.K. (Aug. 3, 2010). However, as explained in Part IV,
infra, in 2004 the CCR still did not know the names of all the detainees in Guantanamo.
69. Andrew Selsky, Pentagon Hands over List of All Guantdnamo Bay Detainees, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 16, 2006, at A9.
70. Interview with Mamdouh Habib, Australian Guantanamo Detainee, in Sydney, Austl.
(Dec. 30, 2011); Profile: Mamdouh Habib, BBC.CO.UK (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4214747.stm.
71. VIVIENNE THOM, INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
IN RELATION TO THE ARREST AND DETENTION OVERSEAS OF MR. MAMDOUH HABIB FROM 2001 TO
2005, at 9 (2011), http://www.igis.gov.aulinquiries/docs/habib-inquiry.pdf; Natalie O'Brien, Intro-
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tralia, and the United States disclosed nothing to her during those early
days. Her husband was officially disappeared, a disappearance about
which she only heard through the media and had no gauge to determine
whether it was true.
Terry and Beverly Hicks, parents of David Hicks, who was also an
Australian citizen and detainee number 002, similarly learned everything
about their son's capture and transport to Guantanamo through the me-
dia.7 2
After 9/11, Soad Abdul Jaleel had not heard from her son for three
months. She feared he was dead.7 3 Finally, someone called to say that he
had been captured. Through the Internet, she learned that he would be
transferred to Guantanamo.
A Kuwaiti father, Khalid Al-Odah, received a phone call from a
Kuwaiti citizen whom he did not know. 7 4 The citizen told Khalid that
that his son had been seized by the Afghanis and then turned over to the
Americans.75 (Subsequently, the man who had phoned Khalid with the
story was also kidnapped and transported to Guantanamo. 76) Until he
heard from the officials in Kuwait that his son was in Guantanamo, all
Khalid knew was that his son had been kidnapped.77 When the Witness
to Guantanamo project interviewed Khalid in 2011, Khalid's story spoke
less to the son's disappearance and more to the family's loss. Stories like
this one best express why families experience torture or CID when their
children are kidnapped and disappeared. As of this writing, Khalid's son,
Fawzi, has been incarcerated in Guantanamo for over ten years without
charges. During the 2011 interview, Khalid's father spoke about the
emotional effects on his family of his son's interminable incarceration in
Guantanamo. Khalid said that sometimes he awakes in the middle of the
night and finds that his wife is not in bed with him. He now knows where
she goes. She goes to their son's room to sleep in his bed. 9
ducing Mrs. Habib, Private Eye, SMH.COM.AU (May 29, 2011),
http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/introducing-mrs-habib-private-eye-20110528- f9h4.html; Interview
with Maha Habib, Wife of Mamdouh Habib, in Sydney Austl. (Jan. 5, 2012).
72. David Hicks Timeline, THEAGE.COM.AU,
http://www.theage.com.au/multimedia/hicks/hicks.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); Interview with
Terry Hicks & Beverly Hicks, parents of David Hicks, in Adelaide, Austl., (Jan. 2, 2012).
73. Jennifer Fenton, Kuwaiti Families in Legal Limbo at Guantanamo, AL-JAZEERA.COM
(Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/201112298544422981.html.
Subsequently, the nation of Kuwait confirmed that her son was held in Guantanamo.





78. The Guantanamo Trials, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
79. Interview with Khalid Al-Odah, supra note 74.
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Because the government classified the list of names of the detainees
held in Guantanamo, outsiders could only gather information about the
people detained in the prison through one of four avenues.
First, the U.S. government would reveal names of certain nationals
to the governments of their countries. When the government of the de-
tainees was so informed, the government would often, but not always,
inform the families of the detainees that their sons, fathers, and husbands
were in Guantanamo.80
Second, detainee information would be revealed when a man was
released from Guantanamo. For example, if the released man knew the
names of others held, he might notify the families directly or inform his
lawyer, who could then pass on the information to the families."
Third, someone who had been present but not taken when another
man was captured and detained by the Americans might inform the fami-
ly of the man detained if he knew the man and his family.82
Fourth, the Red Cross would sometimes contact family members.
Although the Red Cross collected postcards from the detainees to be
presumably delivered to their families, the United States often refused to
grant the Red Cross permission to take the cards outside the facility. 84 in
addition, the mail was heavily censored and often completely redacted
except for the word "dear" in the opening salutation and the name in the
signature line.8 1 Consequently, family members learned little, if any-
thing, from the Red Cross to confirm their worries that their son, hus-
86band, or spouse was incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay.
C. Is There an Obligation for States to Notify Families?
In times of war, the Geneva Conventions require that notice to fami-
lies and next of kin occur within one week or less. Article 70 of the Third
Convention on Prisoners of War requires that "[i]mmediately upon cap-
ture, or not more than a week after arrival at a camp, . . . every prisoner
of war shall be entitled to write direct to his family, . . . informing his
relatives of his capture, address and state of health. The said cards shall
be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any man-
80. For example, the Kuwaiti families were informed this way.
81. Interview with Clive Stafford Smith, Habeas Attorney, in Symondsbury, U.K. (Aug. 3,
2010)
82. See supra text accompanying note 74.
83. Interview with Terry Hicks & Beverly Hicks, supra note 72.
84. MURAT KuRNAz, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE, AN INNOCENT MAN IN GUANTANAMO 68
(2007).
85. Bisher al Rawi Video Interview, WITNESS TO GUANTANAMO,
http://witnesstoguantanamo.com/interviews/detainees/bisher-al-rawi-england/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2012).
86. Interview with Terry Hicks & Beverly Hicks, supra note 72.
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ner."87 In addition, civilians in the territory of a party to the conflict
"shall be enabled to give news of a strictly personal nature to members of
their families."88 Unfortunately, these provisions are not applicable here
because on February 7, 2002, President Bush declared that the Geneva
Conventions' notice requirements do not apply to Guantanamo detain-
ees.89
Although the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfelo held that
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the men detained
in Guantanamo, notice to families .still does not appear in the common
articles. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions also emphasizes the "right
of families to know the fate of their relatives."91 However, the United
States is not a signatory to the protocols.
Additionally, article 17 of the Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides that states guarantee a
detainee the right to "communicate with and be visited by his or her fam-
ily, counsel or any other person of his or her choice."9 2 Article 18 allows.
family members and other interested persons access to information relat-
ed to the whereabouts of the detainee.93 Restrictions may be placed on
article 18 under "exceptional" circumstances and where "strictly neces-
sary," 94 but under no circumstances may a state violate article 17. Unfor-
tunately, unless enforced disappearance is deemed a customary interna-
tional law, these notification rights are not available to people in Ameri-
can custody because the United States is not a state party to this Conven-
tion.
The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Per-
sons requires states to establish and maintain up-to-date registries of de-
87. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 70, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
88. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 25,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
89. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelli-
gence Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/bush memo_20020207 ed.pdf.
90. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
91. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 32, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
92. Enforced Disappearance Convention, supra note 12, at art. 17(d) ("Guarantee that any
person deprived of liberty shall be authorized to communicate with and be visited by his or her
family, counsel or any other person of his or her choice, subject only to the conditions established by
law, or, if he or she is a foreigner, to communicate with his or her consular authorities, in accordance
with applicable international law.").
93. Id. at art. 18(d) ("The whereabouts of the person deprived of liberty, including, in the
event of a transfer to another place of deprivation of liberty, the destination and the authority respon-
sible for the transfer . . . .").
94. Id. at art. 20(1).
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tainees available to relatives and other interested persons.95 But, here too,
this Convention does not apply to the United States because it has not
ratified the treaty.
Notice is important for measuring the statute of limitations96 when
pursuing cases against the U.S. Government. Under federal law, dis-
cussed below in Part IV, the statute of limitations can be either two years
or ten years, depending on whether the claim is brought under the ATS
(ten years) or the FTCA (two years). Even applying the ten-year period,
it is unlikely a family member could file a claim, considering it has been
more than a decade since Guantanamo opened. Consequently, to the ex-
tent that their claims will have lapsed under American law, this Article
will nevertheless be helpful to prospective litigants. That is, if the United
States again disappears alleged terrorists or others allegedly engaged in
hostilities against the United States, the families who suffer torture or
CID can look to this Article for assistance in finding a forum. Whether
detainees are disappeared into Guantanamo, detention sites in the United
States, or detention sites outside U.S. borders, this Article will assist the
litigants in finding a forum to hear and redress their claims.
Additionally at issue is whether the four types of informal notices
recounted above can amount to constructive notice. If so, is constructive
notice to the families sufficient, or is official notice to the families by the
U.S. government required before the statute of limitations begins to
run?98
III. DECISIONS AND U.S. ACCOUNTABILITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Decisions Under International Law
Following this brief background, we now turn to the law on how
parents, wives, and children were victims of torture or cruel, inhuman,
95. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons art. XI, June 9, 1994,
O.A.S.T.S. No. A-60, 33 1.L.M. 1429 ("The States Parties shall establish and maintain official up-to-
date registries of their detainees and, in accordance with their domestic law, shall make them availa-
ble to relatives, judges, attorneys, any other person having a legitimate interest, and other authori-
ties.").
96. See infra Part IV.
97. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
125 Stat. 1298 (2012). The Act permits the detention of "covered persons," including (1) "[a] person
who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September I1,
2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks"; or (2) "[a] person who was a part of or sub-
stantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalitions partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act
or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces." It is not clear whether Sec-
tion 1021 specifically covers U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens. An amendment to the Act reads,
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authority relating to the detention
of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are
captured or arrested in the United States." S. 1867, 112th Cong. § 1031 (2011).
98. See supra Part IV.D. I for more details regarding this statute of limitations issue.
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and degrading treatment when their sons, husbands, and fathers were
disappeared into Guantanamo.
The first case to acknowledge the "anguish and stress" suffered by a
mother when her daughter disappeared was in Uruguay. 99 In 1983, a
young woman who was held by Uruguayan military forces in front of the
Venezuelan embassy tried to break away by jumping over a fence into
the embassy yard. 00 Military personnel chased after her and removed her
while embassy officials watched.101 The young woman was subsequently
taken to the police station, where she was allegedly tortured and killed.102
When her mother, Maria del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros, contacted
the state about her missing daughter, Uruguay did not admit or deny that
she was in detention.10 3
Her mother then submitted a complaint under the individual com-
plaints mechanism to the HRC alleging violations of article 7 of the
ICCPR for both her and her daughter.'04 The Committee recognized "the
anguish and stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her
daughter and by the continuing uncertainty concerning her fate and
whereabouts."05 The Committee concluded that the mother "has the
right to know what has happened to her daughter," and "[i]n these re-
spects, she too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant [ICCPR]
suffered by her daughter in particular, of [a]rticle 7.'106
Years passed before anyone seemed to notice the 1983 Uruguayan
decision. In fact, not until January 1998, fifteen years after Quinteros v.
Uruguay,'07 did the Inter-American Court find a violation of family
members' rights due to the disappearance of their loved ones. In Blake v.
Guatemala,'0o journalist Nicholas Blake and photographer Griffith Da-
vis, both U.S. citizens residing in Guatemala, arrived in the village of El
Llano in March 1985.109 After being questioned by the commander of the
civil self-defense patrol, Blake and Davis were taken on orders from the
military garrison to a place known as Los Compamentos, where they
were killed and buried. 10 The men remained disappeared until their re-
mains were discovered in 1992."'
99. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 6,1 14.
100. Id. at 1.2.
101. Id
102. Id. at 1|1.5.
103. Id. at 1 .7.
104. Id. at 1 10.8.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id
107. U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 6.
108. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36 (Jan. 24, 1998).
109. Id. at 152(a).
110. Id.
11. Id. at 52(b).
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Between 1985 and 1992, Blake's relatives made a number of jour-
neys to Guatemala, meeting with U.S. Embassy officials and Guatemalan
civilian and military authorities, including the president of Guatemala, in
an effort to discover Blake's whereabouts. 112 Throughout this time, ac-
cording to the Inter-American Court decision, although "the Army was
aware of the deaths shortly after they occurred,"" 3 "[t]he State concealed
Mr. Nicholas Blake's whereabouts and hindered his family's investiga-
tion" by concealing facts, lying, claiming he was seized by guerillas,
concealing his remains, and otherwise stonewalling the investigation. 1 14
The court concluded, "[T]he State of Guatemala violated, to the detri-
ment of the relatives of Mr. Nicholas Chapman Blake, the right to hu-
mane treatment enshrined in Article 5 of the American Convention on
Human Rights." 15
A few months later, in Kurt v. Turkey,"'6 a mother witnessed Turk-
ish security forces seizing her son, Uzeyir; she saw that he was surround-
ed by approximately ten soldiers and five guards and appeared badly
beaten. That was the last time this mother saw her son."' 7 Several days
later, she went to the public prosecutor to ask about Uzeyir's wherea-
bouts." That same day, she received a response from someone in local
headquarters saying that her son had been kidnapped by the PKK, the
Kurdish Workers' Party, and not by the State. 1 9 The mother continued to
pursue her son's disappearance by applying to the National Security
Court and again to the public prosecutor. 120 As time passed, State author-
ities pressured her to withdraw the application she filed on behalf of her
missing son.'2 ' She then filed an application with the European Court.122
The European Court ruled in favor of Uzeyir's mother.123 Because
the Turkish Government did not assist her but in fact misled her, the
Government's contention regarding Uzeyir's kidnapping by the PKK had
112. Id. at152(d).
113. Id at I52(o).
114. Id
115. Id. at § XV Ill, 1 2. Subsection 2 of article 5 reads, "No one should be subjected to torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall
be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person." Organization of American
States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, 1 2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.




120. Id. at 17.
121. Id at 19.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id. at 134.
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no basis in fact.124 The Kurt court found that her rights under article 3 of
the European Convention were violated. 125
A year later, in Qakici v. Turkey,12 6 the European Court heard an-
other case regarding a disappeared loved one. In 9akici, a man filed the
application on his and his brother's behalf.127 Ahmet Qakici was detained
by village guards and security forces, beaten, tortured with electric
shocks, and ultimately killed.12 8 The authorities claimed that he was
killed in a clash between the PKK, of which he was a member, and the
security forces.12 9 The court concluded, however, that Ahmet died fol-
lowing his apprehension and detention by security forces. 30 His family
was not informed of his death.131 When his father and brother made in-
quiries as to Ahmet's death, the public prosecutor acted half-heartedly.132
The Gakici court stated that Kurt did not establish "any general principle
that a family member of a 'disappeared person' is thereby the victim of
treatment contrary to Article 3."'33 Rather, the Qakici court held that
whether a family member is such a victim will depend on the "existence
of special factors which gives the suffering of the applicant a dimension
and character distinct from emotional distress which may be regarded as
inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights viola-
tion."l34 The relevant factors introduced in (7akici included (1) the prox-
imity of the family tie, such as a parent-child bond; (2) the particular
circumstances of the relationship; (3) the extent to which the family
member witnessed the events; (4) the involvement of the family member
in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person; and
(5) the way in which the authorities responded to the inquiries."' The
court emphasized that "the essence of such a violation does not so much
lie in the 'disappearance' of the family member but rather concerns the
authorities' reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to
their attention. It is especially in respect of the latter that a relative may
claim directly to be a victim of the authorities' conduct." 36
Applying the factors, the court concluded that Ahmet's brother did
not meet the required criteria.' 37 He was not present when the security
124. Id at 87.
125. Id at 73. Article 5 reads, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment." Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 3, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
126. 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 583.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id. at Ji| 14-17.
129. Id at 20.
130. Id. at 85.
131. Id. at 17.
132. Id. at 53.







forces took his brother.13 8 In addition, although Ahmet's brother made
inquiries with the authorities, he "did not bear the brunt of this task" be-
cause "his father [took] the initiative in presenting the petition . .. to the
... National Security Court." 39 The court also stated that in addition to
the five factors, it could not find any aggravating or special features.140
Consequently, the court found no violation of article 3 in relation to Ah-
met's brother. 14 1
Subsequent decisions by judicial bodies throughout the world often
applied the five factors suggested in Gakici.14 2 Nevertheless, courts var-
ied on how much emphasis to give each factor. A majority of the courts
focused on the same two factors as did (akici-how much the family
member pursued the state in attempting to obtain information of their
loved one's disappearance as well as the reaction of the state officials to
the requests for investigations.143 However, in at least five cases, the
court recognized the bond between the disappeared and the family mem-
ber.'"
A review of thirty-five international cases addressing the disappear-
ance of a family member, including Gakici, demonstrates that in nearly
one-half (or sixteen) of the cases, the forum found a violation of torture
or CID, even though the applicant was not present. In one of the cases,
the judge addressed the issue of presence, stating that the applicant's
absence was not determinative.145 In thirteen other cases, the applicant
was present at the time of disappearance, and a violation was found. 4





142. See, e.g., Timurta v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 95-96 (2000); Bamaca Velisquez v. Gua-
temala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70,11 162-163, 165-166 (Nov. 25, 2000).
143. See, e.g., Ipek v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 11183 (2004); Osmanoglu v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R.
98 (2008); Gekhayeva & Others v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1120 (2008).
144. Qakici v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1199 (1999); Timurtay, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1196; Bazorkina v.
Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 140-142 (2006); Imakayeva v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 164 (2007); Os-
manoklu, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 94.
145. Timurtay, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1196.
146. See, e.g., Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 134 (1998); Orhan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 11 359-360 (2002); Imakayeva, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 165, 167; Osmanoglu, Eur. Ct. H.R. 97-99;
ipek, Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 182-183; Bazorkina, Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 140-142; Khadzhialiyev & Others v.
Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 199 (2008); Gehkayeva & Others v. Russia, App. No. 1755/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.
1 120 (2008); Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, 1 115 (Mar. 1, 2005); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the
Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1 2.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 (July 31, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Views (July 31, 2003)]; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights
Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
11 2.1, 9.7, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1422/2005 (Nov. 13, 2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Views of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Ji| 2.1, 9.7, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/992/2001 (Apr. 24, 2006); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Views, 112.1, 2.2, 7.7, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004 (Aug. 16,
2007).
2012]1 451
452 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:2
tor. 147 In five other cases, including gakici, the applicant was not present,
and the forum found no violation.14 8 Nevertheless, only three of the five
cited absence as a factor.149 In the final case, the applicant was present,
and there was no violation.s 0
When announcing their decisions, the judicial bodies generally cited
the specific charter or human rights document provision that the state had
violated in its treatment of family members, rather than citing the par-
ticular harm.15 1 Because the provisions mention torture and CID together
in the same clause,1 52 it remains unclear whether the judicial bodies ruled
that the family member suffered torture, CID, or both.
At present, there is no firm definition of "family members," leaving
it up to the forum to determine whether to include people other than par-
ents, spouses, and children in considering the "family tie." The Inter-
American Court, however, will recognize brothers, sisters, life partners,
and others who have a special tie to the victim.'53 The Declaration on the
Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance notes, "Any act
of enforced 'disappearance' places the persons subjected thereto outside
147. Kurt, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 133; Orhan, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 359; Imakayeva, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 165;
Osmanoglu, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1197; ipek, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 182; Bazorkina, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 140.
148. Tahsm Acar v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 239 (2004); Seker v. Turkey, App. No. 52390/99,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1183 (2006). In both cases, the Court based its conclusion on the fact that the applicant
had not sufficiently proven that authorities were involved in abduction and that the authorities'
response to victim's inquiries were not inhuman or degrading. See also Unkovid v. Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case No. CH/99/2150, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herze-
govina, 1193 (May 10, 2002) (noting that the essential characteristic of the violation is the attitude of
the authorities in response to the reported disappearance and that in this case, albeit after numerous
delays, the authorities did eventually investigate, discover the fate of the victims, and prosecute the
perpetrators); Nesibe Haran v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., ill 82-84 (2005) (examining a multiplicity of
factors, but no one factor was determinative).
149. The two cases that did not cite absence were Seker and Tahsin. In Unkovie, the court
stated that absence was not determinative; instead it identified the reasons stated supra as the critical
factor. Unkovid, Case No. CH/99/2150,1 93. In Nesibe, the court did not weight the factors. Nesibe,
App. No. 28299/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 83; see also ('akici, Eur. Ct. H.R. 583, 1 98 (1999).
150. Tekdag v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. l 86 (2004) (noting that it was not established that the
state was responsible for the abduction, nor was the authorities' tone or content of replies inhuman
or degrading).
151. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views, (July 31, 2003),1 9.5; Bamaca Veldsquez v.
Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, 1 166 (Nov. 25, 2000); Khadzhialiyev &
Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 122.
152. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI) art.
7, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
153. Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186, 1 175 (Aug. 12, 2008) (as to permanent companion); Juan
Humberto Sanchez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99, 1 103 (June 7, 2003) (as to
siblings, companion, and stepparents).
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the protection of the law and inflicts severe suffering on them and their
families."l 54
In the 2008 case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama,15 5 the Inter-
American Court added two additional factors to those from (7akici that a
court should consider: "[T]he context of a 'system that prevents free ac-
cess to justice' and . . . the constant uncertainty in which the next of kin
live as a result of not knowing the victim's whereabouts."5 In a recent
Inter-American Court decision, the court ruled that the suffering of the
victim's relatives need not be proved but will be presumed. 57
The message from the international oversight judicial bodies has
been universally clear for nearly three decades: When people are disap-
peared by the state, the family members themselves experience torture or
CID. In recognition, international tribunals provide forums to hear the
claims of victims' families on their own behalf when their loved ones
disappear.
B. U.S. Accountability Under International Law
The United States has made itself unavailable in international fo-
rums that would have jurisdiction to hear individual cases against it by
either declaring that the United States is not party to a particular treaty or
by not accepting the jurisdiction of the court or oversight body, even
where it is party to the corresponding treaty. The United States is not a
party to the American Convention on Human Rights. Consequently, it
does not accept jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.' 58 The United
States also does not recognize the competence of the Human Rights
Committee, a body that interprets the ICCPR, to hear individual com-
plaints.'59 Nor does it recognize the competence of the committees of
several other treaties that may have been violated, such as the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT) and the Convention on the Protection of All Per-
sons Against Enforced Disappearance. Furthermore, the United States
terminated its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), where only a state rather than an individual may bring a
154. Enforced Disappearance Convention, supra note 12, art. 2. But see CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 1, passim (explaining and authorizing techniques that indicate
that the United States is not a party to the Convention).
155. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186 (Aug. 12, 2008).
156. Id. at 1163.
157. Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, 1 162 (Nov.
23, 2009).
158. Because the United States has not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, it
cannot be brought before the Inter-American Court. Consequently, it is only answerable to the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, as an OAS organ. However, the Inter-American Commis-
sion has no enforcement powers.
159. The United States is not a party to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which empowers
the HRC to receive and consider complaints from individuals.
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claim.16 o For example, if Kuwait wanted to sue the United States on be-
half of one or more of its citizens, it could not pursue the claim against
the United States in the ICJ.
The Human Rights Council, a United Nations body, is tasked with
monitoring human rights generally and may have jurisdiction over the
United States. However, the Council usually only addresses major hu-
man rights violations and complaints that represent a consistent pattern
of gross violations. Certainly, an argument can be made that detentions
in Guantanamo qualify under this standard and that a complaint could be
filed in the Council under the "1503 procedure."' 6 1 However, these pro-
ceedings are confidential.162
Even more surprising, the United States will not subject itself to the
jurisdiction of these various oversight bodies even though all the bodies
described, except for the Inter-American Court and the ICJ, do not have
any enforcement mechanisms; they only issue nonbinding recommenda-
tions.163 The Inter-American Court and the ICJ only have limited en-
forcement mechanisms, which are essentially political actions that tie
into universal shaming. The Inter-American Court can make recommen-
dations to the OAS if the state does not comply with the judgment.'6
Parties to a dispute in the ICJ have recourse to the United Nations Secu-
rity Council when the losing party does not adhere to the judgment,165
but this recourse does not necessarily compel compliance.
The only international body that can presently hear a case against
the United States is the Inter-American Commission.' 66 The Inter-
American Commission can only issue an unenforceable decision or non-
160. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
392, 11 10 (Nov. 26, 1984). On October 9, 1985, the United States terminated its 1946 declaration
agreeing to submit to compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, in response to a case brought by Nicaragua
against the United States for supporting the contras in their objective to overthrow the government of
Nicaragua. Id. at 11 2.
161. Complaint Procedure, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Complaint.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
11 10.
164. Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights art. 30, Oct. 31, 1979, O.A.S. Res.
448 (IX-0/79), reprinted in 19 1.L.M. 634 ("The Court shall submit a report on its work of the previ-
ous year to each regular session of the OAS General Assembly. It shall indicate those cases in which
a State has failed to comply with the Court's ruling. It may also submit to the OAS General Assem-
bly proposals or recommendations on ways to improve the inter-American system of human rights,
insofar as they concern the work of the Court.").
165. How the Court Works, INT'L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-
cij.org/courtlindex.php?pl=l&p2=6 (last visited Dec. 29, 2012) ("A State which contends that the
other side has failed to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the
Court may lay the matter before the Security Council, which is empowered to recommend or decide
upon the measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.").
166. See generally ORG. OF AM. STATES: INTER-AM. COMM'N H.R.,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/default.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
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binding recommendation.16 7 However, a decision against the United
States, even if not enforced and even if not for money damages, could
nevertheless be a powerful statement of the United States' accountabil-
ity.1
If family members were able to bring the United States into one of
the international forums that have jurisdiction to hear their case alleging
torture or CID committed by the United States, the United States would
be held accountable. Three decades of international law decisions and
rulings stand behind the parents and family members of those we have
disappeared. We Americans can only watch in shame as our nation con-
tinues to promote itself as the bastion of human rights, while it zealously
and methodically shields itself from any accountability both on the inter-
national stage and at home.
IV. PURSUING TORT CLAIMS IN U.S. COURTS
A. Overview
In what only can be termed as a magnanimous gesture to human
rights, the United States invites foreign nationals to pursue civil litigation
against their alleged foreign national torturers in U.S. federal courts.
However, that generosity takes a surprising turn as soon as the foreign
national victim seeks to bring the action against U.S. personnel, rather
than against foreign national perpetrators. In situations where U.S. em-
ployees or officials are accused of being the alleged torturers, the United
States launches procedural and substantive roadblocks to ensure that the
claims do not succeed or even progress much beyond the filing stage.
These hurdles include procedural issues related to questions of jurisdic-
tion, statutes of limitations, and the exhaustion of remedies, as well as
substantive issues related to the definition of "torture," whether the inju-
ry occurred in a foreign land, and to what extent CID is recognized as a
universal norm by U.S. courts.
Federal courts that open their doors to foreign nationals who sue
other foreign nationals as their alleged torturers but not to foreign nation-
als who sue their alleged torturers when they are American nationals
could face another challenge in the years ahead. When the completely
innocent parents, wives, and children of the men who were disappeared
167. See Mandate and Functions of the Commission, ORG. OF AM. STATES: INTER-AM.
COMM'N H.R., http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/functions.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("(1)
Receives, analyzes and investigates individual petitions in which violations of human rights are
alleged to have been committed either by a Member State of the OAS that has ratified the American
Convention or by one that has not.... (6) Recommends to the OAS Member States the measures
they should take the better to protect human rights in the countries of the hemisphere. . . . (8) Pre-
sents cases to the Inter-American Court and appears before the Court during the processing and
consideration of cases. (9) Requests advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court, pursuant to
Article 64 of the American Convention.").
168. See discussion infra Part V regarding possibly filing a claim in the Inter-American Com-
mission.
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into Guantanamo sue for the torture and CID that they independently
suffered, how will the courts respond? Given the current state of the law,
access to justice does not look promising. The following analysis ex-
plains the state of the law in sufficient detail for the family members and
their attorneys to both assess the lay of the land and begin to strategize
how to proceed. The following analysis does not pretend to provide a
complete review of all the complexities one finds when analyzing the
abstruse legal arena where one brings claims against the United States
for human rights violations. Such analysis is left for a treatise or for the
attorneys' own research, depending on how they choose to pursue their
cases.
B. Filing Under the Alien Tort Statute
Foreign nationals who want to pursue claims in American courts for
human rights violations that occurred in foreign nations may file their
claims under the ATS, a statute that has been interpreted as jurisdictional
and not substantive in scope. 69
Through the ATS,170 also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA),' 7 the United States has asserted broad, perhaps even universal,
jurisdiction over violations of accepted international human rights norms
occurring outside U.S. territory and recognized by international law.172
However, the substantive laws within the ATS are not identified as viola-
tions of constitutional law or of a U.S. statute.
The First Congress enacted the ATS in 1789.17 It was designed to
establish original district court jurisdiction over all cases where a foreign
national sues for a tort committed in violation of the "law of nations." 74
The term "law of nations" is now understood as international law.'75 Un-
der the act, the plaintiff must be a foreign national, whereas the defend-
169. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 (2004).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
171. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 587
(2002).
172. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 751-52 (Breyer J., concurring). However, in spring 2012 the Su-
preme Court, after hearing arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, raised the question of
whether the ATS actually applied to international law violations occurring outside United States
territory. Kali Borkoski, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: What's at Stake, and for Whom?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 30, 2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/kiobel-v-royal-
dutch-petroleum-whats-at-stake-and-for-whom/. The Court asked the parties to brief the issue and be
prepared to argue it in the Court's fall 2012 Term. Id
173. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
174. Id. ("[The federal district courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of
the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort
only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
175. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
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ant may be a foreign national or a U.S. citizen.'7 6 The defendant must be
present in the United States to be served.177
Until 1980, the law was largely ignored. Then, in a surprising deci-
sion from the Second Circuit, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,"' the court
breathed new life into the ATS. It held that prohibition against torture
was a universally accepted norm of international law, and consequently,
a foreign national could sue his alleged torturer under the ATS.179 The
court wrote that the "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official
authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever
an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within
our borders, the Alien Tort Statute provides federal jurisdiction."s 0 The
court added that the "constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the
law of nations, which has always been part of the federal common
law."' 8'
The Filartiga decision recognized that international law evolves
over time and is not a stationary concept. Consequently, "courts must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today." 82 In reviewing such trea-
ties and documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 217, the United Nations Charter, the Charter of
the OAS, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture General Assembly Resolution 3452; article 5 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, the ICCPR, and article 3 of the
European Convention, the court concluded that the prohibition of torture
is universally recognized.' 83 Accordingly, a claim based on torture must
be permitted to proceed under the ATS.184 The Filartiga court concluded
by noting that the ATS does not "grant[] ... new rights to aliens, but . . .
open[s] the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recog-
nized by international law." 85
Nearly twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain'86 reinforced Filartiga's analysis. The Sosa Court recog-
nized that when a foreign national files an ATS claim, "courts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (service on individuals that reside in a foreign country); FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(k) (territorial limits of service).
178. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
179. Id. at 880.
180. Id at 878.
181. Id at 885.
182. Id. at 881.
183. Id. at 883-84.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 887.
186. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and de-
fined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized." 87
Although torture is recognized as a universal norm, there may be a
definitional problem with the universal recognition of torture as a prohib-
ited crime when applied to the parents, wives, and children of men who
were disappeared into Guantanamo. The definition that the United States
subscribes to in its statutes implementing the CAT is different from the
one that is universally recognized.' 88 That is, the United States does not
recognize in its law that a third party can be tortured.'8 9 In other words,
the victim must be in custody of the torturer. Under this restrictive defi-
nition designed by the United States, the family members of a detainee
would not be considered victims of torture.
However, an argument can be made that the definition of torture
under the U.S. Code and the TVPA, is not applicable to violations impli-
cating universal norms. In fact, a federal court has ruled that the domestic
definition of torture does not apply when the courts are addressing tor-
ture as a universally recognized violation of international law.1 90 The
court noted that separate and distinct claims for torture could be brought
under both the TVPA,191 which relies on domestic law for its definitions,
and the ATS, which looks to international law for its standards of univer-
sally accepted norms.192 Thus, according to the court, it will look "to the
[CAT] when deciding what constitutes torture according to the law of
nations."' 93
Under this court's analysis, when families file an ATS claim, inter-
nationally accepted norms apply, and the definition of torture as found in
CAT would be the standard definition. The definition of "torture" pursu-
ant to CAT is not restricted to an individual in custody; it includes third
parties. 194 Under CAT's interpretation, the United States would not be
able to avoid the application of an ATS claim by the families of disap-
peared detainees by relying on the custody requirement under the domes-
187. Id. at 725.
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006) ("'[T]orture' means an act committed by a person acting
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody
or physical control...."); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("[T]he term 'torture' means any act, directed
against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control . . . .").
190. See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005),
reh'g denied, 452 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that international law applies in defining universal norms under the ATS).
191. See infra Part IV.B.2. Note that under the claims advocated by this Article, the TVPA is
not at all helpful.
192. Aldana,416 F.3d at 1250.
193. Id. at 1251.
194. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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tic definition of "torture." However, there is another hurdle. CAT re-
quires that the torture be intentionally inflicted.' Consequently, the
families may have to argue that the court should not adopt the CAT defi-
nition either. Rather, the court should recognize torture as a universal
norm that is more broadly defined.
Since Filartiga, federal courts have ruled that CID is also now in-
ternationally recognized as a universal norm of prohibited conduct and is
definable under Sosa's required specificity.' 96 One of the clearest expres-
sions of CID as a prohibited universal norm was articulated by circuit
Judge Barkett in the denial for rehearing in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A.1 97 Although a dissenting opinion, her reasoning has been
adopted and followed by several courts outside the Eleventh Circuit,
which appears to be the only circuit that does not recognize CID as an
international prohibited norm.'1" Judge Barkett accused the majority of
ignoring the Supreme Court's mandate in Sosa that ATS claims "must be
gauged against the current state of international law, looking to those
sources we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized." 99 Reviewing the
recognized sources of international law, identified as a requirement in
Sosa, Judge Barkett pointed to the "treaties, judicial decisions, the prac-
tice of governments, and the opinions of international law scholars."2 00
She wrote, "[I]t is clear that there exists a universal, definable, and oblig-
atory prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, which is therefore actionable under the ATCA." 20 1
Federal courts have defined CID or punishment "as acts which in-
flict mental or physical suffering, anguish, humiliation, fear and debase-
ment, which fall short of torture." 20 2 "'The principle difference between
torture and [CID] is the intensity of the suffering inflicted.' The prevail-
ing view in the caselaw is that 'cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment'
generally constitutes an actionable international law norm under So-
sa."203
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Doe v.
Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
197. 452 F.3d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2009); Bowoto, 557
F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (noting in 2008 that the Eleventh Circuit was the only circuit that had addressed
this issue and adopting the reasoning from Judge Barkett's dissent in Aldana); see also Aldana, 452
F.3d at 1286-87 (Judge Barkett noting that there are district courts in other circuits that have recog-
nized CID).
199. Aldana, 452 F.3d at 1284-85 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 1285.
201. Id.
202. Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Sarei, 650 F. Supp.
2d at 1029) (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. Id. (quoting Sarei, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1029).
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Judge Barkett also noted that the requirement under Sosa-the
gauging against the current state of international law-was also met:
"U.S. law and international policy makes abstention from cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment an expectation of all states
and reinforces such abstention as an explicit global norm." 2 04 Judge Bar-
kett forcefully supported her position by citing to numerous courts that
have concluded that CID is a norm of customary international law.205
To the extent that someone may argue that the problem with recog-
nizing CID as a norm of customary international law is not in recogniz-
ing the claim but in agreeing on its definition-because CID is not clear-
ly defined on its edges-Judge Barkett would respond that Sosa does not
require categorical specificity. That is, Sosa "does not require defining
every possible instance of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, but rather compels a determination of whether the facts alleged
in a particular situation sit within the universal prohibition against"
CID. 206 Thus, "the central question is whether the 'specific conduct at
issue' fits within that core norm." 207
Because the international courts have recognized for nearly thirty
years that families whose loved ones are disappeared suffer torture or
CID20 8 and, as explained above, domestic law looks to universal norms
when considering an international cause of action, it would be difficult
for an American court to deny that the families suffered CID even if the
court chose not to find that the families suffered torture. The United
States may argue that families' suffering was no more than a violation of
the domestic tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. However,
the pain of having a loved one kidnapped and disappeared into Guan-
tanamo certainly rises above the domestic understanding of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. What the families suffered when their
loved ones were disappeared amounts to the universal norm of CID.
Even under the restrictive definition of CID that was designed by the
United States in its reservations to CAT and describes CID as that pro-
hibited by the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion,209 the families would still have suffered CD.210
204. Aldana, 452 F.3d at 1286 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
205. Id at 1287 (citing Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996); de Sanchez
v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d
1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2002); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 186 (D. Mass. 1995)).
206. Id. 1288.
207. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (quoting Sarei, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1028-29).
208. See supra Part I.
209. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed.,
Oct. 27, 1990), available at http:// wwwl.umn.edu/humanits/usdocs/tortres.html.
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In addition to the issues regarding torture and CD, families face
numerous other hurdles before they can succeed in domestic courts on
ATS claims. First, the Government will move to restyle the ATS claims
to ones that must be brought under the FTCA. The Government's posi-
tion will be that the ATS does not provide a remedy for the families be-
cause the Government has not waived its immunity under the ATS. Once
the claims are restyled as FTCA claims, the Government can more easily
challenge the claims and convince the court to dismiss the families'
claims altogether, leaving the plaintiffs without a remedy.
1. Alien Tort Statute: A Jurisdictional Provision
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Sosa interpreted the ATS as
merely conferring jurisdiction (instead of creating a cause of action). 2 11
Although the ATS is only jurisdictional, it is "intended to specifically
create liability, not to limit it." 2 12 Quoting Sosa, a treatise states that
"positive law [such as the ATS] was frequently relied upon to reinforce
and give standard expression to the 'brooding omnipresence' of the
common law." 2 13 Further, "the ATS codifies Congress' [s] intent to pro-
vide redress for violations of the law of nations[, and] Congress has cre-
ated a statutory liability by reference to another body of law-i.e., the
'law of nations."' 214 However, in deference to the United States as sover-
eign and maker of the laws, as well as fearing the possibility of providing
any right or remedy to unsympathetic defendants, federal courts have not
adopted this reasoning of the treatise in deciding cases involving the
United States as party defendant.
2. Alien Tort Statute Paired with Substantive Law
Litigators have often paired the ATS with the substantive law of the
TVPA, perhaps in order to stay within the aegis of the ATS. Although it
would seem by its title that the Torture Victims Protection Act would be
the perfect vehicle for the plaintiffs, in fact it is not at all helpful, and any
claim relying on the TVPA will likely be dismissed.
The TVPA provides, "An individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation ... subjects an individual
210. See Aldana, 452 F.3d at 1288 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting United States courts'
acknowledgement that CID, even under the United States' definition, constitutes a violation of
international law).
211. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
212. BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.
COURTs 288 (2d ed. 2008).
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to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individu-
al."215 The TVPA defines "torture" as
any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering ... , whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for
such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person in-
formation or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that
individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.216
Based on the factors described in the previous paragraph, the fami-
lies of former detainees who were disappeared into Guantanamo are un-
likely to meet the requirements of the TVPA. The Act requires that
claims be brought against individuals acting "under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation."217 A district court ex-
plained that at the time of the signing of the Act, "the 'under foreign col-
or of law' requirement was understood to serve as an important limita-
tion of the Act that would preclude its application to United States opera-
tions abroad." 2 18 After citing President George H.W. Bush's signing
statement to the TVPA, the court concluded, "the plain language of the
TVPA limits liability to those acting under color of law of a foreign na-
,,219tion.
In two cases involving high-level cabinet positions, Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger 220 and Attorney General John Ashcroft221 were
separately sued under the TVPA. Although both cases were decided
against the plaintiffs' TVPA claims, the courts did not explicitly rule out
the possibility that U.S. officials were not immune under the Act.222
However, in another case, CIA agents working in Guatemala were de-
termined to be under color of U.S. law and not under color of Guatema-
lan law even if they acted in concert or conspired with foreign offi-
cials.223
Thus, the Act would seemingly not apply to the family members of
former detainees who were disappeared into Guantanamo. The family
members were not tortured under color of law of a foreign nation: the
United States was the wrongdoer that disappeared the detainees. The
215. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a)(1), Pub. L. No.102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
216. Id. at § 3(b)(1).
217. Id. at § 2(a); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 75.
218. Harbury v. Hayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 41 (D.D.C. 2006).
219. Id
220. Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004).
221. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
222. Id at 266.
223. Harbury, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42.
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United States took over the custody of the detainees, flew them from
Afghanistan to Guantanamo, and continued to detain them in Guantana-
mo. Of course, if family members can somehow show that a foreign na-
tion directed the Americans to disappear their loved ones, there is an
argument that the TVPA should apply.224 There is also the problem as to
whether the family members suffered torture or only CID. If a court de-
cides that the parents, wives, and children only suffered CID and not
torture, the TVPA would not apply. The Act speaks exclusively to tor-
ture.225
Furthermore, as two recent cases confirm, the language of the stat-
ute requires that the victim be in the offender's custody. In one case, the
court included "in offender's custody" as an element of torture in its
analysis.226 In a second case, the court determined that because the de-
fendants had never kidnapped or imprisoned the victims and therefore
never had physical or custodial control over them, the definition of "tor-
ture" was not met.227
As noted above, there should be a difference as to what constitutes
torture under domestic law compared to what constitutes torture under
international law. The difference was addressed in Aldana, where the
Eleventh Circuit noted that two different and distinct claims for torture
could be brought under both the TVPA and the ATS. Thus, under the
ATS, the definition of "torture" as found in CAT would be the standard
rather than the definition under the TVPA. Finally, as with the FTCA,
the TVPA also requires an exhaustion of remedies.228
C. The Westfall Act and Filing Under the Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA was enacted to address claims made by plaintiffs who
wished to sue the U.S. Government.229 Under the Act, the United States
waives its sovereign immunity in certain circumstances. 23 0 The waiver
applies to claims seeking monetary damages for the negligent and
224. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 266; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,
607 F.3d 836, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
225. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
226. Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
227. Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 74 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Escar-
ria-Montano v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing another example
where "the facts do not establish that plaintiff was 'in defendant[']s custody or physical control'
when he was injured" (alterations in original) (quoting Arias v. Dyncorp, 517 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226
(D.D.C. 2007)).
228. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 § 2(b)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)) ("A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section
if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct
giving rise to the claim occurred."). Although there is a requirement of exhaustion of remedies, the
requirement would not be applicable here because the United States could not be sued under the
TVPA in the first place, as described above. See Harbury, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
229. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 283.
230. Id.
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wrongful acts of federal employees acting within the scope of their offic-
es or employment. 231 However, as explained below, the FTCA has be-
come a major component in the U.S. arsenal designed to impede claims
for torture and CID brought against U.S. officials and employees.
Under the Westfall Act,23 2 when a foreign national sues individual
federal employees in the United States under the ATS, the Attorney Gen-
eral can certify that the employees were acting within the scope of their
offices or employment, and the United States then becomes the party
defendant, substituting itself for the defendant employees.233 All gov-
ernment immunities may then be asserted.234
1. Exceptions to the Westfall Act
There are several exceptions to the Westfall Act that would block
the restyling of an ATS claim into an FTCA claim. First, the Westfall
Act and the FTCA do not apply to the acts of independent contractors. 2 35
The government actor must be a federal employee.236 The district court in
Sosa affirmed that independent contractors would not be treated as gov-
ernment employees.2 37 Consequently, the Government could not substi-
tute itself as party defendant for an employee who was an independent
contractor.
As such, family members of detainees should try to learn whether
contractors participated in the disappearance of their loved ones. The
involvement of government-hired contractors is not unlikely, given that
the CIA, 238 the Department of Defense (DoD),23 9 and potentially other
administrative agencies were probably involved in hiring contractors.
These agencies may have employed contractors in conducting their busi-
nesses in Afghanistan and in transferring the men to Guantanamo. If, for
example, Blackwater or Xe contractors were involved in the disappear-
231. Id Suits for violations of the Constitution or a federal statute that provide explicit causes
of action are exempted. See infra Part iV.C. I.
232. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694,
102 Stat. 4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (2006)). In pertinent part it
reads, "Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within
the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out which the claim arose, any civil
action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed
an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and
the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant." § 2679(d)(1).
233. Id. at § 2679(d)(1)-(2). Of course, if plaintiffs sue the Government directly in an ATS
claim, rather than filing against United States officials or employees, the lawsuit is also restyled as
an FTCA claim.
234. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 283.
235. See id. at 291.
236. § 2679(b)(1).
237. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 291 n.46 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 699 (2004)).
238. Reprieve's Renditions Inc. Investigation, REPRIEVE.ORG,
http://reprieve.org.uklinvestigations/rendition/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
239. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 1 (2011).
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ance of persons into Guantanamo, the family members could maintain
their actions against the contractor defendants under ATS claims, and the
cases would not be restyled as FTCA actions.
An act conducted outside the scope of employment presents a sec-
ond exception to the Westfall Act.2 40 However, federal courts have de-
fined "scope of employment" very broadly.241 For example, such despic-
able behavior as torture has been considered to be within the scope of
employment. In Rasul v. Myers,242 where former detainees brought
claims for the torture and mistreatment they suffered while in Guantana-
mo, the D.C. Circuit folded the alleged torture by military interrogators
into the definition of "scope of employment." 243 Thus, even when the
government employee is accused of committing torture, if the Attorney
General certifies that the acts are within the scope of employment, the
defendant employee is substituted out. This is so even though legislative
history of the Westfall Act indicates that Congress did not intend to ap-
ply the act to employees who had committed "egregious torts." 244 A rec-
ognized treatise suggests that counsel "argue that there can be no substi-
tution [under the Westfall Act] when the alleged misconduct is a human
rights violation." 24 5 In support, the treatise relies on The Charming Betsy
case, in which the Supreme Court said, "[A]n act of Congress ought nev-
er to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible con-
struction remains."246
Two other exceptions to the Westfall Act bar substitution by the
government, thereby preventing the claim from being reclassified as an
FTCA claim.247 However, these exceptions provide little assistance to the
families of the Guantanamo disappeared. In civil actions brought under a
violation of the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute, the Attorney Gen-
eral is barred from substituting the United States as a party defendant.248
The Geneva Conventions, to which the United States and every nation in
the world are parties, are an example of statutes that can arguably bar
removal under the Westfall Act. However, federal courts have ruled that
the Conventions do not fall within one of the statutory exceptions to the
240. § 2679(b)(1).
241. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 291.
242. 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
243. Id. at 658-59.
244. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 291; see also Harbury v. Hayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d
19, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2006) (examining the issue of egregious torts as a bar to substitution in detail, and
concluding that the reading of the statute will cover despicable behavior when perpetuated "for the
purpose of serving the master").
245. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 291-97 (providing a forceful analysis of this issue).
246. Id. at 296 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy Case), 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2006).
248. Id. As noted, supra Part IV.B.1, although the ATS is a federal statute, because Sosa and
subsequent cases have described the ATS as jurisdictional only and not substantive, filing an ATS
claim does not bar the Government from substituting itself and restyling the claim as an FTCA
claim.
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Westfall Act.2 4 9 Also, one might argue that a claim under the TVPA, a
federal statute, would impede the Westfall Act from taking effect. For
reasons described, this claim would also likely fail.2 50
2. Failure of the FTCA Claim to Provide a Remedy
Although filing an FTCA claim may appear promising, once fami-
lies are drawn into FTCA claims, problems escalate. First, the FTCA is
not available against the United States when the tort occurred outside the
United States. 25 1 As the statute describes, the lawsuit cannot proceed
against the United States for any claim "arising in a foreign country." 2 52
This provision applies even when the planning and direction for the deci-
sions related to the tort were undertaken in the United States. 253 Courts
inquire as to the location of the alleged offense and not the location of its
planning. In Sosa, the Supreme Court ruled that although the planning
was in the United States, because the victim was kidnapped in Mexico,
the FTCA would not apply.254 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's
adoption of the "headquarters doctrine," noting that the planning and
direction of the victim's kidnapping was coordinated and determined
from within the United States. The fact that the United States and Cali-
fornia "served as command central for the operation carried out in Mexi-
co" did not sway the Supreme Court.255 The location of the actual injury
determined the place of the tort.256 As the Justices saw it, because the
kidnapping occurred in Mexico, the statutory harm or injury also oc-
curred in Mexico.257
Thus, there is a problem with the "location" of Guantanamo. The
Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene v. Bush,258 held that
Guantanamo is within the jurisdictional territory of the United States for
purposes of providing habeas rights to the detainees. 25 9 Yet, when the
case relates to government accountability for claims of torture and CID,
district courts have ruled that Guantanamo is a "foreign country" and not
part of the United States. 260 A court has ruled that Cuba holds de jure,
249. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming the lower district
court's ruling); Hamad v. Gates, No. CIO-591 MP, 2011 WL 6130413, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8,
2011).
250. See supra Part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the TVPA.
251. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006).
252. Id.
253. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 298.
254. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 702, 712 (2004).
255. Id. at 702 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604, 639 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
256. Id at 700 (quoting Sosa, 331 F.3d at 639).
257. Id at 700-01.
258. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
259. Id at 771; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004).




rather than de facto, sovereignty over the area.26 1 This ruling flies in the
face of logic and American law.
The district court has seemingly decided to disregard the Supreme
Court's acknowledgements in both cases that Guantanamo is de facto
U.S. territory. Pursuant to its one-sided "lease agreement" with the na-
tion of Cuba, the United States has the right to hold on to the territory
and maintain absolute control over the area for as long as it chooses.262
The lease provides that "the United States shall exercise complete juris-
diction and control over and within" Guantanamo Bay.263
In a decision that mirrors the general attitude of the federal courts
not to provide redress to alleged terrorists, one court wrote, "Since Cuba
is a foreign country regardless of whether the United States has de facto
sovereignty and regardless of whether Guantanamo detainees have ac-
cess to constitutional rights, the foreign country exception applies."2 64
One would think that because habeas rights are constitutionally more
significant than rights to pursue actions in tort, if habeas were granted to
people in this de facto controlled territory, so would access to pursue
remedies for tortious acts. That is, access to federal courts for purposes
of pursing civil actions based on prohibitions of torture or CID that are
recognized by international law and rise to the level of universally ac-
cepted norms should similarly be available, as are habeas rights.
In addition, the district courts have ignored not only the spirit and
law of the Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene Supreme Court rulings but also
the fact that federal law fully applies to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. For
example, after the Cuban iguana crosses the border from Cuba into
Guantanamo, it is protected by the Endangered Species Act.265 Nonethe-
less, people who were disappeared into Guantanamo, as well as their
parents, wives, and children, have no rights or remedies under federal
law. Only Cuban iguanas enjoy such rights. Accordingly, because the
torture and CID of family members of the detainees did not occur in the
United States but rather occurred either in Guantanamo as the location of
the disappearance or in the country where the family members were liv-
ing when their loved ones were disappeared, a lawsuit brought by the
family members would be barred under the Sosa ruling.
An additional exception to the FTCA for combatant activities dur-
ing time of war would seemingly bar family members' lawsuits. Howev-
er, Professor Beth Stephens and her co-authors in International Human
Rights Litigation in the U.S. Courts maintain that "egregious human
261. Id.
262. Agreement for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23,
1903, T.S. No. 418. The lease agreement does not specify the duration of the lease.
263. Id. at art. Ill.
264. Hamad, 2011 WL 6130413, at *l l.
265. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
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rights violations should not be seen as 'arising out of combatant activi-
ties."'266 Interestingly, although the "combatant activities" exception
could be a major obstruction to pursuing claims against the United
267States, there is little in the literature addressing this exception.26 Instead,
the-courts have tossed out the claims based on other hurdles mentioned in
this Article.
3. Reconciling the ATS and the FTCA
The FTCA should not be used for substitution of parties where the
ATS provides jurisdiction.2 68 In a fascinating, vigorous, and robust dis-
sent to the majority opinion dismissing ATS claims brought by plaintiffs
allegedly tortured in Iraq and Afghanistan, D.C. Circuit Senior Judge
Harry Edwards wrote in 2011 that the appeals court should have allowed
the ATS claims to go forward against the state actors and not be barred
by the introduction of the Westfall Act. 269 Because the ATS incorporates
the law of nations, Judge Edwards reasoned that the ATS is a statute that
fits the Westfall Act exception.270
Judge Edwards criticized the direction in which the federal courts
are moving in granting immunity to U.S. officials when claims are
brought under the ATS for violations of the universal norm of torture.
Twice in his dissent, he stressed that "[i]t is ironic that, under the majori-
ty's approach, United States officials who torture a foreign national in a
foreign country are not subject to suit in an action brought under [the
ATS], whereas foreign officials who commit official torture in a foreign
country may be sued under [the ATS]." 2 7' Edwards drove his point home
by emphasizing how the United States has consistently and repeatedly
condemned the use of torture on the international stage and that conse-
quently, Congress could not have intended the ironic result that now con-
fronts us. 272
4. Filing Only for Declaratory Relief: A Possible Remedy
Under the Westfall Act, the Government can intervene and substi-
tute itself as defendant for government employees when the claim is for
money damages.273 In those situations, the ATS claim is restyled as an
FTCA claim. However, if the family members only file for declaratory
266. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 299.
267. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that interro-
gators are immune from torture claims because of the combatant activities exception, but not ad-
dressing the human rights-combatant activities relationship).
268. See supra Part IV.C.
269. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778-79, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Edwards, J. dissenting).
270. Id. at 792.
271. Id. at 779, 789.
272. Id. at 792-93.
273. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006).
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relief, the Government seemingly could not, under the Westfall Act, sub-
stitute itself and terminate the ATS claim.
In Ali v. Rumsfeld,274 the plaintiffs, who were allegedly tortured in
Iraq and Afghanistan, sought a declaratory judgment that defendants
violated "the law of nations, binding treaties and the U.S. Constitu-
tion." 2 75 The district court dismissed their claims on the grounds that the
"defendants no longer held their official positions ... and therefore the
plaintiffs could not show 'that they face a real and imminent threat of
being wronged again in the future' by those defendants." 27 6 In addition,
the district court noted that because the plaintiffs sued the defendants
only in their individual capacities, they could not seek declaratory re-
lief.27 7 On appeal, the D.C Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, which
were based on the ATS and the Constitution because they "have not al-
leged a cognizable cause of action and therefore have no basis upon
which to seek declaratory relief."27 8 However, neither the lower court nor
the appeals court addressed the specific question of whether an ATS
claim seeking only declaratory relief would survive the Westfall Act.
Plaintiffs might want to consider suing government employees in both
their official capacities and as individuals solely for declaratory judg-
ment, assuming the families are either not seeking or willing to forego
money damages.
D. Procedural Barriers in the Federal Claims Litigation
By restyling an ATS claim as an FTCA action, the Government
adds procedural blocks that further complicate the likelihood of plaintiffs
prevailing on their claims for torture against the U.S. Government. To
begin, as previously mentioned, the FTCA has a two-year statute of limi-
tations. 2 79 The ATS does not have a statute of limitations written into the
law. However, courts have interpreted the act to have a ten-year statute
of limitations, a significant difference from that in the FTCA. In addition,
the FTCA imposes another procedural roadblock. Before a litigant can
bring an action under the FTCA, the person must first exhaust all admin-
istrative remedies. 280 Essentially, the parents, wives, and children of for-
mer detainees must first bring their claims to the agencies that have been
274. 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
275. Id. at 766.
276. Id. at 769 (quoting In re Iraq & Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d. 85, 118 (D.D.C. 2007)).
Because plaintiffs have the right under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to seek
leave to amend, one wonders why the plaintiffs did not substitute current government officials for
those officials who had left office, such as Rumsfeld.
277. Id. at 769 n.9. The appeals court noted in a footnote that Rumsfeld, in fact, was sued "in
both his individual and official capacities." Id.
278. Id. at 778.
279. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
280. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006); see, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 528 n.l (D.C. Cir.
2009) ("Since plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the FTCA ...
the district court lacked jurisdiction . . . ." (citation omitted)); see also Hamad v. Gates, No. CIO-591
MJP, 2011 WL 6130413, at *ll (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011).
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involved in holding and abusing their loved ones, such as the CIA, the
National Security Agency (NSA), and the DoD, which are not likely to
respond quickly, if at all. The plaintiff must then wait until the agency
has denied the claim or until six months after the claim has lapsed to file
under the FTCA. 2 81 Because the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative
remedies within the two-year statute of limitation period, cases trans-
ferred from ATS claims to FTCA claims are usually dismissed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. 2 82
1. Application of the Statute of Limitations
This subpart addresses the question of which statute of limitations
applies and whether it can be tolled. A discussion of what constitutes
notice worthy of triggering the statute of limitations follows.
The ATS contains no statute of limitations provision. In Papa v.
United States, 283 the Ninth Circuit adopted the TVPA's ten-year statute
of limitations.284 The court looked to the TVPA for guidance because the
TVPA, like the ATS, "furthers the protection of human rights and helps
'carry out obligations of the United States under the United Nations
Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of
human rights.' Moreover, it employs a similar mechanism for carrying
out these goals: civil actions."28 5 Later courts have followed this adop-
286tion.
In contrast, the FTCA has a two-year statute of limitations.287 As
discussed above, the ATS claims are nearly always restyled as FTCA
claims, 28 8 and it seems appropriate for the courts to recognize the spirit of
the ATS, which was designed to provide a remedy for violations of uni-
versal norms under international law, including torture and CID. 9 Con-
sequently, after the plaintiffs' FTCA claims are dismissed for failure to
exhaust their remedies, the plaintiffs should be permitted to refile their
ATS claims and continue litigating their claims during the ten-year peri-
od available. This is seemingly the only option if these victims are going
to have their voices heard in federal court for violations of human rights.
As the Ninth Circuit wrote in Papa:
281. § 2675(a).
282. See, e.g., Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F. 3d 427,431 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Rasul, 563 F. 3d at
529 n.1; Ali, 649 F. 3d at 775.
283. 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002).
284. Id at 1012.
285. Id (quoting Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106
Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006))).
286. See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009); Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.
3d 776, 778 (1lth Cir. 2005); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
288. See supra Part IV.C.
289. See supra Part IV.B.
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[T]he realities of litigating claims brought under the ATCA [Alien
Tort Claim4 Act or Alien Tort Statute], and the federal interest in
providing a remedy, also point towards adopting a uniform-and a
generous-statute of limitations. The nature of the violations suffered
by those the ATCA [or ATS], like the TVPA, was designed to protect
will tend to preclude filings in United States courts within a short
time."'
It appears that no plaintiff has yet successfully refiled his or her claim as
an ATS claim.29 1
Also, one might argue that the statute of limitations, whether the
two-year period under the FTCA or the ten-year period under the ATS,
should be equitably tolled. Under the theory of equitable tolling, courts
have tolled cases in extraordinary circumstances and in situations outside
a plaintiffs control, such as fraud, misinformation, or deliberate con-
cealment.292 One could conceivably argue that the statute should be
tolled because the United States concealed material facts necessary to
pursue the families' claims until the detainees' names were officially
released or even until the detainees were actually released.293
2. What Kind of Notice Is Necessary?
The United States has withheld detainees' identities from their fami-
lies and lawyers in the conflict surrounding Guantanamo. Such a failure
to comply with international norms leaves families not only with uncer-
tainty but also without the ability to seek redress for their claims. In these
instances, the statute of limitations should be tolled.
As noted in Part I, the definition of enforced disappearance can be
found in the International Convention for the Protection from Enforced
294
Disappearance. As a treaty, the Convention is considered the accepted
standard for defining disappearance on the international stage, even
though the United States has not signed it. The second prong of the stat-
ute reads: "[F]ollowed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." 295
Consequently, once the detention is acknowledged-for example, by
providing notice to the family-the violation ceases.
Under this definition, the State must acknowledge the concealment
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person. Accordingly, and
pursuant to the Convention, notice through the media or through neigh-
290. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002).
291. For further discussion of this argument, see infra Part IV.D.3.
292. Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F. 3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007).
293. See, e.g., Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 652 (S.D. Tex. 2011).




bors or community members who observed the person being abducted
would not qualify as sufficient notice. Similarly, notice from men who
were in the detention center and who, upon their release, disclosed names
of other inmates would also not meet the definition under the Conven-
tion. In fact, even if family members or others observed the abduction,
those observations would not be sufficient to constitute notice.
Because the federal court hearing the claim would resolve the issue
of notice, it is likely that federal common law, rather than the Conven-
tion, would apply in the determination of notice unless the court recog-
nized the Convention as customary international law. Under federal law,
the claim usually ripens when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know
of the injury.2 96 Accordingly, the examples described above could be
argued as meeting the requirement of "has reason to know."
It is also possible that official notice requirements could be met
through other channels. For example, if the U.S. government disclosed to
a foreign government the names of the men it was holding in Guantana-
mo, and the foreign government then revealed that information to the
local families, one might argue that the families received official notice.
However, this government notice process may not have worked smoothly
as described. Although these instances cannot be documented, there may
have been situations where the United States did not want to fully inform
certain governments that it did not necessarily trust, such as Pakistan,
and unstable countries, such as Yemen, of the "high value" nationals that
the United States was holding. In addition, because many of the men in
Guantanamo were known under several names and spellings, it was not
always clear which person was actually being held.297 Finally, even if the
United States revealed the names to the foreign governments, it is not
certain that the governments transferred the information to the fami-
lies.298
To the extent the Red Cross revealed the names of people in Guan-
tanamo to their families, disclosure could be construed as official notice.
However, the Red Cross had limited access to the detainees, and it is
unclear how many men the Red Cross actually met in Guantanamo. The
United States may have kept certain detainees hidden from the Red
Cross.
296. See, e.g., Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., No. 09 Civ. 10590(PAC), 2011 WL
1085325, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011); Litle v. Arab Bank, PLC, 507 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
297. See, e.g., The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 8 (identifying, for example, detainee
Yunis-Abdurrahman-Shokuri with several names and spellings).
298. The United States could try to argue that all it needed to do was inform an official "Infor-
mation Bureau" of the "prisoners of war" it is holding for the statute to begin running. See Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 87, at art. 122. However, because President Bush declared on Feb-
ruary 7, 2002, that the conventions do not apply to Guantanamo and thafthe men are not prisoners of




One may also receive notice by a government official acting in a
nongovernmental capacity. In December 2004, Barbara Olshansky, a
lawyer for the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York, wrote to
the Pentagon asking for the names of all the detainees. 29 9 Navy lawyer
Matt Diaz, who was stationed in Guantanamo, saw her request and be-
came concerned that the public still did not have an accurate list of eve-
ryone detained.30 o In January 2005, he assembled and sent to Olshansky,
without authorization, a classified list of the 551 men then held at Guan-
tanamo. 30 1 Olshansky, believing that the list was not officially sent, for-
warded the list to a local federal court.30 2 Whether she had read it or not,
one could argue that the notice was neither official nor accurate. The
United States did not officially acknowledge the names of the men in
Guantanamo until it released the first batch of 558 names in April 2006,
followed by the release of a second batch of 201 names in May 2006.303
The names were released in response to an Associated Press Freedom of
Information request filed in January 2006 and a subsequent lawsuit filed
in March 2006.
In the international law cases previously discussed, family members
who pursued the abductions and were repeatedly met with denials or
rejections by the state had stronger claims for torture or CID than family
members who were not as forceful in their pursuits.305 Similarly, one
could argue that the United States' repeated denial of its knowledge of
the victims exaberbated the torture or CID suffered by the inquiring
family members, causing the violation to have lasted for more than four
years, until the names were officially released.306
3. Refiling Claims
It is not at all apparent whether foreign nationals can refile their
claims as ATS actions after their FTCA suits are dismissed. In support of
refiling, one might argue that the foreign nationals tried all avenues
available yet still have not been given their day in court. Presumably, the
ATS was designed to provide a forum for the people who have suffered
torture and ClD. Consequently, the families could argue that they should
be permitted to return to their ATS claims and continue in their litigation
for the remaining portion of the ten-year statute of limitations after their
FTCA claims are dismissed. However, there is no documentation that
anyone has tried to refile, perhaps because case law supports the position
that the FTCA is the exclusive remedy against the United States once the




303. Pentagon Discloses Detainees'Names, supra note 9.
304. Id.
305. See supra Part Ill.
306. See, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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United States has substituted itself for the defendant officials and em-
ployees.307 Of course, if someone were to refile, the Government may
again substitute itself under the Westfall Act and then move for Rule 11
sanctions.308
Plaintiffs can appeal the substitution of an employee by the Attor-
ney General on the grounds that the employee did not act within the
scope of employment.3 09 However, as discussed above,3 10 the standard
for scope of employment in these situations is exceptionally broad and,
consequently, this appeal is also likely to fail.
Importantly, although filing claims under the ATS, TVPA, and fed-
eral question statute (addressed below) may be dismissed and replaced
by the FTCA (which would then be dismissed), plaintiffs should file un-
der all the federal statutes to preserve any claims on appeal.
E. Filing Under the Federal Question Statute
The federal question statute (§ 1331) states: "The district courts
shall have jurisdiction of all civil cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."31 The statute gives federal courts
jurisdiction not only over federal statutes and treaties but also over inter-
national law because international law is incorporated into federal com-
mon law.3 12 Thus, an argument could be made that the family members
should file under the federal question statute, thereby avoiding the pit-
falls associated with filing an ATS claim. Filing a claim under § 1331
requires (1) determining whether § 1331 provides jurisdiction and (2)
identifying a cause of action. 13
As to the first requirement, because § 1331 will support claims
based on federal common law and international law is folded into federal
common law, federal courts would have subject matter jurisdiction over
claims for violations of international law.314 As to the second require-
ment, Sosa suggested that there may be a difference between § 1331 and
the ATS regarding courts exercising "their common law powers to rec-
ognize a cause of action for some international law violations." 315 In fact,
the Sosa court left "open the possibility" that § 1331 would recognize
316causes of action for international law violations. However, federal
district courts have not tried to distinguish § 1331 claims from ATS
307. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 212, at 288-89.
308. FED. R. CIV. P. I1(c).
309. See supra Part W.C.1.
310. See supra note 241.
311. 28 U.S.C.§ 1331 (2006).
312. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980).






claims, and instead have cited Sosa to support their rulings that § 1331
"merely confers federal question jurisdiction, rather than creating any
kind of cause-of-action for international law violations."" In contrast,
the Second Circuit in Filartiga noted that its reasoning might also sustain
jurisdiction under the federal question provision.3 18 Nevertheless, the
Filartiga court decided to rest its decision upon the ATS. 1 Certainly,
family members should consider filing their claims under the federal
question statute. A sympathetic court may understand the frustration of
family members in having no other viable forum or recourse to provide a
remedy for their sufferings resulting from the violations of the universal-
ly accepted norms of torture and CID.
F. Derivative Claims
The United States as the party defendant in a lawsuit brought by
family members for the disappearance of their loved ones would likely
also raise a derivative claims defense. In Harbury v. Hayden,32 0 a U.S.
citizen and widow of a Guatemalan rebel leader brought claims on behalf
of herself and as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate against
U.S. agencies and individual defendants.3 2' She sued under, inter alia,
the ATS, FTCA, and TVPA for the torture and execution of her husband
by Guatemalan forces in contract with the CIA.322 Although she was in
frequent contact with the State Department seeking information on her
husband's whereabouts, she was not informed of her husband's death
until eighteen months after he was executed.323 Among her numerous
causes of action were claims for emotional distress based on her hus-
band's detention, torture, and execution. 3 24 She also added a count for
loss of consortium. 32 5 However, she did not assert a claim that she had
326suffered torture, CID, or anything else because of his disappearance.
The Harbury court dismissed her personal claims as derivative of the
primary claims.327 That is, because all her primary claims were dis-
missed, her "derivative" claims must also be dismissed.32 8
However, the claims in the Harbury case and the claims made by
families here are not necessarily identical or even similar. First, only a
handful of the men who disappeared into Guantanamo have filed any
claims, and we do not know what claims, if any, other detainees may file.
317. Harbury v. Hayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 38 (D.D.C. 2006).
318. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
319. Id.
320. 444 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006).
321. Id. at 23.
322. Id at 24.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. - Id. at 43.
326. Id
327. Id at 44.
328. Id.
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Moreover, the families' causes of action are entirely independent of any
causes of action that the men might have now or in the future. That is,
the claims of violating the universally recognized norms of torture or
CID are very different from the American law-based tort claims of per-
sonal distress and loss of consortium raised by the wife in Harbury.
The analysis in this Part unfortunately demonstrated how the United
States-ironically and perhaps surprisingly-violates the spirit of the
laws that we, as Americans, uphold: the belief in providing a remedy for
grave or egregious human rights violations. Consequently, only one firm
option is likely available to the family plaintiffs who want to pursue their
claims under the ATS: filing for a declaratory judgment.329
V. ALTERNATIVE FORUMS
FOR THE FAMILIES OF THE DISAPPEARED DETAINEES
A. Filing a Claim with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Recently, two cases were filed against the United States with the In-
ter-American Commission. One was filed on behalf of "victims and sur-
vivors of a widespread and systematic program of forced disappearance,
secret detention, and torture designed and implemented by the United
States of America." 330 The other was brought by Khaled El-Masri, a
German national and victim of the United States' extraordinary rendition
program, where he was detained incommunicado and "inhumanely treat-
ed" in a secret CIA prison in Afghanistan for four months. 331 Both cases
were first filed in U.S. district courts and ultimately dismissed on state
secrets and national security grounds after appeals to and denial of certi-
orari by the Supreme Court. 332 Consequently, the plaintiffs had exhausted
their local state remedies and could then progress to the Inter-American
Commission.333
Accordingly, if the family members lose their claims in federal
courts, which is likely, the Inter-American Commission may be the best,
if not the only, forum to which they can turn. Although the Commission
has no enforcement powers, it can issue a declaratory ruling that the
United States has violated provisions in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man3 34 and international norms as recognized by
329. See supra Part IV.C.4.
330. Binyam Mohamed et a. Petition, supra note 34.
331. Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Khaled El-Masri by the United States
of America with Request for an Investigation and Hearing on the Merits, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.
(Apr. 9, 2008), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/elmasri iachr_20080409.pdf.
332. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010); El-Masri v.
United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007).
333. One of the plaintiffs in the Binyam Mohamed case, Ahmed Agiza, was not included in the
Inter-American Commission petition.
334. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 1, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (May 2,1948), reprinted in Basic Docu-
ments Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L.V/ll.82, doc. 6 rev. 1,
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the Inter-American Commission.33 5 A declaratory ruling by an interna-
tional commission would be a significant victory for the plaintiffs. An
Inter-American Commission ruling holding the U.S. Government ac-
countable for the torture and CID of the family members would be a
powerful statement by an international oversight body. Such a declara-
tion would also provide benefits to the family members, who will hope-
fully find some solace in the ruling.3 36 The decision may also contribute
to building legal authority in favor of family members whose loved ones
were disappeared by the United States as well as provide evidence that
may be used in subsequent cases.
Money damages for the plaintiffs are neither mandatory nor en-
forceable in the Inter-American Commission. However, the Commission
can recommend reparations. For example, in two recent cases, the Com-
mission recommended reparations from the United States337 and from
Brazil. 338 Of course, if the plaintiffs were seeking money damages, the
Commission's recommendation for reparations would not necessarily
hold the United States financially accountable for the torture or CID the
families suffered because the Inter-American Commission is not empow-
ered to enforce its recommendations. 339 However, a President and Con-
gress could do the right thing and publicly take responsibility for past
errors and offer reparations. Additionally, the U.S. Government may
want to remove the issues from the global stage and avoid an internation-
al decision that could embarrass the nation. 34 0 In that scenario, the Gov-
ernment may offer financial compensation to the plaintiffs in exchange
for their settling the lawsuits.
(1992), available at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/2.AMERICAN%20DECLARATION.pdf.
335. "Both the Commission and the Court have established that despite having been adopted as
a declaration and not as a treaty, today the American Declaration constitutes a source of international
obligations for the Member States of the OAS." The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, INTER-AM. COMM'N H.R, http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/Basicl/.%201ntro.htm#_ftn4
(last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
336. SARA CULLINAN, REDRESS, TORTURE SURVIVORS' PERCEPTIONS OF REPARATION,
PRELIMINARY SURVEY 25-26 (2001).
337. Where the court wrote in its recommendations that the United States should "[o]ffer full
reparations to Jessica Lenahan and her next-of-kin considering their perspective and specific needs."
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.142, doc. 11, § 215,1 3 (July 21, 2011).
338. Where the court wrote in its recommendations that Brazil "[miake reparations to the
family of Manoel Leal de Oliveira for the damages suffered[, s]uch reparation should be calculated
in keeping with international parameters, and must be in an amount sufficient to compensate the
material and moral damages suffered by the victim's family members." Manoel Leal de Oliveira v.
Brazil, Case 12.308, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 37/10, § 159, 1|4 (Mar. 17, 2010).
339. See generally Charter for the Organization of American States art. 1, Apr. 30, 1948,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
340. Compare where Great Britain paid millions of dollars to twelve Guantanamo detainees
who resided in England in order to avoid a possible costly court decision in favor of the former
detainees brought against British intelligence officials for torture and rendition. U.K. Agrees to Settle
with Ex-Guantanamo Detainees, NPR.ORG (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/2010/11/16/131357467/u-k-agrees-to-settle-with-ex-guantanamo-detainees.
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In addition, international tribunals will not accept cases unless the
plaintiffs have exhausted their remedies with the forum state. 34 ' This
approach assures that the forum state has been provided the opportunity
to address the issues before being subject to litigation on the international
stage. However, the Commission could waive the requirement when the
pursuit of such exhaustion of remedies appears fruitless.342 A plaintiff
could certainly argue that U.S. agencies such as the CIA, the DoD, the
Department of State, and the NSA will reject claims brought by family
members for the torture or CID they suffered when their loved ones were
disappeared into Guantanamo. And, given the likelihood that all claims
under the ATS and FTCA will be rejected, the families could also argue
that they should be permitted to file directly with the Inter-American
Commission and not futilely try to exhaust administrative remedies. 3 43
Nevertheless, the Inter-American Commission would not likely allow
these plaintiffs to forego exhausting their remedies against U.S. agencies
before bringing their claims to the Inter-American Commission. For pol-
icy reasons, the international courts and commissions should provide the
local jurisdiction an opportunity to resolve complaints and thus not be
subject to international litigation and possible international reproba-
344tion.
The statute of limitations-whether two years under the FTCA or
ten years under the ATS-should not be a barrier to pursuing an action in
the Inter-American Commission. As long as the plaintiffs file within six
months after the federal courts have rejected their claims, they should
meet the "timely" requirements of the Commission. 345
B. Filing a Claim in a State that Recognizes Universal Civil Jurisdiction
Although the universal jurisdiction approach is a bit of a long shot
in current jurisprudence, it should not be overlooked. The theory of uni-
versal jurisdiction has its ebbs and flows, and its supporters and detrac-
341. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (recognizing the principle
that exhaustion of remedies in the domestic legal system may be appropriate before asserting a claim
in a foreign forum).
342. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Rules of Procedure, art. 31, 1 2.
343. Petitions must be lodged within six months following notification of exhaustion of reme-
dies. If the plaintiff argues for an exception to the requirement of exhausting remedies, the petition
must be filed "within a reasonable period of time," taking into consideration the date on which the
alleged violation occurred and the circumstances of each case. Id
344. The Inter-American Commission and other international bodies have waived the require-
ment of exhausting remedies in death penalty cases that are brought before it by United States liti-
gants. However, the situation described in this Article is unlike the situation in death penalty cases,
where it is well understood that the United States will continue to maintain and enforce the death
penalty for the foreseeable future. The response of agencies and of federal courts to claims brought
under the ATS, FTCA, TVPA, and § 1331 is not nearly as certain in outcome as is the outcome in




tors.346 As the law evolves, legal scholars and judges will recognize the
importance of moving the law forward in this direction.
Justice Breyer's concurrence in Sosa linked ATS litigation-which
allows the United States to provide a forum for a foreign national to sue
another foreign national for a tort committed in a foreign nation-with
the evolving concept of universal criminal jurisdiction.347 He recognized
that universal civil jurisdiction and civil tort recovery may accompany
universal criminal jurisdiction.34 8 In essence, Justice Breyer suggested
that if norms are universal for purposes of universal criminal jurisdiction,
as are torture and CID, Why should they not also support a universal
civil jurisdiction private cause of action? To Justice Breyer, "universal
tort civil jurisdiction would be no more threatening" than universal crim-
inal jurisdiction to the principles of international comity. 3 49 "That is," he
continued, "because the criminal courts of many nations combine civil
and criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by criminal conduct to
be represented, and to recover damages, in the criminal proceeding it-
self. . . . Thus, universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates a
significant degree of civil tort recovery as well." 5 o
Universal criminal jurisdiction is much more common and prevalent
in the international community than universal civil jurisdiction. 35 How-
ever, requiring a defendant to pay money damages seems less onerous
and not any more in violation of due process concerns than criminally
prosecuting a defendant. Consequently, if universal criminal jurisdiction
is recognized among nations, certainly nations should consider permit-
ting civil tort actions based on universal civil jurisdiction as well.
Usually, states require domestic enabling legislation before they ex-
ercise universal criminal jurisdiction.352 Presumably, enabling legislation
would also be adopted by states that wish to exercise universal civil ju-
risdiction. However, states could arguably act even without the enabling
legislation when the issues concern universal norms.353
The families could also argue that because the ATS has been recog-
nized by the international community as an exercise of universal civil
346. See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal
Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 144 (2006).
347. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 762-63.
351. INT'L BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 15
(2009).
352. See BETH VAN SCHAAK & RONALD C. SYLE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 135 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that both Belgium and Spain
implemented a statute to allow for universal jurisdiction).
353. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 346, at 144.
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jurisdiction,5 the ATS should be made available to the plaintiffs when
other avenues addressing violations of universal norms are closed in the
U.S. legal system. And if U.S. courts rule that the ATS and other related
federal statutes such as the FTCA and the TVPA are ultimately closed to
the families of men who were disappeared into Guantanamo, other na-
tions should have the right and perhaps even the obligation to provide a
forum through universal civil jurisdiction for the family members who
are victims of torture and CID.
Amicus curiae in Sosa, representing the European Commission be-
fore the Supreme Court, argue that one could read universal civil juris-
diction into article 14 of CAT.355 That article provides that "[e]ach State
Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate com-
pensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible."356
The authors of the brief further note that although article 14
does not specify whether a state must provide an enforceable right of
compensation for any victim within its territory regardless of where
the torture took place or the nationality of the victim or defend-
ant[,] ... [s]uch a reading is consistent with the text, as it would
promote the purpose of the Convention to bring torturers to justice. 357
When plaintiffs filing ATS and FTCA claims are impeded by juris-
dictional, immunity, or procedural issues such as exhaustion of remedies
or statutes of limitations, they should have another forum that will actual-
ly hear the substance of their powerful cases.35 8 That is, "courts must find
a way to ensure than an effective remedy is available under universal
jurisdiction while respecting the right of states with traditional connec-
tions to exercise jurisdiction where they are willing and able to provide
an accessible forum and effective remedy."359 Consequently, if the Unit-
ed States is not willing and able to provide an accessible forum and ef-
fective remedy for the families, other nations must act through universal
civil jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The United States has proven itself a formidable foe. It has eluded
any accountability for its actions to the parents, wives, and children of
detainees who were disappeared into Guantanamo. The United States, as
354. Id. at 146. However, this may change given the Supreme Court's order to review the issue
in fall 2012 Term. See Borkoski, supra note 172.
355. Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Comm'n in Support of Neither Party at 18, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 177036, at *18.
356. Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment art. 14(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
357. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 346, at 148.
358. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass 1995).
359. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 346, at 159.
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of now, cannot be held to pay money damages in any international tribu-
nal.3 60 And the Government, as sovereign, has maneuvered its way
through the American judicial system equally successfully. Given the
current state of the law, the United States may likely avoid being held
accountable to the family members for claims for money damages in any
federal court, whether under the ATS, FTCA, TVPA, or § 1331.
However, should the families successfully pursue claims for declar-
atory relief in federal court or in the Inter-American Commission, there
will be some accountability at the end of the day. These decisions may
not be monetary, but they will be noticed. Perhaps, for some of the vic-
tims, to have an international oversight body officially recognize and
determine that the families were injured and wronged when their loved
ones were disappeared will provide them with some peace and justice. At
least they can perhaps feel that their voices have been heard, and they
have not been forgotten.
360. The Inter-American Commission can recommend money damages or reparations but has
no enforcement powers. See supra Part V.A.
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THE TROUBLE WITH CITY OF BOERNE, AND WHY IT
MATTERS FOR THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT AS WELL
EVAN TSEN LEEt
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's test for the constitutionality of state action
and its test for the constitutionality of congressional legislation enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment are out of synch with one another. When a
plaintiff challenges state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
degree of scrutiny varies with the type of claim. Racial classifications,
for example, are examined under strict scrutiny. Most classifications,
such as disability, age, or socioeconomic status, are examined on a ra-
tional basis. When Congress acts pursuant to its Section 5 powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights, however, the Court has no
corresponding spectrum of degrees of scrutiny. In this Lecture, I argue
that the Court should adopt the "mirror image" spectrum of scrutiny for
congressional enactments pursuant to its Section 5 powers. For example,
if Congress seeks to protect people from age discrimination or discrimi-
nation based on disability by permitting individuals to sue states without
their consent in federal court, the plaintiff should have to show that he or
she actually suffered a constitutional violation in the case at bar. If Con-
gress seeks to protect people from race discrimination, the plaintiff
should have to show only that there is a rational, means-end relationship
between the congressional remedy and the targeted discrimination. Ap-
plying this test to the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits race dis-
crimination in voting, the courts should apply rational, means-end scru-
tiny to statutes such as the Voting Rights Act, including the preclearance
condition that is presently before the Court in Shelby County v. Holder.
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I. INTRODUCTION
My topic today is how the federal courts should handle congres-
sional enactments purporting to enforce two of the three Reconstruction
Amendments-the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.' These issues
have been important for fifty years now, and their importance has not
diminished in the least. Last Term, the Supreme Court decided one such
case under the Fourteenth Amendment, Coleman v. Court of Appeals,2
and it seems likely that the Court will soon review a case involving pre-
clearance under the Voting Rights Act,3 which obviously grows out of
the Fifteenth Amendment.4
The Supreme Court's current approach to judging congressional
legislation meant to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment comes from a
1997 case called City of Boerne v. Flores,5 which I believe to be correct
in one important respect and seriously misguided in another. Today, I
will call for the repudiation of that second aspect of City of Boerne, to be
replaced by something I call the "mirror image" approach. Finally, I will
say why I think this has implications for legislation, such as the Voting
Rights Act, enacted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 ("The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
Why have I not extended my approach to the Thirteenth Amendment? I have chosen to
save this topic for another day because my instinct is that Congress should have the very broadest
latitude when legislating under Section 2 of that Amendment, simply because there is no state action
requirement, and therefore, there are little or no federalism costs involved in such legislation.
2. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (plurality opinion).
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
4. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed 81
USLW 3064 (U.S. July 20, 2012) (No. 12-96).
5. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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H. WHAT IS THE CITY OFBOERNE FRAMEwORK?
In City of Boerne, the question was whether the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)6 was an "appropriate exercise" of Congress's
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant
characteristic of RFRA was its attempt to legislatively overrule the Su-
preme Court's decision in the so-called peyote case, Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith.8 In City of Boerne, the Court ruled that in order for a con-
gressional enactment under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
pass muster, it must "enforce" constitutional rights, and the remedy cho-
sen for enforcement must be "congruen[t] and proportional[]" to those
rights.9
The decision in City of Boerne answers three important questions
related to the appropriateness of legislation under Section 5. The first
question is whether the power to enforce constitutional rights includes
only situations involving actual violations of constitutional rights or
whether it also includes deterrence of potential constitutional violations.
The second question is, for purposes of scrutinizing Section 5 enforce-
ment legislation, Who decides what constitutional rights are cognizable?
That is, who interprets Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-
Congress or the courts? The third question is, assuming at least some
deterrence of potential constitutional violations is permissible, How
should the courts decide how much deterrence is appropriate? This third
question has the potential to overlap the first question.
On the first question, City of Boerne unambiguously held that some
deterrence of constitutional violations is permissible. Today, all of the
Justices adhere to that position except Justice Scalia, who argues that
Congress may only legislate remedies for people who can demonstrate
that their personal Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated.'o
On the second question, at least in theory, there are three possible
answers. When it comes to who decides what constitutes a cognizable
constitutional right for purposes of judging appropriateness under Sec-
tion 5, (1) Congress itself could have the last word; (2) the Court could
give some level of deference to Congress's interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; or (3) the Court could decide the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment with no deference to Congress's interpretation.
The City ofBoerne Court chose the third-no deference.
6. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993),
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
7. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 517.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
10. Importantly, however, he would make an exception in the race discrimination cases be-
cause of stare decisis. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557-65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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On the third question, having already decided that Congress may act
to prevent potential constitutional violations, the Court further decided
that all remedial legislation must be congruent and proportional to such
potential constitutional violations. A literary analysis of the phrase "con-
gruent and proportional" suggests a fairly non-deferential standard of
review, as in the requirement of a tight, if not perfect, fit between the
remedy and the constitutional rights to be protected. We will see that
subsequent cases confirm this literary analysis. We will also see that if
one agrees with Justice Scalia on the first question-every plaintiff must
show his or her own constitutional violation-that answers the third
question about the relationship between right and remedy.
III. THE MERITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CITY OF BOERNE
Those were the answers provided by City of Boerne, and I will now
examine those answers. I am going to take the questions out of order,
because my views on questions two and three do, in fact, affect my view
on question one.
A. Who Decides What the Constitution Means?
Let us start with question two-Who decides what counts as a vio-
lation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of Sec-
tion 5? I think we have to rule out Congress having the last word on the
interpretation of "Equal Protection" or "Due Process." It is theoretically
possible to have one interpretation of these grand phrases for purposes of
scrutinizing remedial legislation and an entirely different interpretation
for purposes of scrutinizing state action. But there is little to recommend
such a schizoid system. Constitutional law is confusing enough.
The two remaining options, then, are to accord some deference to
Congress's interpretation of the rights enumerated in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment or to give them no deference whatsoever. Of the
two, I think the more tenable view is for the courts to accord congres-
sional interpretation no deference-but with an important asterisk. The
reason not to accord congressional interpretation deference is the one I
just gave-we ought not have two interpretations of "Equal Protection"
or "Due Process" or "Privileges and Immunities" for one purpose and a
different interpretation for another purpose. If the Court defers, even
somewhat, for one purpose, it will potentially create that difference.
Here is the asterisk. The Court should be open to the persuasive
force of Congress's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Con-
sider the peyote case, in which the Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not apply to any law of general applicability (i.e., so long as
it does not single out any religion for negative treatment, a law cannot
violate free exercise). In RFRA, Congress tried to reinstate the case law
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overruled in Smith, which (at least in theory) had held that any law bur-
dening the exercise of religion was subject to strict scrutiny."
Deference to Congress's attempted reinstatement to the previous
case law would have required the Court to accept Congress's interpreta-
tion unless it failed some kind of test, whether rationality or something
else. I think the Court should have considered whether Congress's inter-
pretation could have been folded into the Court's view without compro-
misiig the basic principle that the Court found in the Free Exercise
Clause. The basic principle of Smith is that government cannot be pro-
hibited from achieving legitimate, across-the-board legislative goals by
claims that such enactments infringe on religious practices. But that prin-
ciple could easily have been preserved if the Court had simply ruled that
the Free Exercise Clause protected the ritual use of peyote by a group
with a sincere, longstanding practice, that the ritual was central to the
religion, and that the effects of ritual peyote use did not impact the per-
formance of employees. The peyote law could have been held unconsti-
tutional as applied to the type of usage in the case at bar. This is not any-
thing close to the strict scrutiny that Congress had tried to impose
through RFRA-yet at the same time it incorporates the values that Con-
gress saw in the Free Exercise Clause into the Court's core interpretation
of the Clause.
Thus, I agree with the general approach of City of Boerne on the
matter of who finally decides what the Constitution means. It must be the
courts. But the courts should take seriously what values Congress finds
immanent in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and they should
try to accommodate those values in a manner not inconsistent with the
principles that the Court itself finds in the Fourteenth Amendment. To
reiterate, however, once the United States Supreme Court has completed
that analysis-whether it finds anything in Congress's view persuasive
or not-there remains only a single interpretation of the right involved,
and that is the Court's.
B. What Relation Must There Be Between Rights and Remedies?
I now turn.to the third question, which is what relationship congres-
sional remedies must bear to the constitutional rights needing protection.
City of Boerne held that such remedies must be congruent and propor-
tional to the constitutional rights needing protection.12 With one reluctant
reservation, I reject that view.
The congruence and proportionality standard is poor judicial
craftsmanship. It provides no real guidance to Congress, the lower
courts, or lawyers as to what enforcement legislation will pass muster. In
11. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to a
free exercise claim).
12. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (1997).
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the end, concluding that a remedy is not congruent and proportional to
the record of constitutional violations before Congress amounts to little
more than the statement, "These shoes don't feel good on me." If it takes
twenty minutes with a shoehorn and pliers to get the shoes on, yes,
they're too small. If you have to scrunch up your toes to keep them from
flopping off every other step, they're too big. But in between those ex-
tremes, you can't just look at someone standing in a pair of shoes and tell
whether they are a good fit. Only that person can really tell.
One might say that it does not matter because the Supreme Court is
going to review all these statutes itself and the Nine will decide whether
the shoes fit. But that is not a sufficient answer. Congress constantly
amends and updates many of these statutes, such as the Voting Rights
Act. Each time it amends, the contours of the shoe change. Moreover,
feet change size over time too. The conditions in American society are
constantly changing-in some ways for the better, in others for the
worse. The Supreme Court cannot, and should not have to, grant review
every time statutes are updated or conditions change. Never mind the
expenditure of judicial resources-the sheer lag time will create injustic-
es that ought not be tolerated.
But if not congruence and proportionality, then what? At one end of
the spectrum lies a highly deferential rationality test. Dean Evan
Caminker argued several years ago that the Court should judge all con-
gressional legislation under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by
the same standard as analyses conducted under the Commerce Clause-
the highly deferential McCullough v. Marylandl3 means-end test.14 At
the other end of the spectrum, Justice Scalia has taken the position that
Congress may only provide remedies for actual violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment-in other words, that Congress may only authorize
people to sue if the plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation in the
case at bar.15 Under Justice Scalia's test, the relationship between remedy
and right is always one to one.
IV. WHAT SHOULD REPLACE CITY OF BOERNE?
My position is that there should be no single test for.the permissible
relationship between right and remedy. The test should depend on the
type of scrutiny the Court would employ when testing state action for
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment. The kind of scrutiny
that the Court imposes on congressional remedies should mirror the
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
14. Id. at 421; see also Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Sec-
tion 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1133, 1161 (2001). This position once commanded a majori-
ty of the Court, at least with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
15. Lane, 541 U.S. at 558-61, 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting he would permit some
prophylaxis in the race discrimination cases on the basis of stare decisis).
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Court's well-established levels of scrutiny in examining the constitution-
ality of state action. As you all know, the level of scrutiny in examining
state action depends on what kind of right is at stake. Classifications
based on race, national origin, alienage, and a few other things trigger
strict scrutiny.16 A classification based on sex triggers intermediate scru-
tiny.17 Almost all other kinds of state action are judged on a "rational
basis"-if there is a rational relationship between the state action and a
legitimate governmental purpose, the action is not unconstitutional. 8
I will call my position the mirror image thesis. By that, I simply
mean that the scrutiny the Court applies to congressional enactments
under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment should
be the mirror image of the scrutiny that the Court already applies to
judge the constitutionality of state action. Thus, under my argument, if
the classification or right at stake triggers strict scrutiny, then Congress
should be permitted to authorize broad prophylactic measures-anything
that is rationally related to eradicating or preventing race discrimination
by state actors. If the classification or right at stake triggers only rational
basis review, then I will argue that Congress may authorize the courts to
remedy only constitutional violations that have already occurred. For
rights that trigger intermediate scrutiny, I will argue for something in the
middle. Finally, I will urge that the Court apply the same rationale to the
Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from discriminating on the
basis of race in voting.
No one should be astounded by my thesis. The tiers-of-scrutiny
framework can ultimately be traced back to a source no less august than
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,19 which sug-
gested that the Court ought to have a narrower presumption of constitu-
tionality for legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities.20 Nor am
I the one who has tied Congress's enforcement powers under the Four-
teenth Amendment to these tiers of scrutiny-the Court did that at least
as far back as 2006.21 In this Lecture, I am merely asking the Court to tie
the review of Congress's legislation to the tiers of scrutiny in a precise
manner, and to treat the Fifteenth Amendment as it treats the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Why am I attracted to the mirror image thesis? Two reasons. First, it
perfectly matches Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
16. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 278-79 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
18. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961).
19. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
20. Id at 152 n.4.
21. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-75 (2001).
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ment with the states' duties under the Fourteenth Amendment. The more
fundamental and historically rooted the states' failures to perform their
duties under the Fourteenth Amendment, the less the Judiciary should
interfere with Congress's attempts to enforce those duties. The less pro-
found that history of state failure, the less leeway Congress ought to have
in legislating remedies.
A. Recent Case Law
A review of the Court's modem jurisprudence respecting congres-
sional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment starts with the "new
federalism" cases of the early 1990s. During the time the Court was
pruning back the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez,2 2 it was
scaling back Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in City ofBoerne.
Not long thereafter, the Court handed down three more cases strik-
ing down statutes as improper under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,23 Congress had amended the patent laws
to authorize private suits for damages against state governments for pa-
tent infringement. 24 The Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not provide Congress the power to enact such a law.
True, patent law creates property interests, and the Due Process Clause
as it applies against the states prohibits takings without due process. But
the Court found that Congress had failed to identify any pattern of un-
constitutional patent infringement by the states. Consequently, the Patent
Remedy Act2 5 was not congruent and proportional to any actual history
of constitutional violations by the states.
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,26 some former employees of
the Florida State University sued the school for money damages under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),2 7 claiming that
certain pay adjustments discriminated against older employees. 28 Wheth-
er or not states had a history of discriminating on the basis of age-
Congress had neglected to document any such history-it was far from
clear that such discrimination was irrational, said the majority. The ab-
sence of evidence of irrationality was critical because age is not a suspect
classification and triggers no heightened scrutiny. Thus the rational basis
test applies in judging the constitutionality of state-sponsored discrimina-
22. 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
23. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
24. Id. at 630.
25. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2006)), invalidated by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
26. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
28. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66, 69-70.
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tion on the basis of age. The Court concluded that Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not empower Congress to enact the ADEA.2 9
The next in the series was Board of Trustees v. Garrett.30 This case
was the consolidation of two suits against the University of Alabama by
former employees who alleged that the school had violated a portion of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 3 1 A majority of the
Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
support enactment of the ADA any more than it did the enactment of the
ADEA. The majority opinion in Garrett featured the same emphasis as in
Kimel that the classification of disability does not trigger any heightened
scrutiny under constitutional analysis. In enacting the ADA, Congress in
fact had marshaled an impressive record of discrimination against disa-
bled persons. But the majority rejected virtually all of the examples for
various reasons.
The first reason, following Kimel, was that not all acts of discrimi-
nation against the disabled are irrational. There are jobs that able-bodied
people can do that disabled persons cannot do without something more
than what the Court has determined to constitute "reasonable accommo-
dation." 32 So again, the lack of heightened scrutiny played a major factor
in Garrett. But the Court did not stop there. The Court also brushed aside
acts of discrimination against the disabled by local governments. True,
local governments are instrumentalities of the state. But because the
ADA authorized private suits for money damages against the state, all of
the acts of discrimination against disabled persons had to be by state em-
ployees because local governments are not covered by the Eleventh
Amendment. That, of course, meant that private acts of discrimination
against the disabled-no matter how cruel, animus-based, or utterly irra-
tional-were also irrelevant to the analysis. In the end, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had identified only six scattered acts of irrational
discrimination against disabled persons by various states over the years.
The provision of a private cause of action for money damages against
states in federal court was not a congruent and proportional remedy for
those six scattered acts of irrational state discrimination.
Thus the Court had established a two-step process for determining
whether Congress had properly used its Section 5 powers to authorize
private suits for damages against states in federal court. The first was to
scour the congressional record for findings of sufficiently widespread
29. The Commerce Clause almost certainly empowers Congress to enact the ADEA, but
because of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), Congress may not authorize private suits
for money damages against the states under the ADEA. Id. at 72-73 (holding that Congress's powers
to subject unconsenting states to suit for money damages do not extend to either the Interstate Com-
merce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause).
30. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
32. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385-86.
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actual constitutional violations by states. If that prong were satisfied, the
Court would proceed to whether the legislative remedy was congruent
and proportional to this history of constitutional violations.
In three cases since Garrett, the Court has upheld laws under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, permitting private suits for damag-
es against states in federal court. The first of those, Nevada Department
of Human Services v. Hibbs,33 concerned the family-care leave provision
in the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).34 When it enact-
ed the FMLA, Congress documented a sufficiently widespread history of
gender-based discrimination in the dispensation of family and medical
leave. Congress found that states had perpetuated the stereotype of wom-
en as family caretakers and men as breadwinners by giving women leave
to rear children but denying such leave to men. And, because gender
discrimination triggers some form of heightened scrutiny, the majority,
led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was satisfied that the first prong was met.
The Court did not flyspeck the congressional findings on prior discrimi-
nation as it had done in Garrett and Kimel, but it nonetheless found that
there was a sufficient history of constitutional violations. It then went on
to find that the family-care provision of the FMLA was a congruent and
proportional response to the history of violations.
In Tennessee v. Lane,5 the Court took up the validity of a different
portion of the ADA than it had reviewed in Garrett. Lane involved a case
where a criminal defendant literally had to crawl up the stairs on his
hands and knees to a court proceeding because the local courthouse had
no elevator to accommodate his wheelchair. The Court held that this por-
tion of the ADA was supported by Section 5 on the ground that Lane had
been denied a fundamental right-access to court-which, in turn, trig-
gered heightened scrutiny under constitutional analysis. Then, in United
States v. Georgia,36 the Court had no trouble finding that a paraplegic
inmate in a state prison could sue under the same provision of the ADA
involved in Lane.37 The state had failed to provide him with a toilet that
he could use without assistance, which squarely violated his Eighth
Amendment rights.
Last Term, the Court, having zigged for several years, zagged again.
In Coleman, the Court reviewed the self-care provision in the FMLA.
Although it had upheld the family-care provision of the FMLA in Hibbs
nine years earlier, the Court now held that the self-care provision could
not be justified by Section 5. The majority, led by Justice Kennedy,
found that there was no real connection between the states' history of
33. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
35. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
36. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
37. Id. at 159.
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gender discrimination and the self-care provision. Congress created the
self-care provision not to remedy any past gender discrimination but
simply to provide employees with the flexibility in work arrangements
necessary to care for themselves. Thus there was really no question of
whether the self-care provision was congruent and proportional to the
history of constitutional violations; the Court had found that there was no
relationship at all between the two.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg laid out a powerful historical rebuttal.
She explained that the self-care provision was part of a holistic remedy
for gender discrimination in employment and in leave policies. Without
the self-care provision, the statute as a whole was greatly hampered in its
effectiveness. But it is not my current purpose here to assess who has the
better statutory construction argument. I wish to look at the Court's
modes of review in these Section 5 cases and attempt to gauge what as-
pects appear settled and what aspects appear unsettled.
Erwin Chemerinsky (among others) has argued that the following
approach can be deduced from the cases.38 If the right at stake is one that
triggers some kind of heightened scrutiny, then it does not matter wheth-
er or to what extent Congress has documented a history of constitutional
violations. As a practical matter, that is the end of the inquiry; the legis-
lation will be found constitutional. If the right at stake is one that gener-
ally triggers only rational basis review, then Congress must document a
sufficiently widespread history of constitutional violations by the states.
This is a difficult project because discriminatory acts by local officials or
private actors do not count; only those of state officials count. Further-
more, the discrimination must be irrational because no heightened level
of scrutiny has been triggered. Even if plaintiffs can surmount this test,
they must then convince the court that Congress's chosen remedy is con-
gruent and proportional to the history of discrimination.
As I have said, the intellectual origins of the tiers-of-scrutiny ap-
proach trace back in large part to footnote four of Carolene Products.
Discrete and insular minorities are less able to obtain relief from discrim-
ination through the political process. But there is another reason to vary
the level of scrutiny based on the type of claim involved. It is a plain fact
that some constitutional violations are more stubbornly rooted in our
nation's history than others are. Yes, we have discriminated against
heavy people and short people and, in a more serious vein, against people
with learning disabilities and treatable mental health issues. But it simply
blinks reality to say that America has discriminated against those groups
as consistently and seriously as it has against such groups as African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans, Native Americans, and women. There
are certain social cleavages around which our political, economic, and
38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 477 (5th ed. 2007).
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cultural structures have been built, and they are familiar-race, national
origin, religion, and sex. There are other traits that society has irrational-
ly made points of distinction, but not in nearly as profound a manner.
B. Why "Rational Basis" Review Should Not Govern Scrutiny ofAll
Fourteenth Amendment Legislation
But if any form of state-sponsored discrimination is irrational, Why
not give Congress broad authority to legislate against them? My answer
is trite, but nonetheless true: because the federal government is still a
government of enumerated powers. Suppose Congress were to permit
private suits in federal court against states for having levied irrational
regulatory burdens on failed businesses? Or private suits in federal court
against states that place irrational restrictions on the possession of con-
cealed handguns? Or that discriminate irrationally against cigarette
smokers? Every conceivable legislative objective can be couched as
"discrimination" against somebody, or as the deprivation of someone's
right to substantive due process.
You may not think my parade of horribles very realistic, and indeed,
you may think it more likely that Congress would do "good" and "pro-
gressive" things with near plenary powers. Even so, that would not
change my mind. Giving Congress the power to legislate about virtually
anything would throw off our existing balance of powers, with unknown
and unknowable systemic consequences. If we were to start from scratch
and redraft the Constitution, I do not know whether I would choose a
federated system where the states are "sovereign." I might opt in favor of
a centralized government. But we are not going to start from scratch, and
realistically, we cannot.
To me, that is one of the attractions of the mirror image thesis-it
puts some meaningful limits on congressional power under the Four-
teenth Amendment. That raises the next question, which is, What rela-
tionship between right and remedy should the Court require with respect
to each tier of scrutiny? On the strict scrutiny end, the answer must be
something highly deferential. Here, I would use the simple means-end
test of McCullough, which I do not view as meaningfully different from
the rational basis test used to judge the constitutionality of most state
action. The remedy must enforce constitutional rights recognized by the
Court, but the relationship between the remedy and the right merely has
to be one of plausible justification.
At the other end, What relationship must there be between legisla-
tive remedies and rights that trigger only rational basis scrutiny? I have
just explained why I oppose a highly deferential standard of reviewing
such legislation-it turns Section 5 into a near plenary grant of power to
legislate against the states on almost any subject matter. Perhaps the
Court could adopt a standard permitting legislation to enforce rights that
trigger rational basis review only when the legislation is essential to the
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preservation of such rights. My reservation about such a standard, how-
ever, comes from the same place that makes me uncomfortable with con-
gruence and proportionality. There is too much room for argument about
what legislation is essential and what is merely desirable.
At this end of the spectrum, I find myself alone with Justice Scalia,
calling for an actual constitutional violation in the case at bar. In other
words, when Congress legislates to enforce rights that trigger only ra-
tional basis review, the legislation should be held valid as applied only to
cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate an actual constitutional viola-
tion in his or her case. To put it yet another way, when it comes to rights
triggering rational basis review, Congress should not be permitted any
prophylaxis or deterrence. It should be able to provide a remedy only in
cases where the right has, in fact, been violated. Characteristic of Justice
Scalia, this is a readily administrable, bright-line rule.
Although only Justice Scalia has, to date, openly advocated such a
standard, it is consistent with the Court's actual cases scrutinizing legis-
lation to enforce rights that trigger onlyrational basis review. Kimel was
actually the consolidation of three cases. In one, Daniel Kimel and other
faculty members of a Florida state university sued to challenge the uni-
versity's failure to implement a previously announced pay increase.
Their argument was that the failure to follow through with the pay raise
had a disparate impact on older employees because they tended to have
higher base salaries. Even if Kimel and his colleagues' allegations were
true, however, the Court has held that disparate impact by itself never
makes out a constitutional violation, so my proposal is consistent with
the Court's treatment of Mr. Kimel's claim.
In the second consolidated case, Wellington Dickson sued his em-
ployer, the Florida Department of Corrections, alleging that the depart-
ment had passed him over for promotion because of his age and then
retaliated against him for filing a grievance. In the third consolidated
case, Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz were associate professors
at a state-run business college. They alleged that the college used an
evaluation system that had a disparate impact on older faculty members,
and that the college retaliated against them for filing grievances with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Under my thesis, whether the Court decided these cases correctly
depends on whether one takes the retaliation charges seriously. Again,
the disparate-impact claim does not state a constitutional violation. The
department passing Mr. Dickson over for a promotion because of his age
does not violate the Constitution because a rational basis can be articu-
lated for encouraging old professors to retire.3 9 Not every professor be-
yond a certain age has "lost it," but it is not irrational to think that com-
39. I resemble that remark.
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petence generally diminishes beyond a point, and it is administratively
costly to engage in case-by-case evaluations. On the other hand, retalia-
tion for filing a grievance clearly constitutes a First Amendment viola-
tion. If the retaliation claims in these cases were not merely plaintiffs-
lawyer-boilerplate tack-ons-and they usually are-then the Court was
wrong to find that they could not sue in federal court.
Garrett also involved consolidated cases. In one, Patricia Garrett
was a registered nurse in the University of Alabama's Birmingham hos-
pital. She was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent treatment,
including chemotherapy. When she came back, she was told that she
could not have her old position back, but rather would be relegated to a
lower-paying position as a nurse manager. In the other case, Milton Ash
was a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. He
was diagnosed with chronic asthma and sleep apnea and asked for differ-
ent assignments that would accommodate these conditions. The depart-
ment did not accommodate him to his satisfaction. Both Garrett and Ash
sued the State of Alabama in federal court for money damages pursuant
to Title I of the ADA.
Under rational basis review, neither of these plaintiffs stated a con-
stitutional violation. It is certainly possible that the hospital had promot-
ed someone else to a position in Garrett's absence such that it could not
afford to pay Garrett her old salary any longer. That would have been a
rational reason for acting as the hospital did. If that was the case, it was
stupid management and poor employee relations, but those things are not
unconstitutional. In Ash's case, perhaps there were no other open shifts.
Or perhaps the department had a strict rule not to accommodate health
conditions because then everyone would want to move their schedules
around for allergies, sleep patterns, and so on. Don't get me wrong-
what Garrett and Ash alleged clearly violated Title I of the ADA. I mere-
ly note that neither of those allegations amounts to a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, under my thesis, the Court was right
not to permit Congress to authorize these plaintiffs to sue the state for
money damages in federal court.4 0
That leaves the intermediate scrutiny cases. What relationship must
exist between congressional remedies and rights triggering intermediate
scrutiny? If you put a gun to my head, I suppose I am stuck with congru-
ence and proportionality. I just lack the imagination to articulate a test in
between strict scrutiny and rational basis review that does not require
some assessment of fit. I would need to invent a metric by which inter-
40. I would like to register my reservations about the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. I agree that permitting private suits for money damages against unconsenting states in federal
courts is a significant federalism cost, but I do not necessarily agree with the Court's holding in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), that the Eleventh Amendment applies in a case where the
cause of action arises under federal law and where the plaintiff is a resident of the state.
496 [Vol. 90:2
THE TROUBLE WITH CITY OF BOERNE
mediate scrutiny of legislation could be exercised without reference to
the relationship between means and ends. Yet the notion of intermediacy
seems to denote that very relationship. Perhaps the Court should simply
abandon the category of intermediate scrutiny. Sex as a classification
could be moved to strict scrutiny and commercial speech could be moved
to rational basis review. That would be my gut suggestion, but a defense
of those views will have to await another day.
C. The "Distribution and Currency of Violations" Issues
Two important issues remain, which I shall treat together because I
believe they are related. One is whether a pattern of violations in a few
states justifies legislation that applies in all states. The other is whether
Congress's power to legislate may only be based on current violations, or
whether a history of violations triggers the Section 5 power.
Under my proposal, neither of these issues arises when the claimed
right triggers only rational basis review because my proposal would re-
quire an actual constitutional violation in the case at bar. If a plaintiff can
demonstrate that his or her constitutional rights were violated by the
state, then that state was obviously among the offenders, and the viola-
tion is current.
But what if the claimed right would be reviewed under some form
of heightened scrutiny? I believe the Court should ignore the distribution
of violations among states for three reasons. One is that the types of con-
stitutional rights that trigger strict scrutiny have almost certainly been
violated in all the states at one time or another. Slavery and Jim Crow
may have been limited to the states of the former Confederacy, but at one
point or another, facially neutral laws in almost every state have been
enacted with the intent to disadvantage certain racial groups. It would be
hard to think of a single state that has not, at one time or another, dis-
criminated on the basis of religion, if even only against atheists. All
states at one time discriminated against women in their marital or crimi-
nal (rape) laws, to say nothing of their own employment policies.
Another reason to disregard the distribution of violations among
states is that when the states joined to create "a more perfect Union,""'
they surrendered some aspects of their sovereignty. One of them, in my
estimation, was the privilege of having national legislation tailored to
their idiosyncrasies. This is especially true when the problems spawning
the legislation have broad and deep roots.
The third reason to disregard the distribution of violations among
states is also the reason why Congress need not rely on current violations
to justify legislation. The framers of the Reconstruction Amendments
desperately would have wanted to avoid new forms of state-sponsored
41. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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discrimination based on race. It is beyond cavil that they saw slavery and
any version of systematic racial oppression as a moral and practical fail-
ing of the nation. Did they succeed in eliminating all such oppression?
For a few years, they came close, but that brief period of near formal
equality proved all too transient. Jim Crow soon took hold and recreated
the formal system of racial subordination.
That is why the courts must not insist upon current violations to up-
hold legislation enforcing rights that trigger strict scrutiny. There are
certain social dynamics that do not change over time. The players may
change, but the dynamics remain the same. It is not only the United
States. Look around the world. Most societies can absorb a small number
of people who are not of the dominant race without much trouble. But let
the number swell to significant proportions and the dominant group feels
threatened. The dominant group then is tempted to use the law to rein-
force its dominance. Religions say they are in favor of freedom of wor-
ship until they have enough power to seize the state apparatus and en-
force their beliefs on everyone. If your version of the Supreme Deity and
holy scripture are right, then anyone who disagrees must be wrong-and
their souls must be saved by whatever means necessary. The racial and
religious targets change over the generations, but the human story re-
mains the same. That is why, when it comes to discrimination on the
basis of race or religion, it is both foolish and dangerous to say, "Oh, that
was then, this is now."
One last loose end. It is true that the Court has defined "race dis-
crimination" under the Equal Protection Clause to mean only "intention-
al" discrimination, eschewing "disparate impact" as sufficient proof of a
constitutional violation.4 2 Thus, one might argue against my proposal on
the ground that remedial legislation based on race where no intentional
discrimination can be proved would be struck down. One possible illus-
tration would be the proposed North Carolina Racial Justice Act,43 which
would have dealt with racially disproportionate capital sentencing. With
respect to this example, I simply disagree with the Court's conclusion
that there is not intentional race discrimination involved in dispropor-
tionate capital sentencing. In the study involved in McCleskey v. Kemp,"
and in subsequent studies, the late David Baldus and his colleagues of-
fered statistical evidence from which intentional race discrimination not
only could have been inferred, but also should have been inferred.4 5 In
some studies it was based on the race of the victim and in others on the
42. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1994) as recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011).
44. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
45. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS passim (1990).
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race of the defendant, but I believe it is inconsistent with the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment to deny an inference of intentional discrimi-
nation in capital sentencing.
In general, my response regarding disparate impact is this: in true
cases where no inference of even partial racial motivation is warranted,
the plaintiff should not win on a claim of race discrimination. But I be-
lieve both the Supreme Court and lower courts have been too quick to
accept "plausibly neutral" explanations that were quite possibly pretextu-
al. The attitude that "we decline to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious" 4 6 is, at least in some contexts, simply not a faithful application
of existing doctrine. It is significant that Justice Powell, who wrote those
words, later admitted that he had come to regard the McCleskey decision
as a mistake.47
V. How DOES MY THESIS AFFECT THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT?
So much for legislation enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. What are the implications for the Fifteenth Amendment?
As some of you may know, a D.C. Circuit panel in May handed
down an opinion in a case called Shelby County v. Holder,4 8 in which
Shelby County, Alabama, claimed that the preclearance provision of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as reenacted for a period of twenty-five years
in 2006, exceeds Congress's enforcement powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment. 49 The panel voted 2-1 to uphold the preclearance provision,
and most observers expect the Supreme Court to take the case.so
The Court will not be writing on a blank slate. In 1966, the Court
decided a case called South Carolina v. Katzenbach,5 ' which made it
clear that the federal courts were to review Congress's enforcement
choices under the Fifteenth Amendment in the most deferential manner.52
But in 2009, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion whose tenor
can best be characterized as, "It's not 1965 anymore, and all bets are
off."
The 2009 case is called Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
No. 1 v. Holder.53 A utility district in Texas challenged the constitution-
46. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
47. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994).
48. 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
49. Id. at 856-57, 863-64.
50. The Court did grant certiorari in Shelby County on November 9, 2012. The grant is limited
to the following question: "Whether Congress'[s] decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act
exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution." Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-96).
51. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
52. Id. at 325-27.
53. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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ality of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires some states and
localities to obtain preclearance for certain types of changes to their vot-
ing systems. Congress first enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1957 pursu-
ant to its enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and has
reenacted it numerous times, most recently in 2006, finding that it is still
necessary to combat race discrimination in voting. The utility district had
never itself discriminated in its elections, and requiring it to engage in
the preclearance procedure exceeded Congress's Fifteenth Amendment
powers, the district argued.
The Supreme Court held in favor of the utility district, but not on
the constitutional question. The Court found that the utility district was
entitled to a statutory exemption from the preclearance procedure-
known in the Voting Rights Act lexicon as a bailout-and therefore the
constitutional question was avoided. But the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Roberts, stated that the preclearance provision was consti-
tutionally suspect: "§ 5, 'which authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive
areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial 'federalism
costs.' These federalism costs have caused Members of this Court to
express serious misgivings about the constitutionality of § 5."
Translation: Preclearance is strong prophylactic medicine. Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for all the Justices save Justice Thomas (who
would have struck down § 5 on the spot), then engaged in what might
fairly be characterized as a congruence and proportionality analysis:
Some of the conditions that we relied upon in upholding this statu-
tory scheme [in the past] have unquestionably improved. Things have
changed in the South....
... It may be that these improvements are insufficient and that
conditions continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But the
Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.5 5
The Court then hinted at its concerns about the fact that preclear-
ance is required of certain states and not of others-and that the basis for
singling out the states required to engage in preclearance may not be up-
to-date.
The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrat-
ed in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance. The statute's cov-
erage formula is based on data that is now more than 35 years old,
and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current
political conditions. 56
54. Id. at 202 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
55. Id. at 202-03.
56. Id. at 203.
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Despite extensive briefing on the question, the Court declined to de-
cide whether congruence and proportionality was required or whether the
proper test was one of rationality.57
Thus, the Northwest Austin Court expressed strong disapproval for
the notion that Congress can base current and continuing remedies on
conditions that may have been eliminated decades ago. Such remedies
impose serious federalism costs, and such costs can only be justified by
roughly commensurate current needs in enforcing Fifteenth Amendment
rights.
I am no expert on the Voting Rights Act, but clearly not everyone
who supports the preclearance provision thinks it is perfect as it is cur-
rently written. In particular, there seems to be too much emphasis on
statewide redistricting, where discriminatory behavior is pretty transpar-
ent, and where the Justice Department has the greatest potential to en-
gage in partisan abuse of its preclearance powers. The current real needs
lie more in local elections and their attendant conditions, which are not
highly transparent, where it takes only a few bad actors to shut down
groups of minority voters, and where the Attorney General of the United
States has little incentive to game the system through his or her preclear-
ance powers. Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Michael Pitts have de-
bated the matter, and despite their divergent conclusions regarding the
overall desirability of the preclearance provision, they agree on the point
just mentioned.
In his Shelby County opinion upholding the preclearance provision,
Judge David Tatel of the D.C. Circuit dutifully followed Northwest Aus-
tin dicta on the standard of review. Because Northwest Austin stated that
the preclearance provision raises serious constitutional questions under
either the congruence and proportionality test used in cases like City of
Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett or under the rational basis test used in cases
like Hibbs and Lane, Judge Tatel logically assumed for the sake of ar-
gument that the congruence and proportionality standard applied-yet he
found that the preclearance provision satisfied even that demanding
test."
Why? Because the congressional record contained sufficient evi-
dence from which Congress could reasonably conclude that racial dis-
crimination in covered jurisdictions remains so serious and pervasive that
individual litigation (as opposed to the systematic, prophylactic preclear-
ance system) is insufficient to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. As re-
counted in Judge Tatel's opinion, the town of Kilmichael, Mississippi,
cancelled a 2001 election when there was "an unprecedented number" of
57. Id. at 204.
58. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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African-American candidates. 5 9 In 1998, Webster County, Georgia, pro-
posed to reduce the black population in three of the school board's dis-
tricts after the electorate voted in a majority of black board members for
the first time in history. In 1993, Washington Parish, Louisiana, created a
new at-large seat "to ensure that no white incumbent would lose his
seat."6 0 In the early 1990s, Mississippi legislators opposed a "redistrict-
ing plan that would have increased the number of black majority dis-
tricts, referring to the plan publicly as the 'black plan' and privately as
the 'nigger plan."'6 Georgia's state House Reapportionment Committee
Chairman "told his colleagues on numerous occasions, 'I don't want to
draw nigger districts."' 62
No. It's not 1965 anymore. But these incidents from the early 1990s
to the early 2000s demonstrate that the states of the former Confederacy
still have powerful forces whose clear intention is to minimize the elec-
toral impact of African-Americans. Would I limit the preclearance re-
quirement to the states of the former Confederacy? No, I would not. I
will come out and say that I think it's probably needed in parts of Arizo-
na, parts of Texas, and parts of my home state of California. Should pre-
clearance continue to be required at the statewide level of every single
Southern state? Maybe not. Maybe preclearance ought to be concentrated
at the level of local government.
But here is my point, and it is as unoriginal as any point can be: de-
cisions about what governmental entities should be subject to preclear-
ance are for Congress to decide, not the Court. As Judge Tatel said of the
2006 renewal of the preclearance provision, "Congress found that serious
and widespread intentional discrimination persisted in covered jurisdic-
tions and that 'case-by-case enforcement alone . . . would leave minority
citizens with [an] inadequate remedy."' 63 That conclusion is hardly irra-
tional, considering the evidence that faced Congress in 2006, and that
ought to be the end of the inquiry. Race discrimination, no less under the
Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth, is the most suspect kind
of state action. When Congress acts pursuant to its Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendment enforcement powers to combat such action, those
enactments must be given the widest berth possible. Any plausible justi-
fication that can be articulated in favor of the legislation-whether or not
Congress was actually motivated by it-must be permitted to sanction
the enforcement scheme. The Court would clearly stray beyond its prop-
er boundaries in our constitutional system if it were to put the magnify-
59. Id at 865 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 36-37 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
60. Id (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 38 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.) (internal quotation
mark omitted)).
61. Id at 866 (quoting Modern Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 22 (2006)).
62. Id (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 67 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.)).
63. Id. at 872 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 57 (2006)).
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ing glass on the congressional record and insist upon the tightest possible
fit between remedy and malady in every single situation. The generic cry
of "federalism costs" does not, and cannot, change that boundary.
Judge Tatel's masterful opinion for the panel in Shelby County pro-
vides a wonderful blueprint for the Court to uphold the preclearance pro-
vision, while expressing a desire for Congress to rework the provision to
make it more focused on local practices than on statewide redistricting.
The only disagreement I have with Judge Tatel stems from the fact that
he is a judge deciding a real case and I am a commentator. The differ-
ence is in the standard of review. He apparently felt compelled to apply
the congruence and proportionality standard. As I mentioned earlier,
even in the cases where the rights trigger heightened scrutiny, the Court
insists that it still does perform some kind of congruence and proportion-
ality review, although it is questionable whether the legislative facts sup-
port that conclusion. I would make it clear right now, just as I have made
clear with respect to those Fourteenth Amendment cases involving rights
that trigger strict scrutiny, that the congruence and proportionality test
should not apply. The only question should be whether Congress had any
conceivable rational basis to enact the remedial legislation-and, in the
spirit of true rational basis review, the facts supporting that rational basis
need not appear in the congressional record at the time of enactment.
That is the only way for the Court to square its standards of reviewing
state action for constitutionality with its standards for reviewing congres-
sional acts enforcing constitutional rights, both with respect to the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
No way, you say? Northwestern Austin portends nothing but a bat-
ting down of the preclearance provision in toto? That certainly could
happen, but don't bet the rent money just yet. Consider the following
quote:
In assessing those questions, we are keenly mindful of our institu-
tional role. We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of
an Act of Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this
Court is called on to perform." "The Congress is a coequal branch of
government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the
Constitution of the United States." The Fifteenth Amendment em-
powers "Congress," not the Court, to determine in the first instance
what legislation is needed to enforce it.6
Those words are straight from the Chief Justice's opinion in North-
west Austin. And don't think for a minute that they are just window
dressing. Every one of those nine Justices takes both federalism and sep-
64. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. I v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204-06 (2009) (quoting
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) and Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981), respectively).
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aration of powers seriously. Every one of them is keenly aware that the
Court must stay within its proper role when reviewing legislation. Each
of them sees things differently at the margins, and from different per-
spectives-that's why there are nine of them, not just one. But don't as-
sume that any of them are going to vote to chuck the preclearance provi-
sion without a good long look, just as none of them is going to vote to
rubber-stamp it. The Justices are like your family members. At times
they make you crazy, you want to strangle them, you wonder how you
could really be related to them. There are days when you disagree on
everything. But at the end of the day, you know they really want to do
the right thing, and in this case, that would be to apply rational basis re-
view to all congressional enactments enforcing the right not to be dis-
criminated against on the basis of one's race.
THE BIG BANKS: BACKGROUND, DEREGULATION,
FINANCIAL INNOVATION, AND "Too BIG TO FAL"
CHARLES W. MURDOCKt
ABSTRACT
The U.S. economy is still reeling from the financial crisis that ex-
ploded in the fall of 2008. This Article asserts that the big banks were
major culprits in causing the crisis by funding the non-bank lenders that
created the toxic mortgages, which the big banks securitized and sold to
unwary investors. Ironically, banks that were then too big to fail are even
larger today.
The Article briefly reviews the history of banking from the Found-
ing Fathers to the deregulatory mindset that has been present since 1980.
It then traces the impact of deregulation, which led to the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s and the current financial crisis. Prior to deregula-
tion, the country had gone fifty years without a financial crisis. The Arti-
cle briefly examines the causes of the crisis and analyzes in depth the
financial innovation, such as adjustable-rate mortgages and credit default
swaps, that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan extolled but that led us
into a near financial meltdown. It traces the growth of the big banks and
asserts that breaking them up would improve efficiency, permit risk to be
priced appropriately, increase competition, and eliminate many conflicts
of interest, including those of management who pursue greater financial
rewards by ignoring the potential for catastrophic risk. It also asserts that
regulation cannot be left in the hands of regulators who do not believe in
regulation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If they're too big to fail, they're too big.
-Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan'
When former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan made the
above comment, some listeners were shocked. However, if Greenspan
were viewed as a true conservative, such an approach should not be
shocking because, until the Reagan Administration in 1980, conserva-
tives generally were strong advocates of antitrust enforcement and
viewed excessive size and power with suspicion.2 On the other hand,
until he recently "got religion,"3 Greenspan was more a libertarian than a
1. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the C. Peter McColough Series on
International Economics: The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences (Oct. 15 2009),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20417/c_peter mecolough series on international economics.htmi.
2. See Republican Party Platform of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid-25842#axzzl W4javJKZ (last visited Jan. 5,
2013) ("We will press on for greater competition in our economy. The energetic antitrust program of
the past four years demonstrates our commitment to free competition as our basic policy. The Anti-
trust Division has moved decisively to invalidate those 'conglomerate' mergers which stifle competi-
tion and discourage economic concentration. The 87 antitrust cases filed in fiscal year 1972 broke
the previous one-year record of more than a decade ago, during another Republican Administra-
tion. . . . Small business, so vital to our economic system, is free enterprise in its purest sense. It
holds forth opportunity to the individual, regardless of race or color, to fulfill the American dream.
The seedbed of innovation and invention, it is the starting point of many of the country's large
businesses, and today its rol[e] in our increasingly technological economy is crucial. We pledge to
sustain and expand that role.").
3. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address to the Economic Club of New York 3
(Feb. 17, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/EconClub.PDF ("But in August
2007, the risk management structure cracked. All of the sophisticated mathematics and computer
wizardry essentially rested on one central premise: that enlightened self interest of owners and
managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against insolvency
by actively monitoring and managing their firms' capital and risk positions. When in the summer of
2007 that premise failed, I was deeply dismayed. I still believe that self regulation is an essential tool
for market effectiveness-a first line of defense. But, it is clear that the levels of complexity to
which market practitioners, at the height of their euphoria, carried risk-management techniques and
risk-product design were too much for even the most sophisticated market players to handle properly
and prudently. Accordingly, I see no alternative to a set of heightened federal regulatory rules for
banks and other financial institutions.").
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conservative, and it was his libertarian instincts that were part of the
cause of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007 and 2008, and contin-
ues through today. Besides the lack of regulation embodied in Green-
span's philosophy, another major cause of the crisis was the greed and
incompetence of the big banks. These banks financed the non-bank
mortgage companies that generated many of the toxic loans, which were
then securitized into toxic securities by the big banks and sold to unwary
investors. The incompetence continued as Jamie Dimon initially charac-
terized J.P. Morgan's potential $9 billion4 trading loss as a "tempest in a
teapot."5 What has transpired is that profits have been privatized but
losses have been socialized.
When President Barack Obama took office, monthly job losses ex-
ceeded 700,000 jobs, and a worldwide economic collapse had been
averted only by the prior action of the Bush Administration in arranging
a $700 billion bailout of financial and other systemically important insti-
tutions.6 But the $700 billion was only the tip of the iceberg in terms of
the financial assistance provided to the big banks. Bloomberg reported
that the federal government pledged over $12.8 trillion to avoid a finan-
cial meltdown.7 President Obama then undertook an inadequate stimulus
package in an attempt to restart the rest of the economy but thereafter
turned his focus to health care.
A macro approach to the causes of the financial crisis was not un-
dertaken until comprehensive legislation, namely the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, was finally enacted in July
2010.8 Although this legislation probably would have precluded the cur-
rent financial crisis by requiring originators to implement mortgage-
underwriting standards, by requiring securitizers to have some skin in the
game, and by exposing credit-rating agencies to liability, it may not pre-
4. Ambereen Choudbury & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Slips on Report Trading Loss Wid-
ened to $9 Billion, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2012, 7:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2012-
06-28/jpmorgan-slips-on-report-of-trading-loss-widening-to-9-billion.html.
5. Jonathon Weil, What Jamie Dimon Doesn't Know Is Plain Scary, BLOOMBERG (May 11,
2012, 8:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-1 1/what-jamie-dimon-doesn-t-know-is-
plain-scary.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was passed by
the Senate on October 1, 2008 and by the House on October 3, 2008, and signed into law by Presi-
dent Bush on October 3, 2008. Id.; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Signs
HR 1424 Into Law (Oct. 3, 2008), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081003-17.html.
. 7. Mark Pittman & Bob Ivry, Financial Rescue Nears GDP as Pledges Top 12.8 Trillion,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2009, 2:20 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=armOzfkwtCA4.
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
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vent future crises because it did not adequately address the power of the
big banks and their culture of risk taking.9
Part II of this Article is a short history of the attitude toward large
banks and their power in this country, from the time of our Founding
Fathers to the present. It first looks at the period up to the Great Depres-
sion, during which, for the most part, banking power was viewed with
suspicion. The Article then examines the impact of inflationary and other
pressures of the 1970s upon banking, which then led to deregulation un-
der President Ronald Reagan in 1980 and in the following years. Part III
examines the causes of the financial crisis and the aftermath of the crisis,
which has devastated our economy. Part IV examines financial innova-
tion, which was extolled by Chairman Greenspan, but which in large part
led to the current financial crisis. Part V examines the growth of the "too
big to fail" banks, the impact of too big to fail on competition and the
creation of financial innovations. Finally, the Article examines proposals
to limit their size and the benefits of breaking up the big banks, including
less complexity, better monitoring by the markets and creditors, and re-
duced conflicts of interest. The Article concludes that it was the failure
of the banking system, not business cyclicality, that led to our depressed
economy, and that the approach in Dodd-Frank does not adequately deal
with the problem of too big to fail. The mega banks need to be down-
sized, voluntarily or by legislation, to create entities that are manageable,
transparent, and able to assess risk properly. Moreover, we need to
change the mentality that government is the problem, not the solution.
The "Appendix," in Part VII, provides a history of the consolidation ac-
tivity of the big banks.
II. SHORT HISTORY OF BANKING: How WE GOT TO "Too BIG TO FAIL"
A. Founding Fathers to 1980
Going back to our Founding Fathers, there has been concern about
the nature of our banking system and the potential for abuse arising from
the power of banks. Alexander Hamilton favored a publicly chartered
bank similar to the Bank of England, and Congress passed legislation in
1791 to create a bank with a twenty-year charter.'0 However, Thomas
Jefferson was deeply suspicious of banks and lobbied President George
Washington to veto the legislation." A brief by Hamilton convinced
9. See generally Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64
SMU L. REV. 1243, 1250-51 (2011) (analyzing the likelihood of success or failure of the Dodd-
Frank legislation at preventing future financial crises).
10. See I JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 88-89
(2002); Hamilton vs. Jefferson, COUNTRY STUDIES, http://countrystudies.us/united-states/history-
41.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
I1. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 89-90.
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Washington to sign the legislation.' 2 Later, however, the charter of the
First Bank was allowed to expire.
After the War of 1812, it became clear that a national bank was
needed, particularly to provide funding for war.13 Legislation creating the
Second Bank of the United States, again with a twenty-year charter, was
adopted in 1816 and signed into law by President James Madison. 14
Nicholas Biddle was in charge of the bank and alienated Andrew Jack-
son, who was elected president in 1828 because he used the bank's eco-
nomic power to curry, favor with members of Congress. Jackson was a
believer in a strong presidency and thought that the Second Bank's mo-
nopoly over government finances gave Biddle and his friends undue
profits and power. Jackson is reported to have said, "The bank is trying
to kill me, . . . but I will kill it!"" He vetoed the recharter bill on the ba-
sis that the bank enjoyed undue economic privilege.'
Jackson's opponent in the 1832 election was Henry Clay, who was
aligned with Biddle and sought to renew the Second Bank's charter four
years early to make it an issue in the presidential campaign. Jackson
again won the presidency, and thus his prior veto was not overturned.
Biddle sought to retaliate. According to one commentator, Biddle's ac-
tions demonstrated that Jackson's fear of the power of the Second Bank
was well founded:
When Jackson began transferring the federal government's deposits
out of the Second Bank to his favored "pet banks," the Second Bank
demanded payment of bills issued by state banks and reduced its
loans by over $5 million, contracting the money supply and causing
interest rates to double to 12 percent. Biddle hoped, by damaging the
economy, to stir up opposition to Jackson; in the process, he showed
that Jackson had not been wrong to fear the power of a major bank to
distort the economy for its own purposes.17
Even though there was no central bank, the state banking system
rapidly expanded, and industry experienced incredible growth during the
rest of the nineteenth century notwithstanding the disruption of the Civil
War. Some would say that industry grew too big because the last couple
of decades of the nineteenth century were the Gilded Age, or the age of
trusts;18 this in turn led to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of
12. See Letters Between Alexander Hamilton & George Washington (1791), in HAMILTON
AND THE NATIONAL DEBT 71-78 (George Rogers Taylor ed., 1950).
13. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, WHITE HOUSE BURNING 3-7 (2012).
14. See RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 28-33 (1993) (discussing the Second Bank generally).
15. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 20 (2010).
16. Id
17. Id.
18. See generally D.C. Shouter, Part II: America in the Gilded Age, CLASSIFICATION OF AM.
WEALTH, http://www.raken.com/american-wealth/trusts/the-trustsl.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2013)
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1890,19 and subsequent "trust busting" by President Theodore Roose-
velt. 20
The rise of the trusts was funded by the investment bankers, the
most powerful of whom was John Pierpont Morgan. His arrogance and
power were reflected in his alleged statements to President Roosevelt: "If
we have done anything wrong, send your man to my man, and they can
fix it up."21
Roosevelt's trust busting was interrupted by the Panic of 1907,
which was triggered by an attempt by insiders and their bankers to ma-
nipulate the stock price of United Copper Company.22 When the attempt
failed, it triggered a run on those banks involved in the scheme and then
spread to other banks. To satisfy their customers' demand for deposits,
the banks were forced to sell assets, thus pushing down their stock prices
and exacerbating the situation in a manner similar to what we have expe-
rienced in this current crisis. Because there was no central bank available
to step in and provide credit to the banks, J.P. Morgan tried to stem the
tide by providing credit. Unfortunately, at least for some banks, because
he could not muster enough funds to save all the banks, in effect Morgan
decided which banks would survive and which would not. However,
even Morgan's actions did not stem the tide, and the federal government
provided $25 million to New York banks to provide the necessary liquid-
23
ity.
The Panic brought both bankers and industry in general to the reali-
zation that there was a need for a central bank. Understandably, what the
bankers wanted from a central bank was an entity that could bail out
banks when they were in trouble; they certainly did not want more regu-
lation. However, the Pujo committee concluded that control of credit was
in the hands of a small number of Wall Street bankers who had consider-
able economic power.24 Louis Brandeis, who was an adviser to President
Woodrow Wilson, was also leery of the power of big banks and favored
stronger regulation.25 Unfortunately, the compromise bill that passed in
(discussing the rising concentration of wealth in the United States during the late nineteenth centu-
ry).
19. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 10, at 363.
20. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (2002).
21. EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 91 (2002).
22. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 27-31.
23. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE
RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 123 24 (1990).
24. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 48; LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 49 (Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press 1995)
(1914). The Pujo Committee was a subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and Curren-
cy, which, in 1912-1913, investigated the ties between financial leaders and major industrial compa-
nies that had consolidated control in a few hands. BRANDEIS, supra, at 24.
25. See BRANDEIS, supra note 24, at 18-19, 22 23.
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191326 gave the banks access to public funds when needed but was not
particularly strong on the regulatory side. Although the first chief execu-
tive officer of the Federal Reserve Board of New York, Benjamin
Strong, was allied with J.P. Morgan,2 7 he is generally regarded as having
been a good chairman, even though he did not stem the credit that was
leading to the Great Depression.
Because of the implicit government guarantee and weak regulation,
banks were able to provide cheap money for the speculation that led to
the market crash of 1929. President Franklin Roosevelt, Teddy Roose-
velt's cousin, was elected president in 1932 and quickly shepherded the
Glass-Steagall Act through Congress in 1933.28 One of the major provi-
sions of this Act was to separate investment banking and commercial
banking. Commercial banks were protected against depositor runs by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) but, in return, were sub-
jected to strict federal regulation. This regulatory regime provided ap-
proximately fifty years without a serious financial crisis. See Figure 1
below.
26. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (2006)).
27. Russ Roberts & Barry Eichengreen, Eichengreen on the Dollar and International Fi-
nance, ECONTALK, at 33:02, (June 6, 2011),
http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2011/06/eichengreenon.html.
28. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 24, 78, 377-78 (1994)) (repealed 1999).
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Figure 1. Bank Failures and Suspensions, 1864-2008
(with data on deposits starting in 1921)
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Although the banking system was not perfect, and there were flaws
that needed correction, the mindset on regulation dramatically changed in
1980 when President Reagan uttered his often repeated phrase "govern-
ment is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem." 2 9
B. 1980-2007: Deregulation and the Dominance ofFinance
1. Prelude: Changing Times in the 1970s
The 1930s were the era of depression; the early 1940s were the era
of war; and the period from the end of World War II to the 1970s was the
era of prosperity and the growth of the middle class. 30 The contrast be-
tween this period and the period following deregulation in the 1980s and
thereafter is illustrated by Figure 2 below:
29. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, 121 CONG. REC. 151 (1981)
30. Robert B. Reich, Op-Ed., The Limping Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR6.
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Figure 2. The Great Prosperity and the Great Regression
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Source: Robert B. Reich, Op-Ed., The Limping Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR6.
Education and technological innovation, not financial innovation,
drove this new prosperity. Banking was boring, giving rise to the 3-6-3
caricature: borrow at 3%, lend at 6%, and hit the golf course by 3
o'clock. Both commercial and investment banking were effective in fun-
neling capital to industry. Moreover, governmental programs made home
ownership a reality for most Americans3' and were responsible for the
growth in higher education.3 2
At this time, investment banks were partnerships.33 Because invest-
ment bankers were personally liable, they had their own wealth at risk,
not just that of other people. This created a more conservative mindset.
31. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (2006)).
32. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1070A (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (providing federal Pell grants to
students of institutions of higher education); 38 U.S.C. § 3001-3035 (2006) (providing education
benefits to veterans); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (repealed
1981); 38 C.F.R. §§ 21.1029-21.9770 (2009) (providing education benefits to veterans and their
dependents).
33. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1173, 1177-78
(2010) ("Until the 1980s, most investment banks were general partnerships run by partners who
were personally liable for the debts of their firms. A partner of Lehman Brothers did not want or
need the government to tell him how to run his business; if the business failed, the partner paid.").
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Bankers' compensation was comparable to that of other private sector
jobs.34
Although this was an era of unmatched general prosperity, this is
not to say that all was well. Not only were there the Korean and Vietnam
Wars but also there was the Cold War, or nuclear detente with Russia,
carrying with it the fear of a nuclear holocaust. Nevertheless, government
funded innovation, which was transferred to industry, and industry in
turn invested in domestic jobs," median income grew,36 unions were
powerful,37 and the top average pay of a chief executive officer (CEO)
was only about twenty-five times that of the average worker. 38 This ratio
of CEO pay to worker pay surged in the 1990s, and in the 2000s had
39increased to as much as 531 times the average worker pay.
Then came the uncertainty of the 1970s. Upon being elected in
1968, President Richard Nixon was confronted with a recession 40 and
scandals in the securities markets41 that, in part, led to a two-tiered stock
market.42 Large-capitalization stocks did well, but small-capitalization
stocks were pummeled, leading to the going-private phenomenon of the
mid-1970s.43 Nixon experimented with price controls, and, when he took
the lid off, prices soared," also sparked by the OPEC oil embargo.45
34. JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 15, at 115 fig.4.
35. See generally CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY 55-61,
66-69 (2010) (discussing the U.S. government's rejection of laissez-faire economics and investment
in major industries and innovations from the Civil War through World War II as a driving force
behind economic growth).
36. See Reich, supra note 30.
37. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 137-39 (1952).
38. Lawrence Mishel, CEO-to-Worker Pay Imbalance Grows, ECON. POL'Y INST. (June 21,
2006), http://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures-snapshots20060621/ (demonstrating that in
1965, CEOs earned about twenty-five times more than an average worker);
39. See Eric Wahlgren, Spreading the Yankee Way ofPay, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2001),
http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/apr200l/ca20010419_812.htm (offering a global
perspective on the recent historical increase in CEO pay).
40. See generally Transcript of Interview by PBS Commanding Heights with Paul Volcker,
Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve 3-7 (Sept. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Volcker Interview],
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/pdf/int paulvolcker.pdf (chronicling
Volcker's views on the recession that greeted President Nixon when he took office, the surprising
inflation that followed, and the imposition of wage and price controls, as well as the "stagflation"-
inflation coupled with a stagnant economy-that confronted President Carter).
41. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1971) (discuss-
ing company officers who, after learning of a significant find, misrepresented the results of testing at
the site while making large purchases of company stock).
42. Lewis D. Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Control,
42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 762 (1973) (describing the two-tiered market as one "in which institu-
tional security favorites enjoy ever mounting prices, while other companies languish at low price-
earnings multiples").
43. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm'r, SEC, Law Advisory Council Lecture at the Notre Dame Law
School: "Going Private"; A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility 4-6, 8, I1, 13 (Nov. 14, 1974).
44. Volcker Interview, supra note 40, at 3-5.
45. Arabs Threaten Oil Embargo in Week ifDemand Isn't Met, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1971, at
DIO.
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At this time, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
moved to modernize the securities industry. Institutions such as pension
funds and mutual funds, which had grown as a result of the country's
overall prosperity, chafed at the fixed commission structure of the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).46 If you traded 100,000 shares, you paid
about 1,000 times as much commission as if you traded 100 shares. Alt-
hough this was arguably inefficient, it had one salutary effect: institu-
tions were investors rather than traders. And commercial banks could not
trade because of Glass-Steagall. Twenty million shares were a good trad-
ing day on the NYSE.47 This all changed with the elimination of fixed
commissions by the Securities Act Amendments of 1975. * The average
trading volume the past few years has been about 1.5 billion shares a
day, but on October 10, 2008, it reached over 7 billion shares.49
Also, at this time, Republicans were the party of small business: this
meant they believed in effective antitrust enforcement.50 The Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964 introduced a regime of public disclosure to
the over-the-counter (OTC) market. 1 Prior to this development, if you
wanted to do due diligence in an acquisition, you needed to bargain for it
in a negotiated transaction. But with public disclosure of financial and
business information in the OTC market, hostile takeovers, sometimes
referred to as "overhead tender offers," became a prudent opportunity.52
46. See In the Midst of Revolution: the SEC, 1973-1981, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/rev/revO2c.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
47. See NYSE Daily Share Volume 1970 Through 1979, NYSE Statistics Archive, N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE, http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/stats/vol70-79.dat (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
48. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 4, 89 Stat. 97, 107 (1975).
49. See NYSE Group Volume Records-Top 10 Days, NYSE Statistics Archive, N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer edition.asp?mode=table&key-3007&catego
ry-3 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (showing over 7 billion shares traded on October 10, 2008); see also
Daily Market Summary, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.nyse.com/financials/1108407157455.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (showing a sample
day from April 2011 with nearly 1.5 billion shares traded); NYSE Statistics Archive, N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE, http://www.nyse.com/financials/l 143717022567.html (follow "Historical NYSE Eu-
ronext Volume" hyperlink; then see "Monthly US Volumes" tab) (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (dividing
Handled Volume by Trading Days for each month equals about 1.5 billion shares per day). On one
recent day, 236,314,500 shares of just one stock, Bank of America, were traded. Most Active New
York Stock Exchange-traded Stocks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9PG02Q8I.htm.
50. See Republican Party Platform of 1972, supra note 2.
51. Act of August 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 6, 78 Stat. 565, 570.
52. When one company seeks to acquire another, it wants to ensure that it knows what it is
buying. Prior to the 1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, companies generally engaged
in negotiated transactions in which an agreement was executed that, prior to closing, enabled the
acquirer to do due diligence. In addition, extensive representations and warranties were included in
the acquisition agreement, the breach of which would either excuse closing or provide a cause of
action. After the amendments created some 10,000 OTC companies that were required to file annual,
quarterly, and current reports, an acquirer, who was thwarted by management of a target corporation
that would not enter into a negotiated transaction, could make an "overhead tender offer" directly to
the shareholders. Now, in such a situation, the acquiring company would not be flying blind because
of the public availability of information.
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Although acquisitions increased, merger mania had not yet begun. Anti-
trust was still something to be reckoned with.
2. 1980-2000 Deregulation: The Savings and Loan Crisis, "Green-
spanomics," and Squelching Derivative Regulation
Economic stagnation, historically high interest rates, and inflation
characterized the 1970s. The Iranian hostage crisis was the last straw,
and President Reagan turned President Jimmy Carter into a one-term
president in the 1980 election. Reagan's goal was to restore prosperity by
getting government off peoples' backs." A major tool was deregula-
tion."
Inflation was problematic for savings and loan institutions. In effect,
they had their assets long and liabilities short; for example, on the asset
side of the balance sheet, the savings and loan association (S&L) had a
thirty-year mortgage yielding 6%, but by 1980, on the liability side, some
certificates of deposit were commanding 12% or more. Whereas in It's
A Wonderful Life Jimmy Stewart was able in 1946 to explain where the
depositor's money had gone, depositors in the 1980s were not appeased
by the fact that their mortgage interest was at 6%; they wanted a market
rate of return on their certificates of deposit.
Deregulation actually began under President Carter. At the end of
his term, the Depository Institutions Deregilation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 was passed.56 The Regulation Q limit on the interest that
could be paid on traditional savings accounts was phased out and banks
could now compete with money market funds," government bonds,
and other investment vehicles. The Act also expanded the permissible
range of investments by S&Ls 59 and preempted state usury laws. 60
53. See Reagan, supra note 29.
54. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Garn-St. Germain Depository (Oct.
15, 1982), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edularchives/speeches/ 982/101582b.htm.
55. See, e.g., Eric N. Berg, Bowery Savings Bank Is Sold for $200 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 1987, at Al ("Beginning in the early 1980's, in a story replayed at thrift institutions nationwide,
the Bowery fell onto hard times as interest earnings from its portfolio of old, low-paying, fixed-rate
mortgages were inadequate to finance high-rate deposits.").
56. Depository Institutions.Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (2006)).
57. See Money Market Funds, SEC.Gov, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmnkt.htm (last
modified Sept. 9, 2009).
58. In the 1980s, I was retained as an expert by the attorney for an elderly and poorly educat-
ed widow who had $100,000 from her husband's estate to invest. Her broker put her in a variety of
risky securities. The expert for the broker opined that it was necessary to buy risky securities to meet
her objective of receiving $12,000 a year to live on. In my testimony I pointed out that U.S. Treasury
bonds were paying 12% in 1980, when the broker invested her savings. The broker settled and gave
her money back.
59. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 401, 94
Stat. at 151-55.
60. See id. § 501, 94 Stat. 161-62.
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Under President Reagan, the Controller of Currency (OCC) in 1981
authorized national banks to offer adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs),
and Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982, which further enabled savings and loan institutions to expand
their lending activities into commercial lending and even junk bonds.62
The Act also authorized state-chartered banks to issue ARMs,63 putting
them on parity with national banks, and gave the OCC the authority to
lift restrictions on loan-to-value ratios, maturities, and amortization
schedules. The Controller exercised this authority the following year.
Although President Reagan hailed deregulation, 6 5 it led to the col-
lapse of thousands of savings and loans and a federal bailout of about
$160 billion,66 as well as the Keating Five scandal, in which Charles
Keating, the former CEO of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, went
to jail, but the highly publicized charges against Senator McCain were
dropped.6 7 The impact of deregulation on the savings and loan industry
was summarized in History of the Eighties-Lessons for the Future:
Most political, legislative, and regulatory decisions in the early
1980s were imbued with a spirit of deregulation. The prevailing view
was that S&Ls should be granted regulatory forbearance until interest
rates returned to normal levels, when thrifts would be able to restruc-
ture their portfolios with new asset powers. To forestall actual insol-
vency, therefore, the [Federal Home Loan Bank Board] lowered net
worth requirements for federally insured savings and loan associa-
tions from 5 percent of insured accounts to 4 percent in November
1980 and to 3 percent in January 1982. At the same time, the existing
20-year phase-in rule for meeting the net worth requirement, and the
5-year-averaging rule for computing the deposit base, were retained.
The phase-in rule meant that S&Ls less than 20 years old had capital
requirements even lower than 3 percent. This made chartering de no-
vo federal stock institutions very attractive because the required $2.0
million initial capital investment could be leveraged into $1.3 billion
in assets by the end of the first year in operation. The 5-year-
averaging rule, too, encouraged rapid deposit growth at S&Ls, be-
61. See Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (Mar. 27, 1981).
62. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.
63. See id. § 801, 96 Stat. at 1545-46.
64. See Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698 (Sept. 9, 1983) (codified
as amended at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34).
65. See Reagan, supra note 54.
66. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S
AND EARLY 1990s, at 169 (1997).
67. See Times Topics: Keating Five, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/keating_five/index.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2013); see also Tom Fitzpatrick, McCain: The Most Reprehensible of the Keating
Five, PHOENIX NEWTIMES NEWS, Nov. 29, 1989, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/1989-11-
29/news/mccain-the-most-reprehensible-of-the-keating-five/.
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cause the net worth requirement was based not on the institution's
existing deposits but on the average of the previous five years.68
One way to alleviate the banking conundrum of having assets long
and liabilities short would be to enable banks to get the long assets, such
as thirty-year mortgages, off their books by selling them, thus converting
them to cash and enabling further lending. But, if the mortgage can be
sold without recourse (i.e., without any liability on the seller in the event
of default by the borrower), there is the problem of moral hazard because
the lender, not having the risk of loss, could be indifferent to the credit-
worthiness of the borrower. This is what happened in the 2000s.
The Government National Mortgage Association, a federal agen-
cy,6 9 first securitized mortgages. It would buy mortgages, combine them
in pools, and then sell securities backed by the pools. These were pristine
mortgage-backed securities in that the securities that were issued each
had an undivided interest in the pool of mortgages. Tranching the pools
and creating priorities of payment was yet to come.70
The investment banks wanted to get into the securitization game but
were stymied by state regulations and concerns about the taxation of
these securitized instruments. However, the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 198471 and the Tax Reform Act of 198672 eliminat-
ed these concerns, and the investment banks became players, eventually
the most significant players, in securitizing mortgages.
This period also reflected a blurring of the lines between investment
banking and commercial banking. Commercial banks sought to under-
write securities, and investment banks sought to emulate savings and
checking accounts. The investment banks accomplished the latter by
creating cash management accounts that provided customers with check-
writing privileges against their accounts with the investment bank, thus
competing directly with the savings and commercial banks. Investment
banks also competed indirectly with savings and loan associations and
commercial banks by funding the non-bank lenders or mortgage bankers.
Because these "non-banks" received funds from commercial lenders ra-
ther than from depositors, they escaped the regulation to which the com-
mercial banks and S&Ls were subject. On the other hand, commercial
banks, as a first step, sold commercial paper for their corporate clients.
After litigation73 ultimately upheld this practice, the Federal Reserve (the
68. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 66, at 173 (footnotes omitted).
69. Act of August 1, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 536 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1717 (2006)).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
71. Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
72. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 671, 100 Stat. 2085, 2309-18 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 860A-G
(2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
73. See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Govemors, 468 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1984); Sec. Indus.
Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Simon Kwan, Cracking the
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Fed), in a series of rulings, undercut the Glass-Steagall prohibition on
underwriting by commercial banks.74
The Fed, under Alan Greenspan from 1987 to 2006, eschewed regu-
lation, and when the Fed expanded the percentage of revenue that banks
could earn from the securities operation of their subsidiaries from 10% to
25%, the demise of Glass-Steagall was well underway. Ultimately, Pres-
ident Bill Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which
enabled financial holding companies to engage in financial and ancillary
activities, including banking, insurance, and securities.75 Glass-Steagall
was no more.76
In the Clinton Administration, financial deregulation became the
norm. Deregulation was also the norm for the Fed during the years that it
was led by Alan Greenspan. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 basically
eliminated restrictions on interstate banking.77 On the other hand, also in
1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act,
which amended the Truth in Lending Act to provide that credit should
not be extended "without regard to the consumers' repayment ability,
including the consumers' current and expected income, current obliga-
tions, and employment."7 8 In other words, predatory lending was prohib-
ited. However, in 1998, the.Federal Reserve Board decided not to "con-
duct consumer compliance examinations of, nor to investigate consumer
complaints regarding, nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies."79 Had the Fed enforced the provision of the Truth in Lending Act
that credit not be extended to those who did not have the ability to repay,
we would not have had the plethora of "liars' loans" that, in part, led to
the financial crisis.
The most foolhardy example of a deregulatory mindset occurred
with respect to derivatives. Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), foresaw the risks that these in-
struments posed to the economy and sought to regulate them. However,
the Clinton Administration, led by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and
Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers joined with Alan Greenspan
Glass-Steagall Barriers, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. ECON. LETTER 97-08 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F.,
S.F., Cal.), Mar. 21, 1997, available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el97-08.html.
74. CHARLES R. GEISST, UNDUE INFLUENCE: HOW THE WALL STREET ELITE PUT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AT RISK 223, 245, 249 (2005); Kwan, supra note 73.
75. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1342 (1999).
76. Interestingly, the drive for the repeal of Glass-Steagall was the acquisition by Citicorp of
Travelers Insurance because Glass-Steagall would have required the new Citigroup to be broken up.
Paradoxically, Citigroup eventually spun off Travelers's insurance business.
77. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, § 101, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339 (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
78. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 152(d), 108
Stat. 2160, 2190-91, 2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h)).
79. See Binyamin Appelbaum, As Subprime Lending Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn't
Bother Barking, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at Al.
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to derail her proposal.o Ms. Born's proposals were not that onerous:
basically, she wanted more transparency and a requirement of reserves to
cushion losses.
Consider American International Group (AIG), a multinational in-
surance company. The "quants" 8 who developed credit default swaps
(CDSs) 82 believed there was a 99% probability that AIG would never
need to pay out on them.83 Consequently, AIG maintained no loss re-
serves for these instruments. Accordingly, when the subprime mortgage
market collapsed, AIG did not have the funds to honor its credit guaran-
tees, and the federal government was stuck with a $135 billion bailout of
AIG. But the people who were sold CDSs were rewarded handsomely
with millions in commissions and other compensation.
Unfortunately, Larry Summers argued that Born's proposals would
lead to a financial crisis. Greenspan, Rubin, and Arthur Levitt, then
Chairman of the SEC, convinced Congress to bar Ms. Born's attempt to
regulate derivatives. The following year, Senator Phil Gramm attached a
rider to an 11,000-page appropriations bill to limit CFTC authority to
regulate derivatives, which passed with no discussion on this issue.84
History has proven Born was correct, and it was the deregulatory
mindset of Rubin, Summers, and Greenspan that led to a financial crisis.
Thus, profit was privatized and risk was socialized.
3. The Continuing Pattern of Deregulation into the 2000s
In 2000, Edward Gramlich, a former Federal Reserve Board mem-
ber, suggested to Chairman Greenspan that the Fed examine consumer
finance lenders that were units of federally regulated bank holding com-
panies. Greenspan opposed this action because it might undermine the
availability of subprime lending.85 This deregulatory attitude persisted
during the 2000s. According to Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning
economist, at a 2003 press conference, "[r]epresentatives of four of the
five government agencies responsible for financial supervision used tree
shears to attack a stack of paper representing bank regulations. The fifth
representative, James Gilleran of the Office of Thrift Supervision, wield-
80. Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2008, at Al.
81. In the financial industry, persons who do quantitative analysis are frequently called
"quants." See Scorr PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES
CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 3 (2010).
82. For a discussion of CDSs, see infra text accompanying notes 146-55.
83. Brady Dennis & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Crack in the System, WASH. POST, Dec. 30,
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/29/AR2008122902670.html.
84. See Goodman, supra note 80.
85. Greg Ip, Did Greenspan Add to Subprime Woes?, WALL ST. J., Jun. 9,2007, at BI.
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ed a chainsaw."86 This interesting visual was emblematic of the attitude
of the Fed and the Bush Administration toward regulation.
In 2001, the OCC, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision issued a joint release that authorized the use of "credit
ratings from the rating agencies to measure relative exposure to credit
risk and determine the associated risk-based capital requirement."8  For
example, if a security were rated AAA, a factor of 20% would be applied
to the asset securitization in determining the amount of capital the bank
would need to hold. In effect, the determination of risk assessment was
transferred from the governmental regulators to the credit-rating agen-
cies, which were beholden to the financial industry. As a result, the fi-
nancial firms had securities that were rated AAA, against which they
held minimal capital but which turned out to be junk.8
Building upon this deregulatory mindset, the SEC, in 2004, modi-
fied the net capital rules for brokers to enable five major firms to nearly
double their leverage.89 According to Lee Pickard, a former SEC regula-
tor who participated in formulating the old rule:
The SEC's basic net capital rule, one of the prominent successes in
federal financial regulatory oversight, had an excellent track record in
preserving the securities markets' financial integrity and protecting
customer assets. There have been very few liquidations of broker-
dealers and virtually no customer or interdealer losses due to broker-
dealer insolvency during the past 33 years.
Under an alternative approach adopted by the SEC in 2004, bro-
ker-dealers with, in practice, at least $5 billion of capital (such as
Bear Steams) were permitted to avoid the haircuts on securities posi-
tions and the limitations on indebtedness contained in the basic net
capital rule. Instead, the alternative net capital program relies heavily
86. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Blindly into the Bubble, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2007, at A37.
87. Risk-based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance:
Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitiza-
tions, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,625 (Nov. 29, 2001) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208,
225, 325, and 567).
88. One study found that the value of AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities (as measured by
the corresponding credit-default-swaps prices) had fallen by 70% between January 2007 and De-
cember 2008. See Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Credit Ratings Failures: Causes and Policy Op-
tions I (Columbia Univ. Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in Am., Working Paper, 2009),
available at
http://www.italianacademy.columbia.edulpublications/working papers/20082009/pagano-volpin s
eminar_ IA.pdf. According to another report, by August 2008, Moody's had downgraded 90% of all
asset-backed CDO investments issued in 2006 and 2007, and Standard & Poor's had downgraded
84% of the CDO tranches it rated. See Cormick Grimshaw, Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings
Let Loose Subprime Scourge, MARKET PIPELINE (Sept. 25, 2008, 7:58 PM),
http://marketpipeline.blogspot.com/2008/09/bringing-down-wall-street-as-ratings 25.html. Moreo-
ver, they had downgraded 85% and 76%, respectively, of the AAA securities they had rated. Id.
89. See Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of Broker-Dealers, N.Y.
SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, at Bus. 1; see also Lee A. Pickard, Op-Ed., SEC's Old Capital Approach Was
Tried-and True, AM. BANKER, Aug. 8, 2008, at Viewpoints 10.
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on a risk management control system, mathematical models to price
positions, value-at-risk models, and close SEC oversight.90
The SEC's staff was supposed to monitor the risk assessment activities
of the brokers but never adequately supervised the program.9 1
When a firm's leverage ratio is in the mid-thirties, a 3% drop in the
value of assets could impair its capital.92 The relationship between the
leverage ratio and drop in the value of the assets necessary to wipe out a
bank's capital is illustrated by Figure 3 below:
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Source: Ezra Klein, Explaining Financial Regulation: Leverage and Capital Requirements,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2010/04/explainingfinancial regulatio.html.
Once again, federal regulators were relying upon the regulated to moni-
tor themselves, with disastrous consequences, as Bear Steams and Leh-
man Brothers demonstrated. Both firms had leverage ratios of over thir-
ty-to-one at the time of their collapse.
Whereas federal regulators were oblivious to the problem of sub-
prime lending, state regulators were more vigilant. In 1999, North Caro-
90. Pickard, supra note 89.
91. See FIN. CRISIs INQUIRY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 153-54 (2011).
92. See Ezra Klein, Explaining Financial Regulation: Leverage and Capital Requirements,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2010/04/explainingfinancial regulatio.html.
522 [Vol. 90:2
THE BIG BANKS AND "TOO BIG TO FAIL"
lina passed a predatory lending law9 3 and, in 2002, Georgia did the
same. 94 The OCC, in its ruling preempting Georgia law, summarized the
Georgia law as follows:
"High-cost home loans" were subject to the restrictions on "home
loans" [prohibitions on the financing of credit insurance, debt cancel-
lation or suspension coverage, and limitations on late fees and payoff
statement fees] and "covered home loans," [restrictions on the num-
ber of times a loan could be refinanced and the circumstances in
which a refinancing could occur] as well as numerous disclosure re-
quirements and restrictions on the terms of credit and loan-related
fees. Creditors were required to disclose to borrowers that the loan is
high-cost, and borrowers were required to be provided with certain
loan counseling before the creditor could make the loan. In addition,
the [Georgia Fair Lending Act] prohibited certain pre-payment penal-
ties; balloon payments; negative amortization; increases in interest
rates after default; advance payments from loan proceeds; fees to
modify, renew, extend, amend, or defer a payment; and accelerating
payments at the creditor's or servicer's sole discretion. 95
The practices that the states sought to outlaw, but that the OCC permit-
ted, were the ones that led to the toxic mortgages, which in turn led to the
real estate bubble bursting.
In preempting the state regulation, the OCC first exempted the na-
tional banks from Georgia's lending restrictions; previously, the Office
of Thrift Supervision had concluded that federal law preempted both the
Georgia law and a New Jersey statute. Later, in 2003, the OCC also
preempted the New Jersey law and, the following year, generally ex-
empted national banks from any state mortgage regulations.97
The attempted state regulation would have reined in some of the
predatory lending practices that led to the financial meltdown. The feder-
al regulators not only shut down state regulatory enforcement but also
failed to exercise the supervisory power they possessed.98 For example,
consider the following material-loss assessment with respect to Flagship
National Bank:
OCC performed timely examinations of Flagship in accordance with
examination guidelines but did not report or take actions to address
the bank's [commercial real estate] concentrations or its inadequate
credit risk management, liberal underwriting, and poor credit admin-
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2 (2012).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6 (2012).
95. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264,46,267 (Aug. 5, 2003).
96. News Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Says New Jersey Law Does Not Apply
to Federal Thrifts (July 23, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/ files/77322.html.
97. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904,
1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
98. See Eric Dash, Pathology of a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at Bl.
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istration until the 2008 examination. These conditions had existed be-
fore-from 2005 through 2007-but OCC did not address them dur-
ing the earlier examinations.99
Not everybody in the 2000s was oblivious to the impact of deregu-
lation and the complexity of our banking system. Alan Greenspan was
honored at an annual gathering of high-powered economists in Septem-
ber 2005 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Raghuram Rajan, a graduate busi-
ness school professor at the University of Chicago, delivered a working
paper entitled Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? He
was concerned about the managerial incentives to take undue risk and
stated that "the kinds of risks that can most easily be concealed, given the
requirement of periodic reporting, are risks that generate severe adverse
consequences with small probability but, in return, offer generous com-
pensation the rest of the time."'00 Those few words describe the moral
hazard among banking executives that led to the economic meltdown we
experienced. He identified credit default swaps as instruments with high
profitability but little apparent risk. This was the AIG problem. He also
identified the risk posed by financial institutions that retain some of the
toxic securities they produced: when the securities started to fail, banks
would not deal with each other. Again, he was prescient: consider the
discussion of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in Part III.1o1
What was the reaction to his paper? He was scorned. 0 2 But as the
following Parts demonstrate, deregulation and financial innovation
brought us to the edge of economic collapse.
III. THE FINANCIAL CRISIs: CAUSES AND AFTERMATH
I have chronicled the causes of the financial crisis in an earlier arti-
cle.10 3 Basically, worldwide assets available for investment doubled be-
tween 2001 and 2006.104 However, interest rates were historically low,
reflecting Chairman Greenspan's desire to keep the economy growing.
The Bush tax cuts were supposed to spur the economy, but growth, par-
ticularly as measured by jobs, was anemic. Because of the Fed's policies,
U.S. bonds were paying only 1% to 4 %, depending upon the issuance
date and maturity. 0 5 The low interest rates motivated investors to find
99. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: MATERIAL LOSS
REvIEW OF FLAGSHIP NATIONAL BANK 5 (2011).
100. Raghuram Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? 3 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11728, 2005).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
102. Justin Lahart, Mr. Rajan Was Unpopular (But Prescient) at Greenspan Party, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 2, 2009, at A7.
103. See Murdock, supra note 9, at 1244.
104. See INT'L FIN. SERV. LONDON, FUND MANAGEMENT REPORT 7 (2008).
105. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 728
tbl.1 158 (2009).
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other investments that were supposedly safe but carried a higher return
than government bonds.
Prior to 2000, real estate had been a relatively safe investment. Re-
lying on the old data, rating agencies began to issue AAA ratings to a
variety of mortgage-backed securities. Unfortunately, the mortgage mar-
ket of 2003-2007 bore little relation to the pre-2000 market. The number
of subprime loans jumped from 456,631 in 2000 to 2,284,420 in 2005.1o6
Similarly, Alt-A loans increased from 78,183 in 2000 to 1,447,782 in
2005.107 Subprime loans were among the financial innovations that
Chairman Greenspan extolled. Other products, such as pick-a-pay loans,
came into the market. A pick-a-pay loan permitted a borrower to choose
the amount of the mortgage payment, which could be even less than the
accruing interest, thereby creating a negative amortization situation.
ARMs supplanted the traditional thirty-year fixed-payment mortgage.
When they reset to a higher interest rate, the buyer often could not make
the higher monthly payment. And "no doc," or liars' loans, became prev-
alent. Mortgage lenders stopped verifying the borrower's financial in-
formation. As one lender stated: "Whatever they wanted to state for their
income. The bank accepted that at face value and made the loan based on
that income."
0 8
Loans were churned out, not underwritten. The Financial Crisis In-
quiry Commission reported: "Several of these factories were originating,
packaging, securitizing and selling at the rate of $1 billion a day. The
quality control process failed at a variety of stages during the manufac-
turing, distribution and on-going servicing."109 Profits for mortgage lend-
ers and investment bankers increased dramatically, as did CEO compen-
sation, sales and finder commissions, and bonuses. Rating agencies sold
their AAA ratings to the investment bankers, who compensated the rat-
ing agencies handsomely for their ratings. Volume, not quality, was the
touchstone. Everybody was making money hand over fist. Financial pro-
fessionals apparently expected the joyride to go on forever.
But then came the mortgage defaults. Although some commentators
have blamed the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
for the crisis, the private-label securities produced by Wall Street de-
faulted at twice the rate as those of Fannie Mae. See Figure 4 below for
106. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R, CHARACTERISTICS AND
PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 24 (2009). Subprime loans are those made to a borrower
with a low credit score at an interest rate above that generally provided to borrowers using traditional
mortgages. Alt-A loans are those made without traditional documentation.
107. Id.
108. See 60 Minutes: House of Cards; The Mortgage Mess (CBS television broadcast January
27, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videolwatch/?id=3756665n.
109. See Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Conm'n, II Ith Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of
Keith Johnson, Former Pres., Clayton Holdings, Inc. & Wash. Mut.'s Long Beach Mortg.)
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the comparative data for 2005 through 2007.0 In the ensuing three
years, the default rates nearly tripled:"'
Figure 4. Cumulative Default Rates for Fannie Mae Alt-A and Private
Label Alt-A for 2005, 2006, and 2007 Cohorts
' ' 4 4 . 0 -t 6' 11 4 16 4 4 4 41 0' ih i
Source: FANNIE MAE, 2008 CREDIT SUPPLEMENT 12 (2009).
As the default rates increased, down came the price of mortgage-backed
securities and, as a consequence, down came Bear Steams in March
2008.112 The bailout of Bear Stearns seemed to settle the situation tempo-
rarily, but then came Lehman Brothers.1 3 Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson decided not to rescue Lehman Brothers; it went bankrupt, and
the Primary Reserve Fund "broke the buck." 1 4 A worldwide economic
meltdown was in the offing.115
110. FANNIE MAE, 2008 CREDIT SUPPLEMENT 12 (2009).
111. FANNIE MAE, 2011 FIRST QUARTER CREDIT SUPPLEMENT 13 (2011).
112. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS passim (2009) (chronicling in great detail the
ten days in March that led to the collapse of Bear Steams).
1 13. Big Banks Fail, Signaling More Economic Troubles Ahead, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 16,
2008), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/us/july-dec08/banks 9-16.pdf.
114. Diana B. Henriques, Buck Broken, but Timing May Affect Reductions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2008, at B4. "Breaking the buck" means that the value of a share in the mutual fund fell below
one dollar. Money is invested or borrowed in a money-market system on a short-term basis, some-
times overnight. The return from a money market investment is not as much as from a long-term
investment; consequently, investors do not expect to lose any money. Money-market funds were
regarded as totally safe. Companies park their money in them overnight and rely upon them as a
source of credit when they need short-term funds. All companies oscillate between having cash on
hand and needing to borrow cash on a particular day. Thus, when the Lehman Brothers debt was
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Congress responded in October 2008 with a $700 billion bailout,"l6
and the Fed made trillions of dollars of credit available to the banks.117
The government bailed out the banks but essentially asked for nothing in
return. The banks later rewarded the federal largess by aggressively re-
sisting the Dodd-Frank reform legislation." 8 The bailout avoided the
specter of another Great Depression, but the economy was in shambles.
The new Obama Administration responded in February 2009 with an
inadequate stimulus package," 9 which turned out to be a palliative rather
than a cure.120
President Obama also sought to provide some relief for beleaguered
homeowners to help them avoid foreclosure.121 This program turned out
to be a failure because banks had no incentive to accept a modest fee for
modifying mortgages when such modification would impact their assets
and their earnings. 2 2 At the time, probably most banks were "legally"
insolvent-assets were less than liabilities-but we will never know for
certain because an accounting change saved them from revaluing their
assets to the then current market value.123 The Fed saved the banks from
being "equitably" insolvent-not being able to pay their debts as they
written down, first to $0.80 on the dollar and then to zero, it created a panic as investors rushed to
get their money out of money-market funds.
115. Treasury Secretary Paulson responded to the crisis by calling congressional leaders to-
gether and informing them that "[u]nless you act, the financial system of this country and the world
will melt down in a matter of days." Frontline: Inside the Meltdown (PBS television broadcast Feb.
17, 2009).
116. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 115, 122
Stat. 3765, 3780.
117. See Pittman & Ivry, supra note 7.
118. Times Topics: Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit crisis/financial regulatory_r
efonn/index.html (last updated Sept. 20,2011).
119. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.




120. See Shaila Dewan, Zero Job Growth Latest Bleak Sign for U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2011, at Al.
121. See Phyllis Caldwell, Making Home Affordable Campaign to Help America's Homeown-
ers, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 1, 2009, 5:48 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/01/making-home-affordable-campaign-help-america-s-
homeowners; see also Tami Luhby, Obama Expands Mortgage Modification Effort, CNNMONEY
(Mar. 26, 2010, 3:44 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/26/news/economy/Obama-mortgage relief!.
122. See Neil M. Barofsky, Op-Ed., Where the Bailout Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2011, at A27 (discussing the program's failure and noting that Barofsky was the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) Inspector General until March 2011); see also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 64, 67 (2011) (showing TARP's limited success, with less than 20% of estimated home-
owners to be affected obtaining relief).
123. See DETERMINING FAIR VALUE WHEN THE VOLUME AND LEVEL OF ACTIVITY FOR THE
ASSET OR LIABILITY HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED AND IDENTIFYING TRANSACTIONS THAT
ARE NOT ORDERLY, Staff Position No. FAS 157-4 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009) (affording
financial institutions significant leeway in "determining fair value when the volume and level of
activity for the asset or liability have significantly decreased").
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came due-by creating profits for banks by lending them funds, in some
cases at almost a zero interest rate.12 4
As the foreclosures exploded, 125 it became apparent that the mort-
gage servicers-many of which were subsidiaries of the big banks-had
inadequate records and often had no idea where the underlying notes
resided. 126 So, in many instances, they falsified court documents when
foreclosures were initiated. Litigation ensued. 127
In 2008-2010, the much-maligned Democrat-controlled U.S. House
of Representatives (which lost control to the Republicans in 2010 due, in
part, to voter anger over Wall Street being bailed out but nothing being
done for Main Street) actually passed legislation that might have
stemmed the decline of the housing market. The Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009128 would have, in effect, enabled homeowners
to file bankruptcy but retain their homes with a modified mortgage re-
flecting the current value of the property. However, the Democrat-
controlled U.S. Senate, which unfortunately needed sixty votes to pass
legislation because of Republican filibusters, failed to pass the legisla-
tion.
By giving homeowners the option to file bankruptcy and keep their
homes with a modified mortgage, lenders would have had an incentive to
negotiate private modifications outside bankruptcy. This could have sub-
stantially reduced the rate of foreclosures. However, this approach was
opposed by many as involving moral hazard, because it could reward
those who had borrowed more than they could repay in order to buy a
home that was beyond their means.
On the other hand, when a lender forecloses, the most the lender
will realize is the current market value of the foreclosed property, and
oftentimes substantially less. The glut of foreclosures has left neighbor-
hoods with empty homes, encouraged vandalism, and triggered further
drops in property values. 129 In addition, foreclosures have increased the
124. Jesse Eisinger, How the U.S. Shelters and Subsidizes the Banking Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2011, at B7 ("When the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates to help buoy the economy
during a slowdown, banks are the first beneficiaries. As the Fed lowers short-term rates, banks
borrow cheaply and lend out for a lot more, making any new lending highly profitable . .. .").
125. Barofsky, supra note 122 (noting the estimates that foreclosures will number between
eight million and thirteen million filings before the crisis runs its course).
126. See John Carney, A Primer on The Foreclosure Crisis, CNBC.COM (Oct. 11, 2010, 2:48
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39617381/APrimerOnTheForeclosureCrisis.
127. See Margaret Cronin Fisk & Kathleen M. Howley, The Foreclosure Mess Could Last For
Years, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 6, 2010, 11:00 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/I10 42/b4199043406256.htm.
128. H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (2009). A different version of the Helping Families Save Their
Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632, was eventually passed that May.
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supply of homes in the market at a time when there are fewer buyers
because of the stagnant economy. Thus, foreclosures exacerbate the
downward pressure on housing prices, which not only depresses the
housing market but also impedes economic recovery.130
Although the Obama Administration has come up with another
mortgage modification plan, 31 and the recent settlement between the
state attorneys general and the big banks provides some relief to borrow-
ers,132 these small steps are a long way from resolving the foreclosure
problem.
Basically, this situation is what innovation has wrought. The impact
of innovation will be further explored in Part IV.
IV. FINANCIAL INNOVATION
A. Has Financial Innovation Created Value?
Alan Greenspan, while Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, was
a strong advocate for financial innovation:
Alan Greenspan has presented a free market defence of financial in-
novations based on Joseph A. Schumpeter's theory that innovations
initiate a dynamic process of "creative destruction" in a capitalistic
system....
As Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Greenspan's interpreta-
tion of the Schumpeterian role of financial innovations in the "New
Economy" has had important consequences. It had an influence on
the Fed's passive response to the emergence of a speculative bubble
in the financial markets, on the one hand, and its proactive response
to the collapse of a large hedge fund which suffered huge losses on
derivative contracts, on the other. It was reflected in Greenspan's tes-
timonies that influenced the U.S. Congress to exempt over-the-
counter financial derivatives from government regulation and to re-
130. See Robert J. Barro, Op-Ed., How to Really Save the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2011, at SR8.
131. See Don Lee, Obama Pushes Housing Plan in Weekly Address, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/04/news/la-pn-obama-weekly-address-20120204 (explaining
President Obama's new proposal to allow homeowners to refinance mortgages at lower interest
rates, even if they owe more than the house is worth); see also Kenneth R. Harney, Some Refinanc-
ing Ideas Have an Inside Track, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 2012, at E04 (describing the various portions
of President Obama's mortgage proposal and discussing the likelihood of passage for each proposal).
132. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, $26 Billion Deal Is Said to be Set for Home-
owners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at Al (explaining the settlement agreed to by government offi-
cials and five large banks); see also NAT'L MORTG. SETTLEMENT,
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (containing specific details
about the mortgage settlement, along with resources for borrowers). For a graphic depicting how the
settlement money will be used, see Help for Some Homeowners, N.Y. TliMtES, Feb. 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/02/09/business/help-for-some-homeowners.html
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peal the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking. 133
But derivatives were not the only innovation favored by Chairman
Greenspan. He was also a strong advocate of the "benefits" of subprime
lending. In 2005, when subprime lending was gearing up to sink the
economy, he stated:
Innovation has brought about a multitude of new products, such as
subprime loans and niche credit programs for immigrants. ... With
these advances in technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-
scoring models and other techniques for efficiently extending credit
to a broader spectrum of consumers... . Where once more-marginal
applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now
able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants
and to price that risk appropriately. These improvements have led to
rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending[,] ... fostering construc-
tive innovation that is both responsive to market demand and benefi-
cial to consumers.134
With a bias such as this, it is no wonder that Greenspan took no steps to
regulate the banking industry's predatory subprime loans.
But isn't innovation good? Americans generally hold innovation in
high regard. However, there are substantial differences between financial
innovation and technological innovation. Technological innovation often
starts in the lab, garage, or basement. It is tested, challenged, and scaled
up. It is generally based upon scientific principles that have been devel-
oped, tested, and replicated over time. Its development is frequently
funded by outside sources that provide another level of accountability.
This is not to say that technological innovation has not had its dark
side. Decades ago, the dangers of the DDT pesticide were brought to the
public by Rachel Carlson's Silent Spring.13 5 Today, the whole world is
aware of the risks of nuclear power from the meltdown in Japan. 1 But,
on balance, although technical innovation has produced great private
profit, it also has produced extraordinary social benefits. Health care
advances have saved millions of lives,137 agricultural developments have
enabled us to grow 200 bushels of corn per acre where formerly we
133. Charles G. Leathers & J. Patrick Raines, The Schumpeterian Role of Financial Innova-
tions in the New Economy's Business Cycle, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 667, 667-68 (2004) (citation
omitted).
134. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve System's
Fourth Annual Community Affairs Research Conference (Apr. 8, 2005) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2005/20050408/default.htm.
135. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING passim (1962) (bringing awareness to the
public and helping to facilitate the ban of the pesticide DDT in 1972).
136. See generally Floyd Norris, 2 Meltdowns with Much in Common, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2011, at BI (discussing the recent nuclear meltdown in Japan).
137. See Dan Childs & Susan Kansagra, 10 Health Advances that Changed the World, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/TenWays/storyid=3605442.
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could only grow twenty,'38 and the computer and the Internet have creat-
ed whole new industries and millions of jobs.139
To put financial innovation on the same continuum as technological
innovation is disingenuous. Financial innovation was never initiated in
the garage but by overpaid quants working for billion-dollar corpora-
tions. 140 More importantly, it has not had the testing and required replica-
tion necessary before technological innovation is opened to the market.
One of the world's most distinguished quants, Paul Wilmott, in discuss-
ing models based upon correlation and volatility, stated:
With models, you want to see where things go wrong ... .You want
to see the dirt. But HJM [the model] is actually just a big rug for
[mistakes] to be swept under... . In the end, we should all like mod-
els that wear their faults on their sleeves.
They built these things [collateralized debt obligations] on false as-
sumptions without testing them, and stuffed them full of trillions of
dollars. How could anyone have thought that was a good idea?
We need to get back to testing models rather than revering them ....
That's hard work, but this idea that there are these great principles
governing finance and that correlations can just be plucked out of the
air is totally false.141
There is no question that financial innovation has created incredible
private wealth. 142 However, any benefits are difficult to quantify. Sup-
posedly, financial innovations can match risk and return, or the timing of
cash flows. For example, the creation of structured financial products
could enable an insurance company or pension fund to better match its
liabilities-the maturities of payment obligations-with its assets by
fine-tuning the maturities and target returns of its assets.
But, insurance companies and pension funds have functioned ade-
quately with less "sophisticated"--read complicated and possibly in-
comprehensible-products in the past. Because of the complexity of
138. See MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNwoRE's DILEMMA 36-37 (2006).
139. See Michael J. Mandel, Jobs: The Lull Will Linger, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 24, 2004),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_43/b3905044_mzO 1 .htm.
140. See Matthew Philips, Revenge of the Nerd, DAILY BEAST (May 28, 2009, 8:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/05/28/revenge-of-the-nerd.html; see also
PATTERSON, supra note 81, at 3.
141. Philips, supra note 140 (second alteration in original).
142. Times Topics: Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/executive_pay/index.html (last updat-
ed Oct. 10, 2012).
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these products, 14 3 they became the province of our huge, well-capitalized
and diversified big banks, thus giving them another competitive ad-
vantage over the smaller and mid-sized banks.144 In addition, the finan-
cial incentives to selling these products led the big banks to continue to
push the envelope in terms of risk.
Let us consider financial innovation in more depth. Banks do not
create value. They are intermediaries who direct funds from investors
into productive investments. But, instead of fulfilling this function, they
created financial products and, in the process, consumed large amounts
of capital. In 1978, banks and related institutions "borrowed $13 in the
credit markets for every $100 borrowed by the real economy; by 2007,
that had grown to $51 ."45 This measures only balance sheet assets; it
does not take into account derivatives, which have grown exponentially
from the 1990s to today.146 The capital that flowed into structured finan-
cial products was capital that was not available for more productive in-
vestment.
Consider financial products. Start with 1,000 homes. Create 1,000
mortgages. Put 100 of the mortgages into an asset-backed security. Re-
peat ten times. We now have ten pools of mortgages and each pool can
be divided into units and sold to numerous investors. We have now cre-
ated ten pristine mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), each unit of which
would have the same undivided interest in each mortgage. Alternatively,
we could divide each mortgage pool into three tranches: senior, interme-
diate, and junior, creating what are known as collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs). The senior tranche would be paid before the holders of the
intermediate and junior tranches and, subject to the prior right of the sen-
ior tranche holders, the holders of the intermediate tranche would be paid
before the holders of the junior tranche. Assume, because of their relative
riskiness, securities in the senior tranche would earn 4.5%; in the inter-
mediate tranche, 6%; and the junior tranche, 7.5%. Assuming all three
tranches were entitled to one-third of the income from the mortgages and
one-third of the principal upon repayment, subject to the above prioriti-
zation, one might intuitively think that the senior tranche would be rated
AAA because of its preferred claim to income and assets, the intermedi-
ate tranche rated A, and the junior tranche rated B.
The above description reflected a cylinder analogy, with three slices
or segments, each of which is equal to the others in size. But in the real
143. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
144. See infra notes 207-09 accompanying text.
145. JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 15, at 59-60; see also FED. RESERVE, CREDIT MARKET
DEBT OUTSTANDING 64 tbl.LI (2012) (listing current data on credit market debt outstanding).
146. The volume of OTC derivative contracts was $80 trillion in 1999. The volume has grown
to $600 trillion in ten years. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REvIEw A141 tbl.19
(2012), http://www.bis.org/statistics/oteder/dtl920a.pdf.
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world, this analogy fails because not all tranches have equal value. A
more accurate analogy would be that of an inverted cone.
Moreover, there would be many more tranches than three. One se-
curity I examined had fifteen tranches. Seven of the tranches had AAA
credit ratings, but these seven tranches composed 83% of the value of the
offering. The lowest three tranches were rated BBB+/BBB- but com-
prised only 3% of the offering. These lower three trenches were the
"foundation" upon which the AAA-rated securities above rested.14 7










Source: Ameriquest Mortg. Sec. Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5), at S-1, S-5
(Dec. 15, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347199/000089109205002534/e23035_424b5.txt.
But we are not yet done. In the simple illustration of three tranches,
we could take the BBB-rated tranches from three different pools, put
them in a new container (sometimes called a CDO-squared), and re-
tranche. Now, even though all the securities are rated BBB, the new sen-
ior tranche could be rated AAA and even carry a higher interest rate than
the AAA-rated security in the predecessor MBS because of the greater
interest entitlement of the new CDO (e.g., its underlying securities might
pay 7.5% interest).
147. See, e.g., Ameriquest Mortg. Sec. Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5), at S-1, S-5
(Dec. 15, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1347199/000089109205002534/e23035_424b5.txt. In this
$1,793,610,000 offering of mortgage-backed securities, five tranches totaling $1,483,410,000 were
rated AAA, and another seven tranches totaling $251,650,000 were rated A- or better. The last three
tranches, rated BBB+ to BBB-, totaled only $58,550,000. So, although there were twelve tranches
below the AAA tranches, they totaled only 17% of the offering. Id.
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But, yet, there is more. We could now write credit default insurance
against the failure of the CDOs to pay out: thus the creation of CDSs and
synthetic CDOs. We could create another pool of investor funds, which
would guarantee the payments of the CDO in exchange for a premium.
One way to bet against the housing market would be to buy protec-
tion in the form of CDSs. This is essentially what occurred in the Abacus
transaction in which the SEC sued Goldman Sachs for creating a synthet-
ic CDO without disclosing that the CDO was created at the insistence of
hedge fund manager John Paulson, who wanted to bet against the hous-
ing market. 14 8 Thus, it was in his interest to have the CDO guarantee
securities that were likely to default. Goldman Sachs permitted Paulson
to participate in the selection of securities without disclosing his adverse
interest to investors. Although Goldman earned commissions and fees up
front, it also "earned," or rather paid, a $550 million settlement. 149
Where is the value in the foregoing chain? One rationale is that it is
possible to manufacture securities with varying rates of return commen-
surate with different levels of risk. But at what cost? These banking in-
novations have brought the world economy, not just that of the United
States, to the brink of collapse. What has also been demonstrated by the
financial meltdown is that financial managers greatly overestimated their
ability to measure and control risk.
Recently, JPMorgan Chase, which came through the 2008 financial
meltdown relatively unscathed and thus was lauded for its risk manage-
ment, unexpectedly announced that its chief investment office had lost
$2 billion in trading, then reported a $4.4 billion loss, and finally revised
its own estimate to almost $6 billion, with speculation that it could go as
high as $9 billion. 50Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan
Chase, first dismissed the problem as a "tempest in a teapot" but, as the
scope of the loss became public, he acknowledged that it was an "egre-
gious mistake."15' However, hewing to his deregulatory mindset, he ar-
148. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
149. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
123.htm.
150. See Stephen Gandel, JPMorgan's Trading Debacle: Why $2 Billion Is Just the Start,
CNNMONEY (May 13, 2012), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/ll/jpmorgan-2-billion-just-
start/; Dawn Kopecki and Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan's $4.4 Billion CIO Loss Drives Profit Down
9%, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-13/jpmorgan-s-4-4-
billion-cio-loss-drives-profit-down-9-percent.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig,
JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 28, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/jpmorgan-trading-loss-may-reach-9-billion/.
151. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, JPMorgan Discloses $2 Billion in Trading
Losses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 10, 2012, 10:11 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/1 0/jpmorgan-discloses-significant-losses-in-trading-
group/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit th 20120511. One of the persons who was largely responsi-
ble for the trading losses was Bruno Iksil, who was known as the "London whale," and the debacle is
sometimes referred to as the London whale trading loss. See id. The scope of this egregious mistake
is now detailed in a 307-page study by a congressional committee. U.S. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND
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gued that "[j]ust because we're stupid doesn't mean everybody else
was.. .. There were huge moves in the marketplace but we made these
positions more complex and they were badly monitored." 52
The problem appears to have occurred when J.P. Morgan re-hedged
the original hedge, and it was this re-hedging that was acknowledged to
be "flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, poorly executed, and poorly
managed."' 5 3 The transactions now look more like trading than hedging
because the Senate investigation revealed that J.P. Morgan had "failed to
identify the assets or portfolios being hedged, test the size and effective-
ness of the alleged hedging activity, or show how the [synthetic credit
portfolio] lowered rather than increased bank risk."' 54 J.P. Morgan in-
vested not just in CDSs but also in credit indices and credit index tranch-
es.' 55 A credit index is a more complicated form of credit derivative, in
which the index references a basket of selected credit instruments, typi-
cally credit default swaps or similar credit instruments.5 6
This is another example of financial innovation run amok. Mr.
Dimon acknowledged the complexity of the transactions and the inability
of J.P. Morgan to effectively assess and monitor risk. Apparently, partic-
ular risks were not hedged, but rather the bank engaged in what is some-
times euphemistically referred to as portfolio hedging. The line between
hedging, market-making, and proprietary trading is indeed a thin one in
the operations of these big banks. 5 7
There continue to be financial incentives in the big banks to take
large risks. Ina Drew, who oversaw the unit that experienced the trading
losses, earned over $31.4 million the past two years, and is eligible for
nearly $14.7 million of deferred equity awards.'5 8 Unlike what occurred
in 2008-2009, some of this compensation may be clawed back.159
SEC. & GOv'T AFFAIRS, PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE
TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES passim (2013) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/chase-
whale-trades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses.
152. See Nelson D. Schwartz, A Shock from JPMorgan Is New Fodder for Reformers, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 10, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/a-shock-
from-jpmorgan-is-new-fodder-for-reformers/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit th20120511.
153. See Matt Levine, Whale Sushi on the Menu at JP. Morgan Executive Lunchroom for Next
Few Months, DEALBREAKER.COM (May 12, 2012, 6:21 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2012/05/whale-
sushi-on-the-menu-at-jpmorgan-executive-lunchroom-for-next-few-months/.
154. SENATE REPORT, supra note 151, at 15.
155. Id. at 29-34.
156. Id.
157. See Ben Protess, After Loss, JPMorgan Regulators in Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(June 5, 2012 8:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/jpmorgan-regulators-in-spotlight-
after-firms-huge-loss/?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=editth_20120606 ("J.P. Morgan officials say the
chief investment office initially hedged the bank's broad exposure to the markets, until the positions
morphed into a proprietary bet.").
158. See Mia Lamar, JP Morgan's Drew Retires; Zames to Take CIO Post, WALL ST. J. (May
14, 2012, 1:52 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304192704577403911410998528.html; Matt
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Although the benefits from financial innovation are tenuous-
except for the compensation packages they generated-the social costs
were disastrous. The end result of these innovations was the worst finan-
cial crisis since the Great Depression. Growth in gross domestic product
(GDP) dropped to a negative 9%160 and unemployment approached
10%.161 Underemployment was even higher.162
B. Economic and Political Costs ofFinancial Innovation
We are now almost four years past the September-October 2008
meltdown, and unemployment has finally dropped to about 8%.163 Job
losses, which approximated 780,000 in January 2009, have been reversed
and the private sector has added jobs for thirty-six consecutive months,
but only at a modest level,' as reflected in Figure 6 below:
Scuffharn & David Henry, JPMorgan CIO Retires, Obama Says Proves Reform Case, REUTERS,
(May 14, 2012, 7:56 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/14/us-jpmorgan-
departures-idUSBRE84COEP20120514.
159. See Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan's Drew Forfeits 2 Years' Pay as Managers Ousted,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 13, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-
13/dimon-says-ina-drew-offered-to-return-2-years-of-compensation.
160. Jared Bernstein, The Impact of the Recovery Act, in a Few Easy Charts, ON THE ECON.
BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011, 5:23.PM), http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/the-recovery-act-worked-in-a-few-
easy-charts/.
161. Id.
162. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES 46, 51
(2011).
163. Jared Bernstein, Jobs Day . .. First Impressions (with Reflections on the Fiscal Clif), ON
THE ECON. BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:35 PM), http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/jobs-day-first-impressions-
with-reflections-on-the-fiscal-cliff/.
164. See Megan M. Barker & Adam A. Hadi, Payroll Employment in 2009: Job Losses
Continue, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2010, at 23, 23; Rich Exner, Private-sector Jobs Rise, Gov-
ernment Jobs Shrink over Last 3 Years: Sunday's Numbers, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 17, 2013, 9:03
AM), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentrallindex.ssf/2013/03/private-sector jobsrisegover.html.
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Note: Data is based on total private and government revised, seasonally adjusted monthly em-
ployment changes. January and February 2013 statistics are based on preliminary data.
Source: News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Employment Situa-
tion-February 2013 (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf; Govern-
ment: All Employees; Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.compaes.txt (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Total Private: All
Employees; Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.compaes.txt (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
The depth of the downturn and the tepidness of the recovery are far
worse than any other downturn since the Great Depression.165
165. See Bill McBride, September Employment Report: 114,000 Jobs, 7.8% Unemployment
Rate, CALCULATED RISK BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:30 AM),
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2012/1 0/september-employment-report-I 14000-jobs.html; see
also Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI (dis-
cussing a report issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce).
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Figure 7. Percentage Job Losses in Post-WWII Recessions
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Source: Bill McBride, Percent Job Losses: Great Recession and Great Depression,
CALCULATED RISK BLOG (July 7, 2012, 10:04 PM),
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2012/07/percent-job-losses-great-recession-and.html.
The costs associated with bailing out the big banks have been not
just economic but also political. Republicans have touted their 2010 vic-
tory as vindicating their policies of cutting spending and rejecting tax
increases. 166 However, an alternative reading of the 2010 election may be
that it reflected anger toward a political system that bailed out bankers
but not homeowners,167 and held no one in the banking system accounta-
ble. 16 8 Unlike the savings and loan crisis, no senior executive has gone to
jail, and compensation remains at obscene levels in the banking indus-
try.169
On the other hand, the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, the stimulus
programs following the 2008 meltdown, and decreased tax revenues
caused by the severe recession that followed have contributed to the bulk
166. Republicans Win House Majority, Make Senate Gains in Wave Election, FOXNEWS.COM
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/ll/02/poll-closing-key-east-coast-races-
balance-power-line/ (explaining that Republican candidates were "[r]iding a wave of voter frustra-
tion over the economy and federal government itself," and quoting the newly elected House Repub-
lican leader John Boehner as promising to fulfill the Republican pledge to cut government spending
and reduce the size of the federal government).
167. See Adam Nagourney, Bracingfor a Bailout Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at Al.
168. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2011, at Al.
169. Id; see also Peter Lattman, Holder Defends Efforts to Fight Financial Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, at BI (explaining that although President Obama announced his commitment
to combat financial fraud, the Justice Department has not pursued criminal cases against banking
executives involved in the 2008 global financial crisis).
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of the budget deficits that approximated $1.4 trillion in fiscal year 2009
and $1.3 trillion in fiscal year 2010.170 The increase in costs and decrease
in revenue are not sustainable. See Figure 8 below:
Figure 8. Factors Driving Budget Deficits, 2009-2019
Defidt, in trillions
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Reawery measures
Bush-era tax cuts TARP, Fannie, and Freddie
U Econorniedownturn
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Center on Budget and Poliy Pririies I cbpparg
Source: Hearing on "Spend Less, Owe Less, Grow the Economy" Before the Joint Econ. Comm'
of the U.S. Cong., 112th Cong. 90 fig. 1 (2011) (testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr.
on Budget & Policy Priorities).
Although the deficits are projected to decrease in the near term, the net
effect of the economic downturn and governmental response was that we
reached our debt limit of $14.3 trillion in August 2011.17 1 This generated
a near impasse on raising the debt ceiling, with Republicans initially re-
fusing to raise the limit unless spending was cut.17 2 As a consequence of
170. Hearing on "Spend Less, Owe Less, Grow the Economy" Before the Joint Econ. Comm.
of the U.S. Cong., 112th Cong. 90 fig.1 (2011) (testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr. on
Budget & Policy Priorities).
171. Jackie Calmes & Carl Hulse, As the Federal Government Hits Its Debt Limit, Lawmakers
Spar over Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, at Al9 (explaining that the government reached its
debt limit in May 2011, but that due to "extraordinary measures," default would not occur until
approximately August 2, 2011).
172. See NIKOLA G. SwANN, STANDARD & POOR'S, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM
RATING LOWERED TO AA+ ON POLITICAL RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE 3
(2011) (explaining the position of Standard & Poor's that "the prolonged controversy over raising
the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate that further near-term progress
containing the growth in public spending, especially on entitlements, or on reaching an agreement on
raising revenues is less likely than we previously assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful
process"); see also Damian Paletta & Matt Phillips, S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 6, 2011, at Al; ABC This Week (ABC television broadcast Apr. 25, 2010), available at
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the ensuing rancor, it is highly unlikely that substantial federal funds will
be available to alleviate continued unemployment or to stimulate
growth. 17 3
Whereas spending as a percentage of GDP has hovered around
20%-22% for the past three decades, in fiscal year 2009 it rose to
25%. 174 Similarly, revenues for the past three decades have hovered
around 18% of GDP but fell to 14.9% in fiscal year 2009.'7 Although it
has been fashionable to assert that we have a spending problem and not a
revenue problem,'76 the reality is that there is both a serious spending and
a serious revenue problem as a result of the financial crisis.
Warren Buffett's characterization of derivatives as "financial weap-
ons of mass destruction"17 7 has proved all too true. Moreover, the misal-
location of capital to risky mortgages instead of to productive investment
has devastated household net worth, 178 exacerbated household debt, and
crippled consumer spending as a vehicle out of our present malaise.179
Our economy cannot afford the mammoth "diversified" financial institu-
tions that we have permitted to conglomerate, and thereby create and
market the financial innovations that have privatized profit and social-
ized risk.
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-goolsbee-brown-corker/story?id=10469580 (fea-
turing Austan Goolsbee, member of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, and Senators
Bob Corker and Sherrod Brown).
173. President Obama signed into law the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat. 156, which extended the payroll tax reduction of two percentage
points and jobless benefits to cover between 63 and 73 weeks. See id. § 1001, 126 Stat. at 158-59.
However, additional fiscal stimulus or federal bailout money is extremely unlikely. See Annalyn
Censky & Charles Riley, What's in Obama's Stimulus Plan, CNNMONEY (Sept. 8, 2011, 9:39 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/08/news/economy/obama-stimulus plan/index.htm (explaining how
President Obama's recent proposal for $447 billion in fiscal stimulus "has almost no chance of
passing" the Republican-controlled House of Representatives).
174. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 24-25 tbl. 1.2 (2011).
175. Id.
176. David Weigel, "It's Not a Revenue Problem. It's a Spending Problem. ": Tracing the
History of a GOP Talking Point, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2011, 6:33 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2291530/ (quoting Speaker of the House John Boehner, Majority Leader
Eric Cantor, and Senator Orrin Hatch, each saying variations of the phrase "Washington does not
have a revenue problem. It's got a spending problem").
177. Paul B. Farrell, Derivatives the New 'Ticking Bomb,' WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH (Mar.
10, 2008, 7:31 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/derivatives-are-the-new-ticking-time-
bomb?print-true&dist=printTop (quoting Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman & CEO, Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., to Company Shareholders 15 (2002), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted). The use
of derivatives is alleged to have contributed to the current economic crisis in Europe because Greece
used derivatives developed by Goldman Sachs and other investment bankers to hide its shaky finan-
cial position. See Louise Story et al., Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe's Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at Al.
178. See JESSE BRICKER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BD., SURVEYING THE AFTERMATH OF THE
STORM: CHANGES IN FAMILY FINANCES FROM 2007 To 2009, at 1, 21-22 (2011).
179. Id. at 22.
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V. ARE BIG BANKS Too BIG?
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act was
supposed to end the problem of too big to fail by creating an orderly liq-
uidation authority (OLA) to provide the federal government with the
power to liquidate banks that have failed without jeopardizing the econ-
omy.80 This provision was designed to end taxpayers footing the bill
when a large institution failed. The Act specifically provides that compa-
nies put into receivership should be liquidated, that all funds expended in
the liquidation should be recovered from the assets of the company or
from the financial sector through assessments, and that no part of the
losses should be borne by the taxpayers. 8'
This sounds good. The era of privatizing profits and socializing
losses is supposedly over. However, not everyone accepts that premise.
For example, Standard & Poor's in 2011 opined, "[G]iven the im-
portance of confidence sensitivity in the effective functioning of banks,
we believe that under certain circumstances and with selected systemi-
cally important financial institutions .. ., future extraordinary govern-
ment support is still possible."' 82 The credit-rating agency also opined
that "implementation of OLA could increase uncertainty in the market at
a time when confidence needs boosting. For instance, dismantling a large
financial firm might spur creditors to pull out of other similar financial
firms in times of stress." 83 The report also noted that the history of gov-
ernmental support reflects a mindset that may not go away. This cyni-
cism was also reflected in a recent report by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas (the Dallas Fed), observing that it is difficult "to imagine political
leaders sticking to the anti-TBTF [too big to fail] guns, especially if they
face a too-many-to-fail situation again."' 84 Both reports agreed with
Chairman Greenspan that "[i]f they're too big to fail, they're too big."'85
A. How Big Is Too Big?
The above report by the Dallas Fed contrasted the change in con-
centration in the banking industry between 1970 and 2010.186 In 1970,
the five largest banks held 17% of banking assets, the next ninety-five
banks had 37% of assets, and the 12,500 smallest banks had 48% of as-
sets. By 2010, the share of the five largest banks had increased to 52%,
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
201-217, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442-1520 (2010).
181. Id. § 214, 124 Stat. at 1518.
182. RODRIGO QUINTANILLA ET AL., STANDARD & POOR'S, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SAYS
SUPPORT FOR BANKS WILL BE DIFFERENT "NEXT TIME"-BUT WILL IT? 2 (2011).
183. Id. at 3; see also supra text and accompanying notes 114-115 (discussing the effect of
Lehman Brothers's bankruptcy).
184. FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., CHOOSING THE ROAD TO PROSPERITY: WHY WE MUST
END TOO BIG TO FAIL-Now 20 (2011).
185. QUINTANILLA ET AL., supra note 182, at 10 (quoting Greenspan, supra note 1) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
186. FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., supra note 184, at 6-7.
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the share of the next ninety-five had dropped to 32%, and the share of the
5,700 smallest banks had plummeted to 16%. Thus, there was a shrink-
age in the number of banks and a tripling of the percentage of assets held
by the five largest banks. See Figure 9 below:
Figure 9. U.S. Banking Concentration Increased Dramatically
J
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Source: FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., CHOOSING THE ROAD TO PROSPERITY: WHY WE MUST END
Too BIG To FAIL-Now 6 (2011).
Another way to appreciate the growth of the big banks is compare
the growth of their assets to GDP. When Senator Sherrod Brown asserted
that the assets of the six largest banks in this country had grown from
17% of GDP fifteen years earlier to 63% of GDP, 18 7 PolitiFact compared
those numbers with data obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia (the Philadelphia Fed) and found that Senator Brown was
correct. The following is the data from the Philadelphia Fed: 1 8 8
187. 156 CONG. REC. 57, S2519 (daily ed., Apr. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Sherrod Brown);
see also ABC This Week, supra note 172.
188. Angie Drobnic Holan, Six Largest Banks Getting Bigger, Brown Said, POLITIFACT (Apr.
27, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/apr/27/sherrod-
brown/six-largest-banks-getting-bigger-brown-said/.
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Figure 10. Asset Concentration of Top Six U.S. Banks ($ in billions)
Assets as Assets as
of Dec. 31, of Dec. 31,
1994 2009
Citicorp $250.5 Bank of America $2,224.5
BankAmerica 215.5 JPMorgan Chase 2,032.0
Chemical Bank 171.4 Citigroup 1,856.6
Nationsbank 169.6 Wells Fargo 1,243.6
J.P. Morgan 154.9 Goldman Sachs 849.3
Chase Manhattan 114.0 Morgan Stanley 771.5
Top 6 Banks Total $1,075.9 Top 6 Banks Total $8,977.5
% of GDP 14.8% % of GDP 62.1%
Nominal GDP $7,248.2 Nominal GDP $14,453.8
Source: Angie Drobnic Holan, Six Largest Banks Getting Bigger, Brown Said, POLrrIFACT
(Apr. 27, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2010/apr/27/sherrod-brown/six-largest-banks-getting-bigger-brown-said/.
The June 30, 2011 listing of "large commercial banks" by the Fed-
eral Reserve reports the consolidated assets of JPMorgan Chase at $1.79
trillion, Bank of America at $1.45 trillion, Citibank at $1.22 trillion, and
Wells Fargo at $1.1 trillion.189 Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were
not listed in this group, apparently because they are investment banks
that only elected bank-holding-company status to access federal funds. 190
But U.S. Bank, the fifth-largest bank listed, has only $310 billion in con-
solidated assets, and there are only two other banks that have over $200
billion in assets. Clearly, the big banks dwarf the rest of the banking sys-
tem.
How did the big banks get so big? Other than Goldman Sachs, this
occurred by acquisition after acquisition, some of which were encour-
aged by the government during the financial crisis. The "Appendix" trac-
es the acquisition activity that led to this consolidation and indicates the
relative size of the combining financial entities in comparison to the
GDP of the United States. Most of the present big banks started at 1% to
2% of GDP but, through multiple acquisitions, now have reached 10% or
more of GDP.
189. FED. RESERVE, INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT HAVE
CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE, RANKED BY CONSOLIDATED ASSETS AS OF
JUNE 30, 2011, at 1 (2011).
190. Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan to Become Holding Companies, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2008), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2008-09-
21/news/30726602_lgoldman-and-morgan-morgan-stanley-Iloyd-blankfein.
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B. What Are the Consequences, or Lack Thereof of "Too Big to Fail"?
The big banks, by financing the non-bank lenders that created the
toxic mortgages that the big banks securitized into toxic securities, were
largely responsible for the financial crisis.1 9' And it was these big banks
that absorbed most of the initial bailout money and took advantage of
much of the minimal-interest money that the Fed made available.1 9 2 Un-
fortunately, these big banks, instead of lending to the small- and mid-
sized firms that are the engine of job creation,19 3 have diverted funds to
trading. The losses in the J.P. Morgan-London whale episode, in which
J.P. Morgan lost billions of dollars from trading activity,' 94 occurred in
the chief investment office. This office supposedly engaged in hedging
and cash management, operations which should not be profit centers.
Instead, J.P. Morgan turned it into a profit center by using depositors'
funds for trading rather than for lending.'95
But unlike the auto bailout, and the failure of smaller banks, there
were no consequences for the big banks and their management. As a
condition of receiving federal money, General Motors was required to
change its business plan, close some plants, renegotiate compensation
with employees, and replace its CEO.19 6 When smaller banks fail, the
FDIC imposes a conservatorship, and generally, their assets are sold to
another bank. Management is replaced, and shareholders lose their in-
vestment. On the other hand, although we have bailed out the big banks,
their management, which oversaw the actions that led to the crisis, is still
in place, and the traders who earned bonuses trading complex financial
products that helped sink the economy have kept their bonuses and have
continued to be rewarded handsomely.' 9 7 Shareholders have suffered
market-price losses, but have not been wiped out. Conversely, creditors
of financial institutions generally have not suffered, thus rewarding their
lack of due diligence in monitoring their loans. As long as government
191. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., supra note 184, at I ("[The big banks] were a primary
culprit in magnifying the financial crisis, and their presence continues to play an important role in
prolonging our economic malaise."); see also Murdock, supra note 9, at 1324.
192. Bradley Keoun et al., The Fed's Secret Liquidity Lifelines, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/data-visualization/federal-reserve-emergency-lending (last visited Jan.
6,2013).
193. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Mr. Banker, Can You Spare a Dime?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2011, at A21; see also 156 CONG. REC. 57, S2519-S2528 (daily ed., Apr. 21, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Sherrod Brown).
194. See supra 150-58 and accompanying text.
195. See JPMORGAN CHASE & Co., FINANCIAL RESULTS: 2Q12, at 14 (2012) (showing that
there were deposits of $1.116 trillion and loans of $693 billion, and that the chief investment office
made a total profit of almost $8 billion in 2009 and 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000248/jpmc2q12exhibit992.htm.
196. See Chris Isidore, GM Bankruptcy: End ofan Era, CNNMONEY (June 2, 2009, 4:03 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/01/news/companies/gm bankruptcy/.
197. See Stephen Gandel, How Washington's Bailout Will Boost Wall Street Bonuses, TIME
(Oct. 27,2008), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1853846,00.html.
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will bail out the banks, stakeholders can adopt a "what, me worry"-type
approach.
Two Nobel Prize-winning economists have argued that we should
have employed a conservatorship model to the big banks, rather than a
bailout model. 19 8 To President Obama's assertion that government own-
ership is not the American way, Professor Joseph Stiglitz responded:
But he was wrong: conservatorship, including the possibility of tem-
porary government ownership when all else failed, was the traditional
approach; the massive government gifts to banks were what was un-
precedented. Since even the banks that were taken over by the gov-
ernment were always eventually sold, some suggested that the pro-
cess be called preprivatization.199
Supporting Professor Stiglitz's argument, the FDIC lists almost 400
banks that have been placed in conservatorship or sold since September
2008.200
Although we tend to view the economic experience of other coun-
tries with disdain, the experience of Sweden could have been helpful. In
1991, Sweden did not let its banks slowly write off bad assets in the hope
that earnings, over time, would return them to solvency, which is basical-
ly what we have done. Rather, Sweden forced the banks to recognize
their losses and nationalized one-fifth of the banking system, which we
have done in the past with insolvent banks that were not too big to fail.201
As a result, the Swedish economy turned around in two years; 202 on the
other hand, our economy is still struggling.
In the current European crisis, Iceland essentially followed the
Swedish model, and Ireland rejected it. Iceland was an extreme example
of a banking system dwarfing the economy. Between 2002 and 2008, the
Icelandic banking system had grown to the point where its assets were
eleven times GDP. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy triggered the col-
lapse of Iceland's shaky banking system, and the Icelandic government
responded by seizing the banks, leaving the toxic assets with the old
banks, and setting up new ones with clean balance sheets, guaranteeing
only domestic deposits.203
198. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., All the President's Zombies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2009, 3:26
PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/all-the-presidents-zombies/.
199. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 116-17 (2010) (footnote omitted).
200. See Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
201. See id
202. See YALMAN ONARAN, ZOMBIE BANKS: How BROKEN BANKS AND DEBTOR NATIONS.
ARE CRIPPLING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 137-38 (2012).
203. Id. at 68.
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On the other hand, Ireland, fearing a capital flight, guaranteed the
obligations of its banks, whose assets represented twice Ireland's GDP.
As a result, the sovereign debt of Ireland increased to the point where
Ireland's solvency became questionable, and interest rates on the Irish
debt shot up. The European Central Bank opposed any losses on the sen-
ior debt. Consequently, the German banks and others who extended cred-
it to the Irish banks were bailed out by the Irish taxpayers, while the Irish
people bore the brunt of an austerity program that has kept the country in
-204recession.
C. Why the Big Banks Should Be Broken Up
There is an incredible difference in size between the big banks and
the remainder of the banking system,2 05 which creates both political and
economic concerns arising from the power that untoward size provides.
The political implications have been evidenced by the lobbying efforts of
the big banks to undercut the provisions of the Dodd-Frank legislation.
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the financial services
industry has spent over $570 million on lobbying during the 2011-2012
election cycle.20 6 From an economic perspective, in 2009 the Center for
Economic and Policy Research estimated that the taxpayer subsidy for
large banks was about 60 basis points, or $34 billion a year, because of
the borrowing benefit that too big to fail gave these large banks.207 This,
in turn, gave them a substantial advantage over smaller banks. However,
a more recent 2012 study estimated that that the current lowered funding
costs for the big banks was now 80 basis points,208 and the editors of
Bloomberg News estimated that this provided the largest banks a $76
billion subsidy a year, which was roughly equivalent to the banks' total
profits over the four quarters prior to June 2012.209
In addition, Professor Rajan, in his working paper on financial in-
novation and riskiness that was scorned in 2005, pointed out some of the
anticompetitive aspects big banks enjoy because of their disparity in size:
204. Id. at 51-52.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 186-90.
206. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Interest Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/index.php (last updated Nov. 12, 2012).
207. See DEAN BAKER & TRAVIS MACARTHUR, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE
VALUE OF THE "TOO BIG TO FAIL" BIG BANK SUBSIDY 2 (2009). After the Continental Bank bailout
in 1984, the too big to fail syndrome created an implicit guarantee for large banks. But, after the
financial bailout in 2008, Sheila Bair, the head of the FDIC, stated that the guarantee, which had
been implicit, was now explicit and was giving large banks a competitive advantage. Paul Wiseman
& Pallavi Gogoi, Pressure Piles Up on Small Banks, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2009, at IB.
208. See Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 4, 12 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
12/128, 2012).
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As deregulation has increased competition for the best borrowers,
and shaved margins from offering "plain-vanilla" products to these
customers, large banks have reached out to nontraditional customers,
or to traditional customers with innovative products. 210
Because creation of these innovative products requires both large
amounts of capital and a high-priced staff of quants, it is only the big
banks that can offer such products. Thus, in addition to the too big to fail
borrowing subsidy, big banks are afforded another competitive ad-
vantage over other banks.
Professor Rajan also posited that executives are motivated to engage
in risky transactions that produce high returns with an apparently low
likelihood of risk even though the risk might be catastrophic. He refers to
this as the "Hidden Tail Risk."211 Consider Goldman Sachs's underwrit-
ing of the Abacus 2007-AC synthetic CDO, utilizing CDSs, which has
been previously discussed. Underwriting CDOs and CDSs has been high-
ly profitable. But after it was disclosed that the person who approached
Goldman about creating the synthetic CDO by writing CDSs against
pools of mortgages was an investor who wanted to bet against the real
estate market, a fact that was not disclosed to investors, Goldman agreed
to a $550 million settlement with the SEC,2 12 and faced the risk of suits
by investors. Moreover, the foregoing does not measure the cumulative
impact upon the economy as a whole of these improvident transactions.
Another example of catastrophic risk was AIG's issuance of CDSs.
Management viewed the "premium" it was paid for standing behind the
CDSs as almost "free money" because it never expected to pay out and
therefore held no reserves against potential loss. But when the mortgages
against which the CDSs were written began to default, AIG failed, and
the federal government bailed it out with over $100 billion.
As discussed earlier, Standard & Poor's was not convinced that the
federal government support for banks "[w]ill [b]e [d]ifferent '[n]ext
[t]ime"' 2 13 and opined that another bailout may be lurking in the future.
Professor Stiglitz has asserted that "[tihe financial sector used 'fear' to
persuade the administration to impose no controls, just as it used fear to
engineer the bondholder and shareholder protection schemes."2 14 If an
other crisis occurs, we can expect the big banks to employ fear once
again. In such circumstances, it is the rare politician who would have the
courage to run the risk of going against the big banks. This also is the
concern raised by the Dallas Fed.215 Since highly regarded economists
210. Rajan, supra note 100, at 6.
211. Id. at 3, 20.
212. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 149.
213. See QUINTANILLA ET AL., supra note 182, at 2.
214. STIGLITZ, supra note 199, at 124 n.24.
215. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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and institutions agree that "[i]f they're too big to fail, they're too big,"
the solution would seem to be to make them smaller (i.e., break them
up).
Supposedly, any bank is now limited in size to not having more than
10% of the nation's total bank deposits.216 But this ceiling has already
been breached.217 Because the 10% of deposits standard currently permits
mega-banks, it is too weak a standard. Professors Simon Johnson and
James Kwak argue that commercial banks should be limited in size to
4% of GDP and investment banks to 2%.218 With a GDP of approximate-
ly $14 trillion in 2010, commercial banks would be "limited" in size to
"only" $560 billion of assets. Although such a suggestion might appear
radical, this would not even restore the situation that existed in the 1990s,
before the spate of transactions outlined in the "Appendix." The econo-
my functioned quite well in the 1990s. To the argument that such a poli-
cy would inhibit innovation, one might respond that millions of unem-
ployed workers would be better off if the financial innovation of the
2000s had never come to pass.
Although some might argue that it is not feasible to break up the big
banks, interestingly, Reuters has already proposed a scenario for break-
ing up Goldman. 2 19 The suggestion was predicated upon trying to max-
imize shareholder value since Goldman's shares were trading at de-
pressed levels. The article suggested separating Goldman's investment
banking unit, the asset management unit, and the institutional client ser-
vices arm. Supposedly, the pieces could be worth more than the whole.
The Reuters proposal followed a more extensive analysis by
ProPublica, which argued that "breakups that seemed politically impos-
sible [are] no longer unthinkable." 22 0 The biggest barrier to such
breakups is the resistance of top management, who would earn less in
smaller institutions.22 1 Although the banks' diversified product and ser-
vice offerings can enhance profits by allowing cross-selling opportuni-
ties, such diversification, and the conflicts of interest inherent in it, do
not assure that clients are receiving the best services or the best deals.
216. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e)(2)(E)(ii) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 12 U.S.C. 1828(c)(13)(A)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i)(8)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
217. Merging Banks Surge Past U.S. Deposit Cap, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 17,2008,8:06
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/merging-banks-surge-past-us-deposit-cap/; see also
James Kwak, Banks and the 10% Deposit Cap, 13 BANKERS (Mar. 18, 2010),
http://13bankers.com/2010/03/18/banks-and-the-I0-deposit-cap/.
218. JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 15, at 216-17.
219. See Rob Cox, Breaking Up Could Be Good for Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/business/breaking-up-could-be-good-for-goldman.html.
220. Jesse Eisinger, Once Unthinkable, Breakup of Big Banks Seems Feasible, N.Y. TIMES
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In 2011, additional support for breaking up the big banks came from
Herb Allison, the former chief executive officer of Merrill Lynch and
assistant secretary of treasury in the Obama Administration, who argued
that breaking up the big banks would reduce complexity and risk.222 In
particular, the smaller resulting entities would be easier to understand
and control, thereby permitting realistic oversight by the boards of direc-
tors of the resulting entities. The cost of integrating, operating, and modi-
fying the complex systems in the conglomerated big banks would be
reduced by removing organizational layers and coordination. Each new
segment would need to acquire its own funding, which would lead to
better assessment of capital and liquidity needs, and the various risks
involved. Equally important, such breakups would eliminate the conflicts
of interest that are inherent in these large, multifaceted institutions.
Nonetheless, there was not much momentum to take on the big
banks. For a time, major regulators were silent on this issue. Then, in
March 2012, the Dallas Fed released its 2011 Annual Report,223 in which
the president of the Dallas Fed noted "an already dangerous trend of in-
creasing banking industry concentration" and concluded that "[i]t is im-
perative that we end TBTF [too big to fail]. In my view, downsizing the
behemoths over time into institutions that can be prudently managed and
regulated across borders is the appropriate policy response."224 Following
up on this policy position, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Presi-
dent James Bullard stated, "I would back my colleague (Dallas Fed Pres-
ident) Richard Fisher in saying that we should split up the largest
banks."2 25 He added:
We do not need these companies to be as big as they are. The regula-
tory system would be much simpler if large firms were broken up, ra-
ther than trying to write complicated rules to capture all of the poten-
tial risks at complex firms . ... It would be simpler to have smaller
institutions so that they could fail if they need to fail .. 226
Bullard also supported the so-called Volcker rule on the basis that
"[y]ou shouldn't be taking insured deposits and be unrestricted in your
activities with these insured deposits." 22 7 Although the Volcker amend-
ments to Dodd-Frank do not reincarnate Glass-Steagall, they do limit
the amount of proprietary trading in which financial institutions can en-
222. See Herbert M. Allison, THE MEGABANKS MESS 658 (2011), available at
http://www.amazon.com/Megabanks-Mess-Kindle-Single-ebook/dp/BO05 I GQX 1l.
223. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., supra note 184.
224. Id at 1.
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228gage. This can itself encourage financial institutions to break them-
selves up by spinning off trading activities, assuming the regulations
presently in process do not emasculate the limitations on trading. Former
Fed Chairman Paul Volcker offered a clear choice to financial institu-
tions heavily involved in trading: "[G]ive up either their proprietary trad-
ing activity or their banking license."229
What Dodd-Frank did not accomplish directly-namely, breaking
up the big banks-it may accomplish indirectly by requiring banks to
create "living wills." According to former FDIC Chairperson Sheila Bair:
These rules [with respect to living wills] require that big banks map
their business lines to their legal entities. So, for instance, Chase and
others would have to identify the legal entities that support their in-
vestment-banking operations, their trading and brokerage activities,
their commercial and retail lending, and so forth. The idea is to have
a credible breakup plan in place if they get into trouble. Meaningful
enforcement of this rule and public disclosure of the plans would
help to convince the market that too-big-to-fail is over. It would also
help shareholders figure out how to start breaking up the Goliaths.230
Although it might not have been surprising that some present and
former regulators would advocate the breakup of the big banks, the fi-
nancial community was taken aback when Sandy Weill, the former
chairman and CEO of Citigroup, asserted that the big banks should be
broken up and commercial and investment banking separated. 231 Weill
was the architect of the mega-bank one-stop-shopping model who or-
228. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-30 (2010).
229. PAUL A. VOLCKER, COMMENTARY ON THE RESTRICTIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING BY
INSURED DEPOSITARY INSTITUTIONS 3 (2012). Chairman Volcker points out the risks of proprietary
trading:
On its face, proprietary trading entails substantial risks. It is essentially speculative in
nature: securities are bought, held and sold in the expectation of profits from changes in
market prices. The recent years of financial crisis have seen spectacular trading losses in
large commercial and investment banks here and abroad operating on an international
scale, with various loss estimates for major international commercial and investment
banks ranging to hundreds of billions of dollars.
Id. at 2. Then, and equally important, Volcker highlights the impact such trading has on the
culture of banking:
The need to restrict proprietary trading is not only, or perhaps most importantly, a
matter of the immediate market risks involved. It is the seemingly inevitable implication
for the culture of the commercial banking institutions involved, manifested in the huge
incentives to take risk inherent in the compensation practices for the traders. Can one
group of employees be so richly rewarded, the traders, for essentially speculative, imper-
sonal, short-term trading activities while professional commercial bankers providing es-
sential commercial banking services to customers, and properly imbued with fiduciary
values, be confined to a much more modest structure of compensation?
Id.
230. Sheila Bair, Breaking Up Chase: Good for Shareholders and Taxpayers, CNNMONEY
(May 25, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/25/jp-morgan-chase-breakup/.
231. Wall Street Legend Sandy Weill: Break Up the Big Banks, CNBC.cOM (July 25, 2012,
8:02 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48315170/WallStreetLegendSandyWeillBreak Up the BigBanks.
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chestrated the merger of Travelers Insurance and Citicorp when he was
chairman of Travelers.232 He also was a leading advocate for the repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated commercial banking and
investment banking activities. 233 John Reed, the CEO of Citicorp at the
time of the Travelers merger, has also acknowledged the need to break
up the big banks, stating: "It wasn't that there was one or two institutions
that, you know, got carried away and did stupid things. It was, we all did
... and then the whole system came down."234
But the simplest and surest way to deal with the oversized institu-
tions that are not only too big to fail, but also too big and complex to
manage, is to impose objective size limits of the sort suggested by John-
son and Kwak and give management a fixed period of time to come into
compliance. The benefits, as discussed above, are manifold: less com-
plexity, easier monitoring by the market and creditors, reduced conflicts
of interest, stronger ties with local economies, more competition, less
innovation focused on creating incomprehensible financial instruments,
and more innovation focused upon servicing manufacturing and the real
economy.
D. Regulators Need to Regulate
Politics should not infect the actions of the Federal Reserve Board.
But the Fed Chairman is appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate.235 Although the appointment of the Chairman should not be polit-
icized, the lessons of the past decade should make it clear that a libertari-
an ideologue is not the proper person to be in charge of economic policy.
Professor David Moss of Harvard Business School has suggested
that it was the success of the New Deal legislation that lulled us into
complacency and made financial regulation seem to be an "unnecessary
burden." 236 This legislation provided fifty years of stability for the finan-
cial system when, prior thereto, there was a financial crisis every fifteen
to twenty years. He analogized the situation to public health: after sharp-
ly reducing deadly epidemics through public health measures, should
policy makers abandon these measures because major epidemics are not
a problem anymore? He offered the following perspective on the past
three decades:
232. Mitchell Martin, Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record $70 Billion Deal: A
New No. 1; Financial Giants Unite, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/07/news/07iht-citi.t.html.
233. See Jed Horowitz & David Henry, Weill Changes Mind, Calls for Big Banks to Break Up,
REUTERS, July 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/25/us-citigroup-weill-
idUSBRE860 I M220120725.
234. Id. (alteration in original).
235. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Nov.
2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed46.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
236. David A. Moss, An Ounce offPrevention, HARV. MAG., Sept. 2009, at 26 fig. 1.
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The magnitude of the current financial crisis reflects the failure of an
economic and regulatory philosophy that proved increasingly influ-
ential in policy circles during the past three decades. This philosophy,
guided more by theory than historical experience, held that private
financial institutions not insured by the government could be largely
trusted to manage their own risks-to regulate themselves. The crisis
has suggested otherwise, particularly since several of the least regu-
lated parts of the system (including non-bank mortgage originators
and the major broker-dealer Bear Steams) were among the first to run
into trouble.237
As earlier parts of this Article have documented, the regulatory fail-
ures in the Reagan and Bush 41 Administrations with regard to the sav-
ings and loan crisis, the regulatory failures in the Clinton Administration
with respect to derivatives, and the wholesale failures in the Bush 43
Administration among all the banking regulators and the SEC have had a
devastating impact upon our economy. This should not be a liberal ver-
sus conservative, or Republican versus Democrat, issue. In fact, two of
the wisest regulators were conservative Republican women, Brooksley
23Born, who saw the danger in derivatives,238 and Sheila Bair, who viewed
the implicit government guarantee provided to the too big to fail banks,
and the subsidy it provides, as unfair to the rest of the banking system
and a threat to financial security.239 It may be that sex is a better test of
good judgment than party affiliation.
Joe Nocera, the highly respected financial journalist, in reviewing
Sheila Bair's efforts to get other regulators to take the subprime mort-
gage practices seriously and to cajole the banks to modify the ARMs that
were resetting at levels that homeowners could not afford, concluded:
My own view is the country would have been far better served if
more people in positions of power had been willing to listen to her as
the financial crisis unfolded. Hers was a voice of common sense, try-
ing to protect the taxpayer, the bank depositor and the homeowner. If
other regulators had taken her early subprime concerns seriously-to
cite just one example-the financial world might be a different place
today.240
Ms. Bair was labeled as "difficult" because she viewed her role as pro-
tecting depositors and taxpayers, rather than bankers and bondholders. 241
But protecting depositors and taxpayers is the function given to the FDIC
by Congress. Policy should be fact-driven, not ideology-driven. It should
be clear that persons aligned with an industry, or whose basic premise is
237. Id. at 25.
238. See Goodman, supra note 80.
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that government is not the solution but rather the problem cannot be ex-
pected to put the public interest first as regulators.
A serious problem is that our financial regulators frequently come
from the financial industry, and often go back to it. There are those in the
financial services industry who realize the necessity and benefits of regu-
lation. But there are also ideologues who do not, who have a structural
bias, and who are imbued with a limited perspective. Although regulators
with expertise are needed, care should be taken to ensure that they are
not ideologues. Former Treasury Secretary Paulson, who proposed the
bank bailout and sought to extract no conditions in return, was previously
the CEO of Goldman Sachs. Robert Rubin, the Secretary of Treasury in
the Clinton Administration became the CEO of Citigroup. These are just
two examples which illustrate the danger that regulators' private sector
interests may override the broader concerns they should have in their
governmental roles. The problem of the movement betwecn industry and
government has been extensively documented.2 4 2
All goods have their costs. There is no free lunch. If financial insti-
tutions want government insurance or government guarantees, then the
price is regulation. As Professor Robert Reich has asserted in tracing the
decline of the middle class in America:
Most telling of all, Washington deregulated Wall Street while insur-
ing it against major losses. In so doing, it allowed finance-which
until then had been the servant of American industry-to become its
master, demanding short-term profits over long-term growth and rak-
ing in an ever larger portion of the nation's profits. By 2007, finan-
cial companies accounted for over 40 percent of American corporate
profits and almost as great a percentage of pay, up from 10 percent
during the Great Prosperity. 243
Unless we implement effective regulation, we are doomed to repeat the
failures of the 2000s, where profit was privatized and risk was socialized.
We will also be stuck with a no-growth economy in which resources
flow from the economy into the banks instead of from the banks into the
economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the Great Depression, from the passage of Glass-Steagall in
1933 until the 1980s, relatively few banks failed. The safety and solven-
cy of financial institutions was taken for granted. From the end of WWII
until the 1970s was also a period of unmatched general prosperity. The
1970s represented a somewhat discordant note, as the economy slowed
and inflation ensued.
242. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92-97.
243. See Reich, supra note 30.
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In 1980, a new ethic arose: government is not the solution, govern-
ment is the problem. This ushered in almost three decades of deregula-
tion. Very quickly came the savings and loan crisis, in part driven by the
problem of having assets long and liabilities short, but also exacerbated
by deregulation. Also, at this time, antitrust enforcement fell out of
vogue, and a wave of bank mergers began in the 1990s. This resulted in
the six big banks today that are too big to fail. The deregulatory mindset
of the Clinton Administration ignored the lethal potential of derivatives,
and the libertarian instincts of former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan and the Bush 43 Administration were blind to the dangers of
financial innovation.
The big banks financed the origination of subprime and other toxic
mortgages that Chairman Greenspan extolled as financial innovation.
The banks then secuntized these toxic mortgages and induced the credit-
rating agencies to give them AAA ratings. Mortgage underwriting stand-
ards were nonexistent and liars' loans became a norm. Securities due
diligence fell by the wayside, and when the toxic mortgages began to
default, the economy of the United States imploded. Today, we are still
witnessing the impact of these "instruments of mass destruction." 24
We are in the throes of the worst economy since the Great Depres-
sion. Like the Great Depression and unlike recessions after it, the plunge
in the current economy was caused not by business cyclicality but by the
failure of the banking system. And the failure of the banking system to
modify mortgages that are underwater, rather than foreclose on them
(sometimes with dubious documentation), has lengthened the downturn
and continues to depress the housing market.2 4 5 The function of the bank-
ing system is to intermediate capital and channel it into productive in-
vestments. To the contrary, it has consumed capital, misallocated capital,
and created a real estate bubble that collapsed. Although most bailout
money has been repaid, the banks have not been held to account for the
devastating losses they have inflicted on the economy as a whole and, in
particular, on average citizens who have lost their homes and their jobs.
All the blame cannot be placed on the banking sector. Regulation,
or rather lack of it, has been driven by an ideology that markets are al-
ways self-correcting and that acting in your own perceived best interest
will always be good for the economy as a whole. This philosophy has
created tremendous wealth for the few and left the many economically
244. See Farrell, supra note 177 (quoting Letter from Warren Buffett, supra note 177) (internal
quotation marks omitted). I have taken the liberty of expanding Buffett's concerns to include other
financial innovations, such as subprime loans and pick-a-pay loans.
245. Although there is an impression today that the housing market may be recovering, part of
this is due to the fact that banks are holding many foreclosed properties off the market in order not to
further depress the market. See Foreclosed Homes Being Kept off Market by Banks: Santa Monica,
SELECT REAL ESTATE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.select-realestate.com/2012/12/foreclosed-
homes-being-kept-off-market-by-banks-santa-monica/.
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regressing. The deregulatory mindset at the Fed and the Bush Admin-
istration had disastrous consequences for the economy and the average
American. But the timidity and deference to the banking industry of
banking regulators, with the exception of two women, has been less than
exemplary.
What has the past taught and what does the future offer? Apparent-
ly, many have learned little from the past because Dodd-Frank is at-
tacked as excessive regulation when, in reality, it did not go far enough.
Supposedly the era of too big to fail is over; however, this is not a view
held by, for example, Standard & Poor's, which has indicated its concern
that future bailouts may be in the offing. Nor did Dodd-Frank adequately
deal with the misaligned incentives that motivated bank management to
take catastrophic risks.
Chairman Greenspan's opinion that "[i]f they're too big to fail,
[then] they're" too big" is beginning to gather some momentum. Wheth-
er the political will exists to break up the banks is questionable, but their
depressed stock prices, Dodd-Frank's living-will provisions, and the
Volcker rule may provide an impetus for the market to demand such ac-
tion. Irrespective of whether that happens, the mentality that "govern-
ment is not the solution, government is the problem" must change.
VII. APPENDIX: CONSOLIDATION HISTORY OF THE BIG BANKS
Year Consolidation Activity
JPMorgan Chase
1991 * Chemical Bank merged with Manufacturers Hano-
ver.246
1995 * First Chicago merged with National Bank of De-
troit.247
1996 * Chemical Bank (assets valued at 1.98% of GDP) 248
merged with Chase Manhattan (assets valued at
1.35% of GDP).249
1998 * In 1998, Bank One merged with First Chicago (as-
sets valued at 0.70% of GDP).250
246. Michael Quint, The Bank Merger; Big Bank Merger to Join Chemical, Manufacturers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, at Al.
247. Stephanie Strom, First Chicago and NBD to Merge as Banks Scurry to Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1995, at DI.
248. Bank assets as a percentage of GDP at the time of consolidation obtained by dividing each
respective bank's total assets by national GDP in that year. Total assets were retrieved from Institu-
tion Directory, FDIC.GOv, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2013), by per-
forming a database search for the bank in question and running a report for the relevant year. GDP
information based on "Current-Dollar and 'Real' GDP" chart from Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
U.S. DEP'T OF COM. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/nationaU (last visited Jan. 6,
2013).
249. Saul Hansell, Banking's New Giant: The Deal; Chase and Chemical Agree to Merge in
$10 Billion Deal Creating Largest U.S. Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al. For calculation of
assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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Year Consolidation Activity
2000 * In 2000, J.P. Morgan (assets valued at 0.70% of
GDP) 25 1 merged with Chase Manhattan (assets val-
ued at 1.00% of GDP).252
2004 * In 2004, JPMorgan Chase (assets valued at 5.64% of,
GDP) 25 3 merged with Bank One (assets valued at
2.30% of GDP).2 54
2008 * In 2008, J.P. Morgan (assets valued at 9.40% of
GDP) 25 5 acquired Bear Stearns 256 and Washington
Mutual.257
Citigroup
1988 * Commercial Credit purchased Primerica (which
owned Smith Barney).2 58 These companies kept the
name Primerica.
1993 * Primerica merged with Travelers Insurance and took
the name Travelers, Inc.259
1997 * Travelers, Inc. purchased Salomon Brothers.260
1998 * Citicorp merged with Travelers, Inc. to form
Citigroup Inc. (assets of Citibank valued at 3.22% of
GDP).26
2006 * Citigroup (assets valued at 5.60% of GDP) 262 con-
solidated its branches in the West (assets valued at
1.04% of GDP). 263
Goldman Sachs
Post-1990 * No mergers found after 1990.
250. Banc One-First Chicago Merger Clears Hurdle, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 1998), at Bus. 3.
For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
251. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
252. Chris Isidore, Chase Buying J.P. Morgan: Stock Deal Valued by Firms at $33B Joins Two
of Banking's Biggest Names, CNNMONEY (Sept. 13, 2000, 2:46 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2000/09/13/deals/chase morgan/. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see
supra note 248.
253. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
254. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas, Jr., Banking Giant: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2004, at Al.
255. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
256. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, JPMorgan Chase to Acquire Bear Steams (Mar. 16,
2008), http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=299805.
257. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of
Washington Mutual (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr)8085.html.
258. Robert J. Cole, 2 Leading Financiers Will Merge Companies in $1.65 Billion Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at Al.
259. Michael Quint, Travelers Approves Merger Offer by Primerica, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1993, at DI.
260. Salomon Succumbs at Last, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 25, 1997), at 79-80.
261. Travelers, Citicorp to Unite, CNNMONEY (Apr. 6, 1998, 2:07 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/1 998/04/06/deals/travelers/. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra
note 248.
262. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
263. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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Year Consolidation Activity
Bank of America
1992 * BankAmerica acquired Security Pacific Corpora-
tion,264 along with other regional banks.
1994 * BankAmerica acquired the Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago.265
1997 * BankAmerica (assets valued at 1.64% of GDP) 2 66
was acquired by NationsBank with the new entity
retaining the name "Bank of America Corpora-
11267tion.
2004 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
6.51% of GDP) 2 68 purchased FleetBoston Financial
(assets valued at 0.33% of GDP).2 69
2006 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
8.57% of GDP) 2 7 0 purchased MBNA (assets valued
at 0.06% of GDP).271
2006 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
9.36% of GDP) 27 2 purchased the United States Trust
Company from Charles Schwab Corporation (assets
valued at 0.09% of GDP) 2 73 and LaSalle Bank Cor-
poration from ABN Amro (assets valued at 0.78% of
GDP).274
2008 * Bank of America Corporation (assets valued at
10.55% of GDP) 275 acquired Countrywide Fi-
nancial Corporation (assets valued at 0.08% of
GDP) 2 76 and Merrill Lynch & Co. (assets valued
at 0.72% of GDP).277
264. Andrew Pollack, The Bank Merger; BankAmerica in $4 Billion Deal to Acquire Rival
Security Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at Al.
265. Saul Hansell, 2 Banks Set $1.9 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, § 1, at 135.
266. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
267. Mitchell Martin, Nations Bank Drives $62 Billion Merger: A New BankAmerica: Biggest
of U.S. Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at DIO. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra
note 248.
268. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
269. Riva D. Atlas, Banking Giants: The Overview; Bank ofAmerica and FleetBoston Agree to
Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at Al. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note
248.
270. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
271. Krysten Crawford, Bank ofAmerica Inks $35B Card Deal, CNNMONEY (June 30, 2005,
4:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/30/news/fortune500/boa/. For calculation of assets-to-
GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
272. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
273. Josh Lipton, Bank ofAmerica to Buy U.S. Trust, FORBES.COM (Nov. 20, 2006, 5:02 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/20/bank-of-america-markets-equity-cxjli_1120marketsl2.html. For
calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
274. Matt Krantz, Barclays Makes $91B Offer for ABN Amro Biggest Banking Deal Ever
Could Spur Other Mergers, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2007, at I B. For calculation of assets-to-GDP
ratio, see supra note 248.
275. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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1991 * Morgan Stanley acquired Quilter & Co., but sold it
in 2006.
1996 * Morgan Stanley acquired Van Kampen American
Capital. 278
2004 * Morgan Stanley acquired Canary Wharf Group.
2009 * Morgan Stanley acquired 51% of Smith Barney
from Citigroup and is now operating under the name
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney.2 79
Wells Fargo
1996 * Wells Fargo (assets valued at 0.66% of GDP) 28 0
merged with First Interstate Bancorp (assets valued
at 0.60% of GDP).281
1998 * Wells Fargo merged with Norwest and assumed the
name Wells Fargo & Company.282
1999 * Wells Fargo purchased thirteen companies during
the year with assets totaling $2.4 billion.
2000 * Wells Fargo purchased Michigan Financial Corpora-
tion, National Bancorp of Alaska, Inc., First Com-
merce Bancshares, Inc., Ragen MacKenzie Group,
Inc., and First Security Corporation.
2008 * Wells Fargo (assets valued at 4.37% of GDP)
2 83
purchased Wachovia Corporation (assets valued at
3.66% of GDP).284
276. Bank of America to Acquire Countrywide, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 11, 2008, 2:55 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22606833/ns/business-real-estate/t/bank-america-acquire-
countrywide/. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
277. Binyamin Appelbaum & David Cho, Bank of America Agrees to Buy Merrill During
Frenzied Weekend, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at AOl. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see
supra note 248.
278. Van Kampen Nearing Sale to Morgan Stanley, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1996, at Bus. 1.
279. Press Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley and Citi to Form Industry-Leading
Wealth Management Business Through Joint Venture (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/af3e409a-elb7-l I dd-84e6-b390c77322d3.html.
280. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
281. Saul Hansell, Wells Fargo Wins Battle for First Interstate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at
DI. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
282. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Approves Norwest/Wells Fargo
Merger After Parties Agree to $1.18 Billion Divestiture (Oct. 13, 1998),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/I 998/1984.htm.
283. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
284. Edward Iwata, Bank Strife Likely to Spark Mergers, Asset Sales, USA TODAY, Oct. 13,
2008, at 3B. For calculation of assets-to-GDP ratio, see supra note 248.
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FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS:
THE RESURRECTION OF BELL V. WOLFISH
AND THE QUESTIONS TO FOLLOW
ABSTRACT
The balance between Fourth Amendment rights and strip search po-
lices in a correctional setting has garnered limited attention from the U.S.
Supreme Court. Moreover, the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent
by circuit courts has been inconsistent, and at times irreconcilable, with
the governing standards. In upholding the strip search policies at issue in
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Court sought to add clarity
to the existing law and reign in circuits that had expanded the Court's
precedent beyond established measures. The Florence Court premised its
decision primarily on the need for deference to correctional expertise and
the security concerns that invasive strip search policies seek to preclude.
Furthermore, in the face of a highly critical dissent, the Court declined to
adopt the majority of circuits' view that a heighted standard of suspicion
is required to justify a strip search.
Although the Florence majority's holding may seem harsh on its
face because of the degrading nature of invasive strip searches, the
Court's decision is consistent with the standards promulgated in Bell v.
Wolfish and ensures the protection of many over the rights of a single
individual. This Comment concludes that the Court's holding promotes
adaptive, rather than reactive, policies in the hands of those with the
greatest expertise. Moreover, blanket strip search policies protect those
incarcerated by both subjecting arrestees to the same, consistent policy
and by eliminating forms of dangerous contraband.
Finally, although the strip search policies were upheld in Florence,
there are potential mitigating factors that will have to be addressed in the
coming years. This Comment opines that both the presence of alternative
holding facilities and the emergence of new technologies represent the
most viable mechanisms for dampening the perceived harshness of the
Court's holding. However, the Court's refusal to define such factors in
Florence provides little guidance to circuit courts and encourages them
to continue to push the boundaries of Bell, and now Florence.
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INTRODUCTION
Correctional facilities today house over two million' convicted and
detained inmates and have been described as 'a world of violence,' 'a
walled battlefield,' and 'Hobbesian."' 2 Despite these depressing descrip-
1. LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011).
2. Christopher P. Keleher, Judges as Jailers: The Dangerous Disconnect Between Courts
and Corrections, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 87, 87 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (quoting MATTHEW
SILBERMAN, A WORLD OF VIOLENCE 2 (1995), James E. Robertson, "Fight or F. . . " and Constitu-
tional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REV.
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tions, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that prisoners are not
beyond the reach of constitutional protections. 3 The question, however, is
how far should constitutional protections extend, and at what point does
the security of others and of the overall facility restrict personal rights?4
The constitutionality of strip-searching detained persons, including
body-cavity searches, has garnered limited attention from the Supreme
Court.s Furthermore, circuit courts have construed the limited precedent
inconsistently6 and have created standards that are irreconcilable with
controlling law. The Supreme Court in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders8 sought to add clarity by addressing a correctional facility's
intake strip search policy vis-A-vis Fourth Amendment rights.9 The Flor-
ence Court in a 5-4 decision rightly resurrected prior precedento by con-
cluding that such policies do not violate Fourth Amendment rights."
Despite this holding, however, concurring opinions by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito consider mitigating factors that will likely gar-
ner further review by courts in the years to come. These considerations
serve as viable mechanisms that may dampen the degrading effects of the
strip searches that gave the dissent pause. /
Part I of this Comment provides a brief record of Supreme Court j u-
risprudence and its various interpretations governing the constitutionality
of strip-searching detained persons. Next, Part II summarizes the facts,
procedural history, and opinions of Florence. Lastly, Part III examines
the justifications and applicability of the decision in Florence, along with
potential exceptions and how those exceptions will guide future deci-
sions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants individuals
the right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."' 2 Moreo-
ver, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "[p]rison walls do not
form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Con-
339, 341 (1995), and James E. Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: Constitutional Protection from
Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 101, 102 (1985), respectively).
3. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (noting that the Court has "repeat-
edly held" prisoners maintain some constitutional rights).
4. See David M. Shapiro, Does the Fourth Amendment Permit Indiscriminate Strip Searches
ofMisdemeanor Arrestees?: Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 131,
132-33, 136 (2011).
5. Id. at 132-33 (explaining only one Supreme Court case, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), directly addresses strip-searching inmates).
6. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012).
7. Keleher, supra note 2, at 89-90.
8. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
9. Id. at 1514-15.
10. Id. at 1518 (explaining that Florence "is set against this precedent and governed by the
principles announced in Turner and Belf').
11. Id. at 1523.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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stitution." 3 However, arrestees may not be "accorded those rights . . .
fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible
with the objectives of incarceration."l 4 For instance, the Supreme Court
cautions that the right to privacy in the traditional Fourth Amendment
sense may not be compatible with prison confines.15 Although the Su-
preme Court does not strictly preclude Fourth Amendment rights in such
a setting, the balance of institutional security weighs in favor of the gov-
ernment, and individual rights must therefore yield.16
A. Bell v. Wolfish17
Bell v. Wolfish is the seminal starting point to Fourth Amendment
challenges by detainees regarding their privacy, or more specifically, the
search of their persons.18 In Bell, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed sev-
eral conditions of confinement claims by detainees and convicted in-
mates of the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York
City.19 At issue was MCC's strip search policy requiring all detainees
partaking in contact visits with outside persons to submit to a visual
body-cavity search after every visit.20 The detainees averred that the
blanket policy infringed on their constitutional rights.2 1 Both the District
Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit
agreed.22 The Second Circuit noted that privacy is "fundamental to [the]
decent treatment of an inmate." 23 Moreover, the "gross violation of per-
sonal privacy" inflicted by the strip searches did not outweigh the "gov-
ernment's security interest." 24 In considering the "deep level of degrada-
tion and submission," the court held absent probable cause that the de-
tainees were concealing contraband, the Fourth Amendment prohibited
such searches.25
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision and con-
cluded that MCC's strip search policy did not violate the Fourth
Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches. 2 6 The Court noted that alt-
hough the nature of the body-cavity search caused it to "pause," in this
situation the policy was constitutional. 2 7 Furthermore, the Court conclud-
13. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
14. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984).
15. See, e.g., id. at 527-28.
16. Id.
17. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
18. Keleher, supra note 2, at 91.
19. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523.
20. Id at 558.
21. Id. at 527.
22. Id at 558.
23. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'dsub nom. Bell, 441 U.S. at 520.
24. Id
25. Id (quoting United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1977)).
26. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
27. Id.
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ed that although the "test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application," courts
must balance four substantive factors: "the scope of the particular intru-
sion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted." 28 The Court explained that
these factors "[b]alanc[e] the significant and legitimate security interests
of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates."29
In holding that the search policy was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court placed the greatest weight on the justification
factor.3 0 The Court explained that imminent security dangers represent
legitimate interests of detention facilities3 1 and justify permitting strip
searches on less than probable cause.3 2
B. Turner v. Safley33
In Turner v. Safley, a class of inmates brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of two regulations promulgated by the Missouri Divi-
34
sion of Corrections concerning prison mail and inmates' right to marry.
The questioned mail regulation limited correspondence between inmates
at separate prison facilities to only family members," and the marriage
regulation restricted inmates from marrying without direct consent of the
superintendent.3 6 The District Court for the Western District of Missouri
determined that both regulations were unconstitutional, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.37
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling as to the unconstitution-
ality of the regulation prohibiting inmates from marrying3 but reversed
the decision as to the prison-mail regulation.3 9 In its opinion, the Court
developed a standard of review for constitutional claims made by prison-
ers, 40 stating that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' consti-
tutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests." 4 1 The Court explained that its rationale was
not to "[s]ubject[] the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an in-
flexible strict scrutiny analysis" but instead to defer judgment to officials
28. Id at 559.
29. Id. at 560.
30. See id. at 559.
31. Id. (noting that "[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too
common an occurrence").
32. Id.
33. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
34. Id. at 81-82.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 82.
37. Id. at 83.
38. Id at 99.
39. Id at 93.
40. Keleher, supra note 2, at 95.
41. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10 (2005) (re-
fusing to apply Turner to constitutional challenges regarding a racial segregation policy).
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who are in the best position to "anticipate security problems" and "adopt
innovative solutions."42 The Court followed by holding that the policy
regulating mail correspondence between inmates ensured security at
prison facilities-a legitimate penological interest.4 3 However, the Court
declined to find an adequate penological interest in the regulation limit-
ing inmates' ability to marry.
C. The Departure from Bell v. Wolfish
In the years following Bell, ten circuit courts attempted to reconcile
the Court's finding in Bell with the strip-searching of individuals arrested
for minor offenses.4 5 These circuits held that strip searches in this in-
stance violated the Fourth Amendment absent "reasonable suspicion"
that the arrestee was hiding contraband.4 6 To provide greater protection
to detainees, these circuit courts selectively read and distinguished Bell
on varying grounds.47
In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,4 8 the Second Circuit examined
a policy requiring the strip search of female misdemeanants placed in
detention facilities of the Chicago Police Department. 49 The court ex-
plained that Bell is not controlling because the detainees in Bell were
"awaiting trial on serious federal charges" rather than being "minor of-
fenders who were not inherently dangerous."50 Furthermore, the court
noted Bell's balancing test "does not validate strip searches in detention
42. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
43. Id at 93.
44. Id. at 99.
45. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S.
Ct. 1510 (2012).
46. See Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring reasonable suspi-
cion for arrestee detained for driving under the influence), overruled by Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d
1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108, 112 (1st Cir.
2001) (requiring reasonable suspicion for an arrestee pulled over for an expired tag and detained for
an "outstanding body attachment"); Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1996) (requiring rea-
sonable suspicion for arrestees detained for minor offences); Maters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1253
(6th Cir. 1989) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees detained for "simple traffic violations");
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees de-
tained for misdemeanors); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
an arrestee detained for violating a leash law and who gave the officer "no other reason to suspect
[the arrestee] was harboring [contraband]" was unconstitutional); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614,
617 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees detained for minor offences), over-
ruled by Bull v. City of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Hill v. Bogans, 735
F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (adopting the analysis of Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.
1981), requiring reasonable suspicion for detainees arrested for misdemeanors); Mary Beth G. v.
City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees
detained for misdemeanors); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (requiring
reasonable suspicion for arrestees detained for driving while intoxicated).
47. See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273; see also Shapiro, supra note 4, at 140-42
(distinguishing on varying grounds, including felonies or misdemeanors, probable cause or reasona-
ble suspicion, and contact visits or arrests).
48. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1267.
50. Id. at 1272.
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settings per se."" The court concluded that because of the "substantial
nature of the intrusions involved" and the differences depicted in Bell,
the court was justified in initiating its own inquiry as to whether the strip
search policy was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.52
Mary Beth G. is the beginning of the Bell distortion and represents
the foundation for which circuits have distinguished Bell and imparted a
reasonable suspicion standard." Commentators have noted that narrowed
interpretations like those depicted in Mary Beth G. depart from the hold-
ing in Bell and exhibit confusion,54 or blatant disregard, by circuits of
the Supreme Court's intended application.
D. The Return to Bell v. Wolfish
More recently, three circuits have resurrected Bell by finding intake
strip search policies constitutional despite the absence of reasonable sus-
picion.56 In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en bane in Powell v. Bar-
rett,57 considered a Fulton County Jail policy that required arrestees en-
tering the jail's general population to submit to a mandatory strip
search. The Powell court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require reasonable suspicion to conduct strip searches-including a
search of body cavities-of detainees entering or re-entering general
prison population.5 9 The Eleventh Circuit noted that it and other circuits
were misguided in distinguishing Bell on the severity of an arrestee's
offense.60 The court explained that the policy upheld in Bell applies to all
inmates "regardless of whether there was any reasonable suspicion to
believe that the inmate was concealing contraband."6 ' This decision on
its own practically ended years of misapplication of Bell, and has marked
62
a turning point in the view of at least two other circuits.
Similarly, in Bull v. City of San Francisco,63 the Ninth Circuit, also
sitting en banc, reversed the district court's finding that a San Francisco
jail policy requiring all arrestees to submit to a strip search was unconsti-
tutional." The Ninth Circuit in Bull directly reversed a line of its own
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Keleher, supra note 2, at 97.
54. See Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped ofAll Reason? The Appropriate Standard for Eval-
uating Strip Searches ofArrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 36 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 163, 199 (2003).
55. See Keleher, supra note 2, at 108.
56. Id at 108-09.
57. 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
58. Id. at 1301.
59. Id. at 1307.
60. Id
61. Id.
62. See Keleher, supra note 2, at 110, 112 (stating that the Ninth Circuit "follows" Powell and
the Third Circuit "endorses" Powell).
63. 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
64. Id at 982.
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cases requiring reasonable suspicion and held that its prior case law was
inconsistent with Bell, Turner, and the general principles embodied in
those decisions.65 The court explained that Bell's blanket policy, which
required all inmates to submit to a mandatory strip search after contact
visits regardless of the level of suspicion, was constitutional. 66 Returning
to Bell and Turner, the court found that documented evidence of "ongo-
ing, dangerous, and perplexing" contraband in the jail represented a legit-
imate penological interest that justified the strip search policy.67 Moreo-
ver, the court warned that decisions departing from Bell and Turner were
"inconsistent with the Supreme Court's warning that federal courts must
avoid substituting their judgment for the 'professional expertise of cor-
rections officials."' 68
The basis for examining correctional strip searches promulgated in
Bell, and its subsequent resurrection by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits,
proved to be of greater precedential value to the five-Justice majority in
Florence.
II. FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
A. Facts
In 1998, officers arrested Albert Florence after he attempted to
evade arrest in Essex County, New Jersey.69 Florence was charged with
obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to
pay a fine in monthly installments.70 In 2005, a New Jersey state trooper
pulled Florence over and noticed there was an outstanding bench warrant
for his arrest.7 1 The officer arrested Florence and took him to the Bur-
lington county jail.72 The warrant, which related to an unpaid fine from
his 1998 conviction, was later determined to be erroneous because Flor-
ence had paid the fine in 2003.73
Before admittance to the general population at the Burlington coun-
ty jail (Burlington), Florence was required to shower with a delousing
agent and submit to a strip search to be checked for scars, gang tattoos,
and contraband.74 This process included lifting his genitals for visual
inspection.75 Six days later, officers transferred Florence to the Essex
County Correctional Facility (Essex), New Jersey's largest county jail.76
65. Id at 980.
66. Id. at 975.
67. Id at 977.
68. Id at 980 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979)).
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Similar to that of Burlington, Essex's policy required all incoming de-
tainees, regardless of the circumstances, to submit to a strip search.7 7 The
search required visual inspection of all body cavities, including a genital
lift and a process in which the detainee squatted and coughed . Charges
were dismissed the following day, and Florence was released.79
B. Procedural History
Florence sought relief from multiple defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.80 He asserted that the Constitution prohibits correctional facilities
from mandating the strip search of those arrested for minor offenses ab-
sent reasonable suspicion of concealed contraband.8 ' The New Jersey
district court, following a majority of circuits,82 distinguished Bell and
granted Florence's motion for summary judgment.13
On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision.84 In its holding, the Third Circuit rejected the district
court's narrow interpretation of Bell and concluded that the strip search
policies reasonably balanced the security needs of the facilities and Flor-
ence's personal rights.85 The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiora-
86ri.
C. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision, the Court framed the issue as "whether every de-
tainee who will be admitted to the general population may be required to
undergo a close visual inspection while undressed."87 In an opinion au-
thored by Justice Kennedy-and joined in whole by Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Alito and Scalia, and in all but Part IV of the opinion by
Justice Thomas-the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's deci-
sion, holding that such strip search polices were constitutional.8
The Court's underlying theme was institutional security,89 premised
on three tenants specific to correctional facilities: (1) "substantial discre-





81. Id. at 1514-15.
82. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 147.




87. Id. at 1513.
88. Id. at 1523.
89. See id at 1513 ("Correctional officials have a legitimate interest . . . to ensure jails are not
made less secure.").
90. Id. at 1515-16.
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against the "resulting invasion of personal rights"; 91 and (3) the "ability
to conduct searches without predictable exceptions."92 The Court ex-
plained that without substantial evidence that correctional officials' re-
sponse was exaggerated, the governing standard required deference to
correctional expertise. 9 3
In its holding, the Florence Court placed its greatest emphasis on
the Bell balancing test, weighing the need for the search against the inva-
sion of personal rights.94 In characterizing the need and the resulting jus-
tifications, Justice Kennedy enumerated risks such as wounds and infec-
tions, gang markings and affiliations, and contraband that the strip
searches in question would reveal.95 The Court held that despite the inva-
sion on Florence's personal rights, there was a "substantial interest" in
alleviating these risks before individuals reached a jail's general popula-
tion in order to protect others in the facility.96 Moreover, Justice Kennedy
noted that "[tihe difficulties of operating a detention facility should not
be underestimated" 97 and explained that officials deserve latitude to form
policies that detect and deter the entrance of contraband.9 8
As to Florence's contention that people arrested for minor crimes
must be exempted from strip searches absent reasonable suspicion, the
Court concluded that neither the Fourth nor Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires such a standard.99 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the differing
views among circuits on this issue but stressed the importance of re-
establishing the foundational rules set forth in Bell and Turner.00
The Florence Court's rationale for declining to adopt a reasonable
suspicion standard is based on two premises. 0' First, Justice Kennedy
explained that the severity of an offense is an inadequate predictor of
those who have contraband, noting that "[p]eople detained for minor
offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals."'O2
The Court pointed to examples in which some of the most dangerous and
hardened criminals were stopped for minor driving infractions during the
midst of grievous criminal activity. 03 Moreover, Justice Kennedy ex-
91. Id. at 1516.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1518 (setting forth the standard promulgated in Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,
584-85 (1984)).
94. Id. at 1521 (explaining that exempting people arrested for minor offenses would increase
both the risk to others and of contraband).
95. Id at 1518-19.
96. Id. at 1520.
97. Id at 1515 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)).
98. Id at 1517.
99. Id. at 1514-15, 1523.
100. See id at 1518.
101. See id. at 1520-21.
102. Id. at 1520.
103. Id. (noting that hours before the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was pulled
over by a state trooper for driving without a license plate and that a terrorist associated with the 9/11
attacks was ticketed for speeding just two days prior to the attacks).
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plamied that exempting those detained for minor offenses would encour-
age experienced detainees to enlist outsiders to bring in contraband or
weapons.'" He opined that the resulting effect would be coercion by,
those in superior positions.'0o
Second, the Court noted that classifying arrestees by current and
prior offenses would be difficult at the time of the search due to incom-
plete or inaccurate identifying information.'0 6 Consequently, the lack of
information is contrary to a central principle set forth in Atwater v. City
ofLago Vista'ov that "[o]fficers who interact with those suspected of vio-
lating the law have an 'essential interest in readily administrable
rules."' 08 The Court also sympathized with correctional officials' posi-
tion against a "complicated constitutional scheme requiring them to con-
duct less thorough inspections of some detainees based on their behavior,
suspected offense, criminal history, and other factors." 09
Lastly, Part IV of the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Alito, reserved several questions that were not at is-
sue in Atwater."o The first question reserved was whether a strip search
violates the Fourth Amendment when "a detainee will be held without
assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact
with other detainees.""' The second was whether "an arrestee whose
detention has not been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer,
and who can be held in available facilities removed from the general
population, may be subjected to the types of searches at issue here." 1 2
D. ChiefJustice Roberts's and Justice Alito's Concurring Opinions
In separate concurring opinions, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito emphasized the importance of not foreclosing exceptions to the
Court's holding.1 13 Chief Justice Roberts noted that Florence's arrest was
for an outstanding warrant, and there were no other alternatives to gen-
eral-population detention.1 4 Due to the particular facts of the case, there
was no opportunity to consider exceptions to the rule proffered by the
Court. 1 However, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Court is
104. Id. at 1521.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
108. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522 (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347).
109. Id
110. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522-23 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas did not join in Part IV
of the opinion.
111. Id. at 1522.
112. Id. at 1523.
113. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Court is "wise to leave open the
possibility of exceptions"); id at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating "the Court does not hold that it
is always reasonable" to strip-search an arrestee).
114. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
115. Id.
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"wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions" but acknowledged that
the Court "makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the
rule."l 16
Justice Alito went a step further and detailed possible mitigating
factors, stating that "the Court does not hold that it is always reasonable
to conduct a full strip search."' 17 First, he explained that the majority's
holding might not apply to scenarios where there are feasible alternative
holding facilities available for those arrested for minor crimes.'" For
example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons requires the segregation of ar-
restees for some minor offenses from a jail's general population.11 9 Sec-
ond, Justice Alito pointed out that the majority opinion explicitly re-
serves the question of the reasonableness of a strip search of an arrestee
- - 120
prior to review by a judicial officer.
E. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, sharply criticized the Court's
holding by proclaiming that "such a search of an individual arrested for a
minor offense ... is an 'unreasonable searc[h]' forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment, unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve the individual possesses drugs or other contraband." 2 1 Justice
Breyer's criticism focused on the degradation of the type of search that
Florence was subjected to, specifically the genital lift and "squat cough-
ing," explaining that such searches are "harmful, humiliating, and de-
grading."1 22 Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Bell balancing test was
the "applicable standard"1 2 3 ; however, he explained that unlike the ma-
jority's reasoning, the "invasion of personal rights here is very serious
and lacks need or justification." 24
In addressing the Court's justifications, the dissent concluded that
the risks proffered by the Court-wounds and infections, gang markings
and affiliations, and contraband-were not "legitimate penological inter-
ests" requiring deferral to correctional expertise.125 Justice Breyer ex-
116. Id
117. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
118. Id
119. Id.
120. Id at 1525. Justice Alito cited Part IV of the opinion for support of this contention. De-
spite Part IV's limited endorsement by the Florence Court, it is likely that the contentions set forth
therein represent a controlling view by the Court, taking into consideration the dissenting Justices.
Therefore, Justice Alito's concurrence likely takes on greater precedential value considering its
general acceptance among at least seven Justices of the Court.
121. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original).
122. Id. at 1525-26.
123. Id. at 1526.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1527-28 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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plained the first two risks could be addressed through less invasive
searches such as pat-downs, metal detectors, making inmates shower in
delousing agents, and searching inmates' clothing.12 6
As to the contraband, Justice Breyer recognized that the lack of j us-
tification was "less obvious" but determined that it was "no less real." 27
Justice Breyer divided his response to the majority's contraband risk into
three parts.12 8 First, he criticized the majority's reliance on security justi-
fications by pointing to multiple empirical studies that suggested the lev-
el of contraband risk would not increase if more invasive strip search
procedures were eliminated.129 Second, he explained that there was a
"plethora" of correctional associations and other professional organiza-
tions that have "promulgated a standard that forbids suspicionless strip
searches,"o30 and many correctional facilities already apply a reasonable
suspicion standard to general-population inmates. 31 Third, Justice Brey-
er pointed to at least ten states and seven courts of appeals that have con-
sidered and adopted a reasonable suspicion standard.132 The dissent con-
cluded its analysis of Justice Kennedy's justifications by noting that the
Court is only "left with the word of prison officials in support of its con-
trary proposition."' 33
As for Bell, the Florence dissent distinguished the seminal case by
explaining that the arrestees in Bell, in comparison to Florence, were a
"greater risk to jail security" and had time to plan to smuggle contra-
band. 134 Justice Breyer noted that "[t]he Bell Court had no occasion to
focus upon those arrested for minor crimes, prior to a judicial officer's
determination that they should be committed to prison."' 35 Justice Breyer
opined that it would be "highly questionable that officials would be justi-
126. Id. at 1528.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1527-28.
129. Id. at 1528-29. In support, the dissent noted a study by the New York federal district court
in which 23,000 arrestees were strip-searched between 1999 and 2003 at the Orange County correc-
tional facility. Id. at 1528. Of the 23,000 searched, five were found to possess contraband-three in
their anal cavities and two in their underwear. Id. The study found that of the five instances, "there
may have been 'reasonable suspicion' to search" the arrestees in four of the cases. Id. (quoting
Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d. 41, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Also, the dissent noted a study
produced in Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2001). Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1528-29. That
study analyzed 75,000 strip searches of new inmates that occurred over a period of five years. Id at
1529. Of the 75,000, sixteen instances led to the discovery of contraband. Id Based on the record,
thirteen instances would have been detected through less invasive searches such as a pat-down. Id
Of the three remaining instances, "there was a drug or felony history that would have justified a strip
search on individualized reasonable suspicion." Id
130. Id. at 1529.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1529-30.
133. Id at 1531.
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fled" in directing those arrested for minor crimes into the "dangerous
world of the general jail population." 36
Lastly, Justice Breyer cited Justice Alito's concurring opinion, not-
ing Justice Alito's reservations about searches before an arrestee's deten-
tion has been reviewed by a judicial officer.137 He concluded that the
issue "remains open."l 3 8
III. ANALYSIS
The U.S. Supreme Court in Florence properly took the first step to
reign in circuits departing from established Fourth Amendment precedent
governing detainee search processes. Despite the humiliating burdens
these processes carry, 139 the Court found greater weight in penological
interests related to correctional-officer discretion and heightened security
needs.14 0 The Court's emphasis on deference to correction officials plac-
es difficult security issues in the hands of those with the greatest exper-
tise and allows for adaptive, rather than reactive, policies. Moreover, by
upholding the blanket strip search policies in Florence, the Court pro-
tected the deterrent effect of strip searches and emphasized the protection
of many over the rights of a single individual. Lastly, in striking down a
reasonable suspicion standard, the Florence Court correctly highlighted
the inadequacies of basing bright-line search rules on the seriousness of
the offense charged. 14 1
Although the majority upheld the constitutionality of the intake strip
search policies in Florence, questions remain unanswered. For instance,
Justice Alito's concurrence raised issues left dormant in the majority
opinion that may act as mitigating factors to the Court's holding. Fur-
thermore, as technology continues to advance, the need for strip searches
like those at issue in Florence will be greatly diminished.
A. The Realities ofDiminished Privacy During Detention and Its Justifi-
cations
Although detainees retain some constitutional rights once commit-
ted to correctional facilities, 142 the "[f]oss of freedom of choice and pri-
vacy are inherent incidents of confinement."l 43 Supreme Court precedent
136. Id. at 1532. In justifying its position, the dissent relied heavily on the question of the
constitutionality of committing to a jail's general population those arrested for minor offenses. As
the dissent noted, "[l]t remains open for the Court to consider whether it would be reasonable to
admit an arrestee for a minor offense to the general jail population." Id.
137. Id. at 1531-32.
138. Id. at 1532.
139. See id. at 1526.
140. Id. at 1515 (majority opinion) (maintaining that safety and order requires the expertise of
detention officials).
141. Id. at 1520.
142. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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justifying the invasion of privacy by strip-searching detainees can be
grouped into two categories: correctional officers' need for discretion'44
and security interests.14 5
1. Correctional Officers' Need for Discretion
Judicial deference to correctional officials is rooted in the doctrine
of separation of powers.14 6 The "unifying theme" among Supreme Court
cases such as Bell, Turner, and Block v. Rutherford 47 has been to defer
to correctional expertise rather than to force stricter alternatives.14" As
noted in Turner, operating detention facilities is inherently difficult and
requires specific expertise 4 9 that "courts are ill equipped to deal with."so
Despite the call for deference, the Supreme Court does recognize that
deference to correctional expertise has its limits. For instance, the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that prison walls do not absolve con-
stitutional protections.'
a. Who Is in the Best Position and with the Greatest Exper-
tise?
The Florence Court, in finding the intake strip search policies con-
stitutional, correctly held that correctional officials must be given defer-
ence to implement reasonable search policies that detect and deter con-
traband.152 To support the holding, the Court deferred policy-making
authority to government officials in the best position and with the great-
est expertise.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that there are inherent op-
erational difficulties within correctional facilities and has concluded that
they are not amenable to easy solutions.15 3 Moreover, maintaining safety
and order within correctional facilities is a fundamental requirement in
promoting effective detention.154 As the Florence Court noted, respond-
144. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85, 90 (1987) (explaining that running a prison is
difficult and requires expertise and planning).
145. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 ("A detention facility is ... fraught with serious security dangers.");
see also Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1512 (majority opinion) (noting that the admission of detainees
creates numerous risks).
146. Keleher, supra note 2, at 115.
147. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
148. Keleher, supra note 2, at 117.
149. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85.
150. Id. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
151. E.g., id.
152. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012).
153. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
154. See id.at 546.
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ing to these difficulties, while ensuring effective detention, requires the
"expertise of correctional officials."155
In reliance on this expertise, the Supreme Court has directed that
correction officials be accorded "wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices."' 56 Furthermore, the Court has
explained that the judgment of correctional officials enables the preser-
vation of "internal order and discipline" and "institutional security"
needs.'57 Accordingly, Supreme Court precedent rightly recognizes the
day-to-day difficulties of running correctional facilities and directs lower
courts to provide general deference to correctional officials, allowing
them to apply their expertise to ensure security. The Florence Court
rightly found credence in these principles and stressed the importance of
allowing correctional officials the autonomy to manage operations, in-
cluding the right to effectively and reasonably enforce blanket strip
search policies. 58
b. The Need for Adaptive, Rather Than Reactive, Policies
Deferring authority to officials inside correctional facilities allows
for adaptive policies that evolve with the ever-changing dynamics of a
correctional environment. There are over 5,000 prisons in the United
States with no two prisons alike, as each is made up of different de-
mographics.159 Moreover, as the nation's population continues to grow
and America's social norms change, so does the "internal society" within
correctional facilities.16 0
Because of the numerous moving parts correctional officials face on
a daily basis, the importance of deference in general policy-making au-
thority is paramount. Given the dissimilarities among correctional facili-
ties and the array of purposes served, correctional officials' ability to
conform policies within narrow judicial standards would be both difficult
and impractical. Correctional deference must continue to be amenable to
reasonable judicial review; however, as in Florence, courts must provide
latitude to those with subject-matter expertise absent substantial evidence
of an exaggerated response. Additionally, beyond correctional officials'
need for deference, the courts involvement in the "day-to-day manage-
155. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515 ("Maintaining safety and order at [correctional] institutions
requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise rea-
sonable solutions to the problems they face.").
156. Bell, 441 U.S. at 521.
157. Id. at 547.
158. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517.
159. John J. Gibbons & Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement: A Report of the
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 385, 398 (2006).
160. Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, American Criminal Justice Philosophy: What's
Old-What's New?, 63 FED. PROBATION 62, 65 (1999). The authors noted that the population in
prisons quintupled between 1975 and 1995. Id. The authors also noted that during the 1970s and
early 1980s prison riots were a common occurrence leading correctional officials to "limit[] or
eliminate[] activities not seen as absolutely necessary." Id.
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ment of prisons" is a "squandering [of] judicial resources with little off-
setting benefit to anyone."' Allowing correctional facilities to proac-
tively adapt policies to current needs serves both the effectiveness of
detention and the preservation of scarce judicial resources.
c. The Cost in Relation to the Proposed Benefit
The final rationale for deference to correctional expertise is correc-
tional officials' inherent ability to weigh a policy's cost in relation to the
proposed benefit. Basic economic theory stipulates that when the cost of
policy changes exceeds the proposed benefit, the policy should not be
enforced.16 2 Moreover, correctional officials are in the best position to
examine both the monetary and personnel cost against the likely benefits
of policy changes.'6 3 Understandably, Florence properly noted that
courts must continue to be the arbiter of personal rights; however, when
the cost associated with maintaining those rights reaches unattainable
levels, the courts must defer to correctional expertise.'6
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Phelan65
noted that there are always "[1]ess-restrictive-altemative arguments." 6 6
For example, the court explained, "[A] prison always can do something,
at some cost, to make prisons more habitable." 67 However, Judge
Easterbrook concluded that if "courts assess and compare these costs and
benefits then judges rather than wardens are the real prison administra-
tors." 6 8 Although the Florence Court did not directly address the point in
a monetary context, the Court's resurrection of the principles in Bell em-
phasizes fundamental jurisprudence that "judges [must] respect [the]
hard choices made by prison officials." 6 9 By allowing correctional offi-
cials to maintain broad control over detention policies, courts will facili-
tate an environment that freely adapts to changing correctional dynamics,
while maintaining economic efficiency.
2. Security Interest
Beginning with Bell, the Supreme Court has placed added emphasis
on the justification factor in determining the balance between the requi-
site need and an invasion of personal rights.170 Consistently, justification
161. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995).
162. E. Thomas Sullivan & Brian A. Marks, The FTC's Deceptive Advertising Policy: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 64 OR. L. REv. 593, 623-24 (1986).
163. See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995).
164. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1522 (2012) ("The restrictions
suggested by petitioner would limit the intrusion on the privacy of some detainees but at the risk of
increased danger to everyone in the facility . . .
165. 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
166. Id at 145.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
170. E.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012).
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has been anchored in the basic tenet that security is a necessary condition
for effective detention.17 1 The Court in Florence extended that logic and
rightly affirmed precedent that ensures the security of the entire institu-
tional setting.
a. The Safety of Many over the Personal Rights of an Individ-
ual
The Florence Court began its security-justification analysis by ex-
plaining that "[t]he admission of inmates creates numerous risks for fa-
cility staff, for the existing detainee population, and for a new detain-
ee."l 72 The Court pointed out that the need for heightened security is the
greatest at the initial point of contact with a detention facility7 3 and
enumerated specific risks that intake strip search policies seek to pre-
clude.174
Although the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment does not "mandate comfortable prisons," 1 5 the Eighth Amend-
ment does impart upon correctional facilities an obligation to care for
detained persons when they are deprived of the liberty to care for them-
selves.'76 To ensure the greatest level of security and care to inmates,
blanket strip search policies are enforced for the protection of the very
detainees who now challenge the constitutionality of such policies. 177
Numerous judicial opinions have documented the alarming rates of vio-
lence among inmates in correctional facilities. 78 This increased violence,
in part, is exacerbated by the availability of contraband, which plays a
significant role in inmate-on-inmate violence.' 79 By not foreclosing cor-
rectional officials' ability to use blanket strip search policies, the Court
correctly concluded that a single right of a single individual does not
supersede the rights of the detained population as a whole.
The final beneficiaries of blanket strip search policies are the men
and women who work at correctional facilities each day. The Supreme
Court accepts that "[p]risons are dangerous places."' 80 However, as
commentators have noted, just because prisons house dangerous people
171. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (maintaining that security in prisons is
an essential goal).
172. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.
173. Keleher, supra note 2, at 115 ("Security interests are strongest when a detainee enters a
correctional facility.").
174. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520 (noting "disease, gang affiliations, and contraband").
175. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
349 (1981)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
176. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1989).
177. Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1988).
178. Keleher, supra note 2, at 126-27 (noting multiple examples of violence, including a
Florida jail reporting 150 assaults among 600 inmates in eleven months, another detention facility
reporting 330 incidents of violence among 650 inmates during one year, and a Tennessee jail report-
ing 685 incidents of violence among 2,300 inmates in six months).
179. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1536 (11th Cir. 1993).
180. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005).
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does not mean that prisons have to be dangerous places.'8 ' The level of
danger is a direct by-product of the mode of operation, including blanket
strip search policies.182 Correctional officers are at the heart of facility
operations and interact daily with those incarcerated for a multitude of
reasons. This begs the question whether judges, who are far removed
from the realities of prison life, should prohibit security measures meant
to protect those on the front line. The Florence Court answered in the
negative.18 3 Blanket strip search policies ensure institutional security and
safeguard correctional officials against unnecessary danger due to dimin-
ished security protocols.
b. Deterrent Effect and the Manipulation of the System
The Florence Court noted that blanket strip search policies detect
and deter the entrance of contraband, protecting all involved, including
guards and other detainees.' 84 As did the Court in Bell, the Florence
Court relied on deterrence to shift the balance and justify a finding that
the strip search policies were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 85
However, the Florence dissent'" and others 87 have opined that the de-
terrent effect in Florence is distinguishable from Bell because those ar-
rested for minor offenses have inadequate time to plan to smuggle con-
traband. The parties expressing these opinions greatly discount the abili-
ties of a criminal mind. For instance, the Florence Court aptly explained
that exempting certain detainees from strip searches before entry would
encourage "experienced" detainees to manipulate the system in order to
obtain contraband. 88
Admittedly, Florence was not likely plotting to bring in contraband,
and further, such plots may not frequently occur. However, the Florence
Court was correct in finding that inmates will seek to take advantage of
loopholes created without the enforcement of blanket strip search poli-
cies. Moreover, correctional officials' inability to enforce blanket poli-
cies would greatly diminish the level of deterrence, resulting in an in-
crease in security breaches. The effectiveness of blanket policies like
those at issue in Florence depends on the foreclosure of predictable ex-
ceptions.'89 The Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer190 explained that
181. See, e.g., Donald Specter, Making Prisons Safe: Strategies for Reducing Violence, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 125, 126 (2006).
182. Id.
183. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012).
184. Id
185. See id.
186. Id at 1531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Amanda Laufer, Comment, The Pendulum Continues to Swing in the Wrong
Direction and the Fourth Amendment Moves Closer to the Edge of the Pit: The Rarnifications of
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 383, 414 (2012).
188. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522 (majority opinion).
189. Id at 1516.
190. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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stipulating that prison searches can only be conducted pursuant to a gen-
eral policy "ignore[s] the realities of prison operation[s]."l 9' By banning
predictable exceptions that inmates may take advantage of, as in Flor-
ence, courts enable strip search policies to maintain their integrity and
maximum deterrent effect. The result of such measures is added security,
translating into further protection for all who come into contact with the
correctional facility.
c. Contraband and the Correctional Facility's Underground
Economy
Finally, although the level of danger can be minimized in correc-
tional facilities, the reality is that some facilities are dangerous places
housing dangerous people. With no form of status other than potential
affiliations with other inmates, detainees sometimes look to contraband
as a form of protection, manipulation, and currency.192 With contraband
forming the basis of this underground economy, one can envision detain-
ees exploiting the system to obtain forbidden items.
The form of contraband does not have to be inherently dangerous to
pose a threat to a correctional facility. 19 3 Correctional officers describe
the use of contraband as a currency, whereby inmates barter and sell con-
traband for "[other] contraband, favors, services, or even money." 9 4 The
trade of drugs makes up a large part of the economy and "command[s] a
high price within ... jail[s]." Moreover, the trade of contraband is not
limited to drug users; an officer familiar with the trade of contraband has
noted that even non-drug users are encouraged to trade as a form of pro-
tecting themselves or obtaining other valuable items.'96 Consequently,
the trade of contraband inside prison walls creates distinct classes-those
who have and those who have not.1 97 The "skewed general order" of
prisons' social structure as a result of contraband creates dangerous or
even deadly tension between and among fellow inmates and staff.198
A contraband specialist who worked for twenty-six years in a cor-
rectional setting noted, "The vast majority of inmates . . . are familiar
with the jail operations and know that they are going to be strip searched
191. Id at 529 (quoting Marrero v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Va. 1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
192. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1519 (noting the value of contraband in an underground economy).
193. Johannes v. Alameda Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, No. C04-458MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63378, at *14k15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2006) (quoting a contraband specialist who explained that it is
important to control contraband whether it is a dangerous item or a "seemingly innocuous" item).
194. Id. at *15.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41,47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
198. Brief for Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
11, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3808399,
at *ll [hereinafter Amici-Respondents BriefJ.
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when they first enter the jail population . . . ."199 Moreover, inmates have
adequate time on their hands "to plot and scheme." 200 Given the value
and protection that contraband can carry, it is not unreasonable to imag-
ine instances in which inmates might coerce others to smuggle contra-
band into correctional facilities. If the Court in Florence had adopted the
view of the dissent, whereby certain arrestees would be constitutionally
exempt from strip searches, then inmates inside correctional facilities
would be encouraged to game the system and use those who are inferior
on the outside as their pawns. The result of operational loopholes would
be an increase in contraband and a compromise of institutional security
as a whole.
B. The Fallacies of the Dissent's Rationale
1. Mandating a "Reasonable Suspicion" Standard
The Florence dissent chastised the Court for declining to adopt a
reasonable suspicion standard for strip-searching those arrested for minor
crimes.201 The dissent explained there is no convincing evidence that "in
the absence of reasonable suspicion, involuntary strip searches of those
arrested for minor offenses are necessary in order to further the penal
interests." 202 Justice Breyer supported his lack of "penal interest" claim
by citing to empirical studies and noting that several correctional facili-
ties already require reasonable suspicion before strip-searching those
arrested for minor offenses.203
The Florence dissent, in advocating a reasonable suspicion standard
for those arrested for "minor offenses," would have required officers to
conduct a series of steps before justifying the strip search of a detain-
ee.204 First, the dissent would have required officers to conduct a pat-
down or a search of the arrestee's outer clothing.205 If an initial search
indicated added suspicion, then a strip search would be justified. Second,
an officer would have been required to review an arrestee's prior arrest
record to determine if there was cause (e.g., a felony history) to initiate a
strip search.206 Each of these factors disregard controlling precedent
enunciated in Bell and would facilitate increased discretion to officers,
leading to possible discrimination and other legal difficulties.
199. Johannes v. Alameda Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, No. C04-458MHP, 2006 WL 2504400, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006).
.200. Amici-Respondents Brief, supra note 198.
201. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1528 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1529.
204. Id. (explaining that a pat-down, search of outer clothing and shoes, or felony history may
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a. Reasonable Suspicion Is Not Reconcilable with Bell
Reading a reasonable suspicion standard into the Constitution for
those arrested for minor offenses fails to leverage correctional officials'
expertise, limits available remedies, and contradicts Supreme Court prec-
edent..207 Lower courts have interpreted Bell to mandate reasonable sus-
picion before justifying a strip search; 208 however, such a reading is in-
consistent with Bell and the Fourth Amendment.209 In fact, Bell stands
for just the opposite. 210 Bell addressed a blanket strip search policy that
applied to all detainees following contact visits regardless of any reason-
able suspicion. 2 1 1 The Eleventh Circuit has provided the greatest context
to the Supreme Court's interpretation of Bell: "When the Court stated
that 'these searches' do not violate the Fourth Amendment, it obviously
meant the searches that were before it, and those searches were conduct-
ed under a blanket policy without reasonable suspicion. It really is that
simple."212
The Florence Court took great effort to document the split among
circuits as to the requirement of reasonable suspicion for arrestees de-
tained for minor crimes.213 In doing so, the Court highlighted the depar-
ture from Bell through the lower courts' narrow interpretation. Although
the Florence Court's resurrection of Bell may be restricted somewhat by
the further defining of the mitigating factors exposed in the concurring
opinions, the proposition holds that those arrested for minor offenses are
given no preferential treatment if their destination is a jail's general pop-
ulation. Such a holding is the most plausible reading of precedent and
rightly corrects years of misapplication of Bell by multiple circuit courts.
b. Reasonable Suspicion Is an Unreasonable Expectation for
Officers
Mandating that the Fourth Amendment require reasonable suspicion
before searching arrestees for minor offenses has significant negative
effects, especially on the officers required to comply with the heightened
214standard. For instance, officers regularly have incomplete information
during intake as to the circumstances surrounding an arrestee's arrest
because the processing officer in most cases is different from the arrest-
ing officer.2 15 Furthermore, the way arrestees enter correctional facilities
207. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("Prison officials must be free to take appropri-
ate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel .. . .").
208. E.g., Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]o be reasonable under [Bell],
strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the
arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons.").
209. Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008).
210. Id
211. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
212. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 558).
213. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012).
214. Keleher, supra note 2, at 121.
215. Id.
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varies, making it difficult to track fact-specific determinations required to
find reasonable suspicion.216 Consequently, reasonable suspicion from an
officer's perspective should not even be a question when an arrestee's
destination is a jail's general population. Those committed to the jail's
general population are searched because they are entering highly secured
facilities, not for the factual nuances underlying what they have done.
c. Reasonable Suspicion Promotes Unpredictable and Dis-
criminatory Practices
The Florence Court correctly concluded that if a reasonable suspi-
cion standard were implemented, "[t]he laborious administration of pris-
ons would become less effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded." 2 17
The Supreme Court is not the first to stress the importance of removing
discretionary decision-making authority from officers for strip search-
es.218 The Third Circuit in Florence held that the implementation of
blanket policies subjects arrestees to the same, consistent policy and di-
minishes correctional facilities' liability for equal protection issues. 2 19
Eliminating discretionary standards not only reduces liability for correc-
tional institutions but also decreases the likelihood of discriminatory and
retaliatory acts as a result of case-by-case standards. Courts have de-
scribed the reasonable suspicion standard as "lines drawn by courts" that
tend to be "ambiguous, subject to manipulation and difficult to adminis-
ter.220 In response to the operational difficulties, officers are encouraged
to forgo searches in close cases, thereby leading to a decrease in liability
216. Id Arrestees enter correctional facilities under differing circumstances. For instance, an
arrestee may enter as a single admit, or as part of a larger group. Similarly, arrestees may be booked
under a variety procedural directives, i.e., by the arresting officer or by another officer upon arrival
at the correctional facility. These varying circumstances pose an immediate problem to officers
applying a reasonable suspicion standard. See id. As the circumstances change from admit to admit,
it becomes increasingly difficult to regularly, and consistently, apply the fact-specific determinations
that form the basis of the reasonable suspicion standard. See id.
217. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1521.
218. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 310 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct.
1510 (2012). The Third Circuit described the risk associated with a reasonable suspicion standard as
"high, particularly where reasonable suspicion may be based on such subjective characteristics as the
arrestee's appearance and conduct at the time of arrest." Id. at 310-11.
219. Id
220. Bull v. City of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 984 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concur-
ring). Chief Judge Kozinski paralleled the adoption of a reasonable suspicion standard to recent
substantive changes to commercial airline searches. As he described:
Treating everyone who gets on a commercial plane the same is simple: If you want to get
on a plane, you take off your shoes, leave behind any liquids over three ounces, remove
your laptop from its carrying case and pass through the metal detector-no exceptions. If
we were to order an exemption for the least risky segments of the population, we'd have
to worry about how to identify those people-that is, what kind of screening we'd have to
set up to make sure no fakers get into the system-and then, at the point of entry, we'd
have to confirm that the people presenting themselves for boarding were, in fact, the ones
cleared in advance. The operation, and recent failure, of the Clear system (which let you
cut to the front of the line but otherwise didn't exempt you from much of anything)
showed that kind of exemption is difficult and costly to administer, and results in a lot of
dirty looks from those you cut in front of.
Id. at 984-85.
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but an increase in security breaches. 22 ' Lastly, the removal of discretion
from the operational level in correctional facilities furthers the general
rule of deference to correctional expertise as set forth in Bell and Turner.
2. The Severity of an Offense Is an Inadequate Standard
Both the Florence dissent22 2 and legal scholars223 suggest that poli-
cies governing intake strip search procedures should be determined based
on the underlying offense. This Comment endorses the Florence
Court's 224 explicit disagreement with that assertion. Furthermore, this
Comment seeks to take the Florence decision a step further2 25 and estab-
lish that a detainee's ultimate destination is the determinative factor
when considering the constitutionality of blanket strip search policies.
As described in Florence, a detainee's underlying charge is a poor
and often inaccurate predictor of the level of harm or the likelihood of
concealed contraband. 22 6 To minimize the security risk, courts should
instead look to an arrestee's destination to determine the permissible
level of personal invasion. By focusing on where the arrestee is going,
correctional officials are able to easily distinguish and segregate those
who need more invasive searches from those who do not. In Florence,
for instance, correctional personnel subjected Florence to the jail's gen-
eral population.2 27 Therefore, regardless of the potential charge, an ar-
restee in Florence's position should be required to submit to an invasive
strip search solely because his ultimate destination is the general popula-
tion. Following this line of reasoning is most analogous to Supreme
Court precedent focusing on penological interests and resurrects founda-
tional rules promulgated in Bell.
Supporters of the level-of-the-offense standard suggest that officials
should segregate arrestees on the severity of the offense charged.228
However, a blanket rule mandating the segregation of those arrested for
221. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522. Admittedly, the doctrine of qualified immunity often pre-
cludes officer liability; however, there are instances where the predictability of blanket policies will
further reduce overall liability. See id. For example, standardized processes decrease the likelihood
of retaliatory acts by officers that are likely outside the realm of qualified immunity.
222. Id. at 1526 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 153.
224. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520 (noting that detainees arrested for minor offenses can be
dangerous criminals).
225. The facts in Florence were limited in that (i) Florence was not arrested prior to judicial
review, and (ii) there were no available holding facilities at either correctional facility in question in
the case. Because the facts in Florence were not conducive to Justice Alito's exceptions, the Court
explained that it was restricted from considering the narrow exceptions. Id at 1523. This Comment
reaches beyond the factual nuances of Florence and seeks to examine and opine on the legitimacy of
the potential exceptions raised by Justice Alito.
226. See id at 1520; see also Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1304, 1305 (1981) (explaining that
the facility enacted its intake strip search policy following the shooting of a deputy by an unsearched
misdemeanant).
227. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.
228. Id. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating it is questionable that persons arrested for
minor crimes should be committed to the general population).
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minor offenses from the general population is impractical from an opera-
tional perspective. To date, pivotal Supreme Court cases addressing de-
tainee strip search policies have pertained only to larger metropolitan
correctional facilities. 22 9 The economic reality is, however, that smaller,
rural correctional facilities often do not have the resources to maintain
multiple units to segregate different classifications of detainees. For ex-
ample, a rural county with a small population likely only maintains a
single jail facility. That facility will hold both convicted inmates and
temporary detainees. If correctional officials in this example were re-
quired to follow a "level of the offense" standard, then arrestees for mi-
nor offenses would have the opportunity to introduce dangerous contra-
band into the facility. In sum, adopting strict rules as proffered by the
Florence dissent would force rural correctional officials to choose be-
tween risking constitutional claims for noncompliance or allowing poten-
tially dangerous detainees to infiltrate the general jail population without
adequate search policies.
It should be noted that this Comment does not opine that it is always
reasonable to commit those arrested for minor offenses to the general
population. This Comment only concludes that it is impractical to man-
date correctional facilities with different levels of operational and eco-
nomic capabilities to require segregation. Consequently, the question
remains whether it is constitutional to commit to the general population,
and thus strip-search, one who has been arrested for a minor offense
where alternative holding facilities are available.23 0
C. Possible Exceptions and Their Likely Outcomes
The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Roberts231 and Justice
Alito23 2 in Florence, as well as Justice Breyer's dissent,23 3 all alluded to
future exceptions to the Court's decision to uphold the intake strip search
policy. Although the concurring opinions offer possible exceptions to the
Court's holding, neither concurrence acts as a defining mechanism to the
holding. Instead, each simply seeks to highlight potential mitigating cir-
cumstances that may influence the Court under the right set of facts. 23 4
Both concurrences and the dissent detailed two possible exceptions: fea-
sible alternative holding facilitieS235 and arrestees whose detentions lack
229. Id. at 1514 (noting that the Essex County Correctional Facility is the largest county jail in
New Jersey); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979) (noting that the Metropolitan Correctional
Center is in New York City).
230. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring); see also discussion infra Part III.C.2.
231. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C. J., concurring).
232. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
234. Justice Alito explained, "The Court holds that jail administrators may require all arrestees
who are committed to the general population of a jail to undergo visual strip searches . . . ." Id. at
1524 (Alito, J. concurring). However, he also asserted that "the Court does not hold that it is always
reasonable to conduct a full strip search" and followed by detailing possible mitigating factors. Id
235. Id. at 1524.
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236judicial review. In addition to the exceptions provided by the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions, this Comment explores a third possible
exception: the emergence of new technologies.
1. Arrestees Whose Detention Lack Judicial Review
Justice Breyer concluded his dissent in Florence by underlining the
preserved issue of whether it would be reasonable for an arrestee to sub-
mit to a strip search prior to review by a judicial officer. 23 7 Justice Alito
expressed a similar reservation in his concurrence.2 38 Considering that
Florence's arrest was premised on an outstanding warrant, albeit a defec-
tive one, the majority was not required to address this issue to reach a
final decision. 23 9 However, the dissent and Justice Alito's concurrence
raise an interesting question-Would the strip search of Florence have
been constitutional if he had been arrested prior to any judicial review? 240
As most notably expressed in the Florence dissent, it is "highly
questionable" to subject those arrested for minor crimes prior to judicial
determination to the "dangerous world of the general jail population" and
concurrently subject them to a strip search. 24 1 The example given by the
242dissent was that of a jaywalker. For instance, should a correctional
facility be permitted to subject an arrestee arrested for jaywalking to a
strip search? There are two constitutional issues presented by this hypo-
thetical scenario: (1) whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment to subject those arrested for minor crimes, prior to judicial review,
to a strip search; and (2) whether it is constitutional to direct those arrest-
ed for minor crimes to a jail's general population.
Ultimately, the first issue will likely depend upon the same justifica-
tions relied on by the Court to define the penological interest at issue in
Florence. If viewed on the basis of the arrestee's ultimate destination, the
security interest underlined by the Florence Court is unchanged. The
Fourth Amendment in no way restricts correctional officers from strip,
searching arrestees who are to be placed in a jail's general population,
notwithstanding the possible alternative-holding-facility argument.243
Florence made clear that "there is a substantial interest in preventing any
new inmate" from putting others at risk when admitted to the general
population.24
236. Id.; see also id at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that intake strip search policies may not always
be reasonable for an arrest prior to judicial review).
239. Id at 1514 (majority opinion).
240. Id at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring); Id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. Id.
243. Id at 1515 (majority opinion).
244. Id. at 1520 (emphasis added).
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The counterargument is that the security risks of those arrested prior
to judicial review do not substantiate the personal invasion of a strip
search. This argument, however, depends upon a similar logic struck
down in a previous subpart of this Comment.245 Precluding correctional
officials from using tools that effectively act as a deterrent will encour-
age the manipulation of the correctional system, resulting in increased
danger to the entire correctional community. Therefore, if this issue is
limited to the Florence Court's reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude
that the Fourth Amendment would not preclude strip searches for war-
rantless arrestees arrested for minor offenses.
In addressing the second issue, future petitioners will likely move
beyond the subject of strip searches, and instead challenge the constitu-
tionality of committing warrantless arrestees for minor offenses to a jail's
general population.2 46 If future petitioners establish that it is unconstitu-
tional to commit to the general population those arrested for minor
crimes prior to judicial review, then it would greatly diminish the justifi-
cations validating the strip search in Florence. In essence, correctional
facilities would be left to make the difficult argument that invasive strip
search policies are justified even when arrestees are not directed to the
general population. By sidestepping the constitutional question of the
search and focusing on the destination, a future petitioner may be able to
effectively defeat an invasive strip search policy. 24 7
2. Feasible Alternative Holding Facilities
Justice Alito's concurrence in Florence noted that it may not always
be reasonable for an arrestee to submit to a strip search. 24 8 As he ex-
plained, many correctional facilities maintain separate holding areas out-
side the general population.249 These areas are often used for temporary
detainees or arrestees apprehended for minor offenses.250 In such instanc-
es, Justice Alito suggested that available alternative holding facilities
provide officers the opportunity to segregate minor-offense arrestees.25 1
245. See discussion supra Part Iil.A.2.b.
246. In his dissent in Florence, Justice Breyer suggested that he would find it questionable
committing to the general population those arrested for minor offenses prior to judicial review.
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Given that the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed this issue, future petitioners may use this reasoning as a platform to support additional
attacks on invasive strip search policies.
247. As an aside, this Comment opines that the Court likely would be reluctant to establish a
definitive line of demarcation directing when correctional officials are prohibited from directing an
arrestee to the general population. Due to the lack of uniformity in this country's prison system, such
a strict demarcation would be infeasible for many correctional systems. Instead, it is likely that the
Court would approach the issue by establishing mitigating factors or exceptions to the general hold-
ings of Bell and Florence. See id. at 1523-24 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id at 1524 (Alito, J.,
concurring); id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
249. Id (noting that the Federal Bureau of Prisons and some other jails segregate from general
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Thus, because alternative holding areas eliminate security risk to the
jail's general population, the likely penological interest justifying the
Florence Court's holding is diminished. In such cases, Justice Alito in-
ferred that the availability of alternative holding facilities would mitigate
a finding that an invasive strip search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, even under a Bell or Turner analysis. 25 2
It is crucial to note that Justice Alito did not suggest a mandate that
correctional facilities segregate those arrested for minor offenses from
the general population.253 The dissent, on the other hand, suggested that
"it is highly questionable that officials would be justified" in committing
arrestees for minor crimes to the "dangerous world of the general popula-
tion."254 As the dissent would have it, courts would define a strict line of
demarcation that would prohibit those arrested for minor crimes from
being strip-searched and subsequently directed to the general popula-
tion.2 55 The distinction, however, between Justice Alito's viewpoint and
the dissent's is one of discretionary versus mandatory control. Justice
Alito's assertion properly takes into account the realities of varying cor-
rectional operations,256 whereas the dissent would require a strict stand-
ard that undermines the operational flexibilities required by Bell and
Turner. In the end, the reasonable-alternative-holding-facility exception
represents one of the stronger mitigating influences that could dampen
the "harshness" of the Florence decision. However, courts must realize
that this consideration should not be a self-contained standard, but rather
a single factor that may justify not applying the general rule resurrected
in Florence.
3. Emergence of New Technologies
In Florence's brief to the Court, he expressed the availability of less
invasive alternatives-such as pat-down searches, metal detectors, and
the Body Orifice Screening System (BOSS chair)-and concluded that
blanket strip search policies were inappropriate where less invasive al-
ternatives were available.25 7 In such circumstances, subjecting an arrestee
to a strip search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 258 The
Essex facility, where Florence was strip-searched the second time, oper-
ated a BOSS chair during the intake process and required the search of
newly admitted detainees. 25 9 Essex's warden testified that the BOSS
252. Id at 1524-25.
253. Id (explaining that strip searches are not always reasonable when there are available
alternatives).
254. Id. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
255. Id.
256. Gibbons & Katzenbach, supra note 159.
257. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct.
1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 4500813, at * 16 [hereinafter Petitioner Reply Brief].
258. Id. at 8-9.
259. Brief for the Petitioner at 5-6, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510
(2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 2508902 at *5-6.
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chair pinpoints metal objects in inmates' body orifices more accurately
than a standard strip search by an officer. 2 60 Florence asserted that indi-
vidualized suspicion may permit further searches, and that absent reason-
able suspicion, the strip search violated the Constitution.2 61
Florence's failure to consider the limitations of the less invasive
search procedures represents a fatal flaw in his argument. For instance,
pat-down searches fail to provide feedback as to contraband hidden in
body cavities, and metal detectors and the BOSS chair are unable to de-
tect non-metallic items.262 Detecting numerous forms of non-metallic
contraband like drugs, tobacco, paper currency, and plastic weapons is
paramount to a correctional facility's security.263 As stated previously,
these items, although not as physically dangerous, are integral to the un-
derground economy in correctional facilitieS264 and compromise correc-
tional officials' ability to minimize the negative effects that contraband
has on correctional institutions.
The question remains, however, whether the emergence and availa-
bility of new technologies may act as an exception or mitigating factor to
the Florence decision. In Illinois's Cook county jail, correctional offi-
cials have recently replaced outdated body scanning machines with four
Canon RadPro SecurPass machines, at a total cost of $940,500.265 Simi-
lar to the full-body scanners at airports that have attracted so much media
attention, these full-body scanners "can spot minute amounts of contra-
band material" of any form.266 A company spokesperson compares the
process to looking at an x-ray and explains that "if there's something
there that normally wouldn't be in your body, that God didn't give you, it
jumps out of you." 2 67 Full-body scanners like these could add an addi-
tional level of scrutiny to cases brought under a Florence analysis and
could prove to pacify some of the dissent's concern for the degrading
nature of strip searches.2 68 However, it is important to point out that be-
260. Petitioner Reply Brief, supra note 257, at 12.
261. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 259, at 20.
262. Amici-Respondents Brief, supra note 198, at 10-11.
263. See People v. Duncantell, No. E053955, 2012 WL 2394824, at *1-2 (Cal Ct. App. June
26, 2012) (noting that the most common form of contraband in the prison was tobacco); Amici-
Respondents Brief, supra note 198.
264. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.b.
265. Elaine Pittman, Inside Out: County Jails Deploy Whole-Body Scanners to Detect Hidden
Weapons or Contraband, GOV'T TECH., May 2011, at 36, 38.
266. Id. at 36.
267. Id.
268. Florida's Collier County Sheriffs Office also uses Canon's new scanners. Id. However,
the scanning process is classified as a "virtual strip search," and Florida state statutes restrict strip
searches to cases where the arrestee meets certain enumerated criteria. Id. Therefore, although the
scanners are not as invasive as a physical strip search, this possible exception may still cause peti-
tioners to pause because of the inherent privacy concerns and the revealing nature of the images
produced by the scanners.
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cause of the significant costs of new technology, and the Court's general
deference to operational decision makers, such devices will only act as a
mitigating factor and will not likely dissuade the Court in future cases
from the general holding set forth in Florence.2 69
CONCLUSION
To ensure equal protection to all, safety and security procedures at
correctional facilities are paramount. Although it is essential that de-
tained persons retain their constitutional rights, courts must nonetheless
weigh these rights against the need for institutional security. The majori-
ty in Florence correctly recognized this fundamental need. By holding
that the intake strip search policies in question were consistent with the
Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches, the Court resurrect-
ed and affirmed existing precedent. Furthermore, the Court rightly con-
firmed that ever-changing security needs are best served at the hands of
experienced correctional officials rather than from the removed benches
of the courts.
Despite the Court's holding, the insightful concurrences in Florence
point to several potential factual scenarios whereby a strip search may
not be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Although the possible
exceptions are worthy of consideration, the likely effect is added discre-
tion among lower courts as they struggle to define and reconcile these
considerations with the foundational rules of Bell, and now Florence. As
circuits seek to apply the principles of Florence they will either return to
a practice that departs from controlling precedent or establish exceptions
or mitigating factors to what may appear to be a degrading rule proffered
by the Florence Court.
Chief Justice Roberts closed his concurrence by announcing that the
Court is "wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that
we 'not embarrass the future."' 270 Ultimately, however, it will be those
exceptions, or the lack of definition thereof, that inhibits blanket strip
search policies from becoming a foregone conclusion. Instead, as the
269. As this Comment has explained through the analysis of the Florence decision, courts
should not force unworkable standards on correctional facilities that serve multiple correctional
functions. Instead, as progeny like Bell and Turner have directed, courts must afford correctional
expertise the latitude to make decisions that are in the best interest of the facility's overall security
and that align with the economics of prison operation. However, as new technologies continue to
emerge and become more cost effective to operate, the presence of less intrusive search methods will
play a more significant role in the determination of the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Nevertheless, the echo of Florence should remain a guidepost to any exception con-
templated by the Court, requiring that the overarching question be one of availability rather than
mandatory control.
270. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012) (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring).
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circuits wrangle with questions left exposed, it is almost certain that the
issue will again require a grant of certiorari.
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